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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I argue for a realist interpretation of physics. I respond to 
claims to the contrary by submitting rebuttals of some of the more 
serious objections, and by formulating and defending counter-claims.
It would be too ambitious to try to argue here for realism throughout 
physics, so I restrict my constructive efforts to the classical domain. 
Attempted rebuttals of the anti-realist case, however, involve intrusions 
into the quantum arena.
I take issue in Part 1 with Nancy Cartwright. She argues in How the 
Laws o f Physics Lie th a t: (i) the fundamental laws of physics are 
false; (ii) causal explanation can ensure truth, in which case the 
theoretical entities invoked are real; and (iii) current theories of 
explanation are misconceived. To support (i) she analyses cases drawn 
from both classical and modern physics, and my response is to show in 
detail how, in these examples, I believe she is mistaken. Whilst I agree 
with (ii), I argue that there is incoherence in simultaneously holding (ii) 
with (i). As for (iii), I defend the D-N model of explanation and point to 
the inadequacies of Cartwright s simulacrum model.
In Representing and Intervening  Ian Hacking argues for the 
reality of (theoretical) entities that can be manipulated in interactions 
with other things. However, he is agnostic on realism about theories, 
because he believes that incompatible theories can equally well cover a 
given range of phenomena. The case to which he points to instantiate the 
view is Hertz s treatment of mechanics in which Hacking claims to find 
three equally good theories, with the overt threat of inconsistency 
among them. In Part 2 I argue that there is but one theory of mechanics 
and that Hertz s project was to investigate three different ways of 
axiomatising it. Only one of the three ways (as conceived by Hertz) 
survives.
To support their position, anti-realists commonly seize on the 
doctrine, supposedly due to Pierre Duhem, that a given range of 
phenomena can be accommodated by different, mutually incompatible, 
theories. Part 3 examines the basis for Duhem's view and establishes that 
he had a quasi-realist attitude to theories. The originator of the doctrine,
it transpires, was not Duhem, but Henri Poincare. I explain how the 
subsequent course of physics invalidated the grounds which misled these 
two philosophers into adopting it.
Part 4 examines Bas van Fraassen's claim to reduce to absurdity the 
demand for explanation that he thinks is exemplified in J.J.C. Smart's 
classic cosmic coincidence' argument for realism. I show that Smart s 
argument comprehends two different sorts of cosmic coincidence, and 
that van Fraassen addresses only the less formidable of these. In so 
doing, van Fraassen's strategy is to assert that Smart's argument relies on 
Reichenbach s principle of the common cause, and to offer an abstract 
schema (deriving from the EPR correlation experiments) which, he claims, 
refutes Reichenbach's principle. I set all of this in context and argue that 
the schema fails to bear the load that van Fraassen places on it, and that 
Smart s argument stands.
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FOREWORD
This project was begun with a different intention from that reflected by 
its current presentation. For, initially, my plan had been to see what I 
could offer in the way of a realist interpretation of modern physics, 
especially quantum mechanics. But the work had barely started when 
Nancy Cartwrights book, How the Laws of Physics Lie, came to my 
attention. And she raised serious questions about scientific realism, 
including in the domain of classical physics which I had always believed 
reasonably secure to a realist interpretation. It were best, I thought, to 
see how I might respond to Cartwright before I launched into what I 
mainly aimed to do.
But then Cartwright s book led inevitably to Ian Hacking's 
Representing and intervening, and to Bas van Fraassen's The Scientific 
Image. And all three forced me to go back to Pierre Duhem to look at his 
grounds for espousing the doctrine that incompatible theories could be 
empirically equivalent. Duhem's book, The Aim and Structure of Pbysicai 
Theory, caused me in turn to go back to the writings of Henri Poincar6.
Now all of this took quite some time and resulted in a sizable 
manuscript which, in the event, turned out to be the first draft of what 
follows. The project on realism in quantum mechanics remains for the 
future. That question is barely touched upon in the present work, 
although it does arise in some of my responses to Cartwright - only 
because of the cases she introduces to support her claims. It also arises, 
but coincidentally, in my response to van Fraassen's alleged rebuttal of 
J. J. C. Smart s cosmic coincidence’ argument for realism. In fact, the 
present thesis ends, quite abruptly, with my summary attitude in 
Appendix 2 to van Fraassen's rebuttal of epistemic realism'. I justify this 
peremptory treatment by noting that epistemic realism' is a doctrine that 
few versed in physics would support, and that there is no mileage to be 
gained from its refutation.
But surely, the anti-realist might claim, the non-classical correlations 
have serious implications for scientific realism. And this is a remark to
which I do not respond substantively here, because the point marks the 
entry to what I hope will be the successor to the present work. I cannot 
refrain, however, from recording one comment. The non-ciassical 
correlations are all to do with those rather peculiar properties, spin and 
polarisation. But the correlations would not be registered at all if 
something  were not interacting with each of the detectors. That 
som ething , in circumstances which we can arrange, exhibits properties 
other than the very strange ones that are the subjects of the 
EPR/Bohm/Bell experiments. There is plenty of comfort here for the 
realist.
So much for the genesis of the present work. What underlies its 
orientation? Substantially, the thesis speaks for itself and reveals my 
strong commitment to scientific realism. But what does that entail? Put 
quite simply, it entails (i) the belief that (some) theoretical entities exist 
with the properties that physics reveals that they have, and (ii) the belief 
that (some) physical theories state truths which derive their integrity 
from the way the world is. These views could be expanded at length, and 
qualified at length. The simplest and most practicable thing to do here, 
however, is to point to the philosophers with whose writings I am most in 
sympathy.
Smart, in his several works, and W.H. Newton-Smith, in his The 
Rationality o f Science, head the list. Apart from them, when it comes 
to realism about entities there are few who present the implications and 
the case in support better than do Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright in 
the books which are the subjects of my criticisms here; and when it 
comes to realism about theories, there are, incredible as it may at first 
appear, few who put the case so forcefully and yet so concisely as does 
Pierre Duhem. In Part 3 of the thesis will be found the justification for 
this attribution to Duhem.
Since Newton-Smith receives only passing reference in what follows 
(see my p.127) let me put on record my admiration for the book 
referenced. My basic position is, I think, very close to his, but he 
expounds it with more force, more insight and more erudition than I 
could hope to muster. With regard to Smart, arguments that I present in
IUI
various parts of the text are, in essence, very closely akin to his cosmic 
coincidence argument. I hope that, to a modest extent, I have managed 
both to draw out some additional nuances of this argument and also to 
add to the grounds that support it.
Finally I am all too aware that, lurking below the surface of what 1 
have written here, there are many unanswered questions. There are also 
many places in the text where, with profit, I might have made diversions 
into other territory. The subtleties in The Scientific Image deserved 
much more consideration than I could give at the time. For example, the 
last word has not been said, I believe, on the van Fraassen/Grover 
Maxwell difference about the observable/unobservable distinction. Much 
more could have been said too about inference to explanation. And I have 
said almost nothing about constructive empiricism'. Also I have in mind 
the glimmerings of an argument to show how Hacking might have been 
led to a re alist view of theories had he continued the analysis in his 
chapter, Microscopes, to the point of invoking Fourier Transform theory 
to explain image formation. These are just a few examples of issues that 
must remain matters for examination at another time.
[Parti,SI]
Part 1
ON CARTWRIGHT’S ANTI-REALISM
l
SI. INTRODUCTION
Do the laws of physics lie? Nancy Cartwright asks the question and 
answers yes' in a set of nine essays and an introductory synthesis1. Her 
arguments are deeply embedded in physics, and involve some thirty 
examples ranging from the abstractions of quantum theory to mundane 
concrete cases, such as toy radiometers costing $2.29 each.
Below, I present the essential thrust of her views and the reasons 
why I believe she is mistaken. Two prefatory comments are called for. 
Firstly, I do not follow the order of her presentation, the three 
components of my account constituting interpretations distilled from 
throughout the book. Secondly, my task requires exegeses of a number of 
physical theories, some of which will unavoidably be somewhat lengthy.
Cartwright distinguishes within physics two kinds o f explanation  
and, correspondingly, two k inds o f laws:
1. A phenomenon is explained by subsumption within some 
theoretical fram ew ork  accommodating similarly
other phenomena. A scientific realist might say that a set of 
fundamental equations, expressing fundam ental la w s , 
governs the phenomena - e.g. Newton s Law of Gravitation 
and his laws of motion, applied to planetary movements;
2. A phenomenon is explained via an account o f how  i t  is  
caused. The causal story invokes phenomenological laws 
which, unlike fundamental laws, are highly specific to concrete 
situations and describe what happens - e.g. Boyle s Law.2
JCartvrightN., How the Laws o f  P hysics Lie , Clarendon Press : Oxford 1983.
2Boyles Lav specifies h ov compression or decompression changes the volume of a 
given mass of enclosed gas at some constant temperature
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Starting with these distinctions and with the assumption of an 
abundance of highly confirmed phenomenological laws, Cartwright 
argues fo r three theses'.
1. The fundam ental laws o f physics are fa ls e ; their 
explanatory pow er entails their fa ls ity , because that 
power derives from ceteris paribus riders attached to the 
laws, or because our explanations involve compositions o f  
causes or approximations that im prove on the Jaws\
2. Causal explanations, by contrast, can guarantee truth, and 
then the phenomenological laws invoked are true;
3. Current theories of explanation, in particular the covering 
law or Deductive-Nomological fD-NJ model are 
misconceived. The Simulacrum m odel provides an 
account that fits practice.
Cartwright dissociates herself from the view that phenomenological 
laws are about appearances and theoretical ones about the underlying 
reality. For her, phenomenological laws describe truly what happens in 
specific situations, and they may or may not explain. Theoretical laws 
organise knowledge by subsumption, exhibiting explanatory power at the 
expense of truth or descriptive accuracy; the processes of abstraction, 
simplification and organisation peel off the nitty-gritty detail without 
which there is no truth.
Her philosophical standpoint, Cartwright says, is a kind of anti­
realism'3: one acknowledging the phenomenological and rejecting the 
theoretical; but one not based on any theory/observation distinction. She 
accepts theoretical en titles featuring in causal explanation. So, 
for example,
' We can believe in the unexpected entities of quantum electrodynamics if
v e  can give them causal roles"* .
Not surprisingly, controlled experiments are advocated as the vehicles for 
progress in causal explanation. She is, then, anti-realist about 
theories, bu t realist about (some) theoretical entities.
3op. cit; p.2
*op. cit; p.8
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Refer now to Figs. 1 and 2, representing my interpretations 
respectively of the D-N model of explanation and Cartwright's simulacrum 
model. Those figures properly belong to Thesis3, but they may be 
usefully anticipated here to provide a good context for understanding 
what is going on in Thesis 1.
Typically the D-N model works like this : via a bridge principle we 
couple some description of a phenomenon to our theory, deduce 
something from the conjunction, and then, via a bridge principle pointing 
in the reverse direction, formulate another description that can confront 
other phenomena; e.g., from observations that glass is an optically 
isotropic refractive material, we might invoke Maxwell’s equations to 
deduce that Snell's law is true of that material, and using that law make 
predictions about glass (e.g. in lenses) that are tested by further 
observations.5
PHENOMENA PHENOMENA
PREPARED
DESCRIPTION
AD HOC 
PROCEDURES
UNPREPARED
DESCRIPTION
BRIDGE
PRINCIPLES
DESCRIPTION
BRIDGE
PRINCIPLES
MODEL OF 
PHENOMENA
INTERNAL
PRINCIPLES
MODEL OF 
PHENOMENA
INTERNAL
PRINCIPLES
ABSTRACT THEORY
LAVS
MATHS
LOGIC
ABSTRACT THEORY
LAVS
MATHS
LOGIC
FIG 1 D-N MODEL OF 
EXPLANATION
F I G . 2  SIMULACRUM
MODEL
5For more details about this example see my §2.3
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If the claim that the fundamental laws of physics lie were sustained 
by showing that particular laws are false, then there would have  to be 
something wrong in the forward path of the D-N model. In that case a 
new account would be called for, and Cartwright has it available in the 
simulacrum model. Conversely, if it could be shown that the forward path 
is not as claimed in the D-N model, but rather that it is interrupted by 
some process or other that itself falsifies descriptions, as the simulacrum 
account has it, then the relevant laws would have  to be false.
Cartwright uses both approaches :
‘ some illustrations purport to fa ls ify  particuiar 
Jaws (and so to discredit the D-N m odel) ;
* others purport to show that our eip lanatory m ethods 
conform to the simulacrum m odel and so entail the 
fa ls ity  o f the fundam enta i Jaws.
. Notice that, in the simulacrum model, laws are true of prepared 
descriptions:
'....fundamental laws do not govern objects in reality; they govern only
objects in models.'6
Deductions from the laws, then, must also be true of objects in models, 
not of objects in reality. But on this view Cartwright has a problem which 
she does not tackle - how is it that theoretical predictions, not about 
objects in models, but about objects in reality, turn out to be true? She 
gives no convincing account of how the simulacrum model gets us back 
from theory output to descriptions confronting reality. But more of that 
later!
^Cartwright; op. cit; p.lS
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She alms, then, not to reject fundam ental la v s  but rather to 
resta te  their roles'.
1. by showing that the fa c ti c ity  view  of laws is false - the 
view that laws of nature describe facts about reality, and 
that the laws are true when the descriptions are sufficiently 
well matched to the facts. This aim relates to Thesis 1;
2. by clarifying their explanatory function; this aim too relates 
to Thesis 1, and also to Thesis 3;
3. by showing how the breaking of the nexus between 
fundamental laws and reality is accommodated by the 
simulacrum account which has it that the so-called laws of 
nature govern objects in models, not objects in reality. This aim 
relates to Thesis 3.
Points to be kep t constantly in m ind  in what follows are these:
Emianation  of a phenomenon is provided either by 
demonstrating its subsumption within a broad theoretical 
framework, or by pointing to its cause; the Jaws in the former 
case are fundam ental or theoretical, and those in the latter are 
phenomenological;
Theoretical la v s  describe no particular circumstances, while 
phenomenological laws describe concrete situations;
Truth resides in descriptive accuracy; it is precisely because of 
the claim that the fundamental laws do not yield factual accuracy 
of description that Cartwright labels them false; on the face of it, 
no Jaw properly characterized as fundamental is exempt from the 
claim that it is false;
Anti-realism  in Cartwright s philosophy focusses sharply on the 
fundamental explanatory laws. She accepts theoretical entities and 
causes, and allows that
all sorts of statements represent facts of nature'7.
V  cit; p.36
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Throughout the book the three theses are run together in various 
ways. To facilitate understanding we will, in our consideration of Thesis 1, 
disentangle them to the extent practicable.
How then, with an eye on clarity of exposition, can we best go about 
the task of unravelling the several threads whilst not losing essential 
interconnections? My solution is :
‘to begin in §2.1 with exposition of Cartwright's web of 
argument that I have called the argument from principle’;
‘in S2.2 to note (i) how the three theses, taken together, conflict 
with the Grünbaum (generic-specific) account of explanation,
(ii) that something would be amiss if that account were valid, 
and (iii) Cartwright s arguments against the account;
‘with this background, to set out in §2.3 a structure for the full 
argument in support of Thesis 1 by locating the argument from 
principle in a unified context;
* to present further expositions and critiques of the arguments 
against the structure thus discerned.
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§2. THESIS 1 : THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF PHYSICS DO NOT TELL 
THE TRUTH
Cartw right offers several argum ents. One of these I call th e  a rgum en t 
fro m  princip le . I t  p u rp o r ts  to  sh o w  th a t th e  e ip ia n a to ry  p o w er  
o f  th e  la w s o f  p h y s ic s  does n o t e n ta ii th e ir  truth, b u t ra th e r  is  
th e  reason  fo r  th e ir  fa ls i ty  This argum ent is not simple, and m atters 
are fu rth er complicated by the fact th a t it overlaps w ith others which are 
of a pragm atic character and stem from w hat Cartwright takes to be our 
m ethods of explanation.
2.1 The Argument from Principle, and the Multiplicity of Theoretical
Treatm ents
The argum ent, we are told, derives via Bas van  Fraassen from Pierre 
Duhem. It begins w ith  a challenge :
"Show exactly what about the explanatory relationship tends to guarantee 
that, if x explains y and y is true, then x should be true as well".1 
Cartwright thinks tha t this challenge has an answer if and only if the 
explanation is causal. Let us defer consideration of one of these 
implications till we come to Thesis 2 and, for the moment, concentrate on 
the other : if the explanation is not causal, then  the challenge cannot be 
answered.
Recall that, if the explanation of a phenom enon is not causal, then  it 
constitutes subsum ption of the phenom enon w ithin a theory at a higher 
level of generality. The claim is that such subsumption, amounting m erely 
to organisation or classification w ithin theory, has nothing to do w ith  
tru th  which, it is asserted, is a characteristic external to explanation and 
to theory.
Cartwright adm its th a t the a rg u m en t fro m  coincidence  stands 
against her view  about the tru th  of explanatory laws. This argum ent, she 
says, is often coupled to the notion, introduced by Gilbert Harman, of 
in fe ren ce  to  th e  b e s t e ip ia n a tio n :
1 Cartwright; op. cit; p.4
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‘It vouid be an absurd coincidence if a vide variety of different kinds of 
phenomena vere ail explained by a particular lav. and yet vere not in
reality consequent upon the lav'.2
But, she goes on, we must impose on the argument from coincidence a 
constraint of non-redundancy \
'We can infer the truth of an explanation only if there are no alternatives 
that account in an equally satisfactory vay for the phenomena'3 4
As we shall see when we consider Thesis 2, she argues that this
requirement is satisfied by an acceptable causal account of any particular
phenomenon. By contrast, she claims, theoretical explanations often
proliferate, and she invokes Duhem's views in the following terms :
for any given set of phenomena, in principle there v ill alvays be more 
than one equally satisfactory explanation, and some o f  these  
explanations w ill be incom patible  . Since not ail of these can be true it 
is clear that tru th  is  independen t o f  sa tisfactorin ess fo r
explanation  “*(my emphasis)
So the point reached is that, for the abstract laws, the constraint of 
non-redundancy, coupled with Duhem's views about multiplicity of 
theoretical treatment, has dealt with the argument from coincidence, and 
the van Fraassen challenge remains unanswered. Cartwright now moves 
to consider some actual cases of multiple theories in physics for the one 
phenomenom, in order to illustrate their occurrence and to show that 
these different theories serve differing explanatory purposes. The 
inference which she chooses to draw is  that wide explanatory 
pow er goes hand in hand with the fa ls ity  o f the abstract laws 
invoked, confirming that abstract theory cannot meet the van Fraassen 
challenge.
She says:
' ...consider actual physical theories vh ich  v e  are v illin g  to account as 
acceptable, ...and ask "vhich ...explanatory claims are v e  to deem true?". My 
ansver is that causal claims are to be deemed true, but to count the basic  
explanatory la ws as true is  to fa il  to take seriou sly  ho w p h y s ic s
succeeds in  g iv in g  explanations:..I v il l  use tvo examples to shov this.’5 
(my emphasis)
2op. cit; p.73
3op. cit; p.76
4op. cit; p.90 
5op. cit; p.77
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She then outlines the theory of quantum damping and its associated line 
broadening which exhibits
' a single causal story but a fruitful multiplication of successful theoretical 
accounts
The causal factor responsible for the widths of the lines observed in a 
spectroscope when atoms radiate light is identified as the reaction of the 
radiation field on the atom. For the theoretical treatment, she refers us to 
Agarwal's summary6 7 where, she says, there are six different approaches, 
each providing precise and accurate calculations for the shapes and 
widths of the lines, and each starting from the basic Schrödinger equation 
but casting it into a form different from that of the others.
Cartwright dismisses the idea that the differences merely signify the 
use by physicists of techniques they know well. She interprets the six 
approaches as competing with one another, offering different 
Jaws fo r  e ia c tiy  the same phenomena. She acknowledges that 
Agarwal would disagree, and, in an ingenious twist, uses the substance of 
his purported disagreement to support the other component of her claim:
For Agarwal, the six approaches are complementary, serving 
different purposes;
For Cartwright, not only do they signify the invocation of different 
laws, but their supposed complementarity for different purposes 
shows just how their falsity endows them with wide explanatory 
power.
Her second example of multiplicity of theoretical treatments comes 
from a summary article8 on the theory of the laser, in which H. Haken 
provides a 'family tree' of the connections between different theories in a 
situation of theory overkill'9. This account of the different explanatory 
purposes of the different theories seems, prim a facie, to offer good 
support to the theses for which Cartwright is arguing.
6ibid.
7Agarvai G. S; Quantum Statistical Theories o f  Spontaneous Emission and 
their Relation to Other Approaches; Springer-Verlag; 1974
8Haken H; The Semiclassical and Quantum Theory o f the Laser , in. Kay S.M. 
and Maitland A. (eds); Quantum Optics; Academic Press; 1970.
9Haken; op. cit; p244
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She asks us to consider, by contrast, the as yet unproven explanation 
of how Crookes' radiometer works (Fig.3). There it is a question, she 
believes, of determining which of two causal accounts is correct: do the 
vanes rotate as a consequence of stresses in the gas tangential to their 
surfaces, or in response to forces perpendicular to the surfaces stemming 
from momentum interchange with the bombarding molecules of gas? 
When experiment settles the issue, she says, only one causal account will 
survive. We will look more closely at this example when we examine 
Thesis 2. Meanwhile we will concentrate on Cartwright's views about 
fundamental laws and theories.
EVACUAI
FLASK
^ V A N E S  MOUNTED ON 
I STRUTS PIVOTED AT 
/ CENTRE
EACH VANE HAS ONE 
SIDE BLACKENED. THE 
OTHER SILVERED
TO VACUUM ^  
PUMP
VANES ROTATE VHEN 
ILLUMINATED BY LIGHT 
OR HEAT
(A ) ’WINDMILL' VERSION
TO VACUUM PUMP
=7\
TORSION SUSPENSION 
RESTRAINS ROTATION
MIRROR CAUSES LIGHT 
TO BE REFLECTED TO A 
SCALE SHOVING 
DEFLECTION
(B ) DEFLECTION VERSION
FIG .3 CROOKES’ RADIOMETER
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2.2 Interactions among the Theses
Since Cartwright believes that phenomenological laws are true but 
fundamental laws are not, and that the van Fraassen challenge can be 
met in the case of the former but not the latter, she moves, as she must 
do, to put paid to the realist view that the fundamental laws are basic 
and that the phenomenological laws hold because of them. The D-N 
m odel o f explanation may be interpreted along such lines: from 
statements of the abstract fundamental laws we formally derive 
statements of the phenomenological laws, such deductions mirroring 
causal relations in the material world. Cartwright rejects the doctrine, 
claiming that we cannot justify the metaphysical supposition. On such a 
basis, therefore, we have no warrant to invoke the D-N model of 
explanation as ground for the truth of the fundamental laws.
Grünbaum 's view  of the relationship between fundamental and 
phenomenological laws, which Cartwright calls the generic-specific 
account, avoids metaphysics : phenomenological laws are special cases of 
more comprehensive truths expressed by fundamental laws. This account 
fits comfortably within a D-N model: a fundamental law, supplemented 
by specification of physical circumstances, entails the relevant 
phenomenological law; the fundamental law make the same claims as the 
phenomenological law when account is taken of the specific facts at hand.
Cartwright rejects th is account on the grounds that actual 
explanations in oh vsics do not proceed in this way:
*'Itis n e v e r  s tr ic t  deduction  that takes you from the fundamental 
equations at the beginning to the phenomenological laws at the end. 
Instead we req u ire  a. va rie ty  o f  d iffe re n t approxim ations  In 
any field of physics there are at most a handful of rigorous solutions,
and those usually for highly artificial situations.'10 (my emphases);
*'p ra c tica l approxim ations usually  im prove on the accuracy  
o f  our fundam ental la wd11 (my em phasis), 
producing something closer to the tru th  than would be obtained  
via a rigorous deductive r o u te . Moreover, she says, seldom are 
the facts sufficient to ju s tify  the derivation ; this being so, how 
can it be sustained that the two types of laws make the same claims?
10Cartwright; op. cit; p.104 
Hop. cit; p.106
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Additional premises have to be supplied and sometimes choices among
these, not dictated by the facts, have to be made; and
*' different choices give rise to different incom patible  results. The 
generic- specific account fails because the content of the 
phenomenological laws we derive is not contained in the fundamental
laws which explain them' 12 (my emphasis)
Such is Cartwright s case against the Grünbaum account. Her strategy, 
then, is to isolate causal laws (Thesis 2) from deductive connection with 
fundamental theory, and so make room for Theses 1 and 3.
2.3 A Structure for the Whole Argument
The story is not simple, and it grows in complexity as it further unfolds.
As background for a critique I now provide a formal precis of the whole 
argument b y  anticipation o f what lies ahead  and conjunction of that 
with what we have already heard:
(a) A challenge : show that explanation entails truth;
(b) First proposition : the challenge cannot be met for explanation 
via abstract laws;
(c) First objection to{h) : the argument from  coincidence 
constitutes a strong reason for belief in inference to the best 
explanation and so to the truth of fundamental laws;
(d) Counter to i t ) ; the argument from coincidence is subject to the 
constraint of non-redundancy; Duhem has taught us that, for any 
given phenomenon, there will always be more than one 
satisfactory explanation; since some o f  these eiplanations  
will be incompatible, truth m ust be independent o f  
satisfactoriness fo r  e ip iana tion ;
(e) Argum ent in  support o f  (b) - Second proposition:
....to count the basic explanatory laws as true is to fail to take seriously 
how physics succeeds in giving explanations ...if  the th eo ry  is  to have  
considerable explanatory power, m ost o f  i ts  fundam ental claim s 
w ill n o t sta te  tru th s ...and ..th is  w ill in  g en era l include the
bulk o f  our most h ig h ly  p r ize d  law s and equationS 13 (my 
emphasis);
12op. cit; p.107 
,3op. cit; pp 78/79
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(f) in support of (e) consider actuaJ ca ses :
i. where the same phenomenon is subject to different laws, 
e.g. quantum damping- instances being
* sp ec tra l lin e  b ro a d e n in g , and 
x la ser  th eo ry ,
ii. where laws carry ce ter is  p a r ib u s  q u a lif ie r s , e. g.
* S n ell's  Jaw,
iii. where laws intersect, or where there is composition of 
causes, e g.
* th e  g ra v ita tio n a i fo rce  J a w , and th e  eJectric 
fo rce  Ja w ,
* en e rg y  JeveJs in  th e  g ro u n d  s ta te  o f  the  
carbon a to m ;
(g) Second  objection  t o { b ) : deductive relations between 
statements of fundamental laws and statements of 
phenomenological laws m irror causaJ reJations  in the 
material world (one interpretation of the D-N model of 
explanation)14;
(h) Counter to {g ) : no justification can be given for the metaphysical 
supposition;
(i) T h ird  objection  to (b) - (a realist interpretation of the D-N 
model of explanation, namely the g en eric -sp ec ific  account of 
Grünbaum): phenomenological laws are special cases of more 
comprehensive truths expressed by fundamental laws; statements 
of the former are deducible when statements of the latter are 
supplemented by statements expressing the relevant physical 
circumstances;
(j) Counter to ( i ) :
i. phenomenological laws are n e v e r  derived strictly from the 
fundamental equations; approximations are required,
ii. a p p ro iim a te  d er iva tio n s usuaJJy im p ro ve  on the 
accuracy of the fundamental laws,
iii. where approximations are required, choices not dictated 
by the facts have to be made, and
‘ different choices give rise to different incompatible results’^ ;
,4I will not be pressing this issue here, so I shall not elaborate it further 
150p. cit; p.107
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(k) in support o f  ( j ) :
i. no attempt is made to prove (j) i,
ii. as we shall see, the examples offered of (j) ii are
‘the equivalent circuit of a single stage transistor 
amplifier, and
‘the theory o f eiponen tia i decay,
iii. examples given of (j) iii are
‘the Lamb sh ift in the excited state of a single 
two-level atom, and
‘the Lamb shift in the ground state of the atom.
Further exposition and criticism will be presented in the context of 
the structure thus identified.
2.4 Critique of the Argument from Principle
Cartwright writes sometimes as though what matters in supporting (b) is 
mere multiplicity of alternative treatments rather than multiplicity 
together with incompatibility. Thus, for example, she says:
' We can infer the truth of an explanation only if there are no alternatives 
that account in an equally satisfactory v a y  for the phenomena'16 
At other times she seems to take it for granted that multiplicity of 
explanation entails incompatibility - for example :
Marvell's explanation involving tangential stresses in the radiometer is 
incompatible v ith  the earlier light pressure account, and it is incompatible
with the more standard hypothesis involving normal pressures'17
We must insist that multiplicity does not entail incompatibility, f t  wouid
be the incom patibiiity ciause in {d), not mere muitipiicity, that
wouid estabiish  (b). Duhem's argument would not work for alternative
theories that are compatible.
/ g ive fu i i  consideration to the genesis o f Duhem 's view in 
Part3 o f the present work and show in detail how he was misled by 
the state of physics in his day. It is my claim that there is no instance in 
contemporary physics where the same phenomena are explained by 
credibie different theories, of which at least one is incompatible with
^op. cit; p.76 
I7op. cit; p.ll
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another. To back up this claim /  show in detail in Part 2 how 
Hacking is mistaken when he points to Hertz s Principies of 
Mechanics as instancing the contrary.
The dogma at 2.3(d) is well known in the latter day guise of Quine's 
thesis18 of the under-determination of theory. The strong version of this 
thesis has it that two theories could be empirically equivalent and so of 
equal explanatory value, and yet logically incompatible; a weak version 
omits the rider of incompatibility. Quine attempted to establish the 
strong thesis19 but, in some good company, I believe that he failed to do 
so. In Davidson s words :
' ( Quine) goes to lengths to convince us that there may be tvo theories such 
that they imply all and only true observation sentences, are equally simple, 
and yet logically incompatible. Thus truth is apparently relative to a theory. 
But Quine settles, at the end, for a frank dualism’ in vh ich  distinctive signs 
are used to state the theories. The theories turn out to be irreducible one to
the other, but unconflicting. No relativism remains.’20
We can only muster the weak version of the thesis of under- 
determination of theories and, in consequence, 2.3(d) loses its force 
against (c), and (c) retains its force against (b). So we conclude that
the argument summarised at (a) through (d) does 
not stand as a refutation of any ciaim to the effect 
that ezpianation entaiis truth , and moreover
the argument from coincidence remains on the 
books as potentiai compiement to the thesis of 
inference to best ezpianation.
Despite this theoretical failure to establish the strong thesis of under- 
determination of theories, nevertheless, if, contrary to my ciaim 
above, it were the case that we couid actuaiiy point to different 
accepted theories which both ezpiained a given phenomenon 
and were Jogicaiiy incompatible, then (b) would be established since 
(d) could be rephrased to serve as a counter to (c). Propositions (e) and
18Q uine¥. V; Word and Object , M.I.T. Technology Press; Cambridge (Mass.); 1960; 
p.22 and p.78
19Quine W .V; On E m pirically  E quivalent System s o f  the World-, in 
E rk en n tis9; 1975; pp 313*328
20Davidson D.; The In scru ta b ility  o f  R eference  ; in In qu iries into Truth 
and Interpretation-, Oxford; 1984; p. 234
[Parti ,S2] 16
(f) can be interpreted as being aimed in part at moving the argument 
forward along these lines.
Cartwright s immediate example, (f) i, is the six different theoretical
treatments of quantum damping that explain spectral line broadening :
' All six provide precise and accurate calculations for the shape and width of 
the broadened line,... (but) offer different laws for ex a c tly  th e  sam e
p h e n o m e n a 21 (my emphasis)
But note that the question of incompatibility of these laws, which is of 
vital importance to the argument, does not arise explicitly and, 
presumably, is taken for granted.
The example illustrates how Cartwright sees explanation working 
throughout physics:
Tn physics it is usual to give alternative theoretical treatments of the same 
phenomenon. We construct different models for different purposes, with 
different equations to describe them. Which is the right model, which the 
"true" set of equations? The question is a mistake. One model brings out some 
aspects of the phenomenon; a different model brings out others. Some 
equations give a rougher estimate for a quantity of interest, but are easier to
solve. No single model serves all purposes best.' 22 (my underlining)
This passage throws additional light on (e), but, here too, the question
concerning incompatibility is left hanging.
The last quotation might give rise to some unease. Although at first 
sight it seems to be something to which we could readily assent, 
nevertheless, it embodies a covert am biguity  associated with the 
phrase, the same phenomenon. Take the case of a transistor amplifier 
and consider three different models used to represent i t : the low 
frequency, the mid frequency, and the high frequency eq u iva len ts.2  ^ Are 
they models of the same phenomenon? Well, they are models of a 
working transistor, so we might be tempted to answer yes’. But working 
transistors deal in signals, and signals come in convenient, albeit 
different, categories, and what is being modelled is the transistor working 
in the domain appropriate to the signal category chosen. I say that, in this 
case, the same phenomena are not being treated in the three models,
21 Cartwright; op. cit; pp 79/81 
22op. cit; p .ll
23See my §2.7.1 and Fig.llA for the mid frequency equivalent circuit of a small- 
signal transistor amplifier - my p.39
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except in the two special cases where low and mid frequencies merge, 
and where mid and high frequencies merge.
In the examples where line broadening only is being considered, the 
six different treatments clearly do deal with the same phenomenon. But 
that is not the case with Cartwright's second example which draws on 
Haken s family tree' of laser theories. There at least some of the theories 
deal specifically with matters that others do not. Only when models 
overlap In what th ey  treat can we say that th ey  are competing 
In explanation; and then, only I f  we could show that they  were 
Incompatible, could we claim one or more false.
With the qualification just made about ambiguity in the phrase the  
same phenomenon, Haken s discussion of the laser fits well to the 
views expressed by Cartwright about models. And Haken is at pains to 
show how and where the different models apply, and how they are 
related. But no hint of incompatibility among them is to be detected in 
the text; it is just that some handle certain questions and not others; for 
example, determination of line width or intensity fluctuations requires 
full quantum mechanical treatment; for the threshold condition at which 
lasing action starts, we can get by with the much simpler treatment 
afforded by semi-classical equations. But note that, in all cases, each 
model originates from the same theoretical foundation -interaction 
between the field equations for the behaviour of quanta and the 
(appropriate) equations for matter, mirroring as it were the sort of actual 
causal type mechanism that Cartwright s own anti-realism approves. 
There would have to be incompatibility at that level of the theory if 
incompatibility were to be found at lower levels reached by normal 
deductive routes. But the common starting point for the theories seems to 
militate against the possibility of incompatibility arising there except via 
incompatible descriptions of the physical circumstances to which they are 
being applied. Let me re-emphasise the point that m erely d ifferen t 
descriptions do not suffice fo r  Incompatibility.
Now in the case of line broadening, although she interprets the six 
different treatments as invoking six different laws, Cartwright does not 
prove, nor even say, that the laws are logically Incompatible. Nor 
does it seem from the text that they could be; and the same goes for the
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different theoretical treatments of the laser. But unless the laws are 
incompatible, the Duhem argument does not go through.
I  conclude therefore that, pro tew , neither  2.3(b) nor is), 
insofar as (e) depends on (f) i, has been established, and that the 
argument from  coincidence and the thesis o f inference to best 
eiplanation  (c) have not been refuted.
We may now turn to detailed examples of the remaining three 
types o f ein lanatorv practice , namely (f) ii, (f) iii and (j) ii, each of 
which, it is claimed, supports the thesis that the fundamental laws of 
physics lie.
But before we do so there is an item which can be got out of the way. I 
do not intend to challenge Cartwright here in her counter 2.3(h) to the 
interpretation (g) of the D-N model. Rather, I  defend  the Grünbaum 
version, and I  claim in  §2.5 that Cartwright s own eiample, 
Snell's law ; is  an endorsem ent o f it. Further support fo r the 
Grünbaum m odel will be forthcoming in  §4.
2.5 Laws that apply Ceteris Paribus-, e.g. Snell's law
The second pragmatic argument, (f) ii, begins with the claim that our 
usual explanatory practice is to take a fundamental law as true, only 
subject to a ceteris paribus  modifier; that is, the law
‘...holds only in special circumstances'24 
This qualification, the argument continues, shows that the law is false, 
because the modifier s effect is to isolate it, in one way or another, from 
application to factual situations. But, Cartwright says, the retention of 
these false laws on the books has value for explanatory purposes because 
it is in this way that the factors to be admitted in explanation are 
registered and types of explanation are authorised.
In this section I focus my objection on the example she gives to 
illustrate the argument, namely Snell s law. If that example is 
representative, then I claim that this line of argument fails.
24Cartwright; op. cit; p.47
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Snell's law (Fig.4) in its usual formulation relates the angles of 
incidence and refraction when light crosses the boundary between two 
isotropic materials : nj Sin 8j = n2 Sin82. According to Cartwright the law
is false, and the reason she gives is that there are anisotropic media 
(certain crystals) which exhibit double refraction. For her Snell s law 
applies only in circumstances ceteris paribus  (which she prefers to see 
interpreted as other things being right’).
I *<---------------nor m il to boundary
inciden t ray reflec ted  ray
medium 1
medium 2
re frac ted  ray
SHELL'S La w : Hj * in9 | a n2 i in 0 2
w here  n Itn 2 are  re frac tiv e  indices (constan ts) 
d e term ined  by the velocity  of light in 
medium 1 and m edium 2 respectively .
FIG.4 ILLUSTRATING SNELL S LAW
But surely no-one would claim that Snell’s law in its usual 
formulation is a completely unrestricted generalisation. No covering law 
theorist would do so, because its derivation from other principles would 
not go through if the materials concerned were other than isotropic. The 
fact that the law can be so derived and that its derivation requires the 
factual premise of isotropy runs counter to Cartwright’s denial that 
phenomenological laws are entailed by fundamental laws in the manner 
of the generic-specific account of explanation. For the law is deducible 
from Maxwell’s equations2^  and there is no good reason not to regard it
25Harnwell G.P.; P rin c ip le s  o f  E lec tr ic ity  and Electrom agnetism , McGraw- 
Hill; 1938; pp 338-342. Also see; Wood R.W.; P h ysica l Optics, Macmillan; 1934; Ch 
xii.
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also as a well-confirmed phenomenological law. In the same process we 
can also derive some related laws:
* that the incident, reflected and refracted rays are co-planar;
‘ that the angle of reflection is equal to the angle of incidence;
* that the energies in the reflected and refracted beams are of 
specified amounts (the Fresnel equations);
*that, for a certain angle of incidence, the reflected ray will be 
plane-polarised (Brewster's law), this being the basis o f  a 
standard m ethod fo r  producing p i  an e-p oiarise d  Jigh t.
So far when I have spoken about Snell's law I have added the 
qualification, in its  usuai formulation  .This I have done with an eye 
on a way in which a law of similar form arises for refraction in both 
isotropic and anisotropic cases.26 For reasons that will shortly become 
apparent the law in its more general formulation is not given a new name 
but is still called Snell's law':
"ve should remember that Snell's l a v ....is a lw a ys  true for the k-vector
directions"27 (emphasis in the original)
A detailed exposition would take us too far afield so I give only a 
brief summary. Electromagnetic energy propagation through anisotropic 
media can be represented by two refractive index surfaces called u- 
surfaces, each associated with a particular vector called a k-vector.* 2* In 
the special case of an isotropic medium there is only one p-surface and 
that surface is spherical. The k-vector is then nothing different from the 
ray path of geometrical optics, and Snell s law could be said to apply to 
the k-vector or to the ray path, interchangeably.
The theory of u-surface construction for anisotropic materials is 
outlined by Lipson and Lipson2^  and we may take it that particular 4- 
surfaces are characteristic of particular crystals. Now, from Maxwell’s 
equations and continuity conditions at the common boundary of any two
26Iipson S.G. and Lipson H.; O ptical Physics, Second Edition; Cambridge 
University Press; 1981. See especially Chapter 3.
27op. cit; p.115 
2Sop. cit; pp94-%
2V cit: pp97-114
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media, it follows that Snell's law holds for the two k-vectors. The 
respective ray paths are then determined uniquely by the points of 
intersection of the ke-vector (corresponding to the extraordinary ray' of 
conventional optics) and the k0-vector (corresponding to the ordinary 
ray ) with their respective u-surfaces.
We may therefore generalise Snell's law, in terms of k-vectors, over 
both isotropic and anisotropic media, the general formulation reducing to 
the usual one about ray paths as soon as we apply the specific 
phenomenological condition of isotropy. In the anisotropic case the law in 
its general formulation, along with the specific conditions of anisotropy in 
particular crystals, together with information about the incident light 
summarised in the relevant k-vector, tells us how that light will be 
refracted in the anisotropic medium.
In the circumstances I have described I am unable to agree with 
Cartwright that Snell's law is in any sense false or that it holds only 
ceteris paribus
I conclude that the example afforded by Snell's law  serves 
Cartwright badly.
1. the Ja w is  tru e ;
2. taken as a phenomenological law, i t  can be derived from  
abstract theory and so confirms the Grünbaum generic- 
specific account o f explanation . It is thus at odds with the 
simulacrum account and is a counter-example to 
Cartwright s claim that i t  is  never strict deduction that 
takes you from  fundam ental equations to 
phenomenological la w s . §2.3(0, pace Cartwright, seems tobe 
holding up well, and her claim at (j) i appears to have been 
refuted (see my p. 13);
3. taken as a fundam ental law, it features in that sort of 
explanation where detailed data about phenomena, in this case 
refracted light, are derived from the law plus specifics30 of the 
case at hand. In this, the example again supports the 
generic-specific account o f explanation ;
30e.g. angle of incident light ray, and refractive indices of materials
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4. the case also introduces another problem which I outline in a 
moment and which threatens Cartwright's whole enterprise.
There may be other instances of ceteris paribus laws that would 
do better. But the prospects would not look promising if interpretation of 
the law of universal gravitation ceteris paribus, in the manner 
conceived by Cartwright, were to fare just as badly, as I claim below.
2.5.1 Abstract and Phenomenological Laws - A Problem of Demarcation, 
with Some Consequences
Snell's law reveals a demarcation problem for Cartwright. Whilst there 
are seemingly obvious cases where one law should be called 'abstract' or 
fundamental' and another 'phenomenological', there seem to be other 
laws that could be put into either category, at the whim of the classifier. 
Ohm s law, Boyle's law, Ampere's law, ...are further examples.
The problem arises when some seemingly very particular concrete 
phenomenological law acquires a degree of wider applicability that lifts it 
into a plane of abstraction removed from any one of its particular 
manifestations. Concurrently, the law may start to assume the status of a 
fundamental law. Indeed it may turn out to be one that can be deduced 
within an encompassing abstract theory - Kepler's laws for instance.
Now the process just described presents Cartwright with a problem. 
The law which started out as a well confirmed phenomenological law and 
which, by her lights, is therefore true, turns into a fundamental law 
which, by her lights, ought to be false. Notice that what we have here is 
just the generic-specific model going in reverse.
Cartwright's response might be to insist that she is referring to the 
law (e.g. Snell's law) in its usual formulation and that the move to 
generalise that law beyond any particular occurrence results in falsity 
because there are non-isotropic materials for which it would be false. If 
that were all there were to it, then our dispute would be only about 
whether or not a law must be an unrestricted generalisation. Now, even if 
she were to receive a message from God that she is right on this last 
point, I would go on to say that I have discovered a new law, Psnell's law, 
about k-vectors, and that the familiar Snell's law is just a special case of 
Psnell's law. Cartwright would now have other problems.
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One thing that the example brings out is that Cartwright m ust 
eJab or ate the criterion b y  which the distinction is  made 
unambiguousiy betw een Jaws that are phenomenoJogicaJ and  
Jaws that are abstract. SneJJ's Jaw, I  thinJc, shows that the  
distinction is  in danger o f coJJapse.
2.6 The Intersection of the Gravitational and Electric Domains, and the 
Composition of Causes
2.6.1 The Case for the Falsity of the Laws
As an introductory comment I note that Cartwright’s views here are 
similar to some of Bertrand Russell's31, but I shall not try to draw 
comparisons. Interestingly enough, Russell’s remarks also bear directly on 
issues we discuss in Part 2 concerning Hertz's mechanics.
What Cartwright aims to show is that the fundamental laws of 
physics, here exemplified by Coulomb’s law and the law of Universal 
Gravitation, taken as descriptions of facts, are false and that, when 
amended to be true by the addition of ceteris paribus modifiers, they 
lose their explanatory force.
She thinks that, when causes combine in the intersection of different 
domains, the laws we invoke to calculate what each cause contributes 
cannot do their jobs if they are taken to be literally true:
' the lavs v e  use are designed only to tell truly vhat happens in each 
domain separately 32
She rejects any appeal to ’super' laws, attributable to the unity of nature 
- firstly because she thinks that such laws, when available (and that, she 
says, is rarely), may not be sufficiently explanatory; secondly because, 
when they are not available, she declines to accept promissory notes for 
their eventual appearance; and thirdly because she has a metaphysical 
view (which she does not urge) that nature is too untidy for there to be 
hope of finding laws matching the uniformity believed in by the realist.
31Russell B; The PrincipJes o f  M athematics, Allen and Unvin; second edition; 
1937; see esp. pp474 and 485 
32Cartvright; op. cit; p.12
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She tells us that neither the law of Universal Gravitation 
(F=Gmim2/ r 2) nor Coulomb's law for the force between two charged 
bodies (F=q jq2/ r 2) is true by itself. For bod ies th a t are bo th  m a ssive  
a n d  charged  th e  tw o  ia w s in te ra c t a n d  n e ith e r  ia w  b y  i t  s e i f  
tr u ly  s ta te s  h o w  th e  b o d ies  b e h a v e :
' No charged objects v i l l  behave just as the la v  of universal gravitation says; 
and any massive objects v i l l  constitute a counterexample to Coulomb s lav. 
These tvo lavs are not true; vorse they are not even approximately true. In 
the interaction betveen the electrons and the protons of an atom, for 
example, the Coulomb effect svamps the gravitational one, and the force 
that naturally occurs is very different from that described by the la v  of 
gravity" 33
She allows that the law of gravity, prefixed by a ce ter is  p a r ib u s  
modifier- ( If there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work, 
th e n ..... ')- is true, but, she claims, it is not a very useful law :
‘ This la v  can explain in only very  simple, or ideal, circumstances........it is
of no help for cases in v h ic h  both gravity and electricity matter. Once the 
ce ter is  paribu s  modifier has been attached, the la v  of gravity is 
irrelevant to the more complex and interesting situations' 34
Cartwright, casting her thoughts ahead to her intended simulacrum 
account, attributes the supposed failure of facticity to the nature of the 
explanations we give rather than to the nature of our physics : when we 
explain via composition of causes, the laws we invoke do not satisfy the 
requirement of facticity; each law by itself states that something will 
happen which, in the event, does not accord with what occurs when they 
act in combination. To be true the law would have to describe what 
actually occurs (which it does not), but to be explanatory it has to 
describe something else (which it does) which is not what happens. Her 
ciaim h e re  in s ta n ces  again h e r  conviction  about th e  in e v ita b ie  
tr a d e -o f f  b e tw e e n  tru th  a n d  exp ia n a to ry  p o w er
She dismisses vector addition as metaphor; it is we who add forces 
vectorially, not nature. We will see later that this view is mandatory if 
the simulacrum account of explanation is to hold. As Cartwright has it, 
the law of Universal Gravitation and Coulomb's law
33op. cit; p.57 
3^op. cit; p 3S
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do not satisfy the facticity requirement. They appear, on the face of it. to 
describe what bodies do : in the one case, the two bodies produce a force of
size. Gmjfl^/r2; in the other, they produce a force of size, q ^ / r 2 But this 
cannot literally be so. For the force o f  size, Gm jm 2 / 1^, en d  th e
force o f  size, q /q 2 /r* ', are no t redi, occurrent forces. In
in ternction  s s in g le  force occurs  - the force we call the  
r e s u l t a n t and this force is neither the force due to gravity nor the 
electric force. On the vector addition story, the grav ita tion a l and  
the e lec tr ic  force are both produced, y e t  n e ith er  exists' 35 (my 
emphases)
I  argue below  that, in these views, Cartwright is  radically 
mistaken.
A few paragraphs on she softens her views just a little :
‘It is im plausible  to take the force due to gravity and the force due to 
electricity literally as parts of the actually occurring force ‘ 36 (my 
emphasis)
This milder conclusion emerges from her criticism of Mill s assertion that 
a body subject simultaneously to a force to the north and one to the east 
would be caused to move in a given time exactly as far in both directions 
as the two forces would separately have carried it. For Cartwright:
....no pure north motion can be a part of a motion that always heads north­
east*^
/  argue beiow  that Cartwright is  aiso mistaken on this point.
To make her supposed rebuttal of Mill the more striking Cartwright 
charges him with the view that a body pulled equally in opposite 
directions would be caused to move simultaneously in both - an 
attribution for which his words seem to me to give no licence, but a view 
which can be sustained in appropriate circumstances38.
Vector addition would make sense, Cartwright believes, and the law 
of gravitation and Coulomb s law would be true, if we were to give up the 
facticity view of laws and make them descriptive of the causaipow ers  
that bodies have. Thus, two bodies would have the power to produce a 
force, Gmim2/ r 2, which they would not always succeed in exercising. The
35op. cit; p.60 
38op. cit; p.61 
37op. cit; pp 60/61 
38See my p27
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outcome would be a compromise among powers. Presumably, because 
vector addition would now make sense, the occurrent powers would 
combine vectorially to produce a resultant compromise which, if 
exercised as a resultant power, would act like a resultant force. In sum, 
Cartwright introduces unexercised causal powers quantitatively the same 
as the component forces they supplant; vector addition produces a 
resultant power exercised as a force quantitatively the same as the 
resultant of vector addition of component forces in the old scheme. Note 
that the new entity, a causal power, is introduced to bypass what I claim 
below is a non-problem.
2.6.2 The Case against Cartwright
When Cartwright asserts that the realist holds a facticity view of laws,
she makes clear what she is attributing to him :
1 The view of laws with which I begin - “ Laws of nature describe facts about 
reality " - is a pedestrian view that. I imagine, any realist will hold. It
supposes that laws of nature tell how objects of various kinds behave.....
What is critical is that they talk about objects - real concrete things that
exist here in our material world ....4M
One might wonder whether the realist would want his views of laws to be 
pinned down in every case to concrete objects in this way. Some laws 
would seemingly state facts about nature rather than saying something 
directly about real concrete things - e.g. The velocity of light is constant 
independent of the velocity of the frame of reference’, or 'Maxwell's 
equations are invariant under a Lorentz transformation', or......
Let us set this point aside and concentrate on talk about the 
behaviour of bodies, the relevant behaviour being the production  
o f forces b y  them. Now it is precisely the production of forces that 
Cartwright claims she is talking about, and she distinguishes her position 
from that of another commentator whose concern, she says, is about the 
motion that resu lts  from  the application o f fo rces . But, despite 
her careful distinction here, I believe from the other things she says that 
she conflates the two elem ents o f the distinction and is, in fact, 
influenced by conclusions one would be tempted to draw if one's 
attention were actually focussed on the question of motion. The slip is an 
easy one to make because forces are often recognised, not In
Mop. cit; p.33
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themselves\ bu t through the motions th ey  cause, and the 
opportunity to conflate the two elements is rarely missing. 
Misconceptions about vectors often go hand in hand with 
misconceptions about forces, and, as I have indicated, I sense a 
fundamental misconception that Cartwright has about the former in her 
criticism of Mill. Since vectors are more general than forces, let us deal 
with them first.
As we have noted, Cartwright says:
.... no p u re  n o rth  m otion can be a p e r t  o f  a m otion th a t a lw ays
heads north-east.'*0 (my emphasis)
I submit that she is mistaken. Let a small motorised truck be located on 
the southern edge of a large platform, say 100 metres wide and 100 
metres long. Let the platform start moving precisely to the east and, at 
the same instant, let the truck start moving across the platform precisely 
perpendicular to the latter's direction of motion. Let the speed of the 
truck relative to the platform be the same as the speed of the platform 
relative to the ground. When the truck reaches the other side of the 
platform let all motion stop.
To an observer on the ground the truck moves exactly to the north­
east. But it does that by virtue of two pure motions, one via its own 
powered movement to the north, and the other via the platform s own 
powered movement to the east. Each motion is separately identifiable : 
turn on and off the respective mechanisms powering the two vehicles. 
Note that, with the platform and truck constrained as specified, the  
truck s  m ovem ent across the piatform  is  always to the north, 
whether the piatform be at rest or in motion; at rest on the platform, the 
truck either does not move at all or it moves only to the east.
If the truck were now constrained to move only along the platform, 
rather than across it, then, contrary to what Cartwright had to say in 
her criticism of Mill, we could indeed apply to it two oppositely directed 
forces, giving it the two opposite motions that, to an observer on the 
ground, would result in its staying in its initial position.
*°op. cit; pp 60/61
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What is described here is typical of hov vectors'*1 reoresentinz 
reai quantities in the world combine to produce a joint result. 
Cartwright 's initial mistake, I  suggest, is to suppose that pure 
motions, cieariy identified as reai in themseives, do not 
combine (in just the way I  have shown that they do) to produce 
a resuit different from either
Take the first case discussed and notice that, to counter rolling 
friction, two forces - each fseparateiy and independentiy) 
identifiabie, controJJabie and measurabie - are caiied into pJay 
One is directed across the platform and produces the truck s motion on 
the platform, the other moves the platform over the ground, but the 
truck finishes in a position not dictated by either force on its 
own.
ft  is time, then, to say something about forces, how they 
operate singiy and in combination, and how they reveai or faii 
to reveai their presence.
A fundamental point to be appreciated at the outset is that forces 
often act differentiy from naive eipectation - yet aiways in 
accordance with Jaw. Thus, for example, the instantaneous velocity of 
a rocket satellite in circular orbit about the earth is always perpendicular 
to the direction of the force exerted by the earth on it, the radially 
inward force responsible for the satellite's maintaining its orbit; in this 
instance, there is no component of the satellite s velocity in the direction 
of the force acting. The radially inward force is real, correctly described 
by the gravitational equation and produces the right acceleration, but the 
motion differs from naive expectation.42
Many situations occur where a single force acting in a given direction 
is the source of what I shall call non-obvious' forces acting in other 
directions. The ladder against the wall (Fig.5) is a good example.
41 In this case, position vectors or velocity vectors
42Someone vho denies the reality of forces might urge that all of this begs the 
question. But that objection is irrelevant in the present case because Cartvright 
and I are engaged in a dispute vhose context presupposes the existence of forces.
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FIG.5 FORCES INVOLVED WHEN LADDER LEANS AGAINST WALL
The obvious force acting is the weight (mg) of the ladder43. But four 
other, not so obvious, forces are called into play : a normal reaction and a 
frictional force on the ladder where it meets wall and where it meets 
floor. Without the frictional forces the ladder would slip; without one of 
the normal reactions, R2 , the ladder would go through the wall; without 
the other, Rj, it would go through the floor. When someone climbs the 
ladder, her weight is a second obvious force to be accounted for; at the 
same time the frictional and reaction forces change their magnitudes. 
Given two coefficients of friction, we could write down the force and 
moment equations that are satisfied in the equilibrium condition. While 
everything remains steady, or whilever our curiosity is not aroused, the 
reactions of wall and floor, and the frictional forces, tend to enjoy a non- 
obvious status. But if, when the climber moves, say from the fifth to the 
sixth rung, the ladder slips or the wall collapses, then we can invoke 
these forces to determine something quite definitive in the first case 
about the coefficient of friction between ladder and floor, or in the second 
about the strength of the wall.
Two other examples where non-obvious forces are brought into play 
are depicted in Figs. 6 and 7. The first I shall not delay over. It shows the
43Strictly, the veight of the ladder is not a single force acting through its centre of 
gravity, but rather the aggregate of the veights of the elements of the ladder 
distributed over its length. We avoid that complication since it does not affect the 
points being made here
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FIG .6 ILLU STRA TIN G  HOW VERTICAL FORCE PRODUCES 
HORIZONTAL FORCE
role played by tension in a connecting rope (of negligible mass). We could 
make the example more realistic (and more complicated) by including 
frictional effects at the pulley and on the shelf, and by giving the rope a 
non-zero mass.
The second example is important for my argument against Cartwright 
and I shall develop it step by step. In Fig.7(A) a block is constrained by a 
fixed guide which, without penalty, we may assume frictionless. For the 
moment we assume also that the rig is fitted in an artificial satellite, so 
that gravitational forces are avoided. A single force F is applied in the 
direction shown. F could be, for example, the pull exerted by a rope 
wound round the output shaft of a mechanism comprising motor, friction 
drive and gears, in which case it is controllable and readily measurable 
with a spring balance44. The block moves to the right. We can stop it with
44How do we know that F applied to the free end of the rope (the right hand side) 
results in a force on the block? To simplify matters we consider a chain rather than 
a rope, and take each link to have zero mass. Consider the link closest to F. Because it 
has zero mass there can be no net force acting on it (Newton's second law). The link  
then must experience a force, -F, applied by the link next to it. By Newton's third 
law, the first link therefore exerts a force, +¥, on the second. This situation is 
iterated along the chain to its point of attachment to the block. (If the chain has 
finite mass and is in motion, the upshot is that the force acting on the block is 
reduced by the amount necessary to maintain the chain's motion).
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a restraining force R1 to the left. R1 could originate similarly to F 45 F and 
R1 are real, and each, independently, can be identified, controlled and 
measured.
There is a 'non-obvious' force acting as well, namely the reaction X of 
the guide on the block. That force too can be measured, either by 
replacement (remove the lower rail from the guide and restrain the block 
with a spring balance46) or directly (unfasten the filed guide from its 
restraints and use a spring balance to keep it in place). But X does not 
exist independently of F; remove F and X disappears.
BLOCX COMSTRAIIED BY GUIDE 
MOVES TO THE SIGHT VHEH F IS 
APPLIED
K1 CAM  BE ADJUSTED TO STOP THE 
M0T10H
X1 _______  THE HOI-OBVIOUS FORCE X
X F
FIG. 7 A ILLUSTRATING FORCES ACTING IN COMBINATION IN 
ZERO GRAVITT
45or it could result from the extension of a spring in a spring balance (but then it 
vould not be available as a force that, in principle, ve could vary independently of 
F andX).
460nly modest ingenuity in guide design is required
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If we remove R!, the block moves to the right; if we re-apply R1, the 
block stops. We infer from these operations that the effect of the 
joint presence of F and X is the same as i f  there were present 
a singie force equai and opposite to R1. This inferred force', -R1, 
we cali the resultant. Notice the similarities in the case to the earlier 
one involving the combination of a northerly motion (or force) and an 
easterly motion (or force) to produce motion to the north-east.
F and Rl, we saw, eilst as independent forces. But there is a 
sine qua non for X, namely the presence of F, and there is a 
sine qua non for the resultant, namely the presence of F and X. 
And whilst we can measure F, R1 and X directly, we cannot 
measure the resultant of F and X in the same way. Instead, we 
deduce its magnitude and direction via the single force, R1, that 
balances it, or, on the removal of R1, via Newton 's second law of 
motion and the acceleration then achieved by the block.
Because the block does not move perpendicular to the guide, Newton’s 
second law requires that there be no resulting force on it in that 
direction. What cancels X is the resolved part of F in the same direction.47 
The so-called resultant force on the block, the force to which we attribute 
movement, is the resolved part of F along the aiis of the guide.48 Why 
do we get this so-called resultant? We get it because the two 
directiy measurable forces, X and F, combine vectorialiy to 
produce an effect which can be conveniently ascribed to a 
fictitious entity so labelled. But that is all it is - a convenient label.
We may say either that forces X and F act on the block, or that their 
resultant acts on the block; these statements are physically equivalent on 
the above understandings. But when we use the latter expression we 
remain mindful of the fact that there would be no resultant force without 
the presence of the applied force F and the induced non-obvious force X. 
To say that there is a resultant force on the block is just to say 
that real forces are acting in combination. Cartwright s account 
is in error because she has failed to appreciate this 
fundamental fact.
47A claim confirmed in innumerable laboratory experiments 
48ditto
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Let us now turn to Cartwright's case of the simultaneous application 
of a gravitational and a Coulomb force. We use Fig.7(B). Let F be a 
gravitational force; we can arrange this by bringing the previous rig back 
to earth and positioning it appropriately. Let us now constrain the block, 
not by the mechanical guide, but by a Coulomb force perpendicular to the 
direction in which the lower rail ran before its removal - we can imagine 
the block to be charged electrically and to be placed at such a distance 
from another charged body that the Coloumb force is exactly equal to X.
If we feel the need we can use a test charge to establish that the electric 
field in the immediate environment of the charged block has the right 
value to produce the force X on it.4^  The Coulomb force now does exactly 
the same job as the rail did. The block can only move downwards to the 
right, and we can stop it from doing so by applying a restraining force R* 
back up the 'slope' of our novel inclined plane. X is real and F is real, 
being Coulomb force and gravitational force respectively, and when R 1 is 
removed the resultant force is downward to the right and equal in 
magnitude to R L  Again, to say that there is  a resuitant force on 
the block is  ju s t to say that the rea i forces have combined in a 
particular way
>
F = mg
BLOCX CONSTRAINED BY GUIDE 
MOVES UNDER GRAVITY
X XC IS COULOMB FORCE INTRODUCEDV \ TO DO THE SAME JOB AS THE BOTTOM
/  J RAIL OF THE GUIDE
xc F = mg
S1 ADJUSTED TO STOP THE MOTION
/ IXc F = mg
FIG.7B ILLUSTRATING HOW A COULOMB FORCE CAN REPLACE 
A MECHANICAL FORCE
49j am taking it that the conventional theory of electrostatics is uncontroversial
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How can i t  be said that\ in the intersection o f these domains, 
the Couiomb force and the gravitationai force do not e iis t  and  
that Couiomb 's 1aw and the iaw  o f gravitation iie  ? I claim that 
Cartwright is mistaken when she says of our forces F and X respectively:
'For the force of size aad the force of size q ^ /r ^  are not real
occurrent forces. In interaction, a single force occurs - the force ve call the 
resultant’ - and this force is neither the force due to gravity nor the
electric force’5°
What I have established in these simple cases can be generalised : 
vary the magnitudes and directions of F and X; let them be different 
types of forces (electrostatic, magnetic, electromagnetic, hydrostatic, 
viscous, aerodynamic,....); the account is the same. Where there is 
interaction among forces from  differen t domains, each force is 
rea i and th ey  combine according to the vector addition 
principie, ju s t as I  show ed fo r  m ovem ent to the north and  
m ovem ent to the east.
So, when confusions are removed, there is no problem about the 
reality of separate forces that act conjointly or of motions that take place 
conjointly. And that being so, Cartwright's case seems to me to fail.
In her exposition, Cartwright rejected the idea of super laws 
attributable to the unity of nature. Now where there is interaction among 
forces from different domains, each force, as we have seen, is real and the 
forces combine according to the vector addition principle. That principle 
is a paradigm of a super law. Combined with Newton's second law it is 
extraordinarily powerful: when forces interact, add them vectorially and 
equate to the time rate of change of the momentum vector. These two 
fundamental laws thus conjoined, and supplemented by the other 
fundamental or phenomenological laws characterising any particular 
situation, will describe accurately what happens in that situation.
For example (Fig.8) write down the phenomenological laws that 
describe the thrust of a rocket motor, the viscous drag on the vehicle, the 
aerodynamic lift, the air buoyancy and the weight; sum the forces 
vectorially and equate to the time rate of change of the momentum 
vector, recalling that the mass varies with time as the fuel burns, and
5°op. cit; p.60
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that there is a reaction on the rocket from the ejected gas; solution of the 
resulting equations gives the vehicle’s motion through the atmosphere.
Because the forces involved vary with air density, they change with 
altitude and temperature, and a solution of the equations throughout the 
trajectory represents a sizable computing task. But that task can be 
accomplished and its achievement is based on the phenomenological laws 
mentioned, in conjunction with Newton s second law of motion and the 
vector addition principle. For fu tu re  reference, notice particularly  
how  various causal factors and the corresponding 
phenomenological Jaws combine in a total theoretical c o n te i t . 
Therein lie the germs of one of the arguments I develop later against 
holding Thesis 1 and Thesis2 concurrently.
The principles outlined for explanation of the rocket s progress 
through the atmosphere serve equally well for cases without number-e.g., 
at the sub-microscopic level, for Millikan's classic oil drop experiment to 
determine the charge of the electron.5i Here, Fig.9, the electron falls 
under the weight of the droplet to which it is attached, but it is restrained 
by air buoyancy and by viscous damping that limits the velocity of fall to 
a measurable terminal value; when the electric field is applied, the 
droplet begins to rise and reaches a new value of terminal velocity. 
Viscous damping is accounted for by Stokes’ (phenomenological) law, and 
all the quantities required for vector addition and the application of 
Newton's second law are calculable. A value for the charge of the electron 
is found by solving the resulting equation in which that constant is the
51 See, for example, Richards J.A. Sears F.W, WehrM.S and Zemansky M.W; 
M odern C ollege P h ys ic s , Addison- Wesley; 1962; pp 403-409.
LIFT BDOTAJJCT
FIG.8 FORCES ACTING ON ROCXET
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only unknown.52
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2.6.3 The Ground State of the Carbon Atom
As a further example of the sort of problem Cartwright sees arising from 
the simultaneous operation of different causes, she refers to the way in 
which the energy levels in the ground state of the carbon atom are 
calculated (Fig.10):
(a) is the level resulting from the central field approximation;
(b) shows the three levels that result from adding to the 
Hamiltonian a perturbation term that leads to a more 
accurate representation of the total Coulomb field;
(c) depicts fine structure consequent on the addition to the 
Hamiltonian of a further perturbation term that takes 
account of spin-orbit interaction
Cartwright s main difficulty is to do with the move from (b) to (c) and, 
in particular, with the fact that the 3P level of (b) is not realised as an 
energy level at all because the spin-orbit interaction is inescapably 
operative. If I understand her correctly, she regards the case as
52For the record let us note that Millikan s result in 1917, based on the calculations 1 
have described, for a quantity which is measured in the order of 10" ^  coulomb, vas 
about 0.5^ lov.
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illustrative, on the one hand, of how an illuminating explanation can be 
provided via combination of causes (Coulomb force and spin-orbit 
coupling), and, on the other, of how a problem arises as soon as an 
attempt is made to articulate a law stating the role of the Coulomb forces 
in establishing the energy levels. She rejects possible statements of the 
law such as:
'Whenever a Coulomb potential is like that in the carbon atom, the three 
energy levels pictured in (b) occur'53,
in which, expressions such as 'like that in the carbon atom' and the three 
energy levels pictured in (b)* stand in for the precise mathematical 
descriptions available in the quantum mechanical treatment. Such 
statements will not do, she says, because the case of the carbon atom is 
nothing less than a counter-example to them:
'It has a Coulomb potential of the right kind, yet the five levels of (c) occur, 
not the three levels of (b)' 54
<S «So
(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 10 ENERGY LEVELS OF GROUND STATE OF 
CARBON ATOM
53cartwright; op. cit; p.6S 
5 i^bid
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It seems to me that Cartwright should have rejected her attempted
formulation on other grounds. Since the spin-orbit interactions are
unavoidably present they cannot be neglected in any acceptable
formulation. We can readily see this when we appreciate that the only
legitimate way of talking about (b) would require, not what Cartwright
writes, but rather something along these lines:
"Whenever a Coulomb potential is like that in a hypothetical carbon' atom, 
vh ich  differs from a real carbon atom in that spin-orbit interactions are 
discounted, then the three energy levels pictured in (b) occur”
Why (b) is not realised is just because the corresponding hypothetical 
atom does not exist. We only get to a real atom of the sort we are trying 
to talk about when we get to (c), and then both laws operate conjointly. 
Indeed, unless they did, we could not get to (b). The problem of 
formulating the Coulomb law in this case disappears as soon as we realise 
that the physical circumstances we are trying to encompass 
necessitate formuiation o f the operative Jaws conjointly. Put 
another way, in the case we are treating we are dealing with no real atom 
unless the Hamiltonian, in our presentation of it, contains all three 
components. In this total context the laws have their usual formulations, 
a fact which is reflected in the way the full Hamiltonian is spelt out.
We should note that the spread of the 3p ground state due to spin- 
orbit interaction^ amounts to dispersion over only 43cm-1 and that, 
correspondingly, emission caused by the transition 5S-3P consists of a 
multipiet56 occupying the waveband 2964.8 to 2967.2 A0. An instrument 
of high resolving power would be required to separate out three lines as 
closely spaced as this. Instruments of lesser quality would yield spectra 
conforming to a ground state like that of (b), thereby obscuring the 
observational evidence that would otherwise call for introduction in our 
theory of the spin-orbit interaction. Whilst at first sight such low 
resolution data might be thought to give something like existential status 
to (b) and so to solve Cartwright’s problem about the role of Coulomb 
forces in this case, a little further thought shows that this 'solution' is 
illusory. This is so because there would remain the problem of accounting
55ßransden B.H. and Joachain C.J.; P hysics o f  Atoms and Molecules, Longman; 
19S3;Fig.7.8;p.34S
5^Kuhn H.G.; Atomic Spectra  ; Second Edition; 1969; Longman; Fig.v.18; p.314
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for the line width actually observed, and that question would not be 
settled till we had moved on to (c).
2.7 Approximations that improve on Laws
The fourth argument based on our explanatory practice is that our 
procedures, far from being consistently in strict accord with the dictates 
of fundamental laws, often take those laws as mere starting points; 
convergence on the truth in concrete situations then results from ad hoc 
fiddling to improve on what the laws state; in these cases the laws cannot 
literally be true. If we subscribe to the generic-specific account of 
explanation, then any approximations in our procedure should detract 
from the truth. But, says Cartwright, what we generally find in practice is 
that approximations take us both away from theory and simultaneously 
closer to the truth. She illustrates with two examples.
2.7.1 Explanatory Practice and the Transistor Amplifier
The first example (Fig.l 1A) concerns the gain of a single transistor 
amplifying stage at a frequency of 2kHz. The example is important not
SCHEMATIC CIRCUIT FO UIV AIEN T T CIRCUIT
•GAIN = | Ayl
= R^Ue + (!■&-*%)( 1 -OC)} =72 
N B. THIS IS  CARTWRIGHTS EQUATION ( 6 .3 )
•Ay MEASURED = 44
*IAV| = R L/ ( r e + ( r b ♦ R ^ X l-O C )  ♦  r Cj)
NÜ. THIS IS  CARTWRIGHTS EQUA TION ( 6 .5 )
FIG .I 1A TRANSISTOR CIRCUITS
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only in relation to the truth or falsity of fundamental laws but also as a 
case to be considered under Thesis3. Our interpretation of it needs to be 
right. To show the sorts of issues involved in my dispute with Cartwright 
about the analysis of this case I will go into it in some detail.
Cartwright shows how the given amplifier can be modelled in two
ways- engineers call her models equivalent circuits'. She says:
'theoretical estimates (based on the models) are often grossly inaccurate due 
to specific causal features present in the actual circuit, but missing from the 
models' 5? (parenthesis added)
She identifies two such features for this case. One i s :
the inaccuracy of the transistor model due to some undiagnosed 
combination of causal factors' 58 f
attributed in this case to the resistance re The other is the omission of a 
resistance rcl to take account of leakage in the bypass electrolytic 
capacitor in the emitter circuit.
Measurements, she says, are made on the amplifier or its components 
to introduce correction factors in the original theoretical equation for the 
amplifer gain as deduced from the model59. Specifically
(6.3) Gain = RL/{re + (rb ♦ Rs)(l - a)) 
is modified to
(6.5) Gain = RL/(re + (rb + Rs)( 1 - a) + rC|)
When that is done the expected gain becomes 47.5 (cf. gain of 72 as 
originally estimated), and close enough to the measured value of 44 for 
many practical purposes.
Cartwright now sums up60 :
‘Let us now look back to see that this procedure is very different from what 
the generic-specific account supposes. Ve start vith a general abstract 
equation (6.3); make some approximations; and end vith (6.5), vhich gives 
rise to detailed phenomenological predictions. Thus superficially it may look 
like a D-N explanation of the facts predicted. But unlike the covering laws of 
D-N explanations, (6.3) as it stands is not an equation that really describes 
the circuits to which it is applied. (6.3) is refined by accounting for the 
specific causal features of each individual situation to form an equation like 
(6.5). (6.5) gives rise to accurate predictions, whereas a rigorous solution to
57Cartvright; op. cit; p.lOS 
5&op. cit; p.109
59See Fig.l 1A for interpretation of symbols; see also my p.45. N.B. It is not 
necessary to be knowledgeable about circuits to follow the essence of the dispute 
6 ° N .B . Equations (6.3) and (6.5) are also reproduced on Fig.l 1A
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(6.3) vould be dramatically mistaken.......................... the improvements (to
(6.3) ) come at the wrong place for the defender of fundamental laws. They 
come from the ground up, so to speak, and not from the top down. We do not 
modify the treatment by deriving from our theoretical principles a new 
starting equation to replace (6.3). It is clear that we could not do so, since 
only part of the fault is diagnosed. What we do instead is to add a 
phenomenological correction factor, a factor that helps produce a correct 
description, but that is not dictated by fundamental law.'^1 (underlined 
parenthesis added)
1 want later to consider the question of which fundamental laws, if 
any, are falsified in this case. Before that, there are a few matters 
requiring comment. First, I am puzzled at the description of what we did 
between starting with equation(6.3) and finishing with (6.3) as the 
making o f some approiimations. What was done was to include a 
missing term  and correct an e iis ting  one - two operations which, 
given how they were carried out, we would not normally regard as the 
making of some approximations’. The point is important in the contexts of 
explanatory practice and the D-N and the simulacrum models which we 
will be discussing in §4. It is important because, when distinctions that 
properly characterise actual cases are blurred in this way and lumped 
together in a class, Approiim ations that im prove on L aw s , the 
evidence that is supposed to support the classification is exaggerated 
beyond its proper bounds and subsequent inferences may look more 
respectable than otherwise warranted.
Secondly, some comments are necessary on the narrative as one 
about explanatory practice. Cartwright 's account reads as though it  
re fers  to the practice o f eiectronic engineers, i t  is on that basis 
that I  deveioped m y  fir s t criticism . Later I discovered, for reasons 
unrelated to her presentation, that another interpretation of her account 
is required, and I will turn to that after I have considered the first one.
If we are addressing electronic engineering practice, then any need  
to m odify equation(6.3) retrospective iy  to inciude the 
resistance o f the eiectroiytic bypass capacitor in the emitter 
circuit at 2kHz signifies a lack of competence on the part of the eiectronic 
engineer who drew out the equivalent circuit in the first place. Any
6*op. cit; pp 110/111
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number of textbooks make the point clear. Terman62, for example, in
discussing circuit elements says :
The action of a capacitor in an electrical circuit is taken into account by 
replacing the actual capacitor v ith  a perfect capacitor associated v ith  a 
resistance'
About electrolytic capacitors he remarks:
'Compared v ith  capacitors of the solid dielectric type, electrolytic capacitors 
have a very high pover factor' [i.e. they introduce relatively high loss] 
and appreciable leakage conductance to the superimposed d-c potential'- 
(parenthesis added)
Similar lack of expertise would be shown by an engineer who failed to 
take account of inductive and/or capacitative effects if the amplifier were 
operating at radio frequencies; but such can be ignored at 2kHz. No doubt 
a measurement would be required to determine the actual value of the 
resistance rci to be inserted in (6.3), properly formulated. That is because,
in many cases including that of electrolytic condensors, we do not have 
theories about the detailed manufacturing processes of component parts - 
it suffices to achieve component values within the limits of specified 
tolerances. If more precise information is required, as is often the case 
when we use an equivalent circuit for accurate calculations, we can 
readily make measurements to that end. Something similar should also be 
said about RL and kindred resistances which may well have tolerances as
wide as 20% or as narrow as 0.1%.
We may take it that allowance should have been made from the start 
for including rcl in (6.3), but, for the reasons I have given, we would
normally expect a measurement to be made to determine what precise 
value to use. So we should properly start with (6.5).
What Is to be said about the need  to fidd le  rg which, according 
to Cartwright, should have a theoretically specified value of kT/qIe , i.e. 
approximately 25.9/Ie at room temperature? On the basis of my
argument above we should take equation (6.5) as our starting point, and 
ponder the significance of the modification to re , viz. the change from 
25.9/Ie to 3O/I0. Since, here, I8 =■ 1 miliiampere our aim is to see how our 
theory could give us a value for r8 of 25.9 ohms when the 
phenomenological requirement seems to be for a value of 30 ohms. It will
62TermanF.S.; E lec tro n ic  an d  Radio E n g in e e r in g ; McGrav-Hill; 1955; p.25. 
p29
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be asserted in what follows immediately below (though not in what 
comes later) that there is some doubt whether this figure of 30 ohms 
should be accepted. Cartwright does not say how it was derived. In 
principle it is calculable from the transistor performance curves, but one 
author at least warns of the difficulty involved.6^
The following remarks are based on discussion64 with a friend, G.J. 
Johnson, who has spent many years at an Australian university teaching 
the theory and practice of electrical engineering measurements. He agrees 
with me that an engineer who failed to take account of rCJ at the outset
would be lacking in professional competence. He is familiar with the case 
at issue here, namely the small signal voltage gain of a common emitter 
amplifier stage. For such a circuit, with attention to detail and after 
measurements on components, he would expect to begin with an equation 
like (6.5) and to have the theoretical gain agree with the measured gain 
within 1-2%. He doubts that an increased value for r8 would constitute a
proper explanation of the present discrepancy. I suggested that the 
explanation might lie in non-ideal behaviour of the transistor, allowed for 
by some authors65 by introducing a parameter n, [1< n<2], such that 
re - nkT/qIe. n= 1.15 would do the trick here, but Johnson's experience
has consistently accorded with a value for n very close to 1.0 . He said 
that (6.5) as it stands omits contact resistance (as much asl ohm) 
between the external wiring and the emitter, and that rb could be as high
as 200 ohms; conceivably, we could account for 1.5 to 2 ohms of the 
missing 4 ohms in this way. However, without doing detailed  
m easurem ents the reason fo r  the discrepancy between  
m easured and caicuiated gain wouid have to s tay  unset tied.
Now what about iaws ? Cartwright does not claim explicitly that 
any nominated law has been falsified. Indeed she does not enumerate the 
laws that are involved. When we attend to the matter we identify the 
following : Ohm s iaw, Kirchhof Ns iaws, Th even in s theorem,
^Hunter L.P. (ed.); Handbook o f  Sem iconductor E lec tron ics ; McGraw-Hill; 
1956; p. jU-20. [ Note that, in Hunter s notation, re-hbc /h cc, and it is concerning
these two parameters that he issues the caution; so much the worse then for the 
ratio]
^Oral and written communication
65e.g. Carroll J£.; P h ysica l Models fo r  Sem iconductor D evices; Edward 
Arnold; 197-4; p.69
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Norton 's theorem, and such laws as describe the behaviour of the 
transistor and circuit components.
Clearly Ohm's law and Kirchhoff s laws are not at any risk here, nor 
is Thevenin's theorem, nor is Norton s theorem.66 Can the difficulty be 
traced to some failure to meet the requirement for linearity? In this 
case, no; the constraint is satisfied by the stipulation that operation is 
restricted to small-signal performance. In the unlikely event that we 
were in any doubt on this score, we could do an experiment to resolve the 
matter and/or to establish the limits on signal amplitudes within which 
linearity would be preserved. But, the whole point of talking about 
small-signal performance is precisely to ensure linearity.
Finally we are left with laws describing the behaviour of the 
transistor and other components. Here we could, if we wished, adopt a 
purely phenomenological approach and measure the impedances, open- 
circuit voltages and short-circuit currents that are needed by Thevenin's 
and Norton s theorems to give us the equivalent of the transistor 
regarded as a black box’67 If we were to proceed thus, there would seem 
to be nothing to go wrong. The problem is that the result on its own 
would not be very useful. We need descriptions of the transistor that 
suffice for us to determine how to use it in countless applications, and to 
be confident about the performance that will be achieved in each case.
So, in any particular application, we start from families of curves 
detailing the steady state performance of a particular transistor. From 
these curves (e.g. Fig.l IB) we settle the operating conditions and the 
limits of excursion of the signal voltages and currents, and ensure that, in 
use, the transistor behaves linearly. At this point we find it convenient to 
derive an equivalent circuit, since such is useful for the calculation of 
parameters that we need for design and/or understanding of 
performance, e.g. current-, or voltage-gain, and frequency response.
66Th6venin‘s theorem tells us how we may replace a linear two-terminal electrical 
network with a voltage source and a series impedance; Norton s theorem tells us 
how to replace such a network with a current source and a parallel impedance. 
These theorems allow us to produce equivalent circuits. The engineer who forgot to 
provide for the resistance of the electrolytic bypass capacitor at 2 kHz used the 
wrong impedance in his equivalent circuit and, so to speak, broke the law.
67e.g. Riddle R.L and Ristenbatt M.P; Transistor P h ysics and Circuits, Prentice 
Hall; 1958; pp 109 etseq.
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The obvious way to derive an equivalent circuit, as distinct from the 
black box' method, is to try to simulate the transistor by 1:1 modelling of 
the relevant electrical components. That is what Cartwright's T-circuit 
attempts to do : Rs represents the internal resistance of the signal (Vs) 
source, re is the resistance of the emitter junction, rc that of the collector 
junction and rb that of the base region; a l e as a current source gives
expression to the current-amplifying characteristics of the transistor, and 
Ii ,Ie and I2 are the input current, emitter current, and load current
respectively. But the fact is that we do not have a theory to tell us what 
rb and rc should be in particular cases.
FIG. 1 IB  COLLECTOR CHARACTERISTICS FOR A
GROUNDED-EMITTER JUNCTION TRANSISTOR 
(ILLUSTRATIV E ONLY)
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We do have a theory that yields the earlier mentioned value for re, viz. 
kT/qIe, which is derived by consideration from basic principles of the 
mechanism and magnitude of current flow in the transistor.68 In the light 
of the earlier discussion any hypothesis that the present case shows that 
theory to be wrong would remain to be settled.
What then are we to conclude ?
1. 1 reiterate that the omission of rcl from (6.3) represented merely 
lack of professionalism of the electronic engineer concerned.
2. Why the total resistance in the denominator of (6.5) is too low is 
unresolved; I showed how the total might reach about 46 ohms 
compared with the 48 ohms that Cartwright would have if we 
were to allow her to lift re as she does; to get to within the
accuracy of 2 \  that expert judgment says is possible, we need a 
value of about 51 ohms; why we cannot do so remains unclear.
3. If our theory about re were wrong, it could mean, not that our 
basic laws are false, but rather that we have an incorrect 
understanding of how current flows in this particular 
transistor.
4. Our theory does not, on its own, reach down from fundamental 
laws to concrete transistor performance; it lacks specific data on 
certain component parameters; the reason for this I have stated.
5. Where we lack adequate data on components we may have to do 
the necessary measurements; but this is not in any way a case of 
fiddling the account after the manner suggested by Cartwright.
6. Once we have the data our model will usually cope; contrary to 
Cartwright s claim that we have to fiddle the books, all we have 
to do, working from the base up, is to supply missing data or 
improve the accuracy of woolly information; we do not aim to 
have detailed theories about everything, and this is particularly 
true about individual component values.
7. It is not proven that any fundamental law has been falsified in 
this case. The only possible candidate for falsification is the law
^e.g . Carroll Jü; P h ysica l M odels.....; pp 61.62,66, 68,69 .
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for the emitter resistance of a transistor, re = kT/qIe , and, for 
the reasons given, we cannot make any judgment about that.
For some time after I had written the foregoing I retained a nagging 
suspicion, despite my respect for Johnson s views, that the explanation of 
the remaining discrepancy in the total resistance in the denominator of 
(6.5) might lie in the factor n to which I referred above. Over a period 1 
scanned through many books on semiconductors in the hope that 
something might come to light. Well it did, in one of the books that 
Johnson suggested I might usefully consult. It was not exactly what I 
expected, for it turned out to be the very example that Cartwright used 
without giving the reference.
J.F.Gibbons^ employs it to show how transistor gain varies with 
frequency, and what is involved in determining the frequency response 
at low, mid and high frequencies, 2kHz being within the mid range. The 
preface to the book tells us quite specifically at whom the book is aimed:
' The maturity level assumed at the outset is that of a beginning junior in 
electrical engineering or physics. 70
An important element of the approach adopted is that of teaching via 
experiment. It is against this background that Gibbons procedure should 
be understood. Students here learn by experiment that electrolytic 
condensors have resistance and that their capacitances can differ 
markedly from their nominal values.
They also learn from additional eioerim en ta l material that Gibbons 
provides that the type 2N324 transistor, the one we now discover to be at 
issue in Cartwright s case, has a characteristic which is properly 
expressed by the equation, re=30/Ieohms. In explanation of this last
mentioned point, Gibbons refers the student to an earlier part of his 
book71 where he has discussed emitter efficiency in real transistors' and 
where the factor n, to which I had been looking hopefully, features as the 
relevant causal parameter. Gibbons has it that setting n=1.2 would fit the 
data, and, given his procedure for determining re, he must be taken as
being right about this. In my speculations I had suggested n - 1.15 in the
^Gibbons JT .; S em iconductor Electronics-, McGraw-Hill; 1966; p.492 etseq. 
7°op. cit; p.vii 
71op. cit, p.339
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context of other possible contributions to the extra resistance required in 
the denominator of (6.5), but such are not mentioned by Gibbons.72
From this new perspective on the transistor amplifier, there are, 1 
think, four conclusions to be drawn :
1. If Gibbons is right about emitter efficiency, then, along with the 
other laws earlier nominated, the law for emitter resistance is 
confirmed rather than falsified;
2. It is nevertheless the case that allowance for transistor 
inefficiency, reflected in the parameter n, will usually be 
determined experimentally; that is, in specific cases we will look 
for a phenomenological factor to fill out the general law;
3. The final discrepancy between calculated gain (46) and 
measured gain (44) remains unresolved; since the example is not 
presented by Gibbons as a critical test of theory, and since he 
quotes no probable error figures, we may care to believe that 
the results obtained reflect unspecified experimental errors;
4. Most importantly, we should note that there is an inherent 
vagueness in the term eip ianatory practice. Gibbons' 
explanatory practice to some extent exhibits the characteristics 
that Cartwright identifies. The trouble for her is that this 
particular practice is dictated by context of, and motivation for, 
writing in that way. But the eip ianatory practice 
e iem p lified  in the workings o f a professional engineer 
is  d ifferen t - he does not make the in itia i m istakes o f  a 
beginning junior in eiectricai engineering or p h y s ic s ' 
and, in the normal course of events, his equation for the gain of
a transistor amplifier will be right within expected limits the 
first time he commits himself to it. He may well do some 
measurements before he reaches commitment, but this in no 
way entails the falsification of fundamental laws nor comprises 
ad hoc fiddling with them to get agreement between calculation
72If the speculation were right about the latter increments, then these (with 
Gibbons' value for re) would give a total figure of about 30 ohms for the
denominator of (6.5), in which case the calculated gain would be 46 compared with 
Gibbons' 47.3 and a measured gain of 44, still outside the accuracy figure expected 
by Johnson but perhaps close enough in the circumstances.
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and measurement. It does no more than acknowledge the fact of 
(limited) variability in manufactured products.
2.7.2 Eioonential Decay
This is Cartwright's second example instancing the fourth type of 
explanatory practice, (j)ii, which supposedly points to the falsity of 
fundamental laws.
Here I do not quarrel with her description of our procedure as one of 
making approximations. What I assert is that the example seems to 
support the argument only because the question at issue is  begged  
at the start.
In brief, Cartwright's claim is as follows :
* real decay is exponential - there is a wealth of experimental 
evidence in support;
* quantum mechanics, rigorously applied, gives a decay law which 
includes one or more very small terms that would cause a small 
departure from what otherwise would have been exponential;
* we can carry out a quantum mechanical calculation which 
incorporates specified approximations and concludes with 
a strictly exponential form for decay;
* therefore, theory strictly applied gives the wrong result; but, 
subject to somewhat delicate approximations', we can arrange 
to get the right result; that is to say, the laws as they stand lie, 
and, only by fiddling them, do we get them to come out right.
That is the account as presented, and it accords with the expectation 
aroused by the argument that it was supposed to support. But we also 
learn that any experiment to discriminate between purely exponential 
decay on the one hand, and exponential decay modified by the small non­
exponential factors that rigorous quantum theory would dictate on the 
other, is faced with the problem that
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‘This is indeed a very difficult question to test * 73.
Quoting one experimenter, Cartwright reveals that
non-exponential effects should not occur before roughly 200 half-lives.
In this example (Mn^6), as with aU the usual radioactive decay materials, 
nothing observable should be left long before the end of the exponential
region.’7^
The experimental difficulty is apparent when we note that, after 200 
half-lives, the intensity of radiation from any particular sample would 
have decayed to some 10~60 times its original level.
The conclusion we should draw is that we do not know  what the  
reaJ truth  Is at aJJ\ it was quite wrong to assume at the beginning that 
an exponential decay law constitutes real truth; if it did, then Cartwright 
would have been right; but if, on the other hand, the truth is as rigorous 
quantum mechanics dictates, then she is wrong.
Now it is true that Cartwright makes an attempt to divert the reader 
from drawing this conclusion, by invoking the criterion of simplicity:
"The fact remains that the data, together with any reasonable criterion of 
simplicity (and some such criterion must be assumed if we are to generalise 
from data to laws at ail) speak for the truth of an exponential law"75
What, we might reply, is the warrant for deciding the issue in this way? 
There is no known metaphysical ground which prohibits the 
generalisation from data to complex laws. In any event, the basic issue in 
this case is not one about inductive generalisation, but rather one about 
deduction within a theory. We cannot rule against the truth of such 
deduction merely because we have a practice and a predisposition in 
inductive generalisation to choose the simpler of two possible theories. 
There are any number of cases in classical physics where simple 
expressions must be complemented by the second or higher order terms 
that theory dictates if we are to expect agreement between theory and 
phenomena. There is no good reason to suppose that the case is different 
here. Cartwright then has no warrant to suppose that the example 
supports her case against the truth of fundamental laws. Moreover, let it 
be remembered that, so far, the unexpected and even the bizarre 
consequences of quantum mechanics seem to have turned out to be right.
73Cartwright; op. cit; p.l 18
7<*ibid; p.118
75op.cit; p.113
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It would be a bold person indeed who, looking back over the record, 
would take the risk of betting against quantum theory in this particular 
case.
§2.8 Conclusion
Let us now turn back to the structure of the argument 76 at §2.3 and 
summarise my claims:
* the argument from principle and the multiplicity of theoretical 
treatments, namely {(a) to (d)} and ((e) with (f)i), has failed;
* the argument of (e). and {(f)ii and (f)iii), has failed;
* (g) with (h) is not disputed, since the conjunction is irrelevant 
to the main questions at issue here;
* (j)i is refuted by Snell's law, the example Cartwright gave at 
(f)ii in support of (e), where it failed in that purpose;
* (j)ii is not sustained by the examples quoted at (k). I go on to 
demonstrate when I consider Thesis 3 below that the transistor 
amplifier example confirms the Grünbaum model.
1 will consider (j)iii in §4.2
7^See my ppl2-14
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§3. THESIS 2 : THAT CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS CAN ENSURE TRUTH ;
THAT, WHEN THEY DO, THE CORRESPONDING 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL LAWS ARE TRUE ;
THAT THEORETICAL ENTITIES INVOKED IN CAUSAL 
EXPLANATIONS ARE REAL.
3.1 Cartwright's Account in Summary
We return to an important issue : Cartwright s belief that causal 
explanation meets the van Fraassen challenge to show how explanation 
conveys truth.
Recall her view that the practice in physics of using a proliferation of 
theoretical accounts for a given phenomenon entails the falsity of the 
theoretical laws involved.
She contrasts theoretical explanation with causal explanation in an 
example - quantum damping and the broadening of spectral lines1.
There, she says, we find six different theoretical treatments with six  
differen t laws for the one phenomenon, but we identify only a single 
causai feature, the reaction of the radiation field on the atoms.
Earlier2, we mentioned the radiometer (Fig.3). Cartwright says it is 
now generally accepted that molecular forces induce vane movement, not 
radiation pressure from incident electromagnetic energy. Here, she 
believes, it would make no sense to accept alternative causal 
explanations. We use experiment to settle the issue when causal accounts 
compete, and in this case, for example, a well designed experiment would 
determine whether the vanes move in response to perpendicular 
bombardment of molecules on them or in response to tangential slippage 
of molecules around their edges -these, according to Cartwright, being the 
competing accounts currently in favour.
5We discussed this example earlier in S2.1 (p.9) and §2.4 (p.17)
2See the final paragraph of §2.1; and Fig.3; my p.10
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Such eiperimentai determination, she says, illustrates how a causal 
account both conveys truth and so answers the van Fraassen 
challenge, and also incurs ontological commitment '.
we have a satisfactory causal account, and so we have good reason to believe 
in the entities, processes and properties in question' .3
Taken generally, Cartwright believes that
'causal reasoning provides good grounds for our beliefs in theoretical 
entities'«.
So, for example,
we can believe in the unexpected theoretical entities of quantum 
electrodynamics if we can give them concrete causal roles'5
Her rejection of conventional realism, and the spirit of the 
anti-realism ' that she substitutes, are clearly articulated :
* ’no inference to best explanation, only inference to most likely cause ;6
* ' ..the propositions to which we commit ourselves when we accept a causal 
explanation are highly detailed causal principles and concrete 
phenomenological laws, specific to the situation at hand, not the abstract
equations of a fundamental theory';7
* In causal explanations truth is essential to explanatory success. But it is 
only the truth of low-level causal principles and concrete
phenomenological laws’.6
In contrasting causal and theoretical explanation, Cartwright 
tells us :
'....causes make their effects happen...... But equations do not bring about
the phenomenological laws we derive from them
and later;
causal claims are to be deemed true, but to count the basic explanatory laws 
as true is to fail to take seriously how physics succeeds in giving
explanations'1
and later again:
^Cartwright; op. cit; p. 6 
«ibid
5op. cit; p. 8 
6op. cit; p.6
V  cit; p.8 
sop. cit; p.10
V cit: P-76
10op.cit; p.77
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'An explanation of an effect by a cause has an existential component, not 
just an optional extra ingredient* 11,
a view contrasting starkly with her belief that truth is external to 
theoretical explanation.
To support the claim that causal explanation incurs an existential 
commitment, Cartwright cites the case of a droplet falling in an electric 
field12; the change from falling to rising is explained by its being 
electrically charged with positrons or electrons. She tells us that
’..the explanation has no sense at all without the direct implication that 
there are electrons or positrons on the ball* ^
We cannot see the electrons but
'there is the generation of other effects: if the ball is negatively charged. I 
spray it with a positron emitter and thereby change the rate of fall of the 
ball: positrons from the emitter wipe out the electrons on the ball. What I 
invoke in completing such an explanation are not fundamental laws of 
nature, but rather properties of electrons and positrons, and highly 
complex, highly specific claims about just what behaviour they lead to in 
this situation....I infer to the most probable cause, and that cause is a specific
item, what we call a theoretical entity.*14
Out of such considerations she concludes
Here then is an answer to the van Fraassen - Duhem question. What is 
special about explanation by theoretical entity is that it is causal 
explanation, and existence is an internal characteristic of causal claims.
There is nothing similar for theoretical laws'15
3.2 A Basic Objection
Critical issues here are whether causal statements in physics, 
like those to which Cartwright points and which she endorses 
as true, can stand independently of theory, or can credibly be 
derivative within an encompassing abstract theory which she 
rejects as false.
1 *op. cit; p.91
12This example is one with which we are already familiar - refer back to §2.6.2 
where I outlined Millikan's oil drop experiment for determining the charge of the 
electron; see my pp35/36 and Fig.9 
^op.cit; p.92 
^ibid
*5op. cit; p.93
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It is my contention that they cannot. Stated independently of theory, 
they may look plausible, but that is only because we forget how much 
theory we covertly take for granted when we make the pronouncements. 
Derived from theory, they are credible only because the theory is true.
In these remarks I also disagree with Ian Hacking who, as we shall 
see in Part 2, whilst being agnostic about the truth of theories, takes a 
realist view of theoretical entities that can be manipulated to affect 
something else,:
..one can believe in some entities without believing in any particular 
theory in which they are embedded'16
To an extent, then, the argument which follows is also directed against 
Hacking, but my primary target is Cartwright.
Consider Cartwright s conviction about the cause of action in the 
radiometer: drag round the edges of the vanes resulting from migration 
of real entities, molecules, from colder to hotter regions17. What are 
these molecules? To have them feature In com plei roles 
requires that we g ive an account o f them adequate to stand  as 
foundation fo r the actions into which they enter in our 
descriptions. What, then, are these molecules? At the least the answer 
has to indicate that they are composed of atoms. If it avoids such content, 
the issue is merely deferred, because inevitably the question will come: 
Oh, so the action is different because that radiometer has ammonia in it, 
and this one has nitrogen; are the molecules different?'.
And other questions follow: Why do atoms combine as they do to 
form the molecules they do, and why do other seemingly possible
combinations not occur?'....... What are atoms composed of?'....  How do
neutrons, protons, electrons... come to form atoms?'...... How big are the
different entities, and what shapes are they?'.... Cartwright would be
bound to confront such questions because she talks freely about these 
entities throughout the book. How can they be invoked  as real 
causes Independently o f a true story which unites them in a 
coherent wayr as does the sort o f abstract theory that 
Cartwright rejects?  How can it be coherently maintained (i) that these
^Hacking Ian; R epresen tin g  and in te rv e n in g , Cambridge University Press ; 
1983; p.29
17The details will be explained in S3.3 following, esp. pp65-67
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entities feature realistically in experiments which themselves could not 
be conceived outside the framework of abstract theory, and 
simultaneously (ii) that the theories, without which these experiments 
could not be, are in fact false?
Talk of the radiometer prompts other worries about Cartwright s 
account. Let me outline some. An important application of the instrument 
in the laboratory has been to measure the level of incident radiation. This 
usage requires that the speed of the vanes, or their deflection in 
opposition to a restraining torque, be related in a known or calculable 
way to the intensity of that radiation. Cartwright’s account, as it stands, 
would provide only part of the story. In addition to the causal role of the 
residual gas molecules in the partially evacuated instrument, we require 
a further story which connects the incident radiation and the movements 
of the molecules, and the whole package has to be upgraded to a 
quantitative one. Could Cartwright s story be tailored to m eet the 
requirem ent now  specified?  Yes; but, out of the way in which that 
could be done consistent with her views about causal explanation, there 
spring other worries, as I go on to show.
The black- box' method is the obvious approach: take the radiometer
to be a transducer, i.e. a device for converting radiant to mechanical
energy; calibrate it for known wave lengths and known levels of incident
energy; use the resulting curves for subsequent measurements. Look now
at what we could claim to have - (i) a causal story exemplified in the
relation between incident energy and mechanical action, the truth of the
relation verified in a long tradition of radiometer usage; and (ii) a set of
concrete phenomenological laws embodied in the calibration curves. The
case would seem to be paradigmatic of Cartwright’s view :
'In causal explanations truth is essential to explanatory success. But it is 
only the truth of lo w  le v e l  causal p r in c ip le s  an d  con cre te
p h en o m en o lo g ica l JavS ^  (my emphasis)
But here there are two difficulties for Cartwright. The first stems 
from the fact that the incident energy, for the electromagnetic spectrum 
extending through optical wavelengths on to the infra-red, seems to meet 
her criterion for the reality of a theoretical entity. Now, as we shall see in
I8Cartvright; op. cit; p.10
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§3.5, she rejects the reality of the electric field.19 For the moment we 
defer our argument against this rejection and merely note that the causal 
story just presented, conjoined to rejection of the field, seems to land her 
in a contradiction. The escape route would appear to require either (i) an 
account dissociating the relevant part of the electromagnetic spectrum 
from the domain of the electric field -but how could Cartwright provide 
this, given her views about theories? or (ii) a justification for exclusion of 
this particular entity from what would seem to be entailed by criteria 
that have been stated to apply without apparent exception.
The second difficulty arises from the fact that, contrary to what 
Cartwright says, radiation pressure  can be measured by a radiometer, 
as I show20 in §3-3. In the black-box’ model that I am using here, 
radiation pressure would then also qualify on her criteria as a real 
theoretical entity. While the concept of radiation pressure arises naturally 
in treatises on electromagnetic theory21, it is not apparent that sense 
could be made of it independently. Cartwright, as far as I can tell, would 
deny that sense has to be made of the concept independently, since she 
seems to hold that it is in order to use an explanatory theory, which she 
says is false, as context for conception of a theoretical entity which can 
then be projected into the world as real. For reasons elaborated in this 
section and the next I do not share her views. But, in any event, the first- 
mentioned difficulty lurks here too. Radiation pressure is a characteristic 
of the field, and if the field were not real, it would be hard to see how 
radiation pressure could be real. Or would radiation pressure too be freed 
from conformity with general principle?
But there is another side to my black-box’ causal account. I can 
formulate it credibly because I have available (i) an encompassing theory 
about the electromagnetic spectrum, which I claim to be true, and 
(ii) comfortably accommodated to that theory, a vast array of 
experimental data to do with particular wavelengths and intensities. But 
here there is no covert background taken for granted. The causai story
19See my pp81/82 
20See my pp63/64
21See. for example, Jeans J; The M athem atical T h eory  o f  E le c tr ic ity  an d  
M agnetism, Fifth Edition; Cambridge University Press; 19-46; Ch xviii. especially 
P-538.
See also Harn v e il G. P; P rin c ip le s  o f  E le c tr ic ity  an d  E lectrom agnetism  ; 
McGraw-Hill; 1938; Ch xvi, especially pp537-8.
[Part 1, S3] 58
is  credible because o f the theory in which it  is located. A nd  the 
theory is  credibie because o f other true causai stories which it  
comprehends and which apply in countless situations invoking  
the electromagnetic fie ld  - in short, because, I  believe, the  
theory is  true.
Now, in explanation of radiometer action, we would aim to do much 
better than we managed with the black-box' approach. We would 
expect to f i i i  in the phenomenoiogicaJJy-observed causai 
relation betw een radiation and vane rotation b y  a p re tty  much 
compiete theoretical/causal story anchored to the specifics o f  
the instrum ent in use. We would employ kinetic theory to relate 
radiation and molecular motion, fluid dynamics to accommodate viscous 
drag of the gas molecules on the vanes, and classical Newtonian 
mechanics to determine vane rotation; the phenomenological variables of 
the gas laws (pressure, temperature and volume) would be involved as 
part of the requirement to specify the particular case in hand, along with 
other specific factors that the general theory would call for.
Several causai stories are inextricably interw oven in this  
theoretical narrative. Thus the theory, spelt out in detail, should 
provide quantitative causal connections between radiation and gas 
motion, and between gas motion and drag on the vanes, for the spectrum 
of gas temperatures and pressures, and the spectrum of vane 
characteristics for which the radiometer works. In principle, these 
predictions could be checked both qualitatively and quantitatively in an 
appropriate experiment. C.W.F. Everitt, Cartwright tells us, hopes to do 
something on these very lines.
How would Cartwright react to my claim that causal accounts like 
hers only make sense within the context of the abstract theories that she 
declares to be false? It would seem encumbent on her to deny that there 
is any difficulty, for she must regard it as legitimate to make use of false 
explanatory theories to reach true conclusions about phenomena since 
that is what she actually does.
When she talks about the practice that she sees associated with causal 
explanation, however, she has an alternative. She says, for example,:
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'Our reasononing from the character of the effect to the character of the 
cause is always against a background o f  o th er knowledge  22 (my 
em phasis);
and, when discussing the reason why she thinks that a causal account 
does not involve the redundancy we find in theoretical treatments:
We begin with a phenomenon which, re la tive  to our o ther g en era l 
beliefs, we think would not occur unless something peculiar brought it 
about'23 (my em phasis);
and, in considering the grounds for acceptability of a causal hypothesis:
The fact that the causal hypotheses are part of a generally sa tisfac to ry  
explanatory th e o ry  is not enough since success at organising,
pred ictin g , and c la ssify in g  is  n e v e r  an argum ent fo r truth.'**
(my emphases)
She also stated in the quotation I gave earlier concerning the falling 
droplets in an electric field* 25 that what she invokes there in the 
explanation are not fundamental laws, but rather properties o f the 
theoretical en tities  and highly complex and specific claims about the 
behaviour occasioned in the particular situation described.
Note in passing that, in the last of the quotations in the preceding
paragraph, Cartwright parts company from Duhem who says:
when the experim en t ...confirm s the p red ic tion s obtained from  
our theory, we fe e l  s tren g th en ed  in our conviction that th e  
re la tion s estab lish ed  b y  our reason among abstract notions tru ly
correspond to re la tion s among th in g s '26 (my emphasis)
I will have more to say about this in my Part 3.
Now, as a credible alternative to discourse stemming from the truth 
of theories, I am in no way disposed to accept Cartwright’s talk, with its 
rejection of theories because they are supposedly false, and its 
consequential reliance on background knowledge', on general beliefs', on 
'satisfactory explanatory theory', and on properties' and behaviour' of 
theoretical entities. All of this latter talk seems to me to amount to 
nothing more than a thinly disguised but inadequate substitute for true 
theory. In innumerable cases in physics, causal accounts like those
22Cartwright; op. cit; p. 83/84 
23op. cit; p.76 
24op. cit; p. 98 
25See my p.34
2^For a detailed discussion see my Part3; §2.1; p.192 et seq., esp. p.195
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exemplified by the radiometer cannot be interpreted as involving merely 
talk of the alternative kind employed by Cartwright. Those accounts are 
litera lly  em bedded In abstract theories and, without the truth  
o f the theories and o f the laws comprehended b y  the theories, 
would lose their In tegrity  and/or their eip lanatory force 
and/or their justification. In the sequel I will move to justify these 
assertions by analysis of cases, letting the examples speak for themselves. 
Admission by Cartwright of the alternative way of talking bears 
testimony to the vacuity of causal talk on its own and amounts to covert 
reliance on a foundation which is overtly claimed to be false.
It might be thought that the argument I presented above in the 
example of the radiometer lacks force in demonstrating the inextricability 
of causal theories and abstract theories because it is to do with a merely 
speculative explanation. If so, the next two sections will, I believe, dispel 
any such reservation.
Before we move on, let us recall a case flagged earlier27 as relevant to 
the present issue : the rocket (Fig.8). There the vehicle's motion was 
determined by a multitude of causal factors : thrust from the motor; 
thrust from ejected spent fuel; viscous drag; aerodynamic lift; air 
buoyancy; vehicle weight, and mass change as fuel burns; air density. All 
of these causal factors are dynamic variables, so there is a potential 
infinity of states28 available to any rocket once launched.
Now make the example more complex by adding control and 
guidance. By the latter, I mean the provision of facilities for determining 
the rocket's position and motion at any time to permit corrections to be 
made via its control mechanisms in order to maintain a chosen course. 
Control might be effected aerodynamically by actuating ailerons, for 
example, or it might be effected by firing auxiliary rockets in accord with 
some program calculated to have the required effect. Several more causal 
factors thus intrude.
27See my pp34/33
28I use the vord 'state' to mean the set of variables necessary for specifying the 
rocket's position and motion at any moment
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Rockets thus launched and controlled can achieve their aims with 
startling accuracy. It is also possible to simulate their motions, and to do 
so with precision. In real life and in simulation, the causa] factors, 
ind ividually and severally, only make sense in the whole 
context It is my opinion that, if the theory comprehended were not 
literally true, such rockets would not be a practical possibility, nor would 
their simulation, on this complex scale and with this precision, be 
possible. /  appeal here, o f course, to grounds very much the 
same as does J.J.C. Smart in h is classic cosmic coincidence' 
argument which I  defend against Bas van Fraassen in Part 4.
3.3 The Radiometer - Other Objections
Cartwright makes considerable use of the radiometer example in Theses 2 
and 3, and it has an important place in Thesis 1, supposedly as an 
illustration of the contrast between causal explanation where only one 
account is allowed, and explanation via abstract theory where multiplicity 
of accounts is the norm.
I agree with Cartwright that, when physics accepts a particular causal 
explanation of a phenomenon, it does not then tolerate other different 
causal explanations of the same phenomenon. However, her discussion of 
the radiometer to illustrate this point is confused and, worse, misleading. 
It is confused because Cartright does not appreciate that the 
radiom eter calls fo r  the explanation o f a num ber o f d ifferent 
phenomena. It is misleading because the inaccuracy of the account 
makes it impossible to draw the real moral that characterises the case - 
namely that causal stories in physics often owe both their origin 
and their credibility to theories that are true.
I argue below that the radiom eter example serves Cartwright 
badly  because:
(a) in application to Theses 1 and 2, it exemplifies her confusion about 
the uniqueness of causal explanation proper to this case; 
supposedly incompatible causes turn out to have  
com plem entary roles in a coherent total story, a theory, 
within which in circumstances that are identified, they  
do in  fact act conjointly,
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(b) in application to Thesis2 it exemplifies the meagre and 
ground Jess nature o f such causaJ eipJanation when taken  
in jsoiation from  theory, and correspondingly, the 
inextricability of theory and causal explanation;
(c) in application to Thesis3 it supports the D-N model o f  
explanation rather than the simuiacrum m odel.
The reason for these disservices is, I believe, that Cartwright's 
account of the radiometer in its technical and historical aspects is in part 
incomplete, and in part confused. Putting matters straight and getting the 
right context for appraising her theses via the case of the radiometer will 
necessitate a somewhat lengthy excursion into technical territory. The 
diversion will turn out to be rewarding, I believe. M y plan is to 
demonstrate (a) and (b) in what foiiow s in §3, and to defer fc j  
tiil we come to consider The sis3  in  §4.
To begin with, anyone familiar with the physics and history of the 
radiometer is likely to be puzzled, while pondering over the story that 
unfolds throughout the book29, as to whether Cartwright is talking 
specifically about Crookes' radiometer or more generally about the forces 
that act, as a consequence of incident radiant energy, on bodies 
suspended in rarified gases. On either interpretation there appear to be 
confusions. The distinction is important as we shall see, and it would have 
been helpful to have had it drawn and one circumstance or the other 
nominated in particular places in the text as the subject of consideration.
According to Cartwright, three causal stories explaining radiometer 
action have competed in the past (this seems to point to the Crookes' 
radiometer) and two still do (I am not sure how to make sense of this, as 
will become apparent below). One was to do with radiation pressure, one 
with normal forces on the vanes, and one with tangential forces on the 
vanes. The first alternative, she says,
is now universally rejected'30,
29Cartwright; op. cit; pp 5, 7 , 11. 81-2, W -5  
3°Cartvright; op. cit; p.Sl
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and she quotes M. Goldman in support^*. This attribution of support could
make sense if she and Goldman were talking about the same thing in the
passage she quotes. It would be true of the Crookes' radiometer. It is not
true of the radiometer that Goldman was talking about at the time,
namely a radiometer with near perfect vacuum. What the quotation that
Cartwright invokes tells us is that a radiom eter, even  w ith  a perfect
vacuum (and so no gas molecules at all to produce normal or tangential
stresses) would not respond to the light pressure on a typical British
summer day ; more intense sources would have to be used' Goldman
adds (my underlining). But Goldman goes on to show that radiation
pressure can be measured by a radiometer, provided the gas pressure is
low enough and the light intensity high enough, and he speaks of the
work of Bell and Green32 in these terms:
But by careful technique, using radiometers suspended on torsion vires, 
exhibiting only tiny deflections, it vas possible to measure radiation 
pressure proper' (my emphasis).
Examination of the paper by Bell and Green suggests that there were good 
grounds for their belief, and Goldman s, that their experiments at a 
vacuum pressure which they took to be about 10-6 Torr33, but which may 
have been much lower, did indeed measure radiation pressure.
It would therefore seem mistaken to dismiss radiation pressure as an 
explanation of radiometer action. Perhaps we could account for the fact 
that Cartwright does this and that she does so correctly, if we were to 
assume that, in spite of initial unclarities and even if she is confused 
about Goldman s account, she is talking nevertheless about the Crookes’ 
radiometer. But then she would run into trouble from a different quarter, 
as I will show.
She tells us that
31‘A simple calculation shovs that on a typical British summer day. vh en  the sky is 
uniform grey (equally luminous all over) the torque from the black and silver 
faces exactly balance, so that for a perfect radiometer (i.e., a radiometer v ith  a 
perfect vacuum) no motion vould be possible'
-Goldman M .; The Radiometer revisited', in P hysics Education 1 3 ; 1978 ; 
p.428
32Bell M. and Green S. E.; On Radiometer Action and the Pressure o f  
Radiation \ in Proceedings o f  th e  P h ysica l Society  45. p.320; 1933
331 Torr - the pressure exerted by a column of Hg of height 1 mm 
-1333 dynes/cm2 a 1.3 x 10"3 atmosphere
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'..two explanations still c o n te n d '34 (my  emphasis).
Notice, in passing, that she now qualifies this statement by allowing the
possibility that the action might result from a combination of the two
causes at issue, tangential forces and perpendicular forces:
There is a sense in which Maxwell and Goldman may both be righ t the 
motion may be caused by a combination of tangential and perpendicular
stresses'35
Notice too that this concession contrasts starkly with her earlier claim 
that the three accounts that had initially been offered for the radiometer 
action were incompatible one with another and that
If one of these is adopted, the others are rejected*36
Let us overlook these inconsistencies and revert to consideration of
the two explanations now supposedly in contention. Of Maxwell and
Goldman, Cartwright asserts that
Each claims that the factor he cites' (according to Cartwright these are 
tangential stress and perpendicular stress respectively) is the single 
significant factor in bringing about the motion, and only one or the other
of these claims can be accepted'37 (parenthesis added)
We will look at the situation first from  Goldman 's point o f  view. 
He makes no claim that, prima facie, would put him at odds with 
Maxwell. Goldman has it that, at very low gas pressures, the radiometer 
responds to radiation pressure. At intermediate pressures it responds to a 
combination of (i) the effect of re-radiation by the vanes of absorbed heat 
energy, and (ii) the nett effect of molecular bombardments on, and 
molecular reflection from, the vanes. In Cartwright's terms, three causal 
factors, not one, are stated to be at work in this case. Goldman goes on to 
explain how, at higher pressures (i.e. relatively poor vacuums), 
characteristic of Crookes' experiments, complications of the sort 
mentioned by Maxwell begin to intrude - diffusion, gravitational effects, 
convection currents, pressure and temperature gradients. Goldman does 
not make the claim that Cartwright attributes to him. On the contrary, he 
acknowledges the correctness of Maxwell s approach in the Crookes'
34Cartwright; op. cit; p.82
35op. cit; p.82. Actually Maxwell's explanation is that the motion is caused by 
migration of molecules, a secondary effect resulting from tangential stresses in the 
gas
36op. cit;p.ll 
37op. cit;p.82
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pressure regime. So, if we take it that Cartwright s thesis is restricted to 
the Crookes’ radiometer, and that it was proper of her to dismiss 
radiation pressure as a cause of vane movement, we now discover that 
she has misconceived an opposition to Marweil stemming from Goldman.
If Goldman is the archetypal proponent of normal forces as causes in 
radiometers, as he is presented, then, viewed from Goldman's perspective 
and quite contrary to Cartwright’s attribution to him, there are no 
incompatible causal accounts to be resolved. There are just different 
accounts for different circumstances; in some of these, causes that 
Cartwright regards as incompatible and mutually exclusive do in fact act 
conjointly.
Goldman 's theoretical treatm ent o f  the case o f  interm ediate  
pressures illustrates clearly how  theory and causes become 
inextricably interw oven in  explanation  The kinetic theory of gases, 
classical electromagnetic theory and classical mechanics are all called 
upon here; the causal factors involved are radiation pressure, molecular 
motions at the boundary between a solid body and a gas in which it is 
immersed, and tangential and other Maxwellian stresses.
Bonus information that comes to hand includes that, in a typical 
situation at intermediate pressures, the energy removed from the vanes 
by radiation is some 1000 times that taken off by rebounding gas 
molecules, whilst the pressure exerted on the vanes by the gas molecules 
is some 10,000 times that due to the radiation; we learn too that re- 
radiation of heat becomes dominant as the cause of vane movement when 
the pressure drops towards 10"7-10"d Torr. These deductions are all 
presented as facts -predictions to be tested; and if they are eventually 
confirmed, it would surely stretch credibility beyond the limits of reason 
to maintain that the theory is nevertheless false. The deductions could  
not arise as predictions from  a threadbare causal explanatory 
system. They come only from  very complex theory applied to 
very specific situations, s tr ic tly  in accord with the D-N m odel o f  
explanation. We return to this latter aspect in §4.5.6 (p.l 17).
What is the picture we get from  Maxwell's perspective  ? Does he 
claim, as Cartwright asserts, that only one cause (i.e. migration of
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molecules due to tangential stress) is at work? The answer is y e s but 
in  the very restric ted  circumstances of limitation to (i) what I have 
called the Crookes' regime, and (ii) the physical case of non-uniformity in 
the gas caused by temperature differentials.
At the very beginning of his article, Maxwell says that he intends to 
restrict his attention to the situation in which
' the dimensions of the bodies must be of the same order of magnitude as a 
certain length \ .....'39
where x is near enough to the molecular mean path in the surrounding 
gas. He reiterates the point in the appendix to the paper where he turns 
his attention to the boundary conditions between a solid body and the 
gas, remarking that the calculations are
sufficient to determ ine approximately the principal phenom ena in  a gas  
which is  n o t v e ry  h ig h ly  r a r i f ie d ‘4® (my emphasis)
For the size of vanes that Crookes had been using in his 
experiments41, the lower limit of the gas pressures to which Maxwell s 
account applies is about 10-3 Ton*. The minimum pressure which Crookes 
claimed to have worked at was some 1(H Torr, but his experiments were 
for the most part conducted at pressures well above this, 3 xlO’2 Torr 
being typical. For this pressure regime Maxwell, using the kinetic theory, 
showed in a complex derivation that stresses in the bulk gas could not 
account for the motions of bodies immersed in it. In the process he also 
showed that normal stresses, if they were to act alone, could do so, but 
that tangential stresses had to be taken into account and, when this is 
done, no resultant stress is to be found within any surface in the gas. He 
went on to demonstrate that the motions could be explained as a 
secondary effect of gas flow at the boundary between gas and solid body 
via frictional forces associated with viscous drag and gas slippage over 
the surface; flow at the interface would be occasioned by inequalities of 
temperature there or by viscous drag from gas flow nearby, and would 
be directed from colder to hotter parts.
3SMaxvell J.C.; On S tresses in  R a rified  Gases a r is in g  from  In eq u a litie s  o f  
Temperature', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Pt.l, 1879, p.231 
39ibid p.231 
40ibid p249/230
Crookes W.. 5 articles in The P h ilosoph ica l Transactions o f  the  R oyal 
Soc ie ty  . 164 Pt.2; 1874; p.301; 163 Pt.2; 1873; p.319 ; 166 Pt.2; 1876; p.323; 169 
Pt.l; 1878; p.243; 170 Pt.l; 1879; p. 87
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The edge-effect' to which frequent reference occurs subsequently in 
the literature is then the 'creep' of the gas round the edge of a vane from 
the colder (usually the white or shiny) side to the hotter (usually the 
blackened) side, causing a pull on the vane tangential to the strut which 
files it to the vertical aile about which the whole rotates. This, then, 
according to Maiwell, is how the radiometer works within the gas 
pressure regime spec ified . He went on to remark that external forces 
such as gravity could have effects on the flow and, in consequence, he 
mentioned the possibility of convection currents, such being more likely 
to occur in the circumstances of increased gas density at higher pressures. 
Convection currents are not excluded from the Maiwell regime but the 
effects, if any, in Crookes’ radiometer action are taken to be very small, 
and Maxwell s derivations ignore them.
We are now in a position to see that the full spectrum of radiometer 
action spans four well defined gas pressure regimes which, in order of 
increasing pressure, we may conveniently call:
* the radiation pressure regime
* the Goldman intermediate pressure regime
* the Maxwell regime (convection currents, if any, are very small)
* the convection regime (convection effects large).
If one were hazy about the full context now elaborated, it would be 
relatively easy to err by thinking that what Maxwell has to say could 
apply outside the regime he specified. We have already seen how 
Cartwright conflates the Maxwell and the Goldman regimes, and we will 
see later how, in her discussion of Woolworth's radiometers, she conflates 
the Maxwell regime with the convection regime.
The distinction between the Maxwell and the Goldman regimes is 
confirmed in the work of Martin Knudsen42 whose distinguished research 
in kinetic theory and rarified gases straddles the two. So accurate was 
Knudsen's theory for the regime, -10-3 to ~10-6 Torr, within which 
surface-effects* 4^  (rather than edge-effects) were shown to dominate, that
42See, e.g., Knudsen M.; The K in etic  Theory o f  Gsses, Methuen; second edition;
1934
43i.e. causes other than tangential stresses
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he w as able to design and construct an absolute m anom eter (that is, an 
absolute pressure measuring device) for laboratory use**. This 
in strum en t m easures the radiom etric forces', defined to be those that 
arise from  the bom bardm ent of a vane by gas molecules. In this case the 
bom bardm ent produces a pressure differential betw een the front face of 
the vane and the back, a normal stress that is not to be found at the 
higher am bient pressures considered by Maxwell. The vane is restra ined  
by a torsional force in the fibre by which it is suspended, and the angle at 
which the vane comes to rest can be shown from the kinetic theory to be 
directly related to the gas pressure. The quantities in this relationship can 
all be determ ined accurately by means independent of gas pressure, and 
for this reason the device is accorded the status of an absolute 
m anom eter, operating linearly in the range 10-3 to 1 O'6 Torr.
Reference to Goldman s paper shows that, at the low end of the scale, 
IO-6 Torr, the pressure m easurable by Knudsen's m anom eter stops well 
short of the point w here the forces on the vane caused by heat re ­
radiation  from it become significant. Gold man's expression for the 
differential pressure across the vane is identical w ith Knudsen’s. To a 
lim ited extent at the high end the range can be extended upward into the 
Maxwell regime by the inclusion of higher powers of the am bient 
pressure in the perform ance equation. According to Knudsen, at these 
higher pressures, edge effects of the type deduced by Maxwell begin to 
come into play and then  to dominate. Again Cartwright's two 
incom patible causes tu rn  out to be quite compatible; first one dominates, 
then  there  is a transition through the state w here  both are in play to that 
w here  the other dominates. Knudsen's presentation of his theoretical and 
experim ental work on the m anom eter^  and on radiom etric forces46 is 
particularly  lucid.47
Maxwell's claim, then, was tha t action in the Crookes' radiom eter is a 
secondary effect consequent on tangential stress in the gas, but his
44See, e g., YarwoodJ: High Vacuum T echnique ; Chapman and Hall; fourth 
edition; 1967; p.l 14 ; development of Knudsen's manometer by Dumond and Pickels 
45Knudsen; op. cit. pp 40 et seq.
46ibid pp 50 et seq.
47A very readable account of the absolute manometer and of radiometric forces in 
gases, together with an extensive bibliography, will be found in Loeb L. B; The 
K inetic  Theory o f  Gases, McGraw-Hill; second edition; 1934; Ch. VII
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treatment is restricted to only one of the four pressure regimes that we 
have learned to be relevant to radiometers. We may conclude that, if 
Goldman, Bell and Green, Knudsen, and Marweil are right, and there 
seems no reason to suppose otherwise, then, whether we are talking 
about radiometers in general or about only the Crookes' radiometer, it is 
misleading to assert that tangential stresses, normal stresses and 
radiation pressure are, as explanatory causes, incompatible and in 
competition. They are quite compatible and each has a proper place in the 
whole story.
So it seems to me that the radiometer case, as Cartwright invokes it, 
serves her poorly. Moreover, in the interpretation she offers there lurk 
some philosophical difficulties for her theses that we cannot let go 
unremarked.
Cartwright says:
The molecules in Crookes’s radiometer are invisible, and the tsn g en tid l  
stresses ere  n o t the k in ds o f  th in g s  one would h e re  expected to 
see in  the f ir s t  p iece. Yet, lik e  Everitt, I  be lieve  in  both. I believe 
in them because I accept Marvell's causal account of why the vanes move
around....' 48( my emphasis)
I have not been able to find in the text other grounds for the belief here 
expressed. Now Maxwell had good reasons for his. belief in the tangential 
stresses. After all, he had applied what he regarded as a true theory to 
the problem of explaining the motions in Crookes’ radiometers; he had 
first deduced  theoretically why normal stresses could not do the job; 
then, via the insight that the secondary effect of viscous forces attendant 
on gas flow might be responsible, he had fu r th er  deduced , through the 
importation of a phenomenological law to do with viscosity, that the 
tangential stresses in the gas could indeed provide an adequate 
explanation via the secondary effect mentioned.
Cartwright continues:
Tn producing this account, Maxwell deploys certain fundamental laws, such 
as Boltzman's equation and the equation of continuity, which 1 do not
believe in.'49
What, one m ight ask, is  i t  to assert b e lie f in  a causal sta tem ent 
and sim ultaneously to assert that elem ents essential to the
48Cartwright; op. cit; p.5 
49op. cit; p.6
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derivation o f the statem ent, the only ones that ju s tify  i t , are 
fa lse  ? Maxwell's reason for ruling out normal stresses is solely that, as 
a cause, theory rules them out; his reason for advocating tangential 
stresses, subsequent to the insight that suggested their possibility, is 
solely that, as a cause, theory makes them credible. Without the theory, 
Maxwell would have no reason for his conclusions. Cartwright wants to 
have the conclusions but reject the only grounds for them, without which 
they could be no more than whistles in the dark. If Everitt does the 
experiment to confirm Maxwell s views, as Cartwright says he hopes, 
then, should he measure tangential stresses, as presumably he will, 
Cartwright will have the very best grounds for her belief. But, as things 
stand, she is committing herself on blind faith. Maxwell's name and 
reputation will not serve her purposes here, because his grounds for the 
conclusions are nothing at all if they are not the theory that he used to 
establish them.
It seems that there is a related difficulty here for Cartwright. Given 
her views about abstract laws, namely that they apply only to objects in 
models, (and her views about models, of which we shall hear in §4), how 
is it determined that the tangential stresses are other than excess 
baggage collected on route, and how do we project the tangential stress 
from the model into the real gas in the evacuated Crookes' radiometer? 
Until the stress is actually measured, does Cartwright have any licence to 
give it physical status? Is not a ban on unproven theoretical entities 
implicit in the theses she advocates? If not, how, in the case of the 
Maxwell regime, does she justify on the one hand her affirmation of 
tangential stress as cause, which we would not have expected to see in 
the first place', and on the other her rejection of normal stress or 
pressure differential across the face of the vane, which we would have 
expected and indeed do find as the dominant factor in that part of the 
Goldman regime so thoroughly vouched for by Knudsens experiments?
3A Perrin and the Reality of Molecules
We now consider another of Cartwright's examples, Jean Perrin's 
arguments for the reality of atoms and molecules.50 she concentrates on
50Perrin Jean; A tom s ; translated by D. LI. Hammick; Constable, London; 1916
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the thirteen ways in which Avagadro's number was determined 
experimentally, and on the relatively small spread of the results (varying, 
from 75 xlO22 to 60 xlO22). The upshot, according to Cartwright, is that 
Perrin made an in ference to the most probable cause, an inference 
supported by the principle of coincidence:
' So much evidence of such & variety of kinds all pointing to the same value 
must surely convince us, urges Perrin, that atoms exist and that Avagadro's
hypothesis is true.....vould it not be a coincidence if each of the
observations was an artefact, and yet all agreed so closely about Avagadro's 
number?* 51
Quite specifically Cartwright rejects the idea that any inference to 
best explanation is involved :
* * P errin  does n o t make an in feren ce  to the best explanation
where explanation in clu des a n y th in g  from  th eore tica l law s 
to a deta iled  description  o f  how  the explanandum was
brought about'H  (my emphasis)
* ‘In each of Perrin’s thirteen cases we infer a concrete cause from a 
concrete e ffec t‘53
Cartwright's assertions in each of these two quotations are not correct.
In particular, as 1 show  in detail below , P err in  d id  p r e c i s e ly  w h a t
Cartwright, in the fir s t  o f the two quotations above, d en ies .
That she should get this wrong is all the more surprising when we find
her saying of the first of the thirteen ways :
‘ Perrin explicitly has this worry (that the result may be a mere artefact of
the experiment) about........( the method involving) the viscosity of gases,
which yields a value for Avagadro’s number via van der Waal’s equation and
the kinetic theory of gases’54 (parentheses added)
We can agree with her about the worry. But what Cartwright does not 
add is that, in the immediate sequel, Perrin prefaces his account of the 
extension of the gas laws to dilute solutions, in the context of his work on 
the Brownian motion (constituting the second to the fifth of the thirteen 
ways), in the following terms :
' 1 h ave sought in this direction ( i.e. possible application of the laws of 
perfect gases to emulsions composed of visible panicles) fo r  crucia l 
experim en ts th a t should p ro v id e  a so lid  experim ental basis from
51 Cartwright: op. cit; pp 83/4 
52op. cit: p. 83 
53op. cit: p. 85 
54op. cit: p.84
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w hich  to  A ttach  o r  d e fe n d  th e  K in e tic  T h eory .55 (parenthesis amd 
italics added)
From the very beginning, then, Perrin had two main objectives'.
1. To establish the rea iity  o f molecules and atoms via causal 
connections (as Cartwright correctly states);
2. To give a defin itive ruling on the k inetic  th eo ry , (in 
seeming contradiction of what Cartwright says).
It will be useful to review what Perrin was about in the cases we 
have so far mentioned . In the firsts6 he was trying to calculate molecular 
magnitudes and Avagadro's number from the kinetic theory and van der 
Waal's equation. His procedure was :
(a) to calculate the mean molecular velocity in a gas via 
measurements of its temperature and pressure;
(b) to calculate the mean free path of the molecules in a gas from a 
measurement of viscosity;
(c) to derive van der Waal's equation and take measurements on 
pressure, temperature and volume of a gas to obtain values for 
the equation s two unknowns;
(d) from the results obtained in (a), (b),(c), to calculate the mean 
molecular diameter and Avagadro's number.
For argon, a monatomic gas, which he believed could give a 
trustworthy result'57, he obtained a molecular diameter of 2.85 x 10-8cm. 
and a value for Avagadro's number of 62 x 1022. For approximations 
made in using the theory he allowed a probable error of 30% in these 
figures.
His aim now in moving to the work connected with the Brownian 
movement was to see if completely different methods of obtaining 
Avagadro's number would give a like value. If they did, then
55perrm; op. cit; p.S9 
56op. cit; Ch.II; pp53 et seq. 
57op. cit; p. SI
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confirmation of the kinetic theory wouid be obtained and, in the 
process, confirmation of the existence and behaviour of 
moiecuies Cartwright has missed the fact that Perrin was very much 
concerned, not only about the existence of moiecuies and atoms, but also 
about the truth or falsity of the kinetic theory. And in the iatter case 
inference to (best) explanation, nameiv the kinetic theory, is 
involved exoUcitiv through the theory's explanation of 
A vasadro ‘s number for arson.
In the context of Cartwright s Thesis, there is a feature of the first 
case that merits special comment. What Perrin did was
(i) take the abstract kinetic theory,
(ii) apply it to the particular circumstances of argon, and
(iii) deduce a phenomenological law, quite specific to argon, 
a law stating that a mole of that gas contains
62 X 1022 moiecuies.
The procedure is a paradigm of what Cartwright calls the generic-specific 
version of the D-N model of explanation, an account which she rejects. /  
say that this case not oniy faiis to sustain the ciaim that it is 
not part of a process aimed at inference to best expianation, 
but, iike the exam pie of Sneii's law in §2.5, it is a counter­
example to rejection of the generic-specific modei of 
expianation.
It so happens, of course, for reasons lucidly documented in the earlier 
part of Perrin's book, that a mole of any other gas is expected to contain 
the same number of moiecuies as does one of argon. That is why Perrin 
can now look to other methods of determining Avagadro's number and, as 
will transpire, ciaim confirmation of the truth of the kinetic theory when 
those methods yield compatible values. Notice that the case provides 
another iiiustration of a phenomenoiogicai Jaw that has its 
status changed, by quantification over instances, into a 
fundamentai ia w
A parallel interpretation applies to Perrin s treatment of the 
Brownian motion^ which we now summarise :
5$op. cit; pp 89 et seq.
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(i) from simple mechanics and the gas laws calculate
the pressure gradient across a thin horizontal cylindrical 
element of unit cross sectional area sliced from a vertical 
column of gas compressed under its own weight59- 
P 1 -p(l-M gh/RT),
where p 1 and p are the pressures at the surfaces of the element,
M is the mass of a mole of the gas at pressure p, 
g is acceleration due to gravity,
R is the gas constant, 
h is the thickness of the slice, and 
T the absolute temperature;
(ii) notice that equal proportional reductions of pressure in 
different gases occur at height separations varying inversely 
as their molecular weights; with oxygen, a height of 5 km 
would be required at Q#C for its density to be halved; with 
hydrogen the figure is 80 km, with air 6 km;
(iii) assume that the same theory applies to emulsions 
and that the particles comprising an emulsion are identical;
(iv) as for (i) calculate the change in concentration of particles 
in a thin horizontal layer sliced from a vertical column60 -
n</n -1 - ( N / m  m(l-d/D) gh 
where n 1 and n are the respective concentrations,
N is Avagadro's number, 
m is the mass of a particle,
D is the density of the granules, and 
d is the density of the liquid;
(v) equilibrium obtains when gravity balances the scattering 
force inherent in the Brownian motion; equal elevations in 
the liquid then incur equal proportional rarefactions;
(vi) do an experiment to see if the concentration law at (iv)
is obeyed (Perrin states in detail how the experiment was 
conducted and how it confirmed the law);
(vii) note that the assumption at (iii) is confirmed;
5^Note that p1 and p may be replaced respectively by n 1 and n. the number of 
molecules per unit volume at the two levels (this follows directly from the gas 
laws). Note also that this expression and its derivatives are misprinted on 
Perrin s pp90/91
60The expression here is identical with that at (i) except that allowance is here 
made for the upthrust by the liquid on the particles in the emulsion
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(viii) scale this experiment to the case of a gas (air); Le. compare 
(iv) and (i) to establish the ratio between the height of air 
and that in an emulsion (the size of whose granules has been 
determined) at which similar reductions in concentrations are 
achieved. That ratio, about 1010 in an experiment detailed by 
Perrin, is also the ratio between the mass of a particle of the 
emulsion and the mass of a molecule of air;
(ix) in Perrin's words
’ The w eigh t o f  the hydrogen atom m ey be obteined in th e  
sem e wey, en d  i t  now  o n ly  re  m eins to be seen w hether  
num bers ob teined  b y  th is  m ethod ere  the seme es those  
deduced from  th e  k in e tic  theory' 61 (my emphasis);
(x) the values Perrin got for Avagadro's number, in a series of 
controlled experiments in which different parameters were 
altered, varied62
irregularly between 63 x 1022 and 72 x 1022’ ;
(xi) recall that the value derived from the kinetic theory was 
62 x 10 22, with a probable error of 30% >3
Perrin goes on to remark th a t:
such decisive  eg reem en t' (i.e. with the kinetic theory) can leave 
no doubt as to the origin of the Brownian movement' (note and emphasis 
added)
And this evaluation must be taken as confirmation o f
(i) the e iistence  o f moJecules as such 
(Cartwright's cause), and also
(ii) their behaviour in the Brownian m ovem ent in  
accord with the dictates o f the kinetic  theory  
(inference to explanation, an inescapable component 
of the whole enterprise which Cartwright overlooks).
Perrin s achievement is beautifully summarised by Mary Nye :
Tn the hands of Perrin, the one weapon of the phenomenon of the 
Brownian movement could become ail things to all people : e risu el
illu stra tion  o f  th e  truth o f  k in e tic  theory..........a microscopic unit
epitomising the adequacy of mechanical models and the fru itfu ln ess  o f
6* ibid p.104 
62ibid p.105 
P refer  to my p.72
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th e  im aginative, hypothetical, deductive approach in so lv in g  
sc ien tif ic  questions and in  building theories, and. most important of 
ail. the lively, if  not living, proof of the discontinuity of matter and th e  
r e a lity  o f  m o l e c u l e s . (my emphasis)
3.5 What Cartwright's Examples. and Others, show
In the above critique I set out to demonstrate among other things 
that, in physics, causal explanation is inextricably interwoven with 
abstract theory.
I argued that Cartwright misunderstands what Perrin was about in 
his various determinations of Avagadro's number, when she says:
‘Perrin does not make an inference to the best explanation vhere
explanation includes anything from theoretical lavs to a detailed
description of how the explanandum was brought about'.65 
For, as we have now seen, Perrin’s concern was not only to demonstrate 
the reality of atoms and molecules, but also to give a definitive ruling on 
the kinetic theory. And that ruling he gave by using the theory to explain 
the origin of the Brownian movement and, in the process to obtain a 
figure for Avagadro's number. He did precisely what Cartwright claims he 
did not.
I wanted also to show that simple causal explanations on their  
own, like  Cartwright s example o f  tangential stress as the cause 
o f vane m ovem ent in  the Crookes ' radiometer, are threadbare, 
insu fficien t and sterile. If her account of the radiometer were typical, 
they would be grounded on nothing. Worse, if her dichotomy between 
causal explanation and theoretical explanation could be sustained, they 
would be based on falsehoods, and our explanatory story of the 
radiometer would be incoherent.
Here is an encapsulation of what is relevant in the case to the present 
point:
*we have a causal story linking incident radiation to vane 
movement;
^N ye Mary Jo ; M olecular R eality  - a P erspective  on the S c ien tific  Work 
o f  Jean P e r r in ; Macdonald. London. 1972: p.14-4 
65Cartwright; op. cit; p.82
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‘where the vacuum is not perfect we have subsidiary causal 
stories linking radiation and gas movement, gas movement 
and vane movement, and vane movement and non-obvious 
forces (e.g. viscous damping against windmill motion, or 
restoring torque resulting from twist in a fibre suspension);
‘for Cartwright there is the added problem arising from her 
rejection elsewhere of the initiating theoretical entity, the 
radiation field;66
‘there is no one simple account linking radiation and gas 
movement - in some circumstances, for example, convection 
currents do not occur or they are small enough to be ignored; 
in others, they must be taken into account;
‘nor is there one single account linking gas movement and vane 
movement - in some circumstances, normal stresses are 
responsible; in others, gas creep consequent on tangential 
stresses is responsible, and, in this case, the stresses may 
sometimes arise from temperature differentials in the bulk gas 
and sometimes from temperature differentials in the vanes;
‘interwoven with all of this are theoretical accounts like those 
of Goldman, Knudsen, and Maxwell, all of these being specific 
to one or another physical situation;
‘it is only through the relevant theories that the causal relations 
specific to the case in hand can all be pinned down - e.g. that, in 
this  particular set of circumstances, normal stresses are 
dominant, convection currents are negligible...... ;
Cartwright 's account would therefore commit us to 
endorsing an eipianation schema starting with an overaii 
causai story  that wouid be true, fi ile d  out b y  sever aJ 
interw oven causai stories aiso true (but each grounded b y  parts  
o f a theory that are false), and con teitua iiy  em bedded in a 
theoreticainarrative which, aiong with its  theoreticaiiaws, is  
aiso faise. Such an account must surely be wrong. If the explanation is
^ e e  my p.81
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true and the causal stories are true, then so too must the theoretical 
stories be true.
A different example reinforces the points made. The blip on the radar 
screen is caused by a pulse of electromagnetic energy reflected by a 
target illuminated by the transmitted beam. Most people can, to a degree, 
understand such an explanation. The expert can add a lot more - indeed, 
if he designs radars, he has to add a lot more, and much of what he adds 
by way of explanation comes only via abstract theory and its 
employment in the manner of the generic-specific model.
For a start he has to shape the radar beam, and this is made possible 
by the wave nature of electromagnetic propagation and by interference 
effects among waves from individual elements of an array. In earlier 
times, beams were formed by use of rectangular arrays of radiating 
dipoles, specific effects being introduced by selective phase shifts in the 
feed lines to the array elements. Scanning was done by mechanical tilting 
and rotation of aerial systems. With present-day technology, the designer 
may employ a cylindrical array of dipoles and, purely by electronic 
means, form a narrow searchlight beam scanning in both azimuth and 
elevation.
The wave theory that we invoke to shape beams to our needs is also 
relevant to the explanation of other radar phenomena. For example, 
coupled with data on the characteristics of an array and its height above 
the ground, the theory will tell us why, and when, an aircraft flying away 
from the radar at constant height, will alternately appear and disappear 
from the radar screen. Here we have an example o f  the generic- 
specific m odei o f eipianation in use.
Recall that it was Maxwell's equations that prompted Hertz to 
investigate the possibility of electromagnetic energy transmission. Those 
equations continue to serve us in current radar technology. For example, 
via the generic-specific m odei they are vital to the design of wave 
guides, without which electromagnetic energy could not be channelled 
where we want it to go, and radar sets would not work. But let us limit 
further consideration of the intermingling of theory with the simple 
causal story with which we began to just one more subject, namely signal 
enhancement.
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There are various ways in which we can enhance a target signal 
against an ever present noise background. I will mention just one, and to 
add variety 1 will advert to the technique of sonar, which uses sound in 
the ocean for similar purposes to those served by radar elsewhere. It is 
possible to deploy two separated receivers in the sea to detect a wide­
band target signal at a power level very much below that of the 
unavoidable wide-band background sea-noise. The technique involved is 
correlation or time averaging of the product of the separate signals.
The theoretical reason why the process works is that the 
background noise at one location is uncorrelated with both the target 
signal and the background noise at the other, and the corresponding 
components of the time-averaged product of the outputs from the 
separated receivers tend to zero. On the other hand, the target noise 
component at one receiver is correlated with that at the other, and after 
time averaging for long enough we get a detectable output from the 
correlator corresponding to the target signals at both the receivers.
The practical reason why the system works is that the sea 
sustains the coherence between the two target signals received at the 
separate detectors, via their different propagation paths, for a period long 
enough to make averaging practicable. But after some time, random 
fluctuations in propagation paths in the ocean reduce coherence between 
the signals, and further averaging may even downgrade the correlator 
output. There are other practical factors that are relevant to the case. For 
example, the two receivers have to be far enough apart to ensure that the 
background noise is uncorrelated at their two locations, yet not so far 
apart that genuine signal correlation is impared.
I have not spelt out this example in full detail, for that would take us 
too far afield into technical territory that includes a large number of 
causal factors particular to the physical characteristics of the 
environment where the action takes place. But there is point in looking at 
the logical priorities of the essential elements underlying introduction of 
the technique.
Unquestionably the correlation theory comes first, and without the 
insight that suggests the correlation principle there could be no story to 
tell. As abstract theory, the principle applied to wide-band signals is true; 
it admits of rigorous mathematical derivation, and its truth can be
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demonstrated with arbitrary synthetic signals generated and controlled 
in the laboratory.
With the theory available, a further insight is required before the 
story can continue - recognition of potential application to the situation 
outlined. The prospect of converting this potentiality to actuality then 
guides an investigation into a set of factors that are perceived as causally 
relevant. One such has already been noted and its significance outlined - 
receiver separation. But the effect of this latter factor is not independent 
of others, such as propagation paths by which acoustic energy can reach 
the receivers, and fluctuations of these with time. Examination of these 
and other causally relevant factors is necessary, and it is a very 
complicated business sorting out what is contributing to what, and with 
how much. Much subsidiary theory is invoked in the process, especially 
to guide the course of experiments.
I shall not take this example further. My concern has been to show 
yet again that abstract theory, causes, and particular physical 
conditions are in terw oven in  representa tive cases o f  
explanation in p h y s ic s . In the story just told there are many causal 
factors operating, there is much theory involved, and there are many 
phenomenological conditions intruding. It would be a nonsense in this 
case to think that one or other of these - causes , theories , or 
physical conditions - could be detached and regarded as having an 
absolute priority in explanation of how a concrete system based on the 
account would work..
I will conclude my critique of Cartwright's Thesis 2 by making three 
points. The first concerns the criterion for accepting theoretical entities as 
real. As we have seen, she admits them if we can give them concrete 
causal roles. I can be enthusiastic, with a qualification stemming from her 
reference to Laudan’s criticism that
’ it is a poor form of inference that repeatedly generates false
conclusions'67,
a criticism which Laudan applies equally to inference to most likely cause 
and to inference to the best explanation. Cartwright defends inference to 
theoretical entities (through their causal roles) by entering an historical 
dispute with Laudan; she admits Laudan's example of the ether as an
67Cartwright; op. cit; p. 97
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inference that did go wrong, but claims that such cases are much rarer
than Laudan believes. She avers that
theoretical entities that have been varranted by v e il tested causal claims 
like that (i.e. manipulation of entities to intervene in other processes) are
seldom discarded in the progress of science’65 (note added)
The matter rests there, unresolved.
For my part, I side with Cartwright in the dispute with Laudan, with 
the proviso that we can never be absolutely certain that an entity we 
admit has the quality we assign to it; it stays on the register pro te a  , 
but while it is there we accord it the status of the real.
Now to my second point! Given Cartwright s criterion for admitting
theoretical entities as real, why does she reject the electric field? :
T h a t is the distribution function for the molecules in this room? Or the 
value of the electric field vector in the region just at the tip of my pencil? 
These questions are queer. They are queer because they are questions v ith  
no ansvers. They ask about properties that only objects in models have, and
not real objects in real places.’* 6*
The discussion on radar that I introduced above was written with an eye 
on the question of the reality of the electromagnetic field, and I take 
issue with Cartwright accordingly.
The electromagnetic field is an essential component of the causal 
story with which I introduced the radar example. Without the field we 
could not detect the target. We manipulate the fie ld  to our 
requirements by shaping the beam. W e project i t  and, what is more, in 
the manner we wish by tilting and rotating it, knowing that i t  w iii 
reflect o ff  objects on which it impinges. And it plays a vital causal 
role in the production o f the blip  on the screen by which we detect 
the return echo. How well all of this accords with Hacking s criterion for 
the reality of an entity!
We shall count as real vh at v e  can use to intervene in the vorld to affect 
something else.../70
^op. cit; p.98
6*op. cit; p.136
70Hacking Ian; R epresen tin g  en d  in te r v e n in g ; Cambridge University Press; 
1983; p.146
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Despite her assertion that her book is a complement to Hacking s71, as we 
shall see in Part2 that it clearly is, does she part company from Hacking 
on the question of the reality of the field?
The radar echo is itself just such a measure as Cartwright thinks she 
cannot establish near the tip of her pencil. With a field strength meter 
she would find it no trouble at all to plot the radiation pattern of a radar 
array; with a transistor radio she can readily get first hand experience of 
the reality of the electromagnetic field at lower frequencies. I am at a loss 
to reconcile her criterion for admitting a theoretical entity and her 
rejection of the electric field. A possible clue, however, will come to 
notice72 in §4.5.1 and recur?3 in §4.5.2.
My perplexity is the greater when I reflect on her admission of 
tangential stress in rarified gases in the circumstances which I discussed 
earlier, and where, by her own account, faith alone will sustain her belief 
till Everitt or someone else effects a physical demonstration of the reality 
of the phenomenon..
My final point is this. The cases considered above are all real 
examples in which true causal statements are indispensable. But, as I 
have shown, these statements do not stand independently of an 
encompassing theory. Moreover, if the causal statements are true, then so 
too, I believe, must the theory be true. Cartwright 's version o f anti- 
re aiism is  therefore to be re je c te d .
71Cartwright; op. cit; p.20 
72See my p.101
73see my p.104 - combination of causal factors: Coulomb potential and interaction of 
electron v ith  electromagnetic field
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§4. THESIS 3 : CURRENT THEORIES OF EXPLANATION ARE
MISCONCEIVED - THE SIMULACRUM MODEL 
FITS PRACTICE BETTER
4.1 Explanation - The Story so far
We saw in S2.2 how Cartwright argued against Grünbaum's (generic- 
specific) version of the D-N model of eiplanation. That version has it that 
a fundamental law, supplemented by specification of physical 
circumstances, entails a relevant phenomenological law; that is, the 
fundamental laws make the same claims as the phenomenological laws 
when account is taken of the specific facts at hand.
Cartwright's objections were that:
(a) it is never strict deduction that links phenomenological to 
fundamental laws;
(b) approximation in the derivations is the norm, and usually this 
process takes us closer to the truth, and not further from it as 
would occur if the fundamental laws were true;
(c) where approximations are required, choices not dictated by the 
facts have to be made and
'..different choices give rise to different incompatible results. The 
generic-specific account fails because the content of the 
phenomenological lavs we derive is not contained in the fundamental 
lavs which explain them.'1
Now (a) was quickly qualified, and then partially unqualified : 
Cartwright allowed that, in any field of physics, there may be just a few 
rigorous solutions, but such, she said, usually apply to highly artificial 
situations. It seems then that we should discard the word never' in (a), 
and take the actual claim to be something like the following:
(a*) for the great mass of cases in any field of physics, there is no 
strict deduction from fundamental to phenomenological laws; 
for a very small fraction of highly artificial cases there is s tr ia  
deduction; only very rarely is there strict deduction in normally 
encountered situations.
^CartvrightN; op. cit; p.107
[Part 1, S4] 84
Cartwright establishes no such claim, nor do I believe that she could 
do so. To take a counter-example, choose the field of Newtonian 
mechanics and, in particular, Newton's second law of motion. Time 
without number, the variety of different practical applications of this law, 
and the variety of specific cases in any given application, are such that 
we can derive true phenomenological laws describing the motions or 
states of equilibrium for those specific cases.The example of the rocket 
vehicle and that of Millikan's oil drop experiment illustrate the point2 *.
Other counter-examples to (a*) are the derivations of Snell's law, the
laws of reflection and refraction, Brewster's law...3, for particular pairs of
materials. These derivations proceed via Maxwell's equations from 
specific facts about the two materials through which the light passes, and 
by consideration of the boundary conditions to be satisfied at the surface 
separating them. Yet another counter-example is the use of the kinetic 
theory to derive Avagadro's number, as by Perrin for argon4 *.
The transistor amplifier and the theory of exponential decay were 
Cartwright's examples of the claim at (b). I argued earlier5 that, in neither 
case, were any fundamental laws falsified, and that, in both, Cartwright’s 
interpretation is mistaken. I show in §4.5.5 below that explanation in the 
case of the transistor amplifier accords strictly with the D-N model.
We have not yet considered (c), so we will move to this issue now.
4.2 The Significance of the Lamb Shift for the Generic-Specific Account of 
Explanation
Since Cartwright's examples6 of (c) come from quantum electrodynamics, 
we have a choice - examine her claims in detail via a complex excursion 
into quantum theory, or see what we can make of the gist of her account. 
We opt for the latter.
2See my pp34-36
3See my §2.3; ppl8-22, esp. ppl9-20
4See §3.4 above, esp. p.72
5See my §2.7; pp39-31
^Cartwright; op. cit; ppl 19-127
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The situation is this. In the first case that she discusses (the Lamb 
shift7 in the energy levels of the hydrogen atom in the excited state), the 
quantum equation8 does not have an exact solution, but one way of 
proceeding is to make three approximations. The order in which these are 
taken turns out to be all important - the final result includes the Lamb 
shift if and only if the approximations are applied in one particular 
order.9
Appeal to the facts of the case, she says, justifies the approximations,
but there is no fact dictating the order in which the latter are to be
applied. Different choices of the order yield different in co m p a tib le 10
results. The upshot, she claims, is that the generic-specific account fails.
Let us look at her own interpretive comments:
On the generic-specific account the steps of the derivation are supposed to 
show how the fundamental laws make the same claims as the 
phenomenological laws, given the facts of the situation. But seldom are the 
facts enough to justify the derivation. Where approximations are called for, 
even a complete knowledge of the circumstances may not provide the 
additional premises necessary to deduce the phenomenological laws from 
the fundamental equations that explain them. Choices must be made which
are not dictated by the facts...... with approximation procedures: the choice
is constrained, but not dictated by the facts, and different choices give rise 
to different, incompatible results. The generic-specific account fails because 
the content of the phenomenological laws we derive is not contained in the
fundamental laws which explain them.'11,
and later:
‘....the Lamb shift for the excited state fits the fundamental quantum 
equations. But we do not derive it from them '12
Two claims are made here:
71 have a little more to say about the Lamb shift in §4.5.2. See my p.103
8The Schrödinger equation
9ln her second case (the Lamb shift in the ground state), there are similar outcomes
according as the approximation is applied at the outset to the Hamiltonian operator
in the Schrödinger equation or to the final master equation resulting from use of
the full Hamiltonian. We limit our considerations to the first case since no 
important new points of principle are introduced by the second 
l&The incompatibility here is that a specific term present in one solution is 
missing from the other 
* ^p . cit; pp 106/107 
l2op. cit; p.120
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1. There being nothing in the circumstances to require  that the 
approximations be effected in one order rather than in another, 
the generic-specific account fails.13
2. The Lamb shift is not derived from the fundamental equations.14
Let us look first at claim 2. I disagree. We do derive the shift from 
the fundamental equations provided  we apply the approximations in 
the right' order. And there is no doubt that the derivation is rigorous, 
despite the fact that the equation from which we start has no exact 
solution. A n y  p e rp ie iity  stem s oniy from the proviso.
It may be objected that Cartwright means here that the shift is not 
obtained by strict deduction - that it comes via the intrusion of 
approximation procedures and is on that account suspect. We shall see in 
the sequel that this objection has no substance.^
For a case like this, either the right' way of making the 
approximations has retained something genuine and the other has 
eliminated it, or the former has introduced something spurious and the 
latter has failed to do likewise. For Cartwright to establish that the Lamb 
shift is not implied by the fundamental theory plus specifics to the case, 
she would have to show that either (i) only the result obtained with the 
sequence of approximations that failed to yield the shift is valid, or (ii) 
the result obtained from the other sequence of approximations is 
spurious (and miraculously so, it would seem, given its accord with the 
experimentally observed shift). But she has established nothing of the 
sort. In fact, as we shall see, the situation is quite the reverse.
This brings us to consideration of claim 1 and the proviso that the 
approximations be made in the right order. Cartwright shows exactly how
^Presumably, either because its progression stops at the point where we do not 
know which choice to make, or because there are two choices and these give 
different results.
14i take this statement to mean the same as the assertion that the content of the 
phenomenological laws is not contained in the fundamental laws
*5l feel sure that Cartwright is not haggling here on the score that the resort to 
approximation aborts the process of deduction, since any possible lack of strictness 
in deduction, and/or the consequences of such, do not feature as th e  issues in her 
subsequent argument.
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the term for the Lamb shift comes to be missing in one sequence of 
approximations and present in the other.16 Let us ask the question again: 
does one order introduce a spurious effect, or the other fail to pick out a 
genuine effect? Now in another but related connection, Cartwright has 
informed us of a solution to the Schrödinger equation for this case which, 
whilst missing relatively small terms and therefore not being exact, 
nevertheless is obtained without resort to approximation procedures.17 
And that solution includes the Lamb shift. We must conclude therefore 
that one sequence of approximations picks out a term genuinely present 
in the solution, and the other does not. That term, as experiment has 
shown, corresponds to an effect genuinely present in nature. We 
therefore have a decisive reason, dictated both theoretically and by the 
facts, for choosing one order of approximation and not the other.
1 conclude that the story does no more than to point to a moral - the 
(methodological) principle of caution : be careful about how we make 
approximations.
4.3 Cartwright's New Account of Explanation
Cartwright, believing that the laws of physics lie and that the generic- 
specific model of explanation must therefore be abandoned, moves in 
Thesis3 to offer, in the simulacrum model, a new account embodying 
redefinitions of the functions that abstract laws and theories serve. She 
aims to show how the alleged failure of the laws to tell the truth ties in 
with a problem over bridge principles, and how her proposal effects a 
reconciliation. Her story is summarised in the text to the end of S4.4 
below, and my critique follows in §4.5.
4.3.1 The D-N Model of Explanation and the Problem about Bridge 
Principles
As Cartwright states, the D-N account has descriptions of phenomena and 
abstract theory mediated by bridge principles that make two-way 
translation possible (see Fig.l)18.
l6op. cit; p.122 
17op. cit; ppll5-H7 
18See my p.3
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We can illustrate with an example from Hempel:
*.....take the explanation, by the kinetic theory, of Boyle's lav that the
pressure of a fixed mass of gas at constant temperature is inversely
proportional to its volume......... ; the connection vith the macro-quantity,
pressure, is established by a bridge h y p o th e s is  to the effect that the 
pressure exerted by a gas in a container results from the impacts of the 
molecules upon the containing vails and is quantitatively equal to the 
average value of the total momentum that the molecules deliver per second 
to a unit square of the vail area. These assumptions yield the conclusion that 
the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to its volume and directly 
proportional to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules. Then the 
explanation uses a second  bridge h ypo  th e s is ; namely, that the mean 
kinetic energy of the molecules of a fixed mass of gas remains constant as 
long as the temperature remains constant: and th is  p rinc ip le , together
vith  the previous conclusion, evidently yields Boyle’s lav ‘ W (my emphasis)
Bridge principles, then, link the entities and processes assumed by
the theory (e.g. molecules, electrons, molecular movements, electron
movements, masses, momenta and energy) with observable phenomena,
including cases where observation is theory-laden’ (e.g. the wave lengths
of spectral lines). As Hempel goes on to say in relation to Bohr’s theory of
the spectrum of the hydrogen atom :
.... vhile the internal principles of a theory are couched in its
characteristic th e o re tic s l term s  (‘nucleus’. ’orbital electron’, energy 
level', ’electron jump ), the test implications must be formulated in terms 
(such as hydrogen vapor’, emission spectrum’, vavelength associated vith  
a spectral line ) vhich  are antecedently understood’, as ve might say, terms 
that have been introduced prior to the theory and can be used
independently of it.’ 20 (my underlining)
Note that the models of the phenomena being discussed here (gas 
behaviour and the hydrogen atom spectrum) are located within the 
abstract theory of Newtonian mechanics. Note too that, on the D-N 
account, if the laws which characterise abstract theory are to be true of 
phenomena, or are to govern them, then both the internal principles and 
the bridge principles have to be true, and what the theory says about 
phenomena has to come by valid deduction within the model 
comprehended by the theory. Conversely, if the laws were not true, then 
the D-N account of explanation would fail - something would have to be 
amiss with the deduction and/or the bridge principles and/or the internal 
principles and/or the supposedly unbroken connections from phenomena 
to theory and back again.
^Hempel C. G.; P hilosophy  o f  N a tu rs l S c ie n c e ; Prentice-Hall; 1%6; p.73 
20ibid p.73
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The deductive character of explanation via the D-N account is 
supposed by its proponents to be assured, according to Cartwright, 
through the application of internal principles and bridge principles which 
have the requisite character of necessity. To explain how lasers work we 
start with a description in antecedently understood' talk about how 
lasers are constructed, and we find bridge principles that serve to 
translate this description into one
’couched in the language of the quantum theory’21 
Predictions about observable behaviour then flow via other bridge 
principles that translate theory back into description. The problem, 
Cartwright informs us, is that, in certain circumstances, the bridge 
principles do not have the character of universal laws. Hempel, she says, 
now believes that
they hold only for the most part, or when circumstances are sufficiently  
ideal’22
What she will go on to claim is that bridge principles can have the 
requisite necessity within the simulacrum model.
Note that Cartwright's attack so far has centred on two claims:
1. that the laws are in fact false;
2. that the theoretical process via the model is not strictly 
deductive from the covering laws.
Taking these two views as established, she turns to the task of explicating 
them further and of producing, in the process, what she thinks is a better 
account of explanation - the simulacrum model which she believes more 
closely matches actual practice.
4.3.2 The Simulacrum Account of Explanation
We can conveniently begin examination of Cartwright s account of 
explanation by consideration of the process 1 have detailed in Fig.2.23
The critical departure here is the disruption of the Description' block 
in Fig.l to accommodate a claim that, in practice, we first proceed from an
21 Cartwright; op. cit; p.132 
22ibid
23See my p.3
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initially unprepared description via ad hoc procedures to a prepared 
description. The account, as needed for the immediate purposes of 
measuring it against the illustrative examples that Cartwright uses, can 
be summarised thus:
(1) the unprepared descriptions are taken to comprise (potentially, 
if not actually) all that can be said about the phenomenon in 
question;
(2) the best description of a phenomenon is not one which we can 
readily comprehend within theory, so
(3) the prepared descriptions are contrived in such a way that 
they are matched to fall under theories that are available; 
we distort the true picture of what happens (the unprepared 
description) in order to get a story (the prepared description) 
that our theories can handle;
(4) the ad hoc processes call on common sense and experience to 
provide rules of thumb (and whatever) to mediate in the move 
from (1) to (3);
(5) the unprepared description contains our existential 
commitments to the phenomena in question; the prepared 
description implies some model that we can formulate 
within the available abstract theory; the ad hoc procedures 
give substance to the relation R in the expression xRy where 
x and y are summary terms in the prepared and unprepared 
descriptions respectively, and R is the relation, '...behaves as 
if it is ...', (e.g. the CW gallium arsenide laser below threshold 
behaves as if it is a quieted amplitude stabilized oscillator;
a real quantum atom behaves as if it is a classical oscillator).
In the relation, xRy, x is real but y is fictional;
(6) bridge principles govern only the transition from prepared 
description to theory; they have the character of necessity, for 
reasons made clear in (7);
(7) the fundamental equations of the abstract theory can now be 
seen to govern objects in the model, but not objects in reality; the 
fundamental laws turn out to be true in the theoretical models, 
but solely because the models are constructed that way -
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‘..we prepare the description of the phenomenon in just the right way to 
make a lav apply to it'24;
(8) we construct models that are adequate for immediate purposes,
But it is not essential that the models accurately describe everything that
actually happens..........Adjustments are made vh en  literal correctness
does not matter very much in order to get the correct effects when we 
want them ..... ’ ;25
(9) the great explanatory power of specific physical theories (e.g. 
auantum mechanics) comes from the deployment again and again 
in a wide range of cases of well understood common theoretical 
mechanisms; this explanatory power is bought at the price of 
falsity of the prepared descriptions; truth in a prepared 
description would entail a theory so specific to the phenomenon 
described that the theory would have little if any other 
application; these are the reasons why truth and explanatory 
power exhibit a large amount of mutual incompatibility;
(10) the reaJism o f a m odel is interpreted in two senses26 :
‘the first concerns the degree to which a prepared description 
is true to the facts of the unprepared description;
‘the second concerns the degree to which the model is true to 
the abstract theory in which it is immersed.
4.4 Illustrations invoked to support the Simulacrum Account, and the 
Contrast with the D-N Model
4.4.1 Quantum Theory - Explanation and Truth
Cartwright's illustrations of the above points come mostly from quantum 
mechanics. That theory, as she sees it, utilizes a small number of bridge 
principles occurring repeatedly in different applications, often in quite 
novel ways. 1 interpret her account to be illustrated by Fig. 12. The central 
internal principle is Schrödinger s equation (determining how systems 
evolve in time), supplemented by schemata for entry to, and exit from,
2^op. cit; p.l}7 
25op. cit; p.140
26N.B. We shall have occasion to use these notions of realism, and we shall speak of 
a model being realistic or unrealistic in the first and/or the second senses
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the theory (i.e. vectors translating into states, operators into observables, 
and certain products into average values). The real bridge principles, she 
says, are those that tell us how to pick Hamiltonians (the operators that 
characterize systems physically); and what we f in d  in standard texts is 
a few model Hamiltonians featuring repeatedly in different applications; 
what we do not f i n d , according to Cartwright, are bridge principles 
linking the theory to concrete situations. The limitation on bridge 
principles (i.e. the existence of relatively few Hamiltonians) is the factor 
that gives quantum theory great explanatory power, but at the expense 
of truth because of the serious constraint on our ability to provide 
realism in the first sense.
PHENOMENA
BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
PREPARED
DESCRIPTION
M O D a
HAMILTONIANS
MODR OF 
PHENOMENA
AD HOC 
PROCEDURES
UNPREPARED
DESCRIPTION
HEMATA
DESCRIPTIONS -  THEORY 
STATES -  VECTORS
OBSERVABLES «  OPERATORS
ABSTRACT THEORY
FIG .l 2  SIMULACRUM ACCOUNT FOR QUANTUM THEORY
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4.4.2 False Description
An example which Cartwright gives of the distortion of the truth that 
characterises prepared descriptions is the free  particle. This is 
represented in quantum mechanics by an infinite plane wave, the square 
of whose amplitude at any point is supposed to yield the probability of 
the particle's being located there. To obtain a non-zero value for the 
probability that the particle be within some specified region, one 
technique used is box normalisation': the particle is taken to be confined 
within a finite enclosure at the boundaries of which the potential27 
becomes infinite. This is the distortion to which Cartwright draws 
attention:
The vails may interact vith the particle and have some effect on it, but they
certainly do not produce an infinite potential......... (the description) is just
the vay to achieve the results in the model that the vails and environment
are supposed to achieve in reality .' 2S
4.4.3 Louisell's Treatment of the Laser
The explanation of the operation of a gas laser, as propounded by 
Louiseil29, illustrates, and brings into an impressive systematic union, 
many of the points made by Cartwright as summarised at (1) to (10) in 
§4.3.2. We begin at the stage of the prepared description, summarised 
conveniently in Fig. 13 which is Louisell's block diagram30.
For present purposes, it suffices to note a few salient features of 
Louisell's treatment, which I have matched, fea ture b y  fe a tu r e , with 
the points (1) to (10) of §4.3.2 :
(1) we may accept that the unprepared description would
be a full account of how the laser is constructed and operated;
(2) from what follows it will become evident that it would be a 
mammoth (and, very likely, not feasible) task to aim for a model 
matching the full unprepared description;
27The potential is a measure of the energy that the particle vould require in order 
to escape 
28op. cit; p.142
2^ Louiseil W.H: Quantum S ta tistica l P roperties o f  Radiation-, Wiley; 1973 
30op. cit; p.470
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(3) distortions much akin to those outlined in §4.3.2 are introduced 
in the prepared description (summarised in Fig. 13) by having 
the radiation field reservoir stand in for the walls of the laser 
cavity and the surrounding environment. Neither of the latter 
is represented specifically; the reservoir terms do the same 
job, i.e. the reservoir acts as a source of damping on the 
radiation field by bringing about an irreversible change in it; 
similarly, phenomenological terms' stand in for true 
representations of (i) the processes by which the atoms in the 
gas body are pumped from the ground state into their excited 
state, and (ii) the interactions into which the electrons in the gas 
atoms enter that constitute losses of energy from the system;
(4) the 'phenomenological terms' of (3) that Louisell imports come 
from his general theory of damping;
(5) the prepared description permits use of a model which provides 
for causal evolution of the system in accordance with quantum 
theory, modified by ad hoc 'phenomenological* corrections
for damping of field and atoms, and for pumping of atoms;
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(6) the bridge principles couple the theory to the prepared 
description by providing a translation between each of the 
variables of the theory and the relevant element in the block 
diagram; the use of phenomenological terms’ reduces the 
number of bridge principles that have to be invoked, for 
reasons ev id en t from (3);
(7) the equation used governs objects in the model, but not 
objects in the unprepared description (e.g. neither the walls 
nor the environment; for these, the reservoir and the 
corresponding ad hoc damping terms stand in);
(8) it is not necessary that the model be true to the unprepared 
description, only that it be adequate for the purpose in hand;
(9) the causal term used in the evolution equation is the 
Hamiltonian for the interaction of an atom with a radiation 
field, and this Hamiltonian finds application in a wide variety 
of cases; the damping terms too occur elsewhere; the novelty 
here is that the Hamiltonian is summed over all the atoms in 
the cavity; as Cartwright says
'The success of the quantum statistical treatment does not depend on 
using novel principles that are highly involved, but rather in using
some well-known and well-understood principles in a novel way'31 ;
(10) the model used here is only partially realistic in each of the 
senses of §4.3.2(10); the use of the blocks marked reservoir', 
pumping' and 'damping' shows how the model lacks realism in 
the first sense; correspondingly, the use of phenomenological’ 
terms leads to lack of realism in the second sense because the 
damping and pumping do not arise spontaneously from the 
abstract theory per se -they are introduced ad hoc.
4.4.4 Extrapolation to Other Cases
So far we have limited our interpretation of Cartwright's simulacrum 
account to what is required to take a first look at how it measures up 
against the cases which she uses to exemplify it. Let us now  go on to
31op, cit; p.151
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see  h ow  she th in ks i t  has m ore g en era l application  Again, we 
proceed by summarising her views :
(1) the vast majority of successful treatments in physics are not realistic in 
the first sense 32 ,
and again,
’If the models matched up one-to-one, or at least roughly so, with the 
situations we study, the laws which govern the model could be presumed 
to apply to the real situations as well. But models are almost never 
reaiikic in the first sense; and, as 1 have been arguing, that is crucial to 
how physics works'33 ;
(2) ...in the second sense, too much realism may be a stop to explanatory 
power since the use of "phenomenological" terms rather than a more 
detailed “causal" construction may allow us more readily to deploy 
known solutions with understood characteristics and thereby to extend 
the scope of our theory'34 ;
(3) To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic 
framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for 
the messy and complicated phenomenological laws which are true of 
it’35 ;
(4) a model need only be adequate to the purpose in hand; it is a 
fiction:
so m eth in g  h a v in g  m e re ly  th e  form  or appearance o f  a 
certain thing, without possessing its substance or proper
q u a litie s '36, (my emphasis) 
which is the definition of a ’sim ulacrum  *;
(3) this view of models applies whether our purpose be to calculate 
some particular quantity with great accuracy, or to establish its 
precise functional relationship with another, or to replicate a 
broader range of behaviour but with less accuracy, or to lay out 
the causal processes which bring the phenomenon about,...; 
the only requirement is that the model be adequate to the 
specified purpose;
(6) the properties of models may be genuine (i.e. realistic in the 
first sense) or p ro p e r tie s  o f  con ven ien ce ; the latter may be 
real, or idealisations (e.g. infinite potentials, zero time 
correlations, perfectly rigid rods, frictionless planes), or pure 
fictions (e.g. the probability distributions of classical statistical
32op. cit; p.132 
33op. cit; pp 137/138 
34op. cit; p.132
35ibid
36op. cit; ppl32/133; definition taken from The Oxford E nglish  D ictionary
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mechanics as used by Maxwell in his theoretical treatment of 
the radiometer);
(7) what is important is not that the properties of the model be 
shared with those of the phenomenon, but rather that the 
relevant properties in the model behave in the same way as 
their counterparts in the phenomenon.
This extension of the thesis, beyond the examples to which we have 
already noted that it seems to apply, appears to rest on three grounds :
(i) one further example: Maxwell s treatment of the radiometer 
(to which we shall return in the critique below);
(ii) a short argument purporting to show how we are often misled 
into wrongly taking features of a model to be realistic;
(iii) the claim that we could only argue from the success of theory
to the truth of theoretical laws (and so for a D-N model of
explanation) if we could point to example after example, e.g.
the application to lasers, and to transistors, and to tens of thousands of 
other real devices’:
but, she goes on to say, we cannot do this since
the examples do not have the right structure to support the realist 
thesis. For the laws do not literally apply to them’^ 7.
4.5 Against the Thesis
4.5.1 Quantum Theory. Paucity of Bridge Principles, and the Nexus 
between Theory and Phenomena
As we have seen, Cartwright argues that we have only a limited number 
of bridge principles in quantum mechanics, and that we transform and 
distort our unprepared descriptions into prepared descriptions in order to 
utilize these bridge principles to gain access to theory. The sum total of 
model Hamiltonians that she was able to cull from two respected texts 
were those for :
*particle motion (free in one dimension, free in three 
dimensions, and confined within a box);
37op. cit; p.161
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* the linear harmonic osciilator\
* piecewise constant potentia ls  (the square well, the
potential step, the periodic potential, the/ Co''io*^ potential);
* diatomic moiecuies\
* centrai poten tia l scattering ;
* electron in interaction with the electromagnetic f ie ld ;
* the hydrogen atom .
She argued that the last-mentioned was not at all a case of a real 
material because, even in the final form it took after a series of 
progressive refinements at widely separated points in a lengthy textbook, 
it represented only a hypothetical hydrogen atom in isolation from its 
environment - and that is no real material. Truth, she continued, would 
require that the Hamiltonian reflect the effects of the environment and 
accommodate real cases such as the hydrogen atom on a benzene
molecule or the hydrogen atom in a very cold tank ......../  will argue in
§4.5.2 that she is  m istaken and that quantum mechanics does 
deal with rea i hydrogen a tom s .
On Cartwright's account, not only do we have few Hamiltonians, but 
the Hamiltonians that we do have do not connect theory with phenomena. 
1 wiJl argue shortly  that she is  factually m istaken in the b e iie f  
that the so-caiied m odel Hamiltonians do not connect theory  
with phenom ena
But, before turning to that issue, I want to mention her rejection of 
the realist's response that
Only a fev bridge principles are needed because only a small number of
interactions exist in nature'3*,
and, correspondingly, her rejection of the view that complex cases can be 
constructed by combinations of elements from the limited inventory of 
basic interactions. 1 deal with the fir s t po in t in this section, and  
with the second in the n e i t  M.
3*op. cit, p.143 
Ms  ee my p.104
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Her stated reasons for rejecting the realist's position are that the 
latter would involve
'a model of physics v e  do not h a y e .......much vorse, it is a model of physics
that v e  do n otvan t’^ 0
On the face of things, if this were ail there were to her argument, then it 
would seem to be a bad one. What constitutes a model of the physics that 
we do have?’ we might reasonably ask, and the answer would be, 
presumably, the model depicted in Fig. 12‘. But that model is offered on 
the presupposition that the realist has it wrong, and so it can hardly be 
invoked to establish that presupposition. No', it might be rejoined, you 
are not right about this. Fig. 12 stems from all the earlier argument. That 
the realist has it wrong was established well back'. To this I reply :
Firstly, for reasons presented at the time, I did not accept Cartwright's 
earlier arguments. And secondly, new claims are being made in 
relation to Fig. 12 - claims about bridge principles, their paucity, and the 
implications thereof - and it is precisely these new claims that are at the 
focus of our present dispute. Rejection of the realist's view, that only a 
few bridge principles are needed because nature exhibits only a small 
number of interactions, requires argument outside the boundaries of the 
discussion so far. Cartwright's grounds constitute a begging of the 
question.
It might still be pressed, however, that I am in error because I have 
failed to heed other arguments which I have not tried to refute. Thus, it 
might be said that, at various places in her book, Cartwright has urged 
that phenomena are endlessly complex, that we have an immense 
number of highly confirmed phenomenological laws, that specific
phenomenological laws are messy and complicated...... In consequence,
she has it that, for example, if Maxwell's account of 'radiometric' action is 
to apply to Woolworth's radiometers, then explanation on the covering 
law model would be no explanation at all
unless the Book of Nature is taken up v ith  volumes and volumes of bridge 
lavs"**.
This last qualification, it would perhaps be maintained, is equally 
relevant to quantum mechanics . But, it would be continued, we do not 
have volumes and volumes of bridge laws linking specific different
4°Cartwright; op. cit; p.145 
op. cit; p. 156
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Hamiltonians to specific different phenomena; the situation is quite the 
reverse; as has been demonstrated, we depend almost entirely on a small 
set of model Hamiltonians, and there is no credible case of a bridge 
principle linking a phenomenon and the theory that applies to it.
If such an argument were presented, I would reply that it either begs 
the question at issue by presupposing that quantum mechanics requires 
volumes and volumes of bridge laws, or it takes us back full circle to the 
point of entry to the dispute between Cartwright and the realist. In any 
case, it presupposes my acquiescence in views that, in fact, I will later be 
arguing against -first, the view that, in quantum mechanics, bridge 
principles do not link a phenomenon and the theory that applies to it; and 
second, the view that a bridge principle cannot do multiple duty and 
thereby cut down the need for the volumes and volumes of them that 
Cartwright thinks would be needed.
Let us return to Cartwright's interpretation of how quantum theory 
works to see if she has a better argument against the realist. Is it the case 
that the small number of products emerging from her culling of teits on 
quantum mechanics provides factual backing for her claims that those 
products are only model Hamiltonians and that, in consequence, theory 
governs only models rather than phenomena, and that the realist is 
thereby refuted? I think not; and, in justification, I offer something from 
the theory of atomic spectra as a counter-example to her interpretation.
Quantum mechanics is about various sorts of phenomena at the sub- 
microscopic level. Spectral emissions from different elements (e.g. H, He,
...) represent a case in point. These originate in transitions between
allowed energy states of the 'orbital' electrons of the atoms in question. 
Those states in turn depend quantitatively, inter alia, on the Coulomb 
potential appropriate to their respective nuclei, V(r) = -Ze2/4H£0r. So
1. we f in d  Coulomb potentia ls having a common 
causal role In spectral emissions throughout 
the whole table o f chemical e lem en ts , and
2. we get connection from  the so-called model 
Hamiltonian to a real atom  as soon as we give Z 
the value appropriate to the atomic number of the atom 
concerned.
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I said near the end of S3.5 that a clue to the possible reason 
underlying Cartwright's rejection of the electric field as a real entity 
would be found in this section42. Here we have it. I f  we take the 
Coulomb fie ld  to be real, then the thesis, that all we have in  
quantum mechanics is  m odei Hamiltonians, breaks down. I have 
given independent argument in S3.3 why, on Cartwright s own terms, the 
field must be taken as real. In consequence, I assign here to the Coulomb 
potential in the atom the causal role mentioned, and I therefore establish 
direct connection between theory and actual phenomena, as I must if 1 
am right about the field.
Bransden and Joachain show how the elementary theory 
(Hamiltonian, incorporating Coulomb potential, treated by the Schrödinger 
equation) is applied to a sequence of (i) one-electron atoms (H, D,T, He4,
Li44, Be^* 4.... ) 43, (ii) 2-electron atoms (H-, He, Li4, Be44) 44 and (iii)
many-eiectron atoms45, to calculate the atomic energy levels, transitions 
between which yield theoretical values for the observed spectral lines. In 
these cases the common causal roJe o f the Co uJo mb potential. 
thus demonstrated, g ives i t  the very sta tus in the D-N m odel 
that Cartwright denies it  has (describing i t  instead\ in  her  
simulacrum account, as a model Hamiltonian).
Particular cases are accommodated to the Coulomb potential in the D- 
N modei, not by clever ad hoc moves or rules of thumb taking us from 
unprepared to prepared description, but rather by the strict requirement 
that the value given to Z be that appropriate to the element in question. 
And these particular cases are cases of real materials. Therein is  the  
direct Jink betw een theory and phenomena.
True, for spectral emissions, the theory involving only the Coulomb 
potential does not account for all the observable phenomena - we need 
to make provision for other causal factors. Also, there is a price to pay 
for taking the atoms in isolation; for example, without the interaction 
between the atom and the electromagnetic field, we miss the Lamb shift.
42See my p.82
43Bransden B.H. and Joachain C.J.; P hysics o f  Atoms and Molecules, Longman; 
19S3; ppl2S-134
44op. cit; pp249 -289
45op.cit; pp290 -334
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Consideration of these sorts of complications is taken up in 
§4.52 where I ciaim further vindication of the realist's views
My submission then, from the example of the theory of atomic 
spectra, is that
the Coulomb potential appears Jike a modei Hamiltonian ', 
not at ail for the reasons advanced by Cartwright, but 
rather for metaphysical reasons to do with the nature of 
atoms and for causal reasons to do with the processes that 
vieid spectral emissions. Here, pace Cartwright, we have a 
bridge principle that not only links theory to phenomena, 
but also, via the factor Z, does muitipie duty in so doing 
and thereby shows how common causal factors out brakes 
on the proliferation of bridze principles.
4.5.2 The Conventional Treatment of Hydrogen in Quantum Theory
Does the conventional treatment of hydrogen in standard texts on 
quantum mechanics deal with a reai material? Cartwright says it 
does not. 1 shail argue to the contrary
If I understand Cartwright correctly, she offers two grounds in 
support of her claim :
1. we are not studying a real hydrogen atom because the effects 
of its environment are not included in the Hamiltonian; and
2. in standard texts we are introduced to the case by progressive 
modifications to the Hamiltonian to take account of relativistic 
effects, electron spin, and interaction with the electromagnetic 
field. Messiah46, for example, fails to deal with real hydrogen 
atoms since he does not treat interactions with the 
electromagnetic field. Such deficiencies in the treatment of 
hydrogen are not rectified, Cartwright says, in more sophisticated 
accounts. We do not get
a vealth of different, more involved bridge principles that link the 
theory to more realistic descriptions’47
46Messiah A.; Quantum M echanics; North-Holland; 1961 
47Cartwright; op. cit; p.139
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Cartwright, i t  seems to me, is m istaken about the fir s t o f  
these grounds and draws a conciusion which is  not sustained b y  
the second. I shall begin with the first.
In formulating a theory, one of the things we invariably look for in 
our observational data (descriptions of phenomena) is the occurrence of 
causal factors, especially those expressing some general connection that 
can be made specific to individual cases. Such factors, e.g. the Coulomb 
potential discussed in §4.5.1, not only guide us in framing theories, but 
demand consideration when, in our use of a theory, they bear on theory 
output.
On the other hand, there occur circumstances in which particular 
causal factors not affecting the output that is of interest can safely be 
ignored. As a simple example, suppose I am doing some investigation of 
blocks sliding down inclined planes. It is just conceivable (though 
unlikely) that, in extremely precise experiments, the colour of the top» of 
the block would affect the viscous air drag on the block and so would 
have to be taken into account. But in most practical situations the colour 
of the top of the block would be completely irrelevant and, for almost all 
purposes, could be ignored. On the other hand the colour of the bottom of 
the block (or, more accurately, the paint that gives rise to the colour) 
could be an important factor because of the coefficient of friction between 
the block and the plane.
f t  is  m y  ciaim that, in our use o f quantum theory, we take 
account o f environm entai factors when th ey  m atter  Interaction 
of electron and electromagnetic field matters in the case of hyperfine line 
structure when spectrum lines are split into components separated by 
energy levels measured in microwave frequencies rather than the usual 
optical frequencies. The demonstration and measurement of such splitting 
was made possible by advances in radio technology during the second 
world war. Dirac's theory of one-electron atoms had predicted that the 
energy states of hydrogen designated as 2Sj/2 and 2P1/2 should coincide,
but investigators of the spectrum had developed suspicions that these 
states are separated. That this is the case was established experimentally 
by Lamb and Retherford in 1947; the most recent precise experiments 
have yielded a value of 1057.90 + 0.06 MHz for the separation. Quantum 
electrodynamics which received substantial impetus from Lamb and
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Retherford's experimental results provides radiative corrections to the 
earlier Dirac theory; in this case, the corrections lower the 2P1/2 level by 
some 17 MHz and raise the 2SI/2 level by some 1040 MHz, the actual 
theoretical difference being 1057.91 MHz, in excellent agreement with 
the experimental figure mentioned above.48
What this example shows is how a newly developed technological 
capability was deployed to resolve a suspicion that current theory was 
not quite right. Subsequently the theory was am ended b y  the 
Incorporation o f a new  causal environm ental factor that adjusts 
earlier predicted energy states by amounts which, in the event, closely 
match observations.
It will be recalled that mention was made in §4.5.1 that Cartwright 
rejects the realist view that complex cases can be constructed by 
combination of elements from the limited inventory of basic 
interactions.49 The point was held over for consideration in this section, 
and we now turn to it.
First it will be useful to summarise the position on these disputes 
between Cartwright and the realist. In §4.5.1 we saw how the theory of 
atomic spectral line emission supported other elements of the realist s 
view that Cartwright rejected. The eiam ple show ed :
1. how  a bridge principle links theory and phenom ena ;
2. how  the principle functions In a general way among a 
variety o f  cases, thereby reducing the num ber o f 
bridge principles called for.
In this section we have seen
3. how  two causal factors that affect atomic spectra, 
nam ely the Coulomb poten tia l and the Interaction
o f electron with the electromagnetic field, combine to 
produce a jo in t resu lt in ju s t the way that Cartwright 
seem s to reject.
Experiments show that spectral lines are split when the radiating 
atoms are in the environment of an external magnetic field (Zeeman
48Bransden and Joachain; op. cit; pp 229-232 
49See my p.98
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Effect) or an external electric field (Stark Effect). Textbooks^ contain 
theoretical treatments of these environmentally caused effects, providing 
a wealth of detail on the unperturbed spectra, on the splitting caused by 
electric fields and by magnetic fields (weak and strong fields being 
distinguished, and defined according to whether the magnetic interaction 
is less than or greater than the spin-orbit interaction), and on 
comparisons of theoretical and experimental spectra.
The quantum mechanical treatment of the hydrogen atom, bound to 
other atoms within the environment of the molecule which, together, they 
constitute, is covered in Chapter 9 of the book by Bransden and Joachain. 
There we learn about vibrational and rotational energy levels of 
molecules in the context of electronic energy levels, and what transitions 
are to be found that correspond to lines in the infra-red, the far infra-red 
and the microwave regions. We see how stable bound states of diatomic 
molecules are realised and how the vibrational energy levels of the 
molecule are quantised within the potential well that characterises 
molecular stability. Theoretical values of molecular variables (equilibrium 
distance, dissociation energy, fundamental vibrational frequency, 
fundamental rotational constant, electric dipole moment) are listed for a 
range of molecules (H2+, H2, 02, Cl2, N2, C02> NO, LiH, HG, NaCl). We also 
learn about the electronic structure of diatomic molecules such as H2* and 
H2. We are told why the bonding energy of the former is in practice a
little greater than that first calculated theoretically, and by how much. 
How the theory is extended to more complicated cases (e.g. LiH, CH«, C^H )^
is indicated in subsequent pages. The last-mentioned case is that of 
benzene, one of the examples Cartwright says we do not have but really 
need if we are to claim to be dealing with real hydrogen atoms.
I am puzzled that Cartwright should think that the quantum 
mechanical treatment of hydrogen does not extend to real cases, and 1 
can but reiterate my view that she is factually mistaken.
There may be some subtlety in Cartwright’s position that I fail to 
detect because I am as puzzled about the second ground for her belief 
that standard texts do not deal with real hydrogen atoms as I was about
5°e.g. Bransden and Joachain; op. cit; pp 207-227
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the first5i. Cartwright seem s to me to be too much in fluenced by  the w ay  
in w hich  a theory is progressively  presented  in a text book. This w as the 
case in her account of the transistor am plifying stage52. a  good teacher  
can w ell choose to lead his pupils through a subject v ia  graded lev e ls  of 
com plexity. W hat is explained and /or justified b y  sim ple th eories he w ill 
dem onstrate. He w ill also point to the deficiencies of the sim pler theories  
and the w a y s in w hich  more com plex theories rem ed y them . I claim that 
this is the approach adopted in m any standard text books on quantum  
m echanics. It is M essiah s approach as recounted by Cartwright.53 It is an 
approach that, in quantum  m echanics, is facilitated by  the circum stance  
that w e  can su ccessive ly  com plicate the th eory to m atch increasing  
observational su b tlety  b y  including consideration of additional causal 
factors.
Thus, for exam ple, Rojansky s accou n t^  runs like th is :
* The sim ple th eory  of the electron in the Coulomb fie ld  of the  
atom y ie ld s  the coarse structure of the hydrogen line spectrum .
It fa ils to account for fin e structure;
* Som m erfeld ’s successfu l explanation of fine structure, b y  th e  
exten sion  of Bohr's classical quantization rules to  th e case of 
an electron m oving reia tiv istica lly  in a Coulomb field , points  
the w a y  tow ards a relativ istic  form ulation  of the Schrödinger  
equation  for the hydrogen atom. The latter form ulation  y ie ld s  
fine structure, b u t the levels  are q u antitatively  incorrect;
* W hen w e correct th ese  energy  lev e ls  for electron spin, w e  
obtain a form ula c lo se ly  approxim ating Som m erfeld ’s w hich , 
as w e  have noted , agrees w ith  ob servation ;^
5*Recall that the first ground is that a real H atom is not being studied because 
environmental effects are not included in the Hamiltonian. The second ground is 
that the standard treatments do not provide ’a wealth of different, more involved 
bridge principles that link theory to more realistic descriptions* (Cartwright, p.139) 
52See my S2.7.1; esp.pp47/4$
53Cartwright; op. cit; pp 137/8
54Rojansky V.; Introducto r y  Quantum Mechanics, Prentice hall; 1938;
pp 467-478
55op. cit; pp 498-303
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* We then make use of Dirac's theory of the electron to derive 
the Sommerfeld formula exactly.5&
As we have seen earlier, we need to take account of another causal 
factor (interaction of the electron with the electromagnetic field) if we are 
to explain the structure exemplified in the Lamb shift. What textbook 
presentations show is that (i) more subtle effects require consideration of 
more subtle causal factors, and (ii) greater precision requires relativistic 
rather than classical formulation. The moral to be drawn is not that, in 
the simpler expositions, we are not dealing with real hydrogen atoms, but 
rather that, in those cases, we can on occasion ignore certain aspects of 
reality and still get by. §2.6.3 includes a case in point, namely the 
ground state of the carbon atom when our spectrometer does not have 
the ability to resolve the fine structure of the 3p state to bring to 
observation the effect of spin-orbit interaction7. On other occasions our 
treatment must be more faithful to the reality it portrays.
4.5 3 Louisell's Treatment of the Laser, and False Descriptions - 
Phenomenological Terms and Realistic Modelling
Superficially, Louisell's treatment of the laser as interpreted in my §4.4.3 
seems to accord closely with the interpretation I offered in Fig. 12 (my 
p.92) of Cartwright's simulacrum account of explanation in quantum 
mechanics. Is this evaluation sustained when we probe more deeply?
One point of disagreement between Cartwright and myself turns out 
to be fundamental. It concerns the status of the model Hamiltonian for 
the interaction between the gas atoms and the electromagnetic field.
To begin with, Cartwright and I differ over the status of the field 
itself, and that bears importantly on the present issue. I say that, not only 
by my lights but also on her criteria for what makes a theoretical entity 
real, the field is real. She holds, nevertheless, as I indicated earlier that 
she must if the integrity of her simulacrum account of quantum 
mechanics is to be maintained, that the field is only to be found in 
models. I have given independent reason in §3.5 why the field should be 
taken as real and I have suggested that there is a radical inconsistency in
56op. cit; pp 521-525
57See my pp36-39, including Fig.10 (b and c)
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Cartwright s treatment of tangential stress on the one hand and the field 
on the other. She attributes reality to the former but she denies it to the 
latter when the principles she uses to govern such status require that the 
two cases be evaluated alike5s i say therefore that atoms and fields find 
their places in models either via the more direct route shown in Fig. 1 or 
by some short- circuiting of the Ad hoc Procedures' box of Fig. 12.
I say too that the model Hamiltonian which represents the atom- 
fieJd  interaction  has status similar to that of the Coulomb potential 
discussed in §4.5.1 , and signifies a causai factor common to many 
cases Invoking this Hamiltonian is not distorting a description to fit a 
theory just because we have that theory, but rather is in strict response 
to recognition of the causal factor that is operative.
I f  /  am right on these points, then in  this case the  
simuiacrum account o f eipianation fo r  quantum theory fails, or 
i t  needs some quite drastic rev is io n .
But what of the field reservoir and of the pumping and damping 
mechanisms for the atom in the context of the alternative D-N model of 
explanation? I suggest that lack of realism of these sorts leaves the D-N 
model of explanation unblemished. There can be no requirem ent 
that everyth ing  be represen ted  realisticaliy in an eipianation  
conforming to the D-N account, even when term s that m erely  
stand  in are im portant in the workings o f  the theory
It would be absurd to suppose otherwise. What is  necessary when 
phenomenoiogicaJ te rm s ' are used is  that they  substitu te  
adequately fo r  the rea iity  that they  simulate and that the  
m odei not be used outside the bounds that define adequacy o f 
substitu tion  Let me elucidate these points.
Why would i t  be absurd to insist on fu i i  realism in an 
explanatory m o d e i? Consider the following case. We want to 
determine for some particular geographical region the paths by which 
sound propagates in the ocean. From the theory of acoustics we know that 
the path of a sound ray is governed primarily by water temperature 
gradients. Temperature, in turn, depends (i) on heat transfer between sea
5*See esp. my pp69, 70,81. 82
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and atmosphere, and between sea and earth at the relevant boundaries, 
and (ii) on mass water movements in the body of the ocean. Water 
currents move on scales measured sometimes in metres and sometimes in 
thousands of miles, and in layers located anywhere from the surface 
down to depths of thousands of metres, the total transport at any 
particular place often comprising a combination of such bulk water 
movements. Air-ocean interaction is also an extraordinarily intricate 
affair, involving, in addition to the effects of water movements, those 
consequent on atmospheric circulation patterns extending to scales of 
thousands of miles. To try to account for temperature-depth profiles 
throughout the ocean in a fully realistic way would be to set a theoretical 
and observational problem of enormous proportions. No-one could 
reasonably be expected to go about determining sound velocity profiles in 
particular locations in that way, nor is it necessary.
Even if we could cater for all the complexities in the relatively simple 
case being considered, our model could still be claimed by the anti-realist 
to lack realism on the grounds that we have not taken account in it of 
radiation from the sun. The sun is the source of the earth s energy”, he 
might say, "and the parameters to which you refer in this case are 
functions of the magnitude, quality and variability of the sun's output of 
radiation. Your model is not realistic unless it includes these factors and 
the underlying processes in the sun that are responsible for them.” 
Confronted with such a demand the realist could ask himself how far into 
the nature of things would it be necessary to go before a stubborn anti­
realist would concede that a theory is indeed a realistic one?
It might be that the realist could never satisfy the determined anti­
realist, for it would be virtually impossible to produce a model that would 
be realistic to the extremes here sought. But Is there an achievable 
alternative that would sa tis fy  the realist 's own expectations 
and that could be defended p lausib ly  against reasonable 
objections ? I think there is, and this is how I suggest we go about 
providing it.
We begin by demarcating, at some appropriate stage(s) In our 
to ta l description o f the phenomena to be modelled, those 
components o f  the description that we want to treat In a fu l ly  
realistic way from  those fo r  which substitution o f
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phenomenological terms, as In Louisell's account o f the laser, 
would do.
How do we decide what is  to go on one side o f the demarcation 
line and what is  to go on the other ? I suggest that two criteria  
will be dominant and common among cases, supplemented no doubt from 
time to time by the intrusion of other criteria specific to actual 
circumstances and varying from case to case. We confine our attention to 
the two common criteria.
The fir s t stem s from  our purposes in using the model. Those 
parts of the physical situation that we intend to study closely, and 
especially those parts about whose behaviour we are unsure, will need to 
be simulated realistically. Note, however, that, on occasion, realistic 
modelling may turn out to be achievable only after painstaking processes 
of trial and error, and/or after the tedious business of acquiring, or 
refining the accuracy of, data to be included. The transistor amplifier, 
previously discussed, illustrates on a small scale what could be involved.
The second criterion  flows from the conditions under which 
substitution of phenomenological terms is permissible and, as we will 
show below, sometimes desirable - any part o f  a m odel that does 
not fa ll  within the f ir s t  criterion m ay be handled in this way 
provided  the substitu tion  is  adequate.
When does a phenomenological term substitu te  adequately  
fo r  realistic simulation  ? The answer varies with the case. For sound 
propagation in the ocean, the phenomenological term (namely, the 
measured temnerature-deoth orofile) is adeauate in full measure 
because it is the controlling variable on the calculation that follows, and, 
as long as we capture that variable correctly, it is immaterial whether it 
comes theoretically from a model or experimentally from actual 
measurements in the ocean. In this case, on the understanding that our 
acoustic theory (including the model into which the phenomenological 
term is coupled) is correct, adequacy boils down to nothing more than 
assurances about experimental techniques, the functioning of instruments 
and the interpretation of readings obtained from them.
The example of sound propagation in the ocean can be used to 
illustrate other points that complement what has been said already and
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others again that bear on modelling in general. The fundam ental and  
dominant factor in the consideration o f mode Hing is, as 
Cartwright has r igh tiy  emphasised, the purpose for which the 
simuiation is  being effected. If our purpose were to account for the 
temperature-depth profiles at some particular locality, and their daily 
and seasonal variability, say, then our model would be very different 
from the one just recommended. All that was essential before would now 
become almost irrelevant, and some of what was previously irrelevant 
would now become essential. We need to draw a new demarcation line at 
some appropriate stage back within the description we can give of the 
physics that ultimately determines these profiles. Our modelling would 
start back there, no doubt via the introduction of some adequate 
phenomenological term(s), and it would end at the point at which the 
earlier modelling began.
I intimated earlier that the substitution of phenomenological terms is 
sometimes desirable. Here is a case in point that again bears on our 
motivation or purpose in using physical models. Temperature-depth 
profiles vary with place, with time of day and with season. Now the 
performance of sonar sets is greatly affected by the shapes of these 
profiles. Since, within the limits of its design parameters, a given set can 
be operated in different ways, one operational aim is to achieve optimum 
performance in the attendant conditions by adjusting the set 
appropriately. Conversely, when the range of environmental conditions 
in which a future sonar will be used is known, it is possible to aim for 
optimum performance in those conditions by designing the set 
specifically for the purpose.
Explanatory models, of the D-N type, facilitate these aims. The general 
character and ranges of variability of the profiles can be determined from 
observations appropriately planned. Subsequently, to each of the ends 
identified, we can feed typical (not necessarily actual) profiles into our 
explanatory model: for example, to optimise design for the South Pacific 
Ocean; or to optimise the use of a particular set in the region to the north 
of New Zealand during the afternoon of a mid-summer day. In all such 
cases the models, through incorporation of a phenomenological term, the 
temperature-depth profile, short-circuit the impracticable (and perhaps 
impossible) task of simulating the ocean, atmosphere and sun. To this 
extent they may be said to be unrealistic.
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In the actual use of a particular sonar, the phenomenological term 
itself is realistic because it represents a measurement made on the spot 
at the time. In the design process, on the other hand, some statistical 
description of temperature-depth profiles, rather than any particular one, 
constitutes the relevant parameter, and the model has this further degree 
of unrealism. But this is  ju s t the circumstance in which a 
controiied degree o f unreaiism brings bene fits  otherwise 
virtuaiiy impossibie to obtain, fo r  there is  no practicabie way 
in which the design studies couid be e ffec ted  without the use o f  
some statisticai representation o f the phenomenoiogicai 
param eter as stand-in fo r  the actuai rea iity
Fully realistic simulation to achieve one representative temperature- 
depth profile would be difficult enough, but it would be a much less 
ambitious affair than the simulation that would be required to meet the 
demand I chose to put into the mouth of the determined anti-realist. A 
more elaborate model capable of producing daily and seasonal 
fluctuations would present difficulties enlarged by orders of magnitude. 
Using this last-mentioned model to derive performance statistics 
necessary for design under conditions of sonar parameter variation would 
be an horrendous task. The alternative of substituting the 
phenomenological term for the near intractable physics, and varying that 
term to accommodate fluctuations, is what makes the study possible. 
When, subsequently, performance accords with prediction, we have good 
evidence to suppose that our simulations, starting as they did with the 
phenomenoiogicai term, were realistic.
Since many other factors bear on the design of sonar sets, my 
remarks are just part of a much more complicated explanatory account 
that would be relevant in practice. But the simplified story is adequate to 
my purpose. It shows how the use of phenomenoiogicai terms, standing in 
for phenomena but not simulating them, is not only consistent with the D- 
N model of explanation, but, in certain circumstances, serves a positive 
role in no way achievable with fully realistic models. I used the sonar 
example because it offers more scope for elucidation than does Louisell’s 
model of the laser. With the latter, nevertheless, the principles are 
analogous, albeit less dramatic. Louisell's reservoirs stand in adequately 
for phenomena which, although essential to the system that is being 
explained, are not themselves of explanatory interest.
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4.5.4 The Problem of Theory Eiit
We have reached a point in our critique of Cartwright's simulacrum 
account where a problem that has been lurking below the surface needs 
to be exposed. This concerns the processes of theory exit. Cartwright's 
account concentrated on theory entry and only indirectly on exit.
A glance at Figs.2 and 12 shows that in neither have 1 sketched a 
route from the model output back to phenomena. The reason is that 1 
could find no precise lead from Cartwright on the question, apart from 
what she had to say about the role of schemata (Fig. 12) where, prima 
facie, it might seem that these are the bridge principles that link model 
and prepared description. That interpretation would require that we take 
the model Hamiltonians, which Cartwright says are the real bridge 
principles in quantum mechanics, to lie only in the path of theory entry. 
This reading is confirmed when we look back over points (1) to (7) of 
§4.3.2, particularly (6) and (7 )59  We would seem to be locked into the 
diagram from prepared description through to model, and back again, and 
the model would seem to serve the purpose of telling us truths about 
what is in the prepared description. But what we must have is a 
connection from model output, not back to the prepared description, but 
back to a description box directly confronting, and projecting on to, 
phenomena, just as phenomena confront, and project on to, the 
unprepared description box. It is not readily apparent how Cartwright 
gets theory output, in general, to make this connection.
Now there is one way in which the impasse could be broken. If it 
were the case that theoretical models do not produce results which are 
faithful to phenomena and which, therefore, have to be subject to some 
process of amendment, then Figs.2 and 12 would need an additional box 
providing the link from model back to unprepared description. We may 
satisfy ourselves that Cartwright has in mind something along these lines 
by recalling (i) her remark:
The route from theory to reality is from theory to model, and then from
model to phenomenological lav'60,
and (ii) her claim that the process from model to phenomenological law is 
never strict deduction. And this interpretation is reinforced when we
59soe my p.90 
60Cartvright, op.cit, p.4
[Part 1,S4] 114
recall her arguments for cases where approximations are supposed to 
improve on laws.61
She gave two illustrations of such cases, the transistor amplifier and 
exponential decay, and in each I argued that she was mistaken. But even 
if she were right in those instances, so that the missing box would have 
been identified, nevertheless, a similar account would have to be given in 
all cases where the simulacrum model of explanation is claimed to apply.
But what about cases where the theoretical model, supposedly 
contrived from a prepared description that is not true to the facts, gives 
precise results that turn out to be true to phenomena? The coarse- and 
fine-structured spectra of hydrogen, the structure characteristic of the 
same element exemplified in the Lamb shift, and the binding energy of 
H2+ are cases in point to which we have referred earlier.
Here Cartwright faces a question which, on her principles, should be 
framed thus: how can the supposedly fa lse  descriptions which 
appiy to theory en try  in  quantum mechanics y ie id  resu lts that, 
without manipulation, are true to phenom ena?’ To p u t the  
question in van Fraassen format, we ask how  can false  
eiplanation y ie ld  tru th ? ’ - surely  any eipianation that starts  
with fa ls ity  is  false.
4.5.5 The Transistor Amplifier
Does the eipianation o f the transistor ampiifier-gain in the  
smaJJ-signai mode accommodate i t  s e i f  to the simuiacrum  
m o d e i? Since Fig. 12 is specific to quantum mechanics we start62 with 
Fig.l 1, first noting a constraint: the move from schematic circuit to linear 
equivalent circuit (Fig.l 1 A) is one to be completed within the confines of 
theory, since it is effected in accordance with the dictates of theory (viz. 
via Th6venin's theorem and Norton's theorem). So the equivalent circuit 
must be placed in the block, 'Abstract Theory'. We might then think it 
appropriate to give the schematic circuit (Fig.l 1 A) the title of 'Prepared 
Description', but that would not be acceptable because it would suggest, 
quite wrongly, that the circuit is the outcome of the application of ad hoc
6 ,See my §2.7; p.39 
62See my p.39 and p.45
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procedures to some unprepared description. Cartwright s own version of 
explanation for the case does not accord with that view.
My interpretation of her  version of explanatory practice for the 
transistor amplifier is encapsulated in Fig. 14. Although here the 
description is revised before theory output is accepted, the process of 
revision is very different from the rules of thumb and other ad hoc 
procedures which Cartwright accredits to the simulacrum model. So, if I 
am right, her general and her specific accounts do not match up.
Consistent with m y  account of explanation for the transistor 
amplifier, 1 say that the schematic circuit is a convenient shorthand 
summary of part of a single coherent description, albeit in the context of 
an understood vocabulary - as will become clearer in what follows.
These considerations, along with those63 adduced in §2.7.1, rule 
out the simulacrum model in this case and lead us to a conventional
PHENOMENA
LAVS
MATHS
EQUIVALENT
CIRCUIT
CALCULATIONS
IS MODEL 
ADEQUATE?
CALCULATION
VITH
OBSERVATION
INITIAL
BRIDGE PRINCIPIJS
ABSTRACT THEORY
FIG. 14 EXPLANATORY MODEL OF TRANSISTOR AMPLIFIER 
CONFORMING TO CARTVRIGHT'S NARRATIVE
63See my p.39 etseq
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D-N model, expanded from the bare form of Fig.l to the version in Fig. 15. 
Superimposed on the latter, when description is misconstrued as it was 
by the engineer in the story narrated by Cartwright,64 would be 
something similar to the correcting loop in Fig.H. The explanatory 
scheme summarised by Fig. 15 presupposes an antecedent theoretical and 
technical vocabulary which is broad enough for understanding everything 
said about the items in the inventory of components and everything 
comprehended by the performance data of Fig.l IB.
We might note in passing that, in principle, the antecedently 
understood vocabulary seems to be dispensable. That vocabulary is 
synthesised from an extensive background of theory and experience, and 
its reduction, at the expense of an enlarged theory, would seem feasible 
via reversal of the synthesis that produced it. Such reduction would allow 
description of the transistor to start from a base of minimum technical 
content. What would be involved would be the replacement of terms in 
the vocabulary by supplementary loops in Fig.l5 from top to bottom,
back to top, then to bottom......to fill out the expanded theory and
reconcile its elements with phenomena; correspondingly, there would be 
an increase in the inventory of bridge principles.
PHENOMENA
DEDUCTIONSEQUIVALENT
CIRCUIT
NORTON’S THEOREM 
TH^VENIN’S THEOREM 
.„ „ E T C .____________
EXPLANATIONS
PREDICTIONS
NOTE THAT CIRCUIT ELEMENTS AND PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS ARE TRANSLATED EITHER VAY 
UNCHANGED ________
BRIDGE PRINCIPT.FS
*VOCAB. (ANTECEDENTLY 
UNDERSTOOD) 
•CIRCUIT (FIG. 1 1A)
•CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL CIRCUIT 
COMPONENTS INCLUDING TRANSISTOR 
PERFORMANCE CURVES LIKE FIG.l 1B
DESCRIPTION
•APPLICABLE LA V S 
(tlR C H H O FTS LA VS. 
OHM’S LA V . ETC.) 
•MATHS
ABSTR A CT THEORY
FIG. 1 5  D-N MODEL OF TRANSISTOR AMPLIFIER
^That is, by failure to ailov for the resistance of the bypass condenser in the 
emitter circuit
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This suggested procedure would be very complicated and very 
unwieldy in specific cases like the transistor amplifier. I have mentioned 
it only to indicate that it is available, in principle, as an alternative to the 
presupposed acquisition of the antecedent vocabulary*. Indeed, anyone 
who has mastered that vocabulary has been through the procedure by 
one means or another, and perhaps several times, in the learning process. 
But whether we present the explanation of the transistor amplifier in 
terms of Fig. 14 or Fig. 15, together with the 'antecedent vocabulary', or 
whether we do so in terms or the complicated procedure just described, 
we have an account that fits with the D-N model of explanation and not 
with the simulacrum model.
4.5.6 Woolworth’s Radiometers
In Cartwright's extension of the simulacrum model beyond quantum 
theory, she returns to Wooiworth's radiometers and argues, as she must, 
that Maxwell's theory of the radiometer applies to nothing more than a 
model. The ground on which she bases this view is that the probability 
distributions which the theory governs, and without which there could be 
no such theory, are nothing more than pure fictions:
Statistical mechanics works in a massive number of highly differentiated
and highly complex situations. In the vast majority of these it is incredible
to think that there is a true probability distribution for that situation' 5^
Cartwright believes in theoretical entities when it can be shown that 
they feature in causal relationships. She quotes Perrin's work and, in 
particular, his experiments on the Brownian motion, approvingly. As we 
saw in §3.4 (my p.70 et seq) she interprets that work as demonstrating 
the reality of the entities we call atoms and molecules. Now we also saw 
that Perrin believed (and, to the best of my knowledge, many scientists 
and commentators believe) that his experiments simultaneously provided 
a convincing demonstration of the truth of the kinetic theory. The almost 
universally held view is that the motions of the visible particles observed 
in the Brownian phenomenon originate from molecular impacts. If that is 
so it would seem that the distribution of velocities of the visible particles 
which characterises any particular case is to be attributed to the 
distribution of velocities of the impacting molecules. Cartwright owes
65cartwright; op. cit; p.154
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us a convincing explanation for her apparent rejection o f  this 
particular causal relation
The number of grains of sand on any beach is immense. Not all grains 
of sand are the same size. We capture these facts by talking about an 
aggregate and a distribution In size o f Its com ponents , and, if we 
have correctly specified the distribution, our description is true to the 
facts. Is the distribution itself a fiction? To the extent that we have 
constructed it, we might say that it is. To the extent that its application in 
practice accords with the facts, we might say that we have captured in 
the distribution something that constitutes a real characteristic or 
property of the aggregate to which it applies, and, accordingly, that the 
distribution is real, or at least as real as any property is real.
A graph displaying how many people in a population receive incomes 
within adjacent income brackets that, in total, span the range of income 
possibilities, constitutes a very real distribution. In conjunction with
other data, it tells how many people are living below the poverty line,.... ,
what total income a government could obtain from the various ways in 
which income tax might be levied,...., how many people would have their
incomes affected if certain fiscal measures were taken.... . and so on. The
distribution, even though it is a construct, is a very real property, not in a 
model, but of the population; and, what is more, there are real people in 
the world bearing witness to the truth of what the distribution conveys.
What then does Cartwright mean when she says that the Marwell 
distribution of molecular velocities, as specified in his paper on stresses 
in rarified gases, is a fiction? She could mean merely that Maxwell has 
got it wrong and that the real distribution is otherwise. But she goes 
further than th a t:
‘.......and proofs that, for certain purposes, one distribution is as good as
another, do not go any way to making it plausible that there is one at all'66
What then is it that there is not? Do the real molecules, real by her lights, 
not have velocities? If the answer is that no molecule in an ensemble has 
a velocity, then what account is to be given of the Brownian movement? 
But if the answer is that molecules have velocity, then it seems we cannot 
avoid concluding that there must be a velocity distribution characterising 
the aggregate to which the molecules belong.
66op. cit; p i34
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It would be no denial of the reality of the distribution to add that we 
could never know what it is. Indeed such a denial woud be false. Why? 
Because we have eicelJent empirical evidence confirming the 
factua l validity o f the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution o f  
velocities 67, and, with it, the rea lity  o f the velocity 
d istribu tion :
* Sears and Salinger66 give accounts of molecular beam 
experiments in which the distribution is measured. They show 
a comparison of the theoretical Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution 
with the experimental results obtained by investigators69 for a 
range of velocities extending from a lower level of 20% of the 
most probable theoretical velocity to 80% above that value, and 
for which the agreement is better than 1 % ;
* Wilson70 gives an account of work by Richardson on the 
distribution of velocities among electrons emitted by hot 
metals in a vacuum :
'(the distribution) was found to be in agreement with Marvell's lav for 
the molecules of a gas'.
I conclude that there is a real velocity distribution characteristic of 
molecules or electrons in a given state, and since I accept the kinetic 
theory, I look to that theory for guidance on what the distribution is 
likely to be in specific cases.
We would be mistaken, Cartwright tells us, if we were to think that 
the distribution which Maxwell specified in his paper applied to 
Woolworths radiometers:
The radiometers on the shelves in Woolworth s do not have delicate veil- 
tuned features. They cost $2.29. They have a host of causally relevant
characteristics besides the two critical ones Marvell mentions',---- (viz.
inequalities of temperature and velocity)— ' and they differ in these
67N.B. Textbooks distinguish a Marvell-Boltzmann speed distribution and aMaxvell- 
Boltzmann velocity distribution. These are interderivable. It is the former that is 
tested in experiments. The distribution function to which Cartwright points in 
Maxwell's paper is the latter (but it is a distribution function for non-uniform  
gases)
^SearsF.W. and Salinger G.L.; Thermodynamics, K inetic Theory and  
Sta tistica l Therm odynamics ', Addison-Wesley; Third Edition; 1975; pp362-6 
69Miller R.C. and Kusch P.; Velocity D istributions in Potassium and  
Thallium Atomic Beams; Physical Review 99; 1955; p.l3M 
70Wilson H.A.; Modern Physics', Blackie; 1937; p58
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characteristics from one to another. Some have sizeable convection 
currents; in others the currents are negligible; probably the coefficients of 
friction between vanes and gases differ; as do the conduction rates, the 
densities of the enclosed gases, and the make-up of the gas itse lf71
Let us pause over this quotation. The passage has the flavour of an 
evaluation report by a testing authority. Now it is possible that 
Cartwright had access to such results, but her references to the 
experiments that Everitt would like to do to settle unresolved questions 
about the radiometer suggest otherwise. Perhaps then, in the absence of 
any such backing, she has allowed herself to exaggerate a little in order to 
make the effect of her words a little more dramatic. For my part, before 1 
would accept such assertions as that Woolworth's radiometers have a host
of causally relevant characteristics besides...., I would want to know
what these characteristics are, in what way and to what degree they are 
causally relevant, and what constitutes the evidence on which the 
conclusions were drawn.
If the thrust of the passage were merely speculative, I would be 
tempted to suggest a misconception on which it might be based - the 
misconception that a complicated product must be costly and that, to the 
extent that it is not, its characteristics must be wayward and 
unpredictable. Electric light bulbs, thermionic vacuum tubes, automobile 
speedometers, tyre pressure gauges, individual transistors, transistor 
radios, microchips, pocket calculators, wrist watches and the like are 
examples to the contrary. I suspect that Woolworth’s radiometers would 
turn out to be of similar kind : complicated to a degree, cheap, reliable to 
some extent, and having characteristics (gas type, gas pressure,....) that 
are pretty much uniform over a production batch, and not varying too 
much from batch to batch, exemplifying thereby that manufacturing 
tolerances can nowadays be held within relatively small ranges at 
relatively small costs. But if there is such a property of a certain 
ensemble as the velocity distribution of its members, and I have argued 
above that most assuredly in bulk gases there is, then why should not the 
gas in a Woolworth's radiometer have that property - even if it were 
wayward to an extent beyond the limits of likelihood that I have argued 
for? Enclosed gases always consist of molecules, and those molecules,
7'Cartwright; op. cit; pp 154-3
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except for one circumstance irrelevant to our discussion here, are always 
in motion.
In passing, there is a point on which speculation might be worthwhile. 
Recalling from the earlier discussion of radiometers (§3.3) the four 
regimes of radiometer action72, we would almost certainly be right if we 
were to speculate that a Woolworth's radiometer does not operate on the 
basis of radiation pressure. Probably it would not operate in the Goldman 
intermediate pressure regime either - why add to any unavoidable 
manufacturing complexities a requirement to attain a higher vacuum 
when radiometer action is much more pronounced at relatively low 
vacuum pressures? So the odds appear high that this radiometer works 
in the Maxwell regime where the radiometric action is most pronounced. 
That being so, it is unlikely, though not impossible, that complications like 
convection currents would feature prominently in it. If I am right about 
this, the explanation of Woolworth's radiometer action is very much like 
Maxwell's for Crookes' radiometer. In that event, if our aim were to 
ascertain whether a covering law account incorporating Maxwell's theory 
would explain Woolworth's radiometer action, then the circumstances to 
be addressed would be just those elaborated by Maxwell in his paper. In 
any case, this question is relevant to Crookes' radiometer and we return 
to it in a moment.
Cartwright claims that a standard covering law account incorporating 
Maxwell's theory would not do to explain the rotation in a Woolworth's 
radiometer :
'...for ....the radiometer must have a specific distribution function and that 
function must be nomologically linked to the conditions that obtain. But 
Marvell's theory records no such laws. The conditions in these radiometers 
are indefinitely varied and indefinitely complex, so that a multitude of 
highly complicated unknown laws must be assumed to save Maxwell's
explanation ' 73(my emphasis)
I have already argued that it is unlikely that the conditions are as 
indefinitely varied and as indefinitely complex as Cartwright thinks they 
are, and I have suggested that Woolworth's radiometers probably do 
operate in the Maxwell regime. If, however, they happen to operate in 
the region where convection currents exert significant causal influences, 
then Maxwell's theory that radiometer action is caused by tangential
72$ee my p .67 
7^ibid p.155
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stresses would not apply - as Maxwell himself made clear - and we can 
forget about Maxwell's explanation.
For the present we have reached an impasse as to whether or not 
Wooiworth's radiometers and Crookes' radiometer are essentially similar. 
But arising out of Cartwright s remarks just quoted there is a question 
which we can profitably consider: is there or is there not the requisite 
nomologicai link between the conditions defining the case that Maxwell 
explored and the specific distribution function that he used? I take this 
question to comprise two parts: (i) are there laws that, in the physical 
circumstances applying, yield the distribution that Maxwell used? ; and 
(ii) are there laws linking that distribution to the action to be explained in 
the radiometer?. The short answer to the first question is 'yes', and, to the 
second, yes, up to a point*.
Consider first the connection from the applicable physical 
circumstances to the distribution. The distribution function to which 
Cartwright points is
dN = N{ 1 + F(e,n,z,)} A} exp{-h(2sj+e2+n2+z2)}de dn dz
where dN is the number of molecules with velocity 
components in the range e to (e+de),... etc.;
h turns out to be l/2kT, the same for all molecules;
s is a function of the position coordinates and is the 
potential associated with a force whose 
components are 1[, Yj. Z\:
A\ is a constant which may be different for 
different molecules.
Consider now the expression for dN with the factor U+F(e,n,z)} 
removed. It is the Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity distribution, which applies 
to any volume o f gas in a uniform steady state. The emphasised 
phrase describes the conditions to which the distribution is nomologically 
linked. We have already noted that the inter derivable corresponding 
speed distribution has been extensively confirmed in experiment. 
Derivations of the distributions are in standard textbooks74. This same
74e.g. Chapman S. and Cowling T.G ; The M athem atical Theory o f  Non- 
Uniform Gases, Cambridge; Third Edition; 1970; Chs. 3 and 4.
Also Feynman R.P, Leighton R.B and Sands M: The Feynmann Lectures on 
Physics-, Addison-Wesley,1963; Vol.l pp 40-1 to 40-7
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distribution is usually taken also as a first approximation when the case 
of a non-uniform gas is being considered.
What of the factor (1+F(e, n, z)} ? This expression, applied as a 
multiplier to the standard velocity distribution, represents a second 
(improved) approximation to the case of a volu me o f gas in a non- 
uniform state. The theory is developed in detail by Chapman and 
Cowling?5 who show how this second approximation leads to expressions 
for the coefficients of thermal conductivity and viscosity of the gas, 
thereby introducing factors appropriate to non-uniformities in the gas 
volume. Maxwell’s own derivation in the paper at issue here proceeds 
along similar lines.
For the nomological link between the distribution function and the 
mechanical action in Crookes’ radiometer we need to refer to Marwell's 
paper where the connection is developed in detail up to a point. He 
shows what tangential stress could be expected in non-uniform 
conditions, how the gas would slide from colder to hotter parts along the 
surface of a solid immersed in it (thereby producing the edge effect’ 
which he claims causes rotation of the vanes). The treatment stops short 
of an account of the motion generated when the forces identified come 
into effect in some specified mechanical situation. The papers by Knudsen 
and that by Bell and Green continue the story to the point of mechanical 
action but, as we have noted, in other pressure regimes. Maxwell's 
account stopped because his aim was not to explain some specific action, 
but rather to show (i) that normal stresses could not account for the 
motion in the Crookes' radiometer, (ii) that tangential stresses via a 
secondary mechanism could, and (iii) that these latter conditions, 
according to the kinetic theory, could be realised.
Contrary to Cartwright’s claims, then, the covering law account is 
vindicated for the case of the radiometer and, more generally, for the 
case of stresses in rarified gases.
750p. cit; Ch. 7
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§5. CONCLUSION
We have rejected Theses 1 and 3, and we have claimed that there is 
incoherence in simultaneously holding Theses 1 and 2.
Since Cartwright's views are, as we have seen, in part complementary 
to Hacking's and in part complementary to van Fraassen's, it is 
encumbent on us not to ignore these latter two. We shall therefore move 
in Part 2 to consider what Hacking has to say, and since we shall find the 
spectre of multiplicity and incompatibility of theories looming large in his 
views, as it does in Cartwright's, we shall seek to explore in Part 3 the 
genesis of the doctrine in Duhem's philosophy. Because 1 subscribe to the 
principle of inference to (best) explanation and to Smart's cosmic 
coincidence argument for realism, it is on van Fraassen's claim to rebut 
the latter that I shall focus in Part 4.
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Part 2
ON HACKING'S THEORY-AGNOSTICISM
SI. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Hacking's Basic Position
Ian Hacking, like Nancy Cartwright, is a realist about some theoretical 
entities1 2*4: atoms and electrons, for example, which exist and are not just 
theoretical constructs for facilitating the organisation of experience. But, 
unlike Cartwright and like Bas van Fraassen, he is agnostic on the 
question of realism about scientific theories, declining to express positive 
views on whether or not theories are true, or are true-or-false, or are 
capable of being true, or whether they aim at the truth.
For the reality of an entity Hacking s criterion is that
‘We shall count as real what we can use to intervene in the world to affect 
something else, or what the world can use to affect us’.2 
Positrons, for exam ple, are real because w e can spray them  on to a 
niobium ball to increase its positive charge, and
So fa r  as I'm concerned, i f  you can sp ra y  them then th e y  are  
real' 3 (emphasis in the original).
But he has more discriminating criteria:
Experimenting on an entity does not commit you to believing that it exists. 
Only m anipulating  an entity, in order to experiment on something else,
need do that* 4 (emphasis in the original).
When we understand the causal properties of electrons so that we can. 
build an apparatus to line them up' as we want in order to see how they 
interact with something else, then
b ack in g  Ian; R epresen tin g  and in te r v e n in g ; Cambridge University Press; 
1983
2op. cit, p.1-46
3op. cit, p.23
4op. cit, p.263
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Electrons are no longer vays of organising our thoughts or saving the
phenomena that have been observed. They are vays of creating phenomena
in some other domain of nature. Electrons are tools’ 5
No equally explicit and unambiguous statement of his view about 
scientific realism as applied to theories is made by Hacking, and different 
impressions of his position might be inferred at different places in his 
book. In consequence, I believe it appropriate to attribute agnosticism to 
him. Let me point to the more telling examples of what he says in three 
passages, each with vagueness appropriate to agnosticism about theories:
*‘....1 think that reality has more to do vith  vhat v e  do in the vorld 
than v ith  vhat v e  think about it’; * 6
* The overall drift of this book is avay from realism about theories 
and tovards realism about those entities v e  can use in experimental
vork'; 7
*T suspect there can be no final argument for or against realism at the 
level of representation (i.e. theory)’ 8 (parenthesis added).
There is one section in the book where Hacking appears to side with 
the anti-realist about theories. When outlining his conception of scientific 
practice, he invokes some of Cartwright’s views about models and the 
falsity of theories.9 He does so without qualification, and thereby creates 
grounds for inference that he is sympathetic to that version of anti­
realism. But he does not specifically endorse that position. So it seems to 
me that his invocation of Cartwright, with neither objection nor 
endorsement, should be interpreted as an expression of agnosticism : one 
can reasonably take Cartwright's position on models and the falsity of 
theories, though one is not compelled to do so.
By contrast, first reading of an earlier section in the book might 
suggest that Hacking, notwithstanding subsequent appearances to the
5ibid, p.263
6op. cit, p.17
7op. cit. p.29
8op. cit, p.31
9op. cit, pp 216-219
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contrary, is nevertheless a realist about theories. There, he refers to the 
three ingredients that Newton-Smith10 finds in scientific realism:
1. An o n to lo g ica l ingredient: scientific theories are either true or false, 
and that vh ich  a given theory is, is in virtue of hov the world is ;
2. A causal ingredient: if a theory is true, the theoretical terms of the 
theory denote theoretical entities which are causally responsible for the 
observable phenomena;
3. An ep istem o lo g ica l  ingredient: we can have warranted belief in 
theories or in entities (at least in principle)’. I 11
Hacking says:
' M y rea lism  about th e o r ie s  is, then, roughly (1) and (3), but my realism 
about entities is not exactly (2) and (3)' 12 (my emphasis).
This passage might suggest that Hacking holds something akin to a 
conventional doctrine of realism. But, if that were so, why would he 
subsequently invoke Cartwright's views on the subject merely to bolster 
his thoughts on scientific practice at the price of contradicting his views 
about theories? The difficulty disappears when (i) we note that there is 
an ambiguity in the term my realism’ in the passage last quoted: it could 
mean either my conception of what realism entails' or the doctrine of 
realism to which I subscribe'; and (ii) we interpret the passage in the 
former sense. That interpretation is reinforced by the move, which 
immediately follows, to the claim that belief in some entities is not 
contingent on belief in any particular theory in which they occur. With 
Cartwright cited, he goes on:
One can even hold that no general deep theory about the entities could 
possibly be true, for there is no such truth' *3 
The force of the word 'even' here is, I suggest, to limit Hacking s position 
to the immediately preceding stage of agnosticism, which, as is evident 
from this passage, licenses him to invoke anti-realist views, without 
commitment to them, when they give weight to some thesis of his own.
We conclude that Hacking is agnostic on the question of the realism of 
scientific theories. The reason seems to be one with which we are now
I °Nevton-Smith V. H; The R a tio n a lity  o f  Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul; 
1981; Ch.II, esp. p.43
II Hacking, op. cit, p.28 
12ibid, p.29
l 3ibid, p.29
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familiar from our discussion of Cartwright's theses, and we shall turn to 
examine it in the next section.
1.2 Hacking's Perception of Incompatible Theories in Hertz’s Treatment 
of Mechanics
As a supposed problem for realism about theories, the fa c t of multiple
theoretical treatments of the same phenomena, with the sp ec tre  of
inconsistency among them, turns up in Hacking's exposition14, as it did in
Cartwright s. Presumably as a definitive and uncontroversial example,
Hacking points to Hertz's treatise on m echanics,^  where he claims to find
three different theories exhibiting an overt threat of incompatibility:
'Hertz presents three images of mechanics - th re e  d if fe r e n t w ays to 
r e p re s e n t th e  th en  ex ten t kn ow ledge o f  th e  m otions o f  bodies. 
Here, for perhaps the first time, we have three different systems of 
representation shown to us. Their merits are weighed and Hertz favours
one........Hertz needed criteria for choosing between representations....None
of the traditional values - values still hallowed in 1893 - values of 
prediction, explanation, simplicity, fertility, and so forth, quite do the job. 
The tro u b le  is, as H ertz says, th a t a l l  th re e  ways o f  r e p re s e n tin g  
m ech an ics do a p r e t t y  good  job, one b e tte r  a t th is, one b e tte r  a t 
th a t  What then is the truth about the motion of bodies? Hertz invites the 
next generation of positivists, including Pierre Duhem, to say that there is 
no truth of the matter - there are only better or worse systems of 
representation, and th e re  m ig h t w e ll be in c o n s is te n t bu t eq u a lly
good  im ages o f  m e c h a n ic s .....Hertzs warnings that there might be
several representations of the same phenomena went unheeded.......what
Hertz had held up as a possibility too scaring to discuss, Kuhn said was brute
fact'16 (my emphases)
To understand this passage, first recall that mechanics is the science 
of the motions of bodies and that Hacking uses the term representation' 
to mean theory’:
’When I speak of representations I first of all mean physical objects .... or, 
when I stretch the word representation', the most sophisticated theory 
about electromagnetic, strong, weak or gravitational forces 
.............................................. Theories, not individual sentences, are
representations'17
14op. cit, ppl42-143 and 218-219
^Hertz H.; P rin c ip le s  o f  M ech a n ics ; German edition first published 1894; 
English translation by DU Jones and Tü Wailey published in 1899 and re-issued by 
Dover inl955 with commentary by R.S.Cohen 
^Hacking; op. cit; pp 143-144 
17op. cit, ppl33-134
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Next, to put the passage in context, note that Hacking th inks there 
would be no controversy about scientific reaiism i f  there had  
not evo lved  alternative s ty les  o f representation  :
'A nti-realism  makes no sense vhen  on ly  one k in d  o f  
reoresentacion is a rou n d 18 (my emphases)
But, he goes on, as soon as
' .... it began to be realised that there  m igh t be severa l va ys  to
rep resen t the same facts' 19 (emphasis in original),
anti-realism became a viable doctrine.
The fir s t defin itive demonstration o f m u lti pie theoreticai 
treatm ents that he can f in d  is evident, according to Hackinz. in 
H ertzs  treatise on mechanics. So, from then on, anti-realism, on 
Hacking's view, starts to make sense. About the motions o f  
bodies there is  no truth o f  the matter, there are ju s t d ifferent 
theories and some o f them might be inconsistent with others.
When I discussed the argument from principle' and multiplicity of 
theoretical treatments20, I claimed that Quine failed to demonstrate that 
incompatible theories, credible in physics, could be formulated for the 
same phenomena. Such demonstration would, I believe, be potentially 
fatal to the doctrine of realism about theories that, inter alia, I am 
defending in this thesis. I must therefore investigate Hacking s views in 
the closest detail to see if they are sustained. To that end I shall need to 
present some pedagogical and interpretative comment on classical 
mechanics and on Hertz s project of offering an alternative foundation for 
mechanics. In this I must take it that the basic concepts of mechanics are 
understood. Only when we have completed this survey will we be in a 
position to evaluate Hacking's grounds for agnosticism about theories.
To anticipate the outcome, let me say that I shall claim that 
Hacking has erred in interpreting Hertz. No supposition of the co­
existence of equally satisfactory but mutually incompatible theories of 
mechanics can be drawn from that source. The beginning and the end of 
Hertz's treatise are both but a single viable system of mechanics - and
18op. cit, p.139 
^op.cit; pl43
20My Parti, S2.1 and S2.4, esp. p.15
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this whether Hertz had been right about the essential role he saw for the 
ether in the conclusion he thought we could, and would, reach to decide 
between different foundations for mechanics, or wrong on the 
matter as we can now, with the benefit of hindsight, say that he was. To 
put the point another way: there are no grounds for drawing from 
Hertz the conciusion that Hacking does, whether we piace 
ourseives in the conteit o f the physics of the i 890 s or in that 
of the physics o f today.
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S2. HERTZ'S PRINCIPLES OF MECHANICS AND THE CLAIM OF 
MULTIPLICITY AND INCOMPATIBILITY OF EMPIRICALLY 
EQUIVALENT THEORIES
2.1 Classical Mechanics
Students usually approach classical mechanics by way of Newton's laws of 
motion. They then learn something about celestial mechanics via the law 
of universal gravitation, motion under central forces, and Kepler's laws 
and their derivation within orbital theory. They note that space, time, 
mass and force are the fundamental terms involved in mechanics, and 
they learn about momentum, energy and conservation principles. After 
sufficient exposure to Newtonian mechanics they confront the Lagrangian 
and Hamiltonian formulations.
Along the route they hear about virtual work' and d'Alembert s 
Principle, about Gauss's principle of least constraint, and about variational 
methods as exemplified in Hamilton's Principle. They note that many 
problems are solved, via the notions of particle' and force', by use of 
Newton's second law. They take in that Newtonian mechanics readily 
comprehends situations in which 'rigid bodies' rather than particles' are 
central to the action. They become accustomed to the idea that many 
problems are solved with equal facility by the Newtonian method or the 
Lagrangian formulation. Some, however, they note to be better suited to 
one formulation or the other; for example, problems involving classical 
field theory are observed to require Lagrangian or Hamiltonian 
formulation.1
Some students are doubtless puzzled about the relevance of the 
Hamiltonian formulation, in that they do not find it applying to the usual 
run of problems encountered. Others, in contrast, learn how, for example, 
within Hamiltonian mechanics an analogy is provided between 
geometrical optics and the mechanical paths of conservative systems, in 
that surfaces of equal time play the role in optics that surfaces of equal 
action play in mechanics. These latter students observe that, in both 
cases, description in wave terms and description in particle terms are
JSee, for example, Leech J.W; Classical Mechanics, Methuen, second edition, 1963. 
pp2 and 126-142
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appropriate : families of constructed surfaces correspond to wave fronts, 
and the normals to those surfaces correspond to ray or particle 
trajectories.2 3We encountered something like this when we discussed 
Snell's law and anisotropic media.3
The same students note that it is the formal correctness of the 
analogy that explains why Newton and Huygens were each able to 
account for the reflection and refraction of light, the former using a 
corpuscular theory and the latter a wave theory. Such understandings, 
they appreciate, are achievable only by taking classical mechanics 
through to the Hamiltonian formulation. They come to realise that, for 
reasons formally related to what has just been outlined, Hamiltonian 
mechanics is needed as basis for the Schrödinger formulation of quantum 
mechanics, i. e. wave mechanics, which bears the same relation to 
elementary Newtonian mechanics as the wave theory of light bears to 
geometrical optics. Students at more advanced stages in theoretical 
physics are impressed by the variety of application of the Hamiltonian 
methods.
That a scalar quantity (the concept of energy) characterises the 
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian methods (the analytical ones), and that a 
vector (force) characterises the Newtonian formulation (the vectorial 
one), is a distinction readily absorbed by the student. So too is the 
difference between the Lagrangian formulation and the Hamiltonian: the 
use of differential equations in the former, as distinct from the use of an 
integral principle in the latter.
Thoughtful students may see in the alternative scalar and vector 
formulations something like the distinction between the macroscopic and 
the sub-microscopic as exemplified in thermodynamics and kinetic 
theory. Just as thermodynamics, in contrast to kinetic theory, makes no 
reference to the motions of atoms or molecules, so too the Lagrangian 
method, unlike the Newtonian, ignores the motions of individual particles 
within any complex and, in its simplest form, all forces internal to the
2Goldstein H: Classical Mechanics, second edition; Addison-Wesley, 1980, 
pp484/492. Alternatively. Lanczos C; The Variational P rin c ip les o f  
Mechanics, fourth edition; University of Toronto Press, 1970, pp264-276
3See my Part 1, §2.5, p.18 etseq., esp. pp20-21
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complex.4 Apprehension of this distinction represents an important 
philosophical insight, one that in earlier times had a most significant 
impact on the philosophy of science via the opposed stances of positivists 
and realists.
But that is another story. For immediate purposes we should observe 
that the distinction between (i) mechanics based on the notion of force, 
and (ii) mechanics based on the notion of energy, is exactly what picks 
out and then separates the first two of the formulations of mechanics 
which Hacking notes that Hertz discusses.
Advanced students discover that there are alternative ways of 
formulating a system of classical mechanics. For example, one can write 
down Lagrange’s equations and derive Newton s laws of motion; or one 
can start with Hamilton's principle and derive Lagrange's equations; yet 
again, one can start with d'Alembert's principle and derive all the rest. 
Hertz, in his mechanics, starts with a variant of Gauss's principle that is 
strikingly analogous to Newton's first law expressed in an idiom that is 
very familiar from general relativity.
In all of these formulations, except Hertz’s, there occur all the same 
concepts as are met in that which begins with Newton's laws. Hertz's 
differs in that (i) action at a distance is banished, and (ii) the notion of 
force arises by definition and so has none of the metaphysical 
associations that Hertz and others find distasteful in the Newtonian 
approach. Nevertheless, force in Hertz s mechanics serves the same role 
as it does in the other versions. What, in general, marks different 
formulations is that a particular term, concept, or statement may have 
different status in one from its status in another. For example, if we begin 
with Hamilton's principle, then that principle has the status of a 
fundamental postulate or axiom; in alternative formulations it is 
derivable mathematically and so has the status of a theorem.
Let us try to make something out of the sketch just given. The 
student aiming primarily at proficiency in technique may not be too 
concerned about either the basic structure of mechanics or its
4But note, from my 52.2.3, esp. pp 1-43-144. that the simple Lagrangian method may 
be elaborated, via the undetermined multipliers, to take account of internal forces
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philosophical foundations. For such person the claim commonly found in 
textbooks that the Newtonian, the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian 
methods are mathematically equivalent will presumably be sufficient if 
reassurance about the integrity of mechanics is thought necessary.
How, then, would this student react to the following remarks by 
Mario Bunge?:
These various formulations of analytical mechanics are neither formally 
(mathematically) nor semantically (physically) equivalent, although on the 
basis of the same empirical data they lead to the same numerical results. To 
realise their mathematical differences, it suffices to inspect the respective 
equations; as to the semantic differences among them, they are detected as 
soon as it is shown that the various formulations cast light on different 
fea tu res  of the same physical object and, moreover, correspond to 
alternative m ethods for handling the same problems' 5
She could be forgiven if she were now to feel somewhat bewildered. 
Initially she had been led to believe that, where different formulations 
could be used, the same results were guaranteed by the mathematical 
equivalence of the formulations. But, if Bunge is right, it is not at all 
apparent why the different formulations, concentrating on different 
features, should ultimately provide the same answers. Perhaps our first 
recourse should be to look for connections among the features.
Now in one sense the textbooks are right, and in another so too is 
Bunge. This seeming paradox is readily resolved. First note that what we 
have in these different formulations is, in each case, a different way of 
leading into one comprehensive system of mechanics within which the 
other possible formulations now emerge as deductions. The connections 
between the different features that distinguish the different formulations 
are to be found within the several processes through which the whole 
system unfolds, according as the starting point is taken to be Newton s 
laws, Hamilton’s principle or anything else that suffices. For elucidation 
and elaboration of these remarks we should turn our attention to good 
expositions of the theory.
Fine explications of the whole system, starting with Newton's laws 
and emphasising foundational aspects throughout, are given by Lindsay
5ßunge M; M etoscienLific Q ueries; Charles C. Thomas, 1959; p.157
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and Margenau6, and by E. T. Whittaker7. What we will readily conclude, 
and what we should n ote  fo r  fu tu re  re fe re n c e , is that Bunge Js 
righ t in saying, fo r  exam ple, tha t Lagrange s  equations and  
N ewton 's Laws are n ot fo rm a lly  equivalent, e ith er syn ta c tica lly  
or semanticaJJy. H owever, e ith er system  can be  fo rm a iiy  
d e r iv e d  from  the other, g iven  appropria te  addition  aJ te rm s or 
axioms. A n d  equ iva len ce o f  sy s te m s  in th is sense is  
dem onstrable throughout the d ifferen t formulations.
For example, Newton s laws follow directly from d’Alembert's 
principle. But the reverse derivation involving, as it must, consideration 
of a complex of connected particles, and necessitating, as it does, the 
admission of constraints associated with the connections, requires an 
additional postulate. The import of that postulate is to place restrictions 
on the directions of possible virtual displacements relative to the forces 
of constraint that act on the various particles comprising the complex 8.
By way of contrast with this account, note that Hertz takes 
d’Alembert’s principle itself as a fundamental statement that must be 
added to Newton's laws to get the full Newtonian development going.9
Helmholtz puts the matter this way :
‘Newton first conceived the idea of action-at-a-distance, and showed how to
determine it by the principle of equal action and reaction.......From that
time onwards Newton’s idea and definition of force served as a basis for the 
further development of mechanics. Gradually men learned how to handle 
problems in which conservative forces were combined with fixed 
connections; of these the most general solution is given by d’Alembert's 
Principle. The chief general propositions in mechanics (such as the law of
the motion of the centre of gravity..... the principle of the conservation of
vis viva, the principle of least action) have all been derived from the 
assumption of Newton's attributes of constant, and therefore conservative, 
forces of attraction between material points, and of the existence of fixed
connections between them ....'1®
^Lindsay R.B. and Margenau H; Foundations o f  P h y s ic s ; Dover, second edition. 
1957, Ch.III
7Whittaker E.T; A Treatise on the A n aly tica l Dynamics o f  P articles and  
R igid Bodies; Cambridge University Press, third edition, 1927 
8Leech J.W; op. cit, ppll-16  
9Hertz H; op. cit, p.3
l0Helmholtz H. von; Preface  to Hertz's P rin cip les o f  M echanics , 13^ of the 
un-numbered pages
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1 include this quotation, not only for immediate purposes of illustration, 
but also because it is a good one to have in mind when Hertz s mechanics 
is being considered.
Taking a more general view, Lindsay and Margenau have this to say:
'But we must remember that all general methods of solving mechanical 
problems must be interrelated so that any one may be derived from any 
other, unless the latter possesses a lesser degree of generality'11
The last two quotations point directly to two important features of 
classical mechanics:
1. the inter-derivability of principles;
2. the inescapability of the need for extra postulates when any 
particular derivation is going from cases of less to cases of more 
general applicability.
They also serve to reiterate the question: wherein lie the grounds of 
inter-derivability? And the answer is to be found in Bunge's notion of 
fea tures  and the logical connections among them that are explicated by 
the authors previously cited.
I favour locating fea tures  within theory rather than out in the 
world where Bunge seems to want to place them; a rule of 
correspondence (or a bridge principle or an interpretation, depending on 
how one chooses to talk) can be used to make a connection if such is a 
useful thing to do, and if there is a connection to be made. Specific 
fea tures  are readily identifiable. They include the notions of particle, 
rigid body, system of particles or bodies, force, kinetic energy, potential 
energy, conservative system, dissipative (non-conservative) system,
hoionomic/non-hoionomic constraint,..... A systematic account of the
role of such fea tures  and, where appropriate, of their 
interrelationships, will be found in the expositions referenced earlier. 
Reflection on the derivations there and elsewhere12 will show how 
alternative, but not form ally  equivalent, systems of mechanics like
1 1 Lindsay and Margenau; op. cit, p.l 13 
12e.g. Goldstein; op. cit
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Newton's, Lagrange's,..., which are applicable to the same phenomena, 
are possible.
Enough has been said about classical mechanics for our purposes, and 
we can now look at what Hertz has to say on mechanics before we 
examine Hacking s interpretation.
2.2 Hertz on Mechanics
The system of mechanics proposed by Hertz is the th ird  of those pointed 
to by Hacking, the others being f ir s tiy  the (vectorial) system of Newton 
which is based on the concepts of force and momentum, and secondly 
the (scalar) formulation of Hamilton which is based on the concept of 
energy. All three assume the concepts of space, time and mass.
In the Introduction  to his book, Hertz nominates criteria for 
assessing concepts and theories, he criticizes the Newtonian and energy- 
based formulations of mechanics, and he outlines his proposed 
replacement for them. The book proper articulates the new formulation. 
Note that what we would call a concept, Hertz calls an image. What we 
would call a theorem or axiom or principle, Hertz calls an image or a 
relation between images. Theories then are sets of such images and 
relations. Note, in passing, that, when Hertz uses the word principles', he 
means a set of fundamental axioms or postulates from which the whole of 
the usual content of mechanics can be deduced (see my §2.3 2, p. 161).
2.2.1 Criteria for judging Concepts and Theories 
There are three13;
1. Jogicalperm issibility- there must be no contradiction 
of ’the laws of our thought1;
2. correctness- essential theoretical relations' must not 
contradict the relations of external th ings';
3. appropriateness - of two permissible and correct images,
‘...that is the more appropriate which pictures more of 
the essential relations of the object....'
^Hertz; op. cit; p.2
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and of two that are equally appropriate on this basis, that is 
the more appropriate which, in addition, has
'..the smaller number of superfluous or empty reiations- 
the simpler of the two.'
2.2.2 Criticism of the Newtonian Formulation of Mechanics
Hertz evaluates the Newtonian conception of mechanics in terms of the 
above criteria. From consideration of the role o f force in circular 
motion and from reflection on the difficulty of exposition of the concept 
o f fo rce , Hertz expresses doubts about the logical perm issib ility  
o f that concept. He concludes, nevertheless, that, given
'..the numerous triumphs vhich mechanics has von in its applications', 
those doubts must stem from
'..the unessential characteristics vhich ve have ourselves arbitrarily 
vorked into the essential content given by nature' .14
As to correctness , Hertz asserts:
‘No one vill deny that vithin the vhole range of our experience up to the 
present the correctn ess is  p e r fe c t'  (my emphasis);
and then he warns us that
'... there vill yet be occasion to return to the question of correctness......
that vhich is derived from experience can again be annulled by 
experience.^
We should take note o f  this warning since i t  refers to the 
crucial test which we shall hear about later (my p. 166 et seq.).
On the question of appropriateness , Hertz finds the Newtonian 
system deficient on three main counts. Firstly , it fails to account for the 
totality of mechanical phenomena:
Does it contain all the characteristics vhich our present knovledge enables 
us to distinguish in natural motions? Our ansver is a decided-No' ^
The point here may be the same one that we find von Helmholtz 
making17, namely that some general mechanical principles derivable on a 
strict Newtonian basis are known to have applicability over a wider
14op. cit; p.S 
130p. eh: P-9 
^op. cit; p.10
17Heimhoitz; op. cit; 13th page
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domain: extension of some theorem  from conservative to non­
conservative forces would be an example. Additional postulates are 
therefore required to cover such cases. Alternatively, or additionally, 
Hertz may have in mind the non-central force found w ith moving 
magnets in electrodynam ics, for which there  is no im m ediate place in 
Newton s concept of action at a distance, since the latter is characterised 
fully by mutual attraction and repulsion along the line joining the 
sources.
The second deficiency which Hertz sees in the Newtonian system  on 
the score of appropriateness is tha t it seems to adm it more than is to be 
found in nature:
’.... many relations which are considered in mechanics are probably absent 
in nature’18
Hertz is referring here to the w ide scope that the Newtonian system  of 
mechanics gives us to form ulate laws of force betw een masses, or 
equations of connection among them , some of the allowed form ulations 
being m erely speculative and missing from nature. For instance, in the 
case of connections:
'It is mathematically possible to write down any finite or differential 
equation between co-ordinates and to require that it shall be satisfied, but it 
is not always possible to specify a natural, physical connection
corresponding to such an equation....’19
Thirdly , according to Hertz, the concept of force offends on the score 
of simplicity. In m any instances forces are no more than sleeping 
partners’.20 Take the case of the motions of the stars. There is no 
possibility of our ever perceiving the forces that are supposed to act 
betw een them; nevertheless, force term s are introduced into the 
calculations; but, at the end, these term s do not appear in the conclusions. 
All that we have ever perceived, and can ever expect to perceive, in the 
case of the stars, relates to their positions in the heavens.
Note in advance that, in the contrast draw n here betw een w hat is and 
w hat is not directly perceived, lies the essence of the distinction betw een 
the foundations of Newtonian and Hertzian mechanics. Relative positions
I8Hertz; op. cit; p.H  
J9op. cit; p.ll  
2°op. cit; ppll /12
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are what are perceived in such cases of action at a distance, and so we 
will find Hertz removing force between coupled bodies from the 
foundations of mechanics and substituting geometrical connections 
between them. He will claim greater simplicity for his formulation 
because of the absence of the sleeping partner from the foundations.
He also objects that physics has filled the world with 
'....forces vh ich  never appeared in the phenomena'21 
It is absolutely implausible, says Hertz, that aJJ the forces, which would 
have to be admitted as acting on a piece of magnetised iron lying on a 
table, should sum vectorially to exactly zero. Now much of what I wrote 
in opposition to Cartwright in Pt.l, S2.6 (esp. pp26-34), could be invoked 
or elaborated in rebuttal of this point of view. There is nothing 
implausible about the case at all; on the contrary, there are circumstances 
in which the magnet will move and circumstances in which it will remain 
at rest, and we have no difficulty in accounting for either.
Before we move to the second formulation of mechanics, there are 
three things to be noted about Hertz s criticism of the Newtonian 
formulation:
1. The substantive part of the criticism focusses on philosophical 
points about the concept of force as it appears in the 
foundations;
2. Not everyone is disposed to accept Hertz's criticisms. Several 
writers challenge him on his interpretation of the actions of the 
forces of Newtonian mechanics in circular motion.22 Ernst Mach, 
claiming that Hertz s criticism of the concept of force stems from
’logically deficient expositions, such as Hertz doubtless has in mind 
from his student days',
takes issue with him on the question of the supposed unclarity 
in that concept, asserting that, on the score of demonstrability, 
force wins handsomely over the hidden masses and hidden 
motions to which we will later learn that Hertz's own system
21ibid; p.12
22See, for example, Fitzgerald GJ: The Foundations o f  D ynam ics; Nature 31. No 
1316,1895, p.284. See also Sommerfeld A; M echanics- Lectures on Theoreticai 
P hysics  vol.l; Translated by M.O.Stern; Academic Press; 1952; p.60
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appeals23. In support of Mach it might be mentioned that lack of 
clarity in the concept of force does not seem to afflict the 
foundations of mechanics as developed by either Lindsay and 
Margenau or Whittaker, to whose expositions I have already 
referred several times;
3. Hertz Is not inclined to reject the Newtonian
formulation  as, pace Hacking, we will find him doing with the 
energy formulation. Hertz says this:
'Even if these objections are acknowledged to be well founded, they 
should not lead us to imagine that the customary representation 
(i.e. the Newtonian formulation) of mechanics is on that account either 
bound to or likely to lose its value and its priveleged position; but they 
sufficiently justify us in looking for other representations less liable 
to censure in these respects, and more closely conformable to the 
things which have to be represented’24 (parenthesis added)
2.2.3 Criticism of the Energy Formulation
Hertz notes that systems of mechanics based on the transformation of 
energy, such as the Hamiltonian method which he will shortly outline, are 
conventionally presented in textbooks as sequential to, and dependent on, 
the Newtonian method, even though it has long been known that they can 
provide an independent foundation. He proposes to sketch the rough 
outlines' of such an approach.23
The fundamental ideas comprise space and time  which are 
basically mathematical, and mass and energy  which are introduced as 
physical entities that are each conserved. Energy is kinetic and/or 
potential, and physics is required to ascertain how the potential energy 
depends on the configuration of the material bodies that characterises 
any particular case.
To settle the relations among the four fundamental terms, so that the 
evolution of the system in time may be determined, we could start with 
any integral principle of ordinary mechanics involving energy, says Hertz,
23Mach E; The Science o f  M echanics; first German edition, 1883; ninth German
edition (1933) translated by T.J McCormack and published by Open Court, 1942;
pp.319/320
24Hertz, op. cit; p.14
25ibid; p.13
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and accordingly we shall arbitrarily choose Hamilton s principle 
as the sole fundam entai law  o f mechanics -.
'..every system of natural bodies moves just as if  it were assigned the 
problem of attaining given positions in given times, and in such a manner 
that the average over the whole time of the difference between kinetic and 
potential energy shall be as small as possible'26
All that is needed to lay out deductively a full system of mechanics is 
now at hand. Since the concept of force is useful for certain classes of 
problems we are at liberty to introduce it purely by definition. Having no 
metaphysical counterpart, the term is now freed from the objections 
raised against it in the Newtonian formulation.
Hertz finds the energy formulation greatly superior to the previous 
one on the criterion of anoronriateness Firstly , in the Newtonian 
system Hamilton's principle can be derived only on the basis of a 
particular set of assumptions about the applicable forces and connections, 
and so under restrictive conditions that fail to license its subsequent 
application to some motions actually found in nature. Hertz, it will be 
recalled, has earlier criticised the Newtonian formulation on just this 
score (see my pp 138/9). However, neither then did he, nor now does he, 
mention the possibility of bolstering the Newtonian system with 
additional axioms. Since these limitations do not arise when the principle 
is introduced as the fundamental law, Hertz finds the energy formulation 
more appropriate.
Secondly , the energy formulation, he asserts, is superior on the 
subsidiary criterion of s im p lic ity : it avoids all appeals to the presently 
unknown atomic motions and atomic interactions, and depends only on 
'characteristics w hich are directly accessible to experience’27
But, according to Hertz, there are prob Je ms fo r  the Hamiltonian 
system  o f mechanics on the criteria o f correctness and logical 
perm issib ility
26ibid; p. 16 
27ibid; p.lS
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As to correctness , the trouble, it is claimed, is that Hamilton's 
principle leads to results which are physically false'28 in at least one case 
- that of non-holonomic dynamical systems29, an example of which is a 
sphere rolling without slipping on a flat surface.
Hertz claims80 that, in particular, Hamilton's principle licenses
motions that would not be possible
w ithout th e  cooperation  o f  forces, even if the choice of the initial 
velocity is perfectly free.' (my emphasis)
His solution is to propose that the constraints which characterise non-
holonomic systems do not occur in nature:
'We must decline to admit that rigid connections of the kind referred to do 
actually and strictly occur in nature. We must show that a ll  so -ca lled  
r o ll in g  w ithout s lip p in g  is  r e a l ly  r o ll in g  with a l i t t le  s lip p in g , 
a n d  is  th e re fo re  a case o f  fr ic tio n  ' (my emphasis)
It seems that forces are very hard to dispense with. The notion of 
force which Hertz thinks has been eliminated in the energy formulation 
of mechanics now appears to make a nonsense of its banishment by fiat.
It intrudes physically  y either as cause of an otherwise inexplicable 
motion, or via the unavoidable presence of friction between the 
surfaces81. The moral I draw is that force, as a physical entity, is  not 
readily eliminable.
On the understanding that force is not eliminable in the manner of 
Hertz, we are now free to make use of the circumstance that Lagrange's 
equations can be derived from Hamilton's principle, and that these 
equations, supplemented by the technique of the undetermined 
multipliers, suffice to cope with just the specific class of non-holonomic
28op. cit; p.19
29The defining characteristic of such a system is that
'the number of independent co-ordinates required in order to specify the 
configuration of the system at any time is greater than the number of 
degrees of freedom, owing to the fact that the system is subject to constraints 
which will be supposed to do no work and which are expressed by a number 
of n o n -in te g ra b le  k i n e m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s (my emphasis)
Whittaker ; op. cit; p.214
80Hertz; op. cit; pp 19/20. The quotations which follow come from these pages
81 It is my opinion that it is physically impossible for there to be rolling without 
slipping unless there is friction between the surfaces at their point of contact. Not 
everyone agrees. I shall refrain from arguing the matter here
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systems from which Hertz s example is drawn. To achieve this, we have 
admitted friction and we have denied that kinetic energy, in this case, is 
conserved. What the undetermined mutlipiier method then does is to 
introduce the forces due to the non-holonomic constraints and provide 
thereby an equivalent holonomic system.32 Hertz's case of the rolling 
sphere is treated in detail by way of this technique by Whittaker^ who 
also outlines the conditions under which Hamilton's principle per se is 
true of non-holonomic systems.34
As to the criterion of logical permissibility. Hertz does not see 
how a suitable elucidation of the concept of energy is to be provided. In 
particular, there are problems about specifying the correspondence rules 
for the identification of the physical presence of a store of energy and for 
quantifying it. There are also problems that stem from the two totally 
dissimilar forms in which energy is taken to be manifested, and 
especially in synthesising a convincing account of the concept of potential 
energy. All in all these difficulties seem to Hertz to be intractable.
But, according to Hertz, even worse is the problem of the complexity 
and metaphysical implications of Hamilton's principle itself:
’Not only does it make the present motion dependent upon consequences 
which can only exhibit themselves in the future, thereby attributing 
intentions to inanimate nature; but, what is much worse, it attributes to 
nature intentions which are void of meaning. For the integral, whose 
minimum is required by Hamilton's principle, has no simple physical 
meaning; and for nature it is an unintelligible aim to make a mathematical 
expression a minimum, or to bring its variation to zero.‘35
The principle then is seriously deficient, according to Hertz, on the score 
of simplicity, and therefore, a fo rtio ri. on the criterion of 
appropriateness. Whilst we cannot insist on simplicity in nature, he 
says, we can seek for simplicity in our concepts and theories:
our repugnance to a complicated statement as a fundamental law only 
expresses the conviction that, if the contents of the statement are correct 
and comprehensive, it can be stated in a simpler form by a more suitable 
choice of the fundamental conceptions. The same conviction finds 
expression in the desire we feel to penetrate from the external acquaintance
32See, for example, Leech, op. cit, p.60; Goldstein, op. cit, p.45; Whittaker, op. cit, Ch 
viii
33Whittaker; op. cit; pp213-221
34op. cit; pp249/250. See also Goldstein's treatment
35Hertz; op. cit. p.23
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with such a lav to the deeper and real meaning which we are convinced it
possesses.'^
It would be interesting to examine the views expressed in the 
preceding two passages, but we shall need to pass them by as not 
immediately germane to present interests. Perhaps we should note, 
however, that Mach, and, independently, Sommerfeld take issue with 
Hertz on the particular metaphysical interpretation given to Hamilton s 
principle. According to Mach, no teleological connotations should be read 
into such principles, since their full import is exhausted when they are 
understood as delimiting conceivable motions to possible ones - that is, to 
those that are dynamically determined.^ Sommerfeld takes a similar 
view, asserting that integral principles are nothing more than a striking 
mathematical formulation of an extremal property common to the laws 
of dynamics’.3*
For Hertz s part, he concludes that, as a way o f founding  
mechanics, the energy form ulation Is untenable.
What then are we to make of ail this? I suggest the following:
1. Hertz's own final assessment of this method of grounding 
mechanics is that it fails:
' I  have discussed th is  second mode o f  representation  
a t some length , n o t in  order to urge i ts  adoption, but 
ra th er  to show  why, a fte r  due trial, I  h are  fe l t  obliged
to abandon i t '  39 (my emphasis) ;
2. The concept o f force as i t  arises in mechanics is  not 
exhausted at the theoretical le ve l (in particular as a 
definition) bu t has a genuine physical counterpart;
3. At the foundational level, a satisfactory Hamiltonian formulation 
of mechanics is not practicable unless it subsumes much of what 
is at the base of the Newtonian formulation;
3<>ibid; P-24
37Mach; op. cit; pp320, 322,471/472 
38Sommerfeld; op. cit; p.208 
39Hertz; op. cit; p.24
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4. Given the two immediately preceding points, formulations o f  
mechanics that are supposedly independent are, on the 
contrary, ine itr icab iy  J inked ;
5. Hertz s abandonment of this second image of mechanics would 
remove it from Hacking’s category of three different ways to 
represent the then extant knowledge of the motions of bodies', if 
that were the proper way of stating what Hertz is about, which I 
believe it is not. Be that as it may, Hacking, b y  h is lights, is  
nevertheiess Je f t  with bu t two different theories o f  
mechanics.
2.2A The Hertzian Formulation of Mechanics
Three terms are taken as fundamental: time, space and mass. It is also 
hypothesised at the outset that
*....to obtain an image of the universe which shall be well-rounded,
complete, and conformable to law, we have to presuppose, behind the things 
we see, other, invisible things ...'40
In the two previous formulations, force and energy respectively were the 
invisible things that had been presupposed. In the present formulation, it 
is supposed that invisible masses are in motion, and that these constitute 
the sources of force and potential energy. All actions take place through 
rigid connections between elementary particles that are in motion. There 
is  therefore no action at a distance.
Hertz believes that his appeal to the motions of concealed masses 
derives its plausibility from the above-quoted hypothesis, from the fact 
that mass is already a familiar concept, and from other theories current 
at the time - kinetic theory, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetic forces, 
Kelvin s vortex atoms and Helmholtz's cyclical theory. We have already 
noted Mach’s dismissive reaction to the hypothesis of concealed masses 
and concealed motions^*.
Space and time are related, says Hertz, in the subject of kinematics 
which deals with pure motion via the concepts of spatial points, velocity 
and acceleration.
<°ibid; p.25 
“^ See my ppl40/141
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Mass and space are related through the existence of various material 
systems characterised by the spatial connections among the masses that 
comprise them:
'Experience teaches us that between mass and space there exists a series of 
important relations. For we f in d  certa in  p u r e ly  sp a c ia i co n n ec tio n s  
betw een  th e  m asses o f  na tu re: from  th e  v e r y  b e g in n in g  on wards 
th rou gh  a l l  tim e, a n d  th e re fo re  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  time, certa in  
p o s itio n s  an d  certa in  ch an ges o f  p o sitio n  are  p r e sc r ib e d  an d  
associa ted  as p o ss ib le  fo r  th ese  masses, an d  a l l  o th ers  as
im possible. Respecting these connections....they satisfy certain
conditions of continuity (such that mathematically) they can always be 
represented by homogeneous linear equations between the first 
differentials of the magnitudes by which the positions of the masses are
denoted"*2 (my emphasis, parenthesis added)
And here it would be as well to take special note o f that part o f  the  
quotation that /  have ita licised  since it explains, I believe, what 
Hertz means when he talks later about the final constant elements in nature' 
or the strictly invariable elements of nature.**3 Investigations of these 
systems and their connections is the business of experimental physics.
To move to a system of mechanics we need a principle which absorbs 
all three fundamental terms into a relationship that, as a fundamental 
law of nature, is powerful enough to serve as the basis for deriving 
statements that, in total, correspond to all motions found in nature. To 
this end Hertz connects the three terms in a single law of mechanics:
'Every natural motion of an independent material system consists herein, 
that the system follows with uniform velocity one of its straightest paths' **
We now have available, he says, all that we need to derive all of 
mechanics by purely deductive reasoning. Note that, in this formulation, 
dynamics has been effectively reduced to kinematics and, incidentally as 
we shall appreciate later, gravitation would have been reduced to 
geometry if Hertz had been able to carry the theory forward.
Mathematically, Hertz s mechanics for a physical system comprising N 
particles moving in a 3-dimensional Euclidean space has features in 
common with a system of N points moving along a path in a configuration 
space of 3N dimensions. Every material particle in the world is taken to 
be made up of elementary particles, namely infinitesimal mass corpuscles
42ibid; p.27
43See my §2.5, esp. §2.3.1 (p.167 et seq.) and S2.5 3 (p-172 et seq.) 
^Hertz; op. cit; p.27
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that are indestructible, invariable and all alike. Each elementary particle, 
apparently, is in continuous contact with its nearest neighbours, and 
interaction among particles, without energy loss, occurs by some form of 
frictionless coupling. The mass of a material particle is a variable, being 
determined in any specific case by the number of elementary corpuscles 
that comprise it. As for the geometry, we find that position , path, 
angle betw een p a th s , and path curvature  are given explicit 
definitions. A path is straight if it has the same direction in all its 
positions, and the concept of straightest path  is rigorously defined.
The geometrical mode of formulation makes the fundamental law 
equivalent to the conjunction of Newton s first law and Gauss's principle 
of least constraint as customarily expressed in Newtonian mechanics. 
Hertz has objections to Gauss's principle, stated as a postulate, that are 
much the same as we have seen him voice (my p.144) about Hamilton’s 
principle when we considered his views on the second image. Objections 
of that sort cannot be raised against the fundamental law. Moreover,
Hertz thinks that the very articulation of Newton’s first law and Gauss's 
principle implies the possibility of the connections between material 
particles being destroyed, and this would be contrary to his conception of 
the connections as permanent and indestructible. For these reasons he 
considers that, on the criterion of appropriateness , his version is 
vastly superior to the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics.
If there are connections among the geometrical points to which the 
material particles of a system are tied, then, according to Hertzian 
mechanics, there are constraints on the system's possible motions. If 
these connections are independent of time, the system is said to be free  
or indep en d en t. The systems treated within Hertzian mechanics are 
those which exhibit natural m otions ; these are the motions of free 
systems, together with those of any constrained parts of complete free 
systems.
The import of the preceding paragraph is more easily conveyed via 
the concept of force, which arises directly out of the fundamental law and 
is introduced solely by definition:
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’....whenever two bodies belong to the same system, the motion of the one is
determined by that of the other. The idea of force now comes in as follows. 
For assignable reasons we find it convenient to divide the determination of 
the one motion by the other into two steps. We thus say that the motion of 
the first body determines a force, and that this force then determines the 
motion of the second body. In this way force can with equal justice be 
regarded as being always a cause of motion, and at the same time a 
consequence of motion'^
Two such bodies are, in Hertz's terminology, coupled , and together can 
constitute a free system that is governed by the fundamental law, even 
though each considered separately has its motion constrained by its rigid 
connection with the other. In general, deviation of a particle from 
following with uniform velocity one of its straightest paths is attributable 
to a rigid connection with another particle, as contrasted with Newton's 
attribution of the deviation to the action of a force.
Mach, as might be expected given his positivist views, argues that
intersubstitution of force and rigid connection is irrelevant:
If we reflect that in both cases, whether forces or connections be 
presupposed, the actual dependence of the motions of the masses on one 
another is given for every instantaneous conformation of the system by 
linear differential equations between the co-ordinates of the masses, then 
th e  ex isten ce  o f  th ese  equ a tion s m ay be con sidered  th e  e s se n tia l
th in g  - th e  th in g  e s ta b lish ed  b y  e x p e r ie n c e ' ^  (my emphasis)
Now there is a trace of irony in this point being made against Hertz, 
although it may have escaped Mach's notice at the time. Let me elaborate, 
because the circumstances are of substantive import to matters that we 
shall come across later on.
Only two years before the publication of his book on mechanics, 
Hertz’s collected papers on electromagnetism had appeared in prints7 In 
the Introduction to the latter Hertz revealed how much difficulty he had 
had in following the mathematical exposition and in grasping the physical 
significance of the theory as presented in Maxwell's treatise on electricity 
and magnetism. He had therefore fallen back on von Helmholtz's work in 
the hope that he might find there the guidance he was seeking on the 
directions his future experimental work might take. But a new difficulty 
had emerged, in that the physical basis of Helmholtz's theory disappears
45ibid, p.28
^Mach; op. cit; p321
47Hertz H; E lectric  W aves; Macmillan; 1893 (being a translation by Dl.Jones of 
the German edition of 1892); re-issued by Dover, 1962
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at the crucial limiting case leading to Marvell's equations. Hertz therefore
made his own attempt to formulate the theory that leads to those
equations, and, on later reflection, he came to an interesting conclusion:
Thus the representation of the theory in Maxwell's own work, its 
representation as a limiting case of Helmholtz s theory, and its 
representation in the present dissertations - however different in form- 
have substantially the same inner significance. This common significance 
of the different modes of representation (and others can certainly be found) 
appears to me to be the undying part of Maxwell s work. This, and not 
Maxwell's peculiar conceptions or methods, would I designate as "Maxwell's 
TheoryTo the question, "What is Maxwell's theory?" I know of no shorter 
or more definite answer than the following: - M&zwelJ's th e o r y  is  
M axwell's system  o f  equations. E v e ry  th e o r y  which leads to th e  
same system  o f  equations, an d  th e re fo re  com prises th e  sam e  
p o ss ib le  phenom ena, I  would con sider as b e in g  a form  o r sp e c ia l
case o f  M axwell's th e o r y  ' ^  (my emphasis)
So, for the edifice that is Maxwell’s equations, Hertz is found 
exhorting us to let the nitty-gritty details of development lie buried and 
to rest content with the edifice itself. On the other hand he is found 
presenting the edifice that is mechanics through the process of digging 
around to inspect the foundations. It is ironical that we can now see Mach 
finding occasion in precisely these latter circumstances to urge the very 
prescription that Hertz has already advocated and whose violation 
characterizes what he is now doing. For the record we might note that 
Helmholtz takes very much the same view as Mach about all attempts to 
provide mechanical explanations for physical theories which culminate in 
differential equations.^
For later reference (see my p. 161) I should reiterate that, in 
recording the above quotation from Hertz about Maxwell's equations, I 
had more in mind than just pointing to a bit of irony. The import of the 
quotation will serve as part of an important argument that I shall be 
presenting a little later on when I claim that Hacking has misunderstood 
Hertz.
Concerning the detailed exposition of Hertz’s mechanics, our purposes 
are served if we notice three points:
8^op. cit, p.21
^Helmholtz; op. cit; final page
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1. With the important exception already mentioned and to be 
reiterated below, namely the concept and implications of action 
at a distance, the whole of classical mechanics is derived from 
the basis outlined above;
2. Some of the consequents that flow from the foundations have 
the wider degree of generality that the Newtonian formulation, 
without the importation of additional postulates, lacks;
3. An important aspect of Hertz s mechanics, which we should note, 
illustrates again the intimate relationships among the principles 
of classical mechanics. Both Duhem^o and Mach^1 point to the 
fact that Hertz s fundamental principle, when formulated 
analytically, is identical with Lagrange’s equations, whilst Duhem 
notes also that, for any system of masses, the principle is 
equivalent to the statement that the applied inertial forces^2 do 
zero virtual work for every virtual displacement of the system.
2.2.5 Deficiencies of the Formulation
The principle not derivable in the system is, as we expect, Newton s third 
law for cases that, in the customary systems of mechanics, would be 
called action at a distance. For such instances the theory does not provide 
an account of how the hypothetical mechanisms of invisible masses and 
invisible motions are to be conceived. Helmholtz offers mild criticism on 
just this score and goes on to say:
‘It is true that great difficulties have yet to be overcome before we can 
succeed in explaining the varied phenomena of physics in accordance with 
the system developed by Hertz.'53
Mach's criticism of the same issue is a little less gentle:
‘If w e ......should endeavour to investigate (these occult masses and motions)
singly and in detail, we should be obliged to resort....... even in the simplest
5°Duhem P; The Evolution o f  M echanics; 1903 French edition translated by 
M.Cole; Sijthoff and Noordhoff; 19S0; pp 86/S7
51 Mach: op. cit; p.322
52 An inertial force is a fictitious one, being given b y  defin ition  as having 
magnitude equal to the product of a particle's mass and acceleration, and direction 
opposite to that of the acceleration
53Helmholtz; op. cit; final page
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cases, to fantastic and even frequently questionable fictions, to which the 
g iven  accelerations would be far preferable.'54
As example, Mach points to the possibility that, in the case of a mass 
moving uniformly in a circle, we might be driven to suppose that the 
central force is replaced by an unseen mass of equal magnitude rigidly 
connected to the first at the other extremity of a diameter joining them, 
the whole rotating uniformly round the circle. For Mach, the hypothesis of 
a central force is much less unattractive than the hypothesis of such 
occult mass with such invisible motion.
Duhem, pointing to the same gap in the theory, had this to say about
it:
’ This task, which H ertz was unable to accomplish, has so fa r  
found no worker who has brought i t  to a successfu l conclusion
........ For want o f  h a v in g  been applied  to the solution o f  p rec ise
problem s, fo r  want o f  h avin g  been pursued to the p o in t o f  
determ in ing  the hidden masses and the hidden m otions that 
would have to explain such and such a force taken w rongly as a 
re a l action, H ertz's m echanics is, up to now, less o f  a doctrine
than a p r o je c t , more o f  a doctrine than a program m e55 (my 
emphasis)
What has to be done, Duhem goes on to say, is to show the method to be 
followed according to which the ordinary forces of dynamics that act on 
visible bodies are to be replaced by the connections of those bodies to the 
hidden masses with their invisible motions. Then, for particular cases, it 
must be explained what method is to be followed to determine just what 
the latter masses and motions are. While this lack remains, Duhem 
complains, the theory is irrefutable because there is no way, in principle, 
in which it could be proved that a certain force is unexplained by these 
masses and motions. Notice here the foreshadowing of the Popperian 
view on the importance of a theory's being liable to falsification.
2.2.6 Two Objections to the Concept of Fixed Connections
We should note that the Hertzian foundations have not failed to attract 
significant objections. Here is one raised by G.F. Fitzgeraid.56 If systems 
comprise the rigid connections envisaged by Hertz, then, whilst it might
54Mach; op. cit; p.324
55DuhemP; The Evolution o f  Mechanics-, p.SS 
56Fitzgerald GT; op. cit; p.284
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on occasion be easy enough to specify analytically the nature of any 
particular connections, it is far from easy to see how, in time, the 
connections that characterize a complete system will not become 
hopelessly tangled. A similar objection holds against any gravitational or 
electrical theory that involves vortex filaments terminating on atoms; the 
tangling of the filaments is an unsolved problem, says Fitzgerald. This 
particular objection does not appear to have been anticipated by Hertz, 
and it is difficult to see how, in the context of the physics of the day, he 
might have tried to make an effective response.
It is not hard to frame what seem to me to be other serious objections 
to the whole project of replacing forces by fixed connections. The problem 
is that, for quite ordinary cases, the concept of fixed connections, as Hertz 
has it, seems most improbable and requires us to suppose that, on 
occasion, nature makes extraordinary provision for the future turn of 
events.
Let us recall how Hertz s idea goes;
’.... we find certain purely spaciai connections between the masses of nature: 
from the very beginning onwards through all time, and therefore 
independent of time, certain positions and certain changes of position, are 
prescribed and associated as possible for the masses, and all others as 
impossible 57
At first glance the concept appears reasonable, especially as one's 
initial thoughts about its application turn to action at a distance as 
evidenced by star/planet motions. For, here, one thinks of the 
prescriptions on possible positions as, somehow or other, determining the 
same spatial relations as would be derivable from the laws which flow 
from Newtonian mechanics and which govern the motions of the bodies 
involved. That is to say, one conjectures that the dynamical equations 
based on Newtonian forces would transform into an alternative system of 
dynamical equations which would govern the geometrical connections 
and their evolution in time from some specified initial state. This is the 
sort of conception that I take Duhem to have in mind as background to 
the remarks quoted above.
57Hertz; Principles....:, p.27
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A difficulty would seem to be posed, however, as soon as we reflect 
on celestial situations of even minor complexity. Take the case of one 
solar system which, in its journey through space, approaches closely 
enough to another for a planet from the first to be captured by the 
second. The fixed connections between planet and star that characterise 
the first relationship and those that characterise the second might seem 
to be individually unproblematic. But, if we concentrate on the body that 
is the planet, we see an evolution of fixed geometrical connections, such 
that initially there is no relationship at all with the second star, then a 
gradually increasing one, as that with the first diminishes and eventually 
disappears altogether. How, we might enquire, can nature foresee the 
future course of events so that, in consequence, she might build into the 
connections that run between the planet and the two stars the capacity 
for evolution that marks the case? Why should we accept that the future 
of the universe is determined by the evolution of connections among 
masses in accordance with some grand pre-ordained plan that has those 
masses behaving very much in accord with Leibniz s way of pre- 
established harmony? The metaphysical problems encountered here are 
by no means less formidable than those which we noted earlier that Hertz 
found in the concepts of force and energy, and in the several principles to 
which he objected.
What are we to say about a meteor that burns up in the earth's 
atmosphere? Something much more drastic would seem to be involved 
than could be conveyed in the two sets of geometrical connections that, 
supposedly, would describe the circumstances before and after burn-up. 
What governs the evolution of mechanical state during the transition 
stage from meteor to resultant particles? The answer must in some way 
or other involve the effect of the earth's atmosphere, but how could the 
atmosphere come to affect the time evolution of the geometrical 
connections between meteor and earth? Was that effect pre-programmed 
from the beginning of time into all the relevant sets of connections so that 
it would occur just when it did?
A further indication of the implausibility of Hertz's conception of 
fixed connections arises as soon as we consider separate mass particles 
that are interfered with in one way or another by human action.
Construct any article and ask whether the conception still bears the ring
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of truth. Weil, for some products, perhaps it might. But for others there 
seem to be difficulties. Take a wrist watch, for example. There would 
have to be a very large number of interrelated equations that express the 
set of fixed connections among the various particles that are conjoined to 
make up the watch. Trace the history of any representative particle, say 
one of iron comprising part of a larger particle of steel that is located in 
the hairspring. Reflect on all the equations of connection that have 
featured in the various material stages through which the selected 
particle has passed, from and before the time of its extraction as an 
element of a mineral deposit, through to its presence in the watch. Can 
one really believe that all these spatial connections, from the very 
beginning onwards through all time', have been prescribed and 
associated as possible ?
One might be able to do so if the prescription were supposed to be 
merely permissive and to rule out what is physically not realizable. But 
then two new difficulties would appear. First, there would be the 
unanswered questions of what fails within the category of that which is 
not physically realizable, of where such listing or the relevant criterion is 
held, and of what in mechanics polices the policy. Second, there would be 
the contradiction that, in many other cases such as in celestial mechanics, 
the prescription has to be totally specific to the case. For, if it were not, 
the connections could not evolve in time in the manner required for the 
theoretically determined spatial relations to accord with their empirically 
determined counterparts, in the virtually infinite number of individual 
circumstances for which such is demanded.
So, if we take it that the spatial connections among all pairs of 
material particles have been prescribed, in the full sense of this verb, for 
all time from the very beginning, how then can we account for the 
circumstance of human intervention in the history of material particles? 1 
believe there is no possible answer to this question. If I am right about 
that, the conclusion must be that Hertz's idea of eliminating force as a 
fundamental term in dynamics by substituting fixed connections is 
untenable.
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2.3 The Nature of Hertz's Project 
2.3.1 Hertz's Motivation
What motivated Hertz to set about providing new foundations for 
mechanics? Undoubtedly, for the reasons that have already been noted, 
he was dissatisfied with eiisting expositions.
But there may have been a more compelling incentive. As we have 
seen, Hertz had recently been engaged in the like task of presenting what 
he thought was a more logically-satisfying account of Maxwell's theory of 
electromagnetism,5* and, in respect of that theory, his own demonstration 
of electromagnetic propagation was generally taken as a verification of 
the existence of the ether. What, then, would be more natural than for 
him to think that, if action at a distance had been eliminated from 
electromagnetism in this way, then perhaps in like manner it might also 
be eiiminabie from gravitation? And if he did actually think along those 
lines, would we not expect him to be occupied in just such a project as we 
have currently before us? Confirmation of an affirmative answer to these 
questions is, I think, provided in some remarks by Helmholtz:
There can no longer be any doubt that light-waves consist of electric 
vibrations in the all-pervading ether, and that the latter possesses the
properties of an insulator and a magnetic medium....from  the standpoint of
theoretical science it is perhaps even more important to be able to 
understand how apparent actions-at-a distance really consist in a 
propagation of an action from one layer of an intervening medium to the 
next. Gravitation still remains an unsolved puzzle; as yet a satisfactory 
explanation of it has not been forthcoming, and we are still compelled to
treat it as a pure action-at-a-distance.' 59
Has not Helmholtz, without expressing the fact explicitly, captured 
here the essence of Hertz's motivation? Unquestionably, as we have 
noted, Hertz held that, within the theory of electromagnetism, belief in 
action at a distance had justifiably been replaced by belief in propagation 
of action through the ether. The ether must therefore have properties 
akin to those of an elastic medium, even though the conjunction of its 
properties must be very different from any that had so far been 
observed in ordinary materials. But it is just such a mix of conviction and 
uncertainty about the actual nature of this quasi-elastic medium, coupled
5s HertzH; E lec tr ic  W aves; pp 195-268 
59Helmhoitz; op. cit; tenth and eleventh pages
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with its now accepted role in electromagnetism, that would prompt, and 
make plausible, a speculation that gravitational action could be 
propagated through the ether in like manner to electric and magnetic 
action. And no-one at the time was better placed than Hertz to articulate 
the possibility.
Duhem has a similar view:
Hertz's mechanics, indeed, is the extension to the complete physical 
Universe of the ideas Kelvin applied to the ether alone'60
But, if this assessment is intended to be taken literally, then I believe it is 
unwarrantedly restrictive. We should try to get the matter straight.
At the time when Hertz was writing, much effort had gone into the 
task of producing an acceptable account of the workings of the ether 61 
and some great physicists of the time, Hertz among them, held to the 
expectation that a completely satisfactory mechanical explanation would 
be forthcoming.
Among many suggestions for a mechanical visualisation of the ether 
were several by William Thomson (Lord Kelvin). His earlier versions had 
been developed over the period 1847-1867, and each in turn was 
eventually laid aside or abandoned.62 By 1884 Thomson had a new 
mechanical model which he continued to elaborate in later years.63 The 
particular model to which Duhem refers in the above quotation is drawn 
from a paper by Thomson in 1890.64 According to Duhem, this model 
posits the ether as consisting of solid atoms that do not interact with one 
another in any way that would require the medium to have other than 
zero internal potential. Each atom is spinning rapidly so that it resists any 
torque tending to tilt its axis of rotation, but it offers no opposition to any 
force tending to move that axis parallel to itself. Such an ether, Duhem
6oDuhemP; The Evolution o f  M echanics, p.86
6lSee, for example, Harman P. M; Energy, Force and M atter , Cambridge 
University Press: 1982; esp. pp. 6, 7, 21-27, 30-35.72-119 
62op. cit; pp79-84
63See, for example, Harman, op. cit. ppl00-101; also Duhem P; The Evoiution o f  
Mechanics-, p.86
^Thomson V; On a G yrostatic-Adynam ic Constitution fo r  E th er ; Edinburgh 
Royal Society; Proceedings; 17 March 1890 - included in Scien tific  Papers vol 
I I I , p.466
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continues, would not transmit longitudinal vibrations but it would 
transmit transverse vibrations with a finite velocity. As thus described 
by Duhem, we may take it that the model would accord pretty well with 
the then known facts of electromagnetism.
Now this simple description appears to me to bear little relation to 
the extremely complicated model that Kelvin describes in the paper from 
which Duhem claims to be drawing. We shall let that pass, however, and 
merely affirm that Kelvin s model for the ether comprises solid atoms 
connected by rigid bars via flexible ball-and-socket joints, with each 
connecting rod constrained by a complex arrangement of gyrostats to 
which it is attached. In such a mechanism, transverse waves can be 
propagated with finite velocity, but longitudinal waves cannot be 
propagated at all. Insofar as this model comprehends rigid connections 
between atoms, it could be claimed to be similar in that respect to what 
Hertz has in mind in his new mechanics, and, if that is all Duhem intends 
to convey in the above quotation, then there can be no quarrel with him. 
But the ideas Kelvin applied to the ether alone' comprise much more than that.
In passing we might note that, if such a model were to be envisaged 
for mechanics rather than for electromagnetism, then, in its dependence 
on the conservation of angular momentum, it would invoke one of the 
very principles that it is supposed to explain. The point is worth 
generalising. If connections are taken as fundamental in mechanics, then 
their elucidation must avoid any appeal to mechanical principles other 
than primitive terms or axioms.
Let us now endeavour to ascertain, from his writings, what Hertz’s 
views about the ether were in the early 1890‘s. In the first of his two 
papers on Maxwell's theory! restricted to bodies at rest), Hertz presents 
equations that connect the electric and magnetic forces 'in the ether' and 
then rejects the idea of deducing these equations from conjectures about 
the electric and magnetic constitution of the ether, all these things being 
entirely unknown'. Instead he intends to use the equations as a starting 
point in search of further conjectures respecting the constitution of the ether. 5^ 
Bearing in mind Hertz's dissatisfaction with the energy formulation of
^Hertz H; E lec tr ic  W& res\ Macmillan; 1893 -Translation by DJE.Jones of the 
German edition of 1892; re-issued by Dover, 1962; pp 200/201
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mechanics and his preference for a system that imports hidden masses 
and hidden motions, there is irony, complementary to that noted earlier, 
in the fact that, for the calculation of electromagnetic forces acting 
between ponderable bodies, he resorts to exactly the opposite procedure. 
The reason he does this is to avoid one of the problems that attend the 
ether hypothesis, in this case the difficulty that the very pressures that 
are conveyed through the ether would set the ether itself in motion in a 
manner about which we could do no better than speculate.66
At the beginning of the second paper on Maxwell's theory, Hertz 
continues to insist on the role of the ether in sustaining electric and 
magnetic energy and in eliminating the concept of action at a distance67, 
and he raises the question of whether the theory can be extended to 
moving bodies. There are two problems. Firstly there is the deficiency 
already mentioned, namely that we know nothing of the actual 
disturbances that are caused in the ether itself, so we could only proceed 
by introducing arbitrary assumptions; earlier he had avoided this 
problem altogether, we noted, when he used the principle of the 
conservation of energy as the basis for calculations. Secondly, such 
indications as there were about the motion of the ether seemed to require 
a negative answer to the question that had been raised.66 How Hertz 
proposed to get round this difficulty is a matter we need not consider, for 
our purposes here are purely to establish his views about the ether. They 
may now be summarised:
1. he was committed to belief in its existence;
2. he was committed to the view that, at the time, its constitution 
was unknown, and its behaviour largely unknown.
But there is a little more to be culled, and from the Principles o f  
Mechanics itself. As we remarked earlier, Hertz, when he is shoring up 
his hypothesis about hidden masses and hidden motions, mentions there,
66Hertz; op. cit; pp 220/221 
67op. cit; p.241 
teibid; p.242
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in te r  aiia, Kelvin's 'theory of vortex atoms'. 70 Later Hertz again 
speaks approvingly of the vortex atom theory, but he leaves himself a 
wide avenue of escape from any firm commitment to it, and he points to 
a large range of other options compatible with his foundations of 
mechanics:
'I may mention Lord Kelvin's theory of vortex-atoms: this presents to us an 
image of the material universe which is in complete accord with the 
principles of our mechanics, and yet our m echanics in  no wise 
demands such g rea t s im p lic ity  and  lim ita tion  o f  assum ptions as 
Lord K elv in  has im posed upon h im s e l f  He need not abandon our 
fundamental propositions if we were to assume that the vortices revolved 
about rigid or flexible, but inextensible, nuclei; and instead of assuming 
simply incompressibility we might subject the all-pervading medium to 
much more complicated conditions, the most general form of which would
be a matter for further investigation'71 (my emphasis)
Near the end of his Introduction to the P rincipies o f  M echanics , 
Hertz leaves us in no doubt about the fundamental role that he envisages 
for the ether in his formulation of mechanics. Whatever properties the 
ether might eventually be discovered to have, Hertz believes that we will 
be nearer the truth when we can trace back
the supposed actio ns-at-a-distance to motions in an all-pervading
medium whose smallest parts are subjected to rigid connections....This is
the field in which the decisive battle between these different fundamental 
assumptions of mechanics must be fought out’72
We can now see that, in his papers on electromagnetism, Hertz is at 
pains to insist on how little is known about the constitution and 
behaviour of the ether and that, quite deliberately, he refrains from 
making any assumptions about it. Likewise, in his treatment of 
mechanics, he tells us a bare minimum about the elementary particles he 
assumes as basic, and nothing about their behaviour. The best that 
Helmholtz can divine on the subject is that
^Hertz; P rincip les...... ; p.26
70We should note that, strictly speaking, the vortex atom theory is one of Kelvin s 
earlier attempts to find a mechanical model for the ether and is not the same theory 
to which we have seen Duhem referring. The latter has been called more 
appropriately the gyrosta tic -adynam ic  th e o ry  
71op. cit; pp37/3S 
72op. cit; p.41
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'Hem seems to have relied chiefly on the introduction of cyclical systems
vith invisible motions’^
Kelvin could have been completely wrong in his vortex atom theory or his 
later gyrostatic-adynamic theory, as we now know he was, and yet Hertz 
could still have been right, even though, as it happens, it did not turn out 
that way.
So Hertz s motivation and the background to his enterprise may be 
summarised thus:
1. he believed in the existence of the ether;
2. he believed that it would eventually be shown that the ether is 
constituted of elementary particles in fixed connections;
3. but he refrained from being more specific than that about the 
nature of the ether; in particular, i t  is  misleading to describe 
his project, as Duhem does, as the extension o f Kelvin s 
ideas about the ether to the whole un iverse ;
4. he believed that he could tidy up the foundations of mechanics 
and, in the process, deliver the death blow to action at a 
distance, since gravitation would be accommodated via 
connections in the ether a fter the manner o f electric  
and magnetic action.
2.3.2 The Essence of Hertz s Project
What is the essence of Hertz s project? Is  it, as Hacking would have  
it, to provide us with the th ird  o f 'three d ifferen t ways to 
rep resen t the then extan t know ledge o f  the m otions o f  bodies '? Most 
emphatically i t  is  not, as I  shall now  try  to show.
Let us recall (see my p. 150) that, for Hertz, Maxwell’s theory is 
nothing more and nothing less than Maxwell's system of equations, 
independently o f how  th ey  are derived. He made this point in the 
specific context that, at the time, there were three ways of arriving at the 
equations. Not only do we have no reason to believe that he would view 
the case of mechanics differently, but we have good reason to believe 
that he would view it similarly; for we have already noted that, apart
73Helmholtz; op. cit; final page
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from Newton's third law for action at a distance, the theoretical resources 
that flow from Hertz's approach comprise just the terms, principles and 
equations that are universally taken to be the usual content of classical 
mechanics.
So we must take it that, for Hertz, the theory that constitutes 
mechanics comprises Newton s laws, Lagrange's equations, and the rest. It 
is just this content, and this content only, that is equivalent to what 
Hacking calls knowledge of the motions of bodies'. This last point is also made 
by Duhem:
Others, with Hertz........wanted to push the explication of physical
phenomena further than the reduction to Lagrange's equations; they intend 
only to stop in their analysis after haying reduced all transformations to 
shape, motion and mass. It is  still, however, the M echanics o f  
d'Alem bert and Lagrange which p rov ides them with the means o f  
constru cting  an explication o f  the World with these elem ents 
alond  74 (my emphasis).
The implication that Duhem would rest content with the equations alone 
echoes a view that we have already noted as being held by Mach and 
Helmholtz.
That Hertz subscribed to the view of Duhem, that I have highlighted,
is evidenced, not only by what comes out of Hertz's own development of
mechanics, but also by his own words;
For I have not attempted this task because mechanics has shown signs of 
inappropriateness in its applications, nor because it in any way conflicts 
with experience, but solely in order to rid myself of the oppressive feeling 
that to me i ts  elem ents were not fre e  from  th in g s obscure and
u n in te llig ib le  ' * 75 (my emphasis),
and later:
'....In respect to (practical applications or the needs of mankind) i t  is
sca rce ly  possib le  that the usual represen ta tion  o f  mechanics, 
which has been devised  expressly  fo r  them, can e ver  be replaced  
b y  a more appropria te  system. Our represen ta tion  o f  m echanics 
bears towards the custom ary one som ewhat th e  same relation  
th a t th e  system atic  gram m ar o f  a language bears to a gram m ar 
devised  fo r  the purpose o f  enabling lea rn ers  to become 
acquainted as qu ick ly  as possib le  with what th e y  w ill requ ire  in  
da ily  life. The requirements of the two are very different, and they must 
differ widely in their arrangement if each is to be properly adapted to its
purpose'7^(my emphasis)
74DuhemP; The Evolution o f  Mechanics-, p.S4
75Hertz; P rin cip les  ... ; p.33
7V  cit; p.40
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These passages tell us that, to meet the requirements of those who 
are fastidious about the foundations of theories, Hertz is engaged in 
providing a rigorous form uiation o f the same subject m atter 
that is the content of the customary presentations which serve the needs 
of the ordinary users of the theory of mechanics. But this should occasion 
no surprise, because he told us at the outset that his project is to compare 
ways of axiomatising mechanics, as we would now describe it.
To see that this is so let us take stock of the early sequence of ideas 
that Hertz puts before us:
1 . he asserts that experience shows that we can conceptualise 
deductive systems which conform in certain respects to the 
way things are in the world:
'We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and 
the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents 
of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary
consequents in nature of the things pictured' ;77
2. he points to a problem. The concepts that we form are not
determined uniquely by the requirement that the deductions
at which we arrive should map on to the world:
'The images which we may form of things are not determined without 
ambiguity by the requirement that the consequents of the images 
must be the images of the consequents. Various images of the same 
objects are possible, and these images may differ in various
respects’ 7®
I shall have something to say below about this passage;
3. for the purpose of comparing images, he introduces the criteria 
of permissibility, correctness and appropriateness that, in our 
presentation here, we have already seen him use;
4. he tells us that, when he is speaking about the principies of
mechanics, he intends to pick out something quite different
from what is ordinarily connoted in mechanics by that term:
'....when we speak simply and generally of the p r in c ip ie s  o f
m echanics: b y  th is  w ill be m eant a n y  selection  from  
am ongst such and sim ilar proposition s which sa tisfies the  
requ irem en t th a t th e  whole o f  m echanics can be developed
^op. cit; p.l 
78ibid; p.2
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from  i t  by purely deductive reasoning without any further appeal to 
experience'7  ^ (my emphasis);
from the context we learn that the such and similar propositions' 
are those statements that appear in the various formulations 
of mechanics as axioms, postulates or theorems. We note too 
that he makes provision for the inclusion of the fundamental 
ideas of mechanics' or, as we might now call them, the primitive 
terms of the theory:
the fundamental ideas of mechanics, together with the principles 
connecting them, represent the simplest image w hich physics can 
produce of th ings in the sensible world and the processes w hich occur
in it'80
We conclude that there is no doubt about Hertz's project. He in tends  
to compare possible wavs o f aiiom atisinz mechanics, where 
mechanics is  taken as given and comprises that body o f  
theories that we have discussed at Jength . Contrary to what 
Hacking has said, we do not see here three different ways to represent the 
then extant knowledge of the motions of bodies' What we do see is one 
substantive theory about the motions of bodies, and three different ways 
in which it might be axiomatised. Note the emphasis which I have 
placed on the word might'. The reason I have done so is that we shall 
find Hertz himself abandoning the second way (my ppM5/6), and we 
shall discover grounds for abandoning the third way (my p. 151 et seq).
2.4 One Source of Possible Misconception
From the vantage point of the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that, 
whilst misconception o f Hertz 's project shouid not arise, there 
are, nevertheless, several sources o f possibie m isinterpretation  
from which misconception such as Hacking 's might derive. One 
such is Hertz's assertion that the concepts that we form are not 
determined uniquely by the requirement that the deductions that flow 
from our theories should map on to the world.
79ibid; p.4 
SOibid; p.4
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Hertz could be taken to mean by this just what Cartwright and 
Hacking attribute to Duhem - namely that different theories can be 
formulated to comprehend the phenomena that characterize some given 
physical domain, and perhaps theories so different that, whilst remaining 
credible as genuine alternatives, they could also be incompatible.
If Hertz s intention is that the thesis is to be understood in this way, 
he neither says nor does anything to justify it either in The Principles 
o f Mechanics or in Electric Waves.
On the other hand, he might mean just what we can infer from what 
he says he is doing in his treatment of the two theories that we know he 
reformulated - Maxwell's theory and mechanics. In neither case does he 
consider the bulk of the interpreted content of the theory to be at issue. 
On the contrary, he makes clear that it is important to him that any 
reformulation of either theory preserve its usual content. His expressed 
concern is rather about the interpretation and status of fundamental 
terms and concepts, and about the rigour of the formulation. What would 
be meant bv the assertion that our concepts are not determined uniquely 
bv the requirement that the deductions that flow from our theories 
should mao on to the world, then, is not that we can formulate different 
theories that are empirically equivalent, but rather that the same 
theoretical content can flow from alternative foundational concepts.
The second way of understanding Hertz s assertion is, I claim, the 
proper one because it accords with his procedure in the only two cases in 
which his words can be put to the test of his own actions, and also 
because it eliminates the possibility of charging him with merely 
pontificating on a question of importance, a view about which would 
manifestly need justification.
Whilst this interpretation o f Hertz's assertion would 
disaJJow the possib ility  o f alternative system s o f mechanics, i t  
would\ nevertheless, g ive Hacking a second chance to be right. 
For i t  does not elim inate the possib ility  o f incompatible 
foundations yielding the same theoretical con ten t. It will behove 
us, then, in what follows to be alert to this circumstance. As it happens, 
this possibility will start to emerge in §2.5.1 and it will be dismissed in
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§2.5.2. It will recur briefly towards the end of §2.5.3 and again be 
dismissed.
There is a point about Hertz's aims and expectations which I should 
mention. It seems to me that, by his own lights, he could have been 
mistaken, at least in principle, in thinking that changes to the foundations 
would not affect the substantive content of the theory that he wanted to 
preserve. For example, if his doubts about Newton's third law for action 
at a distance had been well founded, then action and reaction between 
coupled masses would not be fully expressed by forces of mutual 
attraction, and a non-central component of force would be found to exist. 
Now, although Hertz points to this sort of phenomenon in 
electromagnetism, it is evident that he did not expect it in macroscopic 
mechanical phenomena, and so he thought that no change to the 
customary system of mechanics would be called for. Rather, it seems 
probable that he expected the effect to become apparent when we came 
to understand the processes by which couplings between separated 
masses are realised in the intervening ether. Only the foundations of 
mechanics would need to be altered. But I can find no grounds in his 
treatise for accepting the conjunction of these two expectations. 
Accordingly, I argue in §2.5.2 that, if Hertz were to be right in his 
speculation about forces at a distance, then errors could flow from the 
foundations right through the development of Newtonian mechanics. 
Nevertheless, as will be apparent in the sequel, these remarks call for no 
change to the view that we cannot infer, from Hertz's treatment of 
mechanics, the possibility of incompatible, but empirically equivalent, 
theories.
2.5 A Second Source of Possible Misconception - the Crucial Test 
(Experiment or Inference)
Now anyone who remains unconvinced by my arguments and who is still 
sympathetic to Hacking's position, might be tempted to embrace the 
seemingly obscure thesis with which Hertz ends his Introduction, and to 
claim that, notwithstanding other appearances to the contrary. Hertz is, 
after all, in the business of comparing incompatible theories.
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I take it that such person would have concurred with Hertz in 
abandoning the second image, namely the energy formulation as Hertz 
propounded i t , and that the incompatibility now supposed is resident 
in the Newtonian and the Hertzian formulations. The condition I have 
placed on the second image for its abandonment, namely its formulation 
as Hertz propounded it, is necessary in the present context because, as we 
saw earlier, it is possible to found mechanics on the concept of energy via, 
for example, Hamilton's principle, provided one introduces into the 
foundations a large part of what is basic to the Newtonian formulation.
But then, in the sense that I have explained, the two foundations would 
be equivalent. The challenge for anyone who still wants to retain the 
second image as a genuine alternative  would be to do what Hertz 
found impossible. That challenge has not been taken up, so we may start 
from the presumption that, if incompatibility lurks somewhere, then we 
must seek to find it in Hertz s first and third images.
2.5.1 The Thesis of a Crucial Test
What is the thesis that might be thought to substantiate the spectre of 
incompatibility? We shall detail the steps that lead to it:
1. Hertz claims51 that, in the customary Newtonian formulation 
of mechanics, the relative accelerations of the masses are 
assumed to be 'the f in a l constant elem ents in n a tu re ,
and that from these are deduced approximate, but o n ly  
approximate, fix ed  re la tion s  between their positions';
2. by contrast, he says, his own formulation assumes
as the s tr ic t ly  in  variable elem ents  of nature fixed relations 
between the positions', from which may be deduced when the 
phenomena require it approxim ately, but o n ly  approxim ately, 
in variab le  re la tiv e  accelerations between the masses';
3. he asserts that the assumptions underlying the two 
formulations cannot simultaneously be true, and he 
visualises the possibility of investigating the issue by what 
might be conceived as nothing less than a crucial experiment.
A sufficiently accurate scrutiny of natural motions, he thinks, 
would reveal
51op. cit; p.41
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Vhether ....the relative acceleration (of masses), or the 
relative relations of position, or both, are only approxim ately  
in variable  82 (my emphasis).
I take Hertz to be articulating here an expectation foreshadowed in 
the Introduction when he was discussing the Newtonian imaged The 
expectation was there left empty, and, as far as I can see, has nowhere 
else been made explicit:
.... as far as future experience is concerned, there v ill yet be occasion to 
return to the question of correctness' * 8^
So, the thesis becomes clear in the implicit instruction : carry out the  
crucial e iperim ent o f peering closely at natural motions; 
determ ine whether, in the ultimate, i t  is  accelerations or 
geometrical connections that are approiim ateiy invariable, and  
thus decide betw een the two incompatible ways o f founding  
mechanics.
Now it could be that Hertz is not really proposing an experiment at all 
here. Perhaps he is merely saying that, i f  we could make the 
observations, then we would know the truth of the matter. But he goes on 
to say:
' And the balance o f  evidence w ill be e n tire ly  in favour o f  the  
th ird  image when a second approxim ation to the tru th  can be 
atta ined b y  trac in g  back the supposed actions-at-a-distance to 
m otions in an a ll-pervad in g  medium whose sm allest p a r ts  are  
subjected to r ig id  connections; a case which also seem s to be 
n ea rly  rea lised  in  the same sph ere  (i .e . e lec tric  and m agnetic  
forces). This is  th e  f ie ld  in which the decisive battle between  
these d ifferen t fundam ental assum ptions o f  m echanics m ust be
fought out' *5 (parenthesis and emphasis added)
This quotation can leave us in no doubt that he thinks the matter will be 
settled. How? There can be only two possibilities: direct experiment or 
inference from indirect experiment.
Let us forgo, for the moment, any temptation to enter a debate about 
whether the dream entertained here, if it implies an experiment, really 
does amount to a proposal for a crucial test to determine which of two
82ibid; p.41
88We took pains to notice it at the time. See my p.138
84op. cit; p.9
85op. cit; p.41
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hypotheses is true, and so which of two ways of founding mechanics is 
correct. Both Duhem86 and Quine87 deny that there can be any such 
crucial test. Since, however, we are investigating a claim by Hacking that 
relates specifically to what Hertz actually wrote, and derivatively to the 
context in which he wrote, our purposes are served by taking Hertz to 
mean precisely what he said. It will transpire, however, that our analysis 
will lead to a conclusion that bears on the question we are bypassing.
We shall also defer choosing between experiment and inference as 
the correct interpretation of Hertz s idea of how a decision is to be 
reached on which of the ways of founding mechanics is the correct one. 
That question we shall resolve in §2.5.3. Meanwhile our interest will turn 
to the implications, for the Hacking thesis we are investigating, of a 
successful experiment or, equivalently, of a sound inference favouring 
one or the other of the two candidates for final constant element in 
nature'.
2.5.2 The Implications of a Successful Test
Let us for the tim e being suppose that the thesis is  sound. The 
Newtonian and the Hertzian formulations of mechanics seem then to be 
incompatible at the foundational level. Now ie t us aiso do a b it o f 
fantasizing and imagine that the proposed eiperim ent is  
conducted, or that a sound inference is  made, and that the 
Hertzian foundation is  vindicated.
We must then surely claim that only one formulation of mechanics is 
valid. At first glance this conclusion seems to put paid altogether to 
Hacking s claim since, of the three images with which we started, only one 
has managed to survive. No set of alternative theories, let alone any 
incompatible ones, is left. To the contrary, i t  was ju s t the 
perception o f incom patibiiity that Hertz seized on to decide 
betw een the two form uiations and to eiiminate one.
^Duhem P; The Aim and Structure o f  P hysica l T h eory ; second edition 1914- 
translated by P.P.Wiener and published by Princeton University Press; 1954; p.188 
etseq , esp. p.189
870uine W.V; Two Dogmas o f  Empiricism  in From a Logical Point o f  View\ 
Harvard University Press; 1953; p.41
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But it might be objected against me that my move to discredit 
Hacking's claim is altogether too swift. For it could be urged that by my 
lights there now exists a false foundation, namely the Newtonian 
formulation of mechanics, which yields deductively the very truths, i.e. 
Lagrange's equations etc., that I assert to constitute the content of 
mechanics and to explain motion in the world. Remember, it might be 
continued, that Duhem, Mach and Helmholtz sought no more; and here, 
coming out of false foundations, they have all they need - an empirically 
correct theoretical content, indeed the same content as flows from the 
validated foundations.
Now this rejoinder will not do, for no longer would Lagrange's 
equations, for example, derived on a Newtonian foundation on the one 
hand, and on a Hertzian foundation on the other, be equivalent. In on) 
derivation the Lagrangian generalised forces would be formulated on the 
basis of the primacy of acceleration, and, in the other, they would emerge 
via definition from a base which accords primacy to fixed connections. In 
the former, therefore, the equations would inherit whatever defects of 
approximation infect the principles; in the latter they would be exact.
It would be difficult to articulate the specific differences between the 
two theories without knowing exactly the nature of the approximation 
that characterises the false theory, and for that we would need 
information about the connections for cases previously considered to be 
examples of action at a distance. Whilst Hertz does not spell out the 
details for any such case, we can be confident that his prime interest is 
gravitation. Indeed, we argued earlier that it was the possibility of 
eliminating Newtonian forces acting at a distance that largely motivated 
his whole enterprise. Moreover, the one potential application of his ideas, 
to which he refers on a number of occasions, focusses on the possibility 
that, to use familiar terminology, interaction between masses will be 
found to be something more than just mutual attraction along the line 
joining them. Let us, then, consider this case.
To determine the errors that would arise in this instance in 
calculations within the Newtonian formulation of mechanics, we would 
need to know explicitly wherein the law of universal gravitation and 
Newton's third law are in error, since it would be errors from these
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sources that would propagate through the theory and infect derivations. 
For example, if there were situations, such as Hertz envisages, in which 
the forces of interaction between separated masses are not limited to 
application along the line joining the masses, then the motions derived 
within Newtonian mechanics would be in error vectorially by such 
amounts as are determined by the non-centrai forces.
On the other hand, the Hertzian formulation would, supposedly, make 
explicit and exact provision for such forces through the equations of 
connection that stem from its foundations. In particular, the gravitational 
relation, in revised format if necessary to make provision for non-central 
forces, would find precise expression within the equations that specify 
the fixed geometrical connections between the relevant masses. Since 
calculations within Hertz s mechanics start from the equations of 
connection, there would be no errors to propagate through theoretical 
derivations if those equations were exact to begin with. The 
approximations that, according to Hertz, affect derivatives’ arise from 
other sources, as we shall see in §2.5.3.
The points that I have just made will be further elaborated below and 
become obvious, I think, if that is not already the case, when I suggest 
how the Hertzian thesis that we have been considering might be 
interpreted. Meanwhile, the moral to be drawn from the discussion 
so fa r  is  that the supposed validation o f Hertz 's principles calls 
either fo r  complete abandonment o f Newtonian mechanics or 
fo r its  reformulation in  such a way that equivalence between  
the system s is  estab lished . The second alternative quite obviously 
would be available to us here, unless our talk of the occurrence of an 
unexpected non-central force were not to make sense.
We are thus taken back to the question we deferred earlier about 
whether Hertz was presenting an instance of a crucial way of deciding 
which of two hypotheses is true, and so which of two formulations of a 
theory would survive and which would perish. Although we started out 
as though our aim were to decide between two formulations of a theory, 
our analysis leads us, in this case, to question whether the offending 
formulation really does need to be abandoned. It looks as though it could 
be recast to provide the required conformity with experience. If that
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view were correct, and if the case actually were one involving a 
supposedly crucial test, then it would conform to Duhem's claim that 
crucial experiments do not occur - it is possible to reformulate a theory to 
accommodate recalcitrant observations. But note that any recasting of the 
Newtonian formulation would be to re-establish equivalence between it 
and the Hertzian formulation.
Everything that has so far been said on the matter before us is 
premised on the hypothesis that Hertz s thesis is sound. On that 
understanding we set out to discover what implications would follow if, 
contrary to fact, the crucial experiment had been carried out, or the 
crucial inference made, and one way of formulating mechanics had been 
validated and the other falsified. The conclusion to which we came is that 
only one way of presenting the theory of mechanics would remain true to 
the phenomena. Even if the alternative foundation that had been falsified 
could be suitably recast, and we argued that it could, there would still be 
but one theory of mechanics since the alternative presentations would 
then be equivalent. And so is repeated here what we have witnessed 
before, since, in both our consideration of Newtonian mechanics and our 
consideration of Hertz s second image, we saw how, and in what sense, 
equivalence between alternative foundations is required if the 
superstructures are to be equivalent.
Our conclusion, in brief, is that no incom patibility Is to be fo u n d  
here.
2.5.3 An Interpretation of Hertz's Thesis
For the purposes of the preceding discussion it was not necessary to 
give an explicit articulation and criticism of the Hertzian thesis that was 
central to it. All that we needed to have at hand were its general thrust 
and implications. But now I want to submit the thesis to close 
examination and, in anticipation of what will emerge, I will reveal the 
conclusion that I shall finally reach.The very presuppositions that 
underlie Hertz's mechanics, presuppositions which he hoped might be 
validated in experience, turn out to be propositions about the world that, 
in being now universally rejected, constitute reason for the falsity of the 
Hertzian foundations of mechanics in their original formulation. In short,
[Port 2, S2] 173
geometrical connections between masses, of the sort Hertz had in mind, is 
a false description of how things ultimately are.
Now we have already noted the fact that Hertz's formulation is 
incomplete. There are, therefore, two reasons why it is a candidate for 
rejection in the form in which Hertz has passed it down to us. One 
possible way in which it might be amended to be acceptable will be 
apparent in what follows. But such recasting would cost the formulation 
its most basic principle.
It has been a matter of surprise to me to see how little impact Hertz's 
proposal for the crucial experiment or inference that we have been 
discussing seems to have had on those who have written about his views 
on mechanics. As far as I can discover, only one commentator goes so far 
as even to mention the matter, and that is Bertrand Russell8* who, 
apparently, gives the idea some degree of support, but without 
articulating what exactly he conceives the proposition to be. Duhem89, 
Mach90, Fitzgerald9! and Poincare92 are all silent on the subject.
So too would be H.A. Lorentz93, if his words were all we had to go by. 
But his deeds imply that he had a view about it. For Lorentz, impressed 
by
’.... the great advantage in conciseness and clearness of expression that is 
gained by the mathematical form Hertz has chosen for his statements'94,
and following Hertz closely in mode of presentation, outlines in a lucid 
exposition how  a theory o f mechanics might be founded  on a 
geometricai base very Jike that which Hertz conceived, with the 
vitai difference that Lorentz retains the notion o f force in its
88Russell B; The P rin cip les o f  M athem atics; second edition; Allen and Unwin; 
1937; pp 494-49$
89Duhem P; The E volution o f  M echanics; Translated by M. Cole; Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff; 1980; pp83-8$
90Mach E; The Science o f  Mechanics-, pp318-325
9!Fitzgerald G J; The Foundations o f  D ynam ics; Nature 51, No 1316,1895, p.284. 
92Poincar6 H; Les Idees de H ertz sur la M6ccanique\ R6vue g6n6raie des 
Sciences viii; 1897; p. 734. (reprinted in Oeuvres de H enri P o in care , vol vii)
93Lorentz H.A; Some Considerations on the P rin cip les o f  Dynamics in  
Connexion with Hertz's P rinzip ien  der M echanik '; Proc. Acad. Amsterdam 
3; p.713; 1902; reprinted in Lorentz's Collected Papers iv; pp36-58; Hague;1937 
9V  cit; p.36
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custom ary connotation . In passing, I suggest that, herein, lies one 
possibility for reconstruction of Hertz's elegant presentation to re­
establish equivalence with the usual formulations. But the reinstatement 
of the Newtonian concept of force would make the revised formulation 
radically different from what Hertz had in mind.
Now we may safely take it that Lorentz did not miss Hertz's 
criticisms, and so presumably he did not have the same problems with 
the concept or rorce as did Hertz. That calls Tor little, IT any, comment 
because many physicists who think deeply about their subject would 
concur with Lorentz. What does call for comment is that Lorentz makes 
no mention at ail of the proposal for settling whether the accelerations or 
the geometrical connections of masses are the ultimate features of the 
world, even though he is careful to be recorded as non-committal on the 
question of hidden masses.95 For, if Lorentz were to concur in supposing 
firstly that a decision is feasible, and secondly that such could vindicate 
rigid connections rather than accelerations as ultimate in nature, then 
surely he would owe the reader an explanation of why he is reverting to 
a foundation for mechanics that is at decided risk of invalidation. His 
reticence on the matter should be interpreted, I suggest, as indicating, if 
not actually establishing, that he did not take Hertz's idea of a crucial test 
seriously.
Although we can find but little evidence of support for Hertz's thesis 
of a crucial test, and no guidance on how best to understand it, let us do 
what we can to give it an interpretation and assessment.
The specific contrast to which Hertz points seems to be that between 
what is ultimate and what is derivative. On the Newtonian foundation. 
Hertz would have it that acceleration is assumed to be what is ultimate 
and spatial separation what is derivative; on his own foundation, the 
reverse is the case. I have used the word ultimate' to pick out what I 
take him to mean by the words final constant' and strictly invariable' in the 
two different phrases that he uses to mark one term in the contrast, 
namely the final constant elements in nature' and the strictly invariable 
elements in nature'. My word 'derivative' is intended to pick out the other 
term in the contrast, which is reached via deduction within the image. In
95op. cit; p.36
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the Newtonian formulation what is deduced are approximate, but only 
approximate, fixed relations’ between the positions of the masses; in the 
Hertzian formulation there are deduced approximately, but only 
approximately, invariable relative accelerations between the masses'
I think that there are the strongest reasons for believing that the 
approximation envisaged has nothing whatever to do with the accuracy of 
mathematical manipulation within a theory. Rather, it is indirectly to do 
with measurements as performed in the world. But it is not an 
approximation that stems from the limitations of scales and chronometers 
for measuring lengths and times respectively.?6 As I shall explain below, 
the approximation is more to do with our inability to get a secure grip on 
reality.
But first let me toy with a metaphor. If, for the word approximate' 
we substitute the word pseudo', we will get, I believe, something of the 
flavour of what is involved. And it seems to me that the substitution is a 
reasonable one to make, since bestowing on something the character of 
approximate invariability, or the character of being an approximate 
fin a i constant, would seem to mean, and to be better rendered in 
English by a statement to the effect that the said thing exhibits pseudo­
invariability or that it is a pseudo-final constant. The contrast would now 
reduce to something very much like that between reality and appearance, 
in the old philosophical senses of those concepts. Talk of something being 
'derivative' would then mean more than merely that it represents the 
product of derivation within a theory. For derivation within a theory, far 
from being at best approximate, could be exact, and if that phrase were 
taken to constitute the full meaning of the word 'derivative' in the 
present context, it would be a singularly inappropriate way of 
understanding Hertz.
We will assume, then, that to say that something is derivative 
amounts to pointing to appearances, i.e. to phenomena based on some 
underlying but hidden reality. An interpretation along these lines 
captures Hertz quite accurately, I think, as will be evident from a 
quotation we have already noted:
?6Hertz; P rin c ip le s  ... ; pp 139-142
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'....to obtain an image of the universe which shall be well-rounded,
complete, and conformable to law, we shall have to presuppose, behind the
things we see, other, invisible things....' 97 
And in another quotation that we have recorded can we not perceive 
Hertz's expectation of a move from appearance on the one hand, to
something nearer to reality on the other?
And the balance of evidence will be entirely in favour of the third image 
(i.e. Hertz s foundations) when a seco n d  approxim ation  to th e  tru th  
can be a tta in ed  b y  tra c in g  bach th e  supposed  a c tion s-a t-a -  
d istan ce to m otion s in  an a ll-p e rv a d in g  medium whose sm allest 
p a r ts  a re  su b jec ted  to r ig id  c o n n e c tio n s ; a case which also seems to
be nearly realised in the same sphere (namely that of electric and magnetic 
forces). This is the field in which the decisive battle between these different 
fundamental assumptions of mechanics must be fought out.'^8 (parentheses 
and emphasis added)
The same contrast is evident in what Hertz says elsewhere:
'.... all connections between sensible masses ....can only be d e r iv e d  
connections. We are compelled to seek the u ltim ate con n ection s  in the
world of atoms, and they are unknown to us"' (my emphasis)
Perhaps, since what I have called 'the underlying reality' is more sharply 
delineated by Hertz as the world of atoms' and/or ’the all-pervading 
medium' (i.e. the ether), it would be more correct to say that his 
distinction is one between the phenomenal on the one hand, and the 
hidden reality as specified in these quotations on the other.
The contrast, then, to which Hertz points in the case of both 
formulations is that between what is ultimate and what is derivative in 
the senses I have suggested. It would seem that the ultimate is to be 
equated with, or to approximate closely to, the hidden world of atoms and 
ether, and that it exhibits exactitude and invariability. The derivative, on 
the other hand, is to be equated with appearance or phenomena, and any 
seeming invariability which it displays is at most only approximate; that 
is, it is quasi-invariability. On these understandings I suggest in what 
follows one interpretation of what Hertz has in mind, which I think does 
justice to his views.
97op. cit; p.25 
98op. cit; p.41
990p. cit; p.151
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A physical theory per s e , according to Hertz, is a deductive system 
which, to be acceptable, must be based on demonstrably secure 
foundations. Rules of correspondence link concepts in the theory with 
entities and processes in the world. Much of the content of a theory is 
strictly logical and mathematical; it accords with the laws of our thought'100 
and lacks nothing on the criterion of logical permissibility. Book I of The 
Principles o f Mechanics is specifically claimed to be of just that form. 
It is through the rules of correspondence that the theory is connected 
with experience. These rules are explicit in the processes according to 
which we first form concepts of objects, and later map back on to nature 
the necessary implications of those concepts, in the expectation that they 
will correspond with the necessary consequents in nature’ of what has been 
conceptualised from nature.101
At the foundational level, I suggest, Hertz is uncompromising in
thinking (i) that there are some ultimate physical features of nature that
our theory  must capture, (ii) that these features, in some sense which
has to be articulated by physics, are invariant, and (iii) that one of their
distinguishing marks is exactitude. Force is taken to be such a feature in
the Newtonian formulation of mechanics, but not in the Hertzian system.
In the latter, it is the spatial connections of masses that bear the stamp of
invariability, characterised as we have already seen in the following way:
'....from the very beginning onwards through all time, and therefore
independently of time, certain positions and certain changes of position are 
prescribed and associated as possible for these masses, and all others as
impossible.....' 102
Force now enters, by definition, via the specific equations that express 
the spatial connections. It is immediately obvious that we must look for 
something other than derivation within a theory if connections are to be 
invariant and force or, as we shall see in the next paragraph, its 
surrogate, acceleration, is to be only quasi-invariant.
Now when Hertz says that relative accelerations are assumed as the 
final constant elements in the Newtonian system, he has taken it that the 
reader will understand, without prompting, that a couple of steps in the
10°op. cit; p.2
101op. cit; pp 1-3, and 140-143 
102op. cit; p.27
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exposition have been omitted. Let us spell them out. Hertz's concern is 
with coupled masses. For simplicity, we start with two such. On the 
Newtonian basis, the relevant law supplied by the physicists is that of 
universal gravitation, and we are led at once, via the concept of action at 
a distance, and via Newton's second and third laws, to the conclusion of a 
mutual attraction between the masses, exhibited completely in their 
accelerations along the line joining them. Now scale the example up to a 
set of different masses in proximity to the earth, and what we find 
experimentally is that, invariably, in vacuo, different bodies fall to the 
earth with constant acceleration - as far as we can tell. This is just as we 
would expect, since it conforms to theory, on the assumption that the 
attraction for such a body by the earth dominates over other possible 
interactions between bodies. This constant acceleration, given by theory 
as invariable and seemingly confirmed as such by experience, applies 
alike to the ultimate mass points, that is to the indivisible hidden atoms 
of which matter is composed, and to the various aggregates of such atoms 
which constitute different material bodies.
Why should a deduction of the relative relations of position of the 
masses be only approximate? The answer, I suggest, has nothing to do 
with deduction, qua deduction, but lies in the fact that deductions within 
theory are to do with observable phenomena, and the latter can at most 
exhibit quasi-invariability. From what Hertz has to say elsewhere in the 
text we can find a hint as to why, in practice, this might be so. The case is 
analogous to that which he states concerning connections between 
macroscopic objects:
'......... in  a ll  connections between sensibie  mosses which p h y s ic s
d iscovers and m echanics uses, a. su ff ic ien tly  close investiga tion  
shows that th e y  h ave o n ly  approxim ate va lid ity ; and th erefo re  
can o n ly  be d erived  connections. Ve are com pelled to seek  the  
ultim ate connections in the world o f  atoms, and th e y  are  
unknown to us. But even if they were known to us we could not apply 
them to practical purposes, but should have to proceed as we now do. For the 
complete control over any problem always requires that the number of 
variables should be extremely small, whereas a return to the connections 
among the atoms would require the introduction of an immense number of
variables'*°3 (my emphasis)
All of this is said in the context of Hertz's claim that, in cases where the 
connections ( the equations of condition of a material system'104) can be
103op. cit; p.131 
104op. cit; p.150
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specified only approximately, the fundamental law can nevertheless be 
applied on the understanding that what wiJJ resuJt wiJJ be 
statem ents about the motion o f the system  that are only 
approximate. This, according to Hertz, is the situation, without 
exception, in ail practical cases.
In passing, /  want to g ive the above quotation special 
emphasis and mark i t  fo r  fu tu re  reference  (my p. 181). I believe 
that, between such remarks on the one hand, and what we know of his 
expectations for a crucial experiment or inference involving fundamental 
processes in the ether on the other, there is such tension as to make the 
notion of the crucial test incoherent.
Now similar circumstances to those that apply to connections in the 
Hertzian formulation attend any practical case being treated in the 
Newtonian formulation. Whilst the acceleration which characterises the 
starting point of deduction supposedly has, as we have seen, the requisite 
standard of ultimacy even for perceptible bodies, nevertheless the 
determination of relative position, although itself a numerically precise 
calculation, becomes confounded by the impossibility of precisely 
specifying the perceptible bodies themselves. Even if it were possible for 
us to be dealing with just two atoms, it seems that we would be no better 
off because, here, according to Hertz:
the form of the atoms, their connection and their motion in most cases 
....are entirely hidden from u s 1Q5
In passing, note that th is is  another quotation to keep in m ind  for 
the time when we come to assess the coherence or otherwise of the idea 
of a crucial test (my p. 181).
What inflicts approximation on us in both the macroscopic and the 
atomic cases, and in both the Hertzian and the Newtonian formulations, is 
our inability to specify precisely what in the objects are the invariable 
reference points to which spatial relativities attach. Hertz make the same 
point elsewhere:
,05op. cit; p.18
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all filed connections between the positions of tangible bodies are soon 
and easily perceived by our senses to be only approximately constant'1
Now the difficulty we have just noted would plague the usual 
experiments that are performed to measure acceleration since they 
involve calculations based on the times at which macroscopic bodies 
occupy various positions.
It would be easy to lapse into a muddle here. How can it be, it might 
be asked, that we can talk about invariability of acceleration and quasi­
invariability of relative position, when any measurements we make to 
check acceleration must be at least as badly tainted as the measurements 
of position from which we calculate the acceleration? The question 
contains the germ of its own answer, and the supposed difficulty 
disappears when we recall that it is a theoretical prescription, at the 
level of ultimate reality, that acceleration be invariable. The real 
difficulty would manifest itself in an effect on the precision with which 
observed accelerations would match theoretical ones, if it be the case that 
the latter are exact and, for the reason given, the former not so. It would 
then transpire that we could never confirm the theoretical claims to an 
unlimited degree of precision, even though nothing less than that would 
seem to be required for the claim of ultimate invariability to be 
established..
Recognition of the specific difficulty that we have perceived is to be 
found in numerous writings. Richard Feynman, for example, in telling us 
that
'....in order to understand physical laws you must understand that they are 
all some kind of approximation', 107
claims that even our concept of an object, a chair for instance, can be only 
approximate:
The atoms are evaporating from it from time to time - not many atoms, but a 
few - dirt falls on it and gets dissolved in the paint; so to define a chair 
precisely, to say exactly which atoms are chair, and which atoms are air, or 
which atoms are dirt, or which atoms are paint that belongs to the chair is 
impossible. So the mass of a chair can be defined only approximately.....To
,0^op. cit; p.4i
l°7Feynman R.P, Leighton R.B and Sands M; The Feynman Lectures on 
Physics, Addison-Wesley; vol i, p.122
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an excellent approximation of perhaps one part in 101 the number of 
atoms does not change in a minute.... '1 08
Imagine then the degree of approximation that would be unavoidable in 
any practicable calculation of the action of the moon on the waters in 
Botany Bay, given the difficulty of pinning down just what the waters in 
Botany Bay comprise, and given also the unavoidable occurrence of 
interference from other sources -the several modes of interaction 
between water masses and atmosphere including the effects of wind, 
evaporation, condensation and precipitation; interactions between the 
waters in the bay and those outside via the surface phenomena of wave 
and swell, and via the volume phenomena of currents and upwellings.
We now have available the basis from which Hertz's thesis of a crucial 
experiment or crucial inference might derive, and, in part, we know what 
contrast he is drawing between the ultimate and the derivative.
Do we not get an immediate intuition that, i f  h e  is  ta lk ing  about a 
crucia l e x p e r im e n t , then the very context in which he sets it makes 
the project self-defeating? For, surely it is not possible to estab lish  
ultimate invariability by measurements that can at best exhibit quasi- 
invariability? Or, to put the same point another way - if ultimate 
invariability lies only in the realm of ultimate reality, and if only quasi­
invariability is to be found in phenomena, how, without contradicting 
ourselves in the very process of expressing what our aim is, could we 
ever aspire to witness that which is ultimately invariable?
But there would be other objections too. If we look back to pages 
178/9 we will find two quotations that I marked for future reference. In 
the first we learn that the ultimate connections are to be found in the 
world of atoms, and that they (presumably the connections) are unknown 
to us. Well, perhaps they might become known to us. But how could that 
be, since, in the second of the quotations, we learn that the atoms and 
their behaviour are entirely hidden from us? How then could any direct 
experiment be possible? Obviously it could not.
Now, with regard to the validation of his own formulation of 
mechanics Hertz is no more than hopeful. The most that he claims is that
,08ibid
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his foundations could turn out to be vindicated. But his reason for this 
modest expectation is not at all to do with the difficulty we have just 
noted. Rather it is that he allows the possibility that his hypothesis of the 
invariability of fixed connections might turn out to be wrong. Is it the 
case then that his thesis is incoherent? We would have to answer in the 
affirmative if our initial supposition, that he is talking about a direct 
experiment, were correct. The alternative is to conclude that It is 
inference from indirect e iperim ent that he has in m ind as the 
vehicle for deciding betw een supposedly incompatible 
foundations.
Can we find anything in Hertz's writings that would suggest how the 
inference might arise? One possibility, the only one that I can discover, 
could be thought to be conveyed by the contents of a few scattered 
passages that occur in The Principles, and comes about as follows.
The potential experience towards which Hertz's expectations are 
directed is, as we have already noted, that of
’.... tracing back the supposed actions at a distance to motions in an all- 
pervading medium whose smallest parts are subject to rigid connections'109
Possibly he thinks that, when we do the tracing back', we will discover
that the forces between particles are not limited to those of mutual
attraction and repulsion; forces of this latter type represent only a first
approximation to the truth'110; already, he says, we know that such is the
case with electric and magnetic forces. He is referring here to the
circumstance in which one or both of the electromagnetic sources is in
motion; this point is made explicit when he comes to discuss Newton's
third law and Action and Reaction in Book II:
For when force and counter-force affect different bodies, it is not quite 
clear what is meant by opposite. For example, this is seen in the case of the
mutual action between current elem ents...... th e  app lica tion  o f  th e
p r in c ip le  o f  rea c tio n  to a c tio n s-a t-a -d is ta n ce  com m only fo u n d  in  
m ech an ics m a n ife s tly  r e p re se n ts  an e x p e r ie n tia l fact, 
co n cern in g  th e  co rre c tn e ss  o f  which in  a il  cases p e o p le  are  
b e g in n in g  to be doubtful. For instance, in Electromagnetics we are 
almost convinced that the mutual action between moving magnets is not in
all cases strictly subject to the principle' 111 (my emphasis)
10^Hertz; P rin c ip le s  ... ; p.41 
110op. cit; p.41 
11 !op. cit; pp 191-192
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So he thinks that Newton s third law could be found wanting in some 
instance of action at a distance and that, in consequence, the Newtonian 
foundations of mechanics would be seen to be only an approximation to 
the truth. There are no indications, however, to show that he is relying on 
more than the supposition that, under close scrutiny, gravitational 
phenomena could exhibit similar characteristics to electromagnetic 
phenomena, and that forces other than centrally directed ones could be 
found to be involved.
Now we have seen that, in m echanics, conclusions of this kind could 
not emerge from direct experiment at the foundational level. They could, 
therefore, only reach that level by inference from phenomena. In Hertz's 
terminology, it would be a case of revising the image that we form of 
objects. But such revision could only be prompted by empirical evidence 
that fails to accord with deduction from existing theory. So, if the 
fundamental laws were to be falsified by empirical mechanical evidence, 
then so too would the theory of mechanics be falsified by the same 
evidence. The trouble that Hertz would have with all of this is that the 
outcome would conflict with his view about the empirical adequacy of the 
customary formulation of mechanics and with his consequential aim to 
preserve the theoretical content of mechanics as it stands, subject only to 
replacing, at the foundational level, the notion of action at a distance by 
ultimate unseen physical processes in the ether.
If the foregoing discussion were to reflect precisely what Hertz has in 
mind, then, whilst he would have suggested to us a reason to suppose 
that inference to the falsity of the foundations of Newtonian mechanics 
could be a possibility, he would, at the same time, run foul of his own 
belief in, and insistence on, the empirical adequacy of that formulation. I 
think we should conclude that the possih iiity  that we have been  
eiam ining is  not the correct way o f interpreting the thesis o f 
the crucial t e s t .
There is one remaining possih iiity  about inference  to the 
foundations that I suggest we should consider, and I think it represents 
the proper way o f understanding what Hertz has in m in d . He 
believes in the existence of the ether, and he believes that the ether is a 
medium comprising particles which are in continuous connection, and
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which have properties that make electromagnetic propagation possible.
He also believes that seemingly separated material particles interact with 
one another via influences stemming from the connections they have 
with the elementary particles of which the ether is composed. This one 
ether explains all action at a distance.
There are two physical domains potentially available for investigation 
of the ether's properties, namely mechanics and electromagnetism, and I 
suggest that Hertz is banking on the latter. My speculation is that he 
expects the non-central forces of electromagnetism to be traceable to 
connections with, and in, the ether. The results would then apply at the 
foundational level of mechanics, but they would not be such as to cause 
any observable effect in the normal domain of mechanical phenomena.
We see, therefore, that on these understandings there would be no 
incoherence in Hertz's idea for deciding between alternative foundations 
for mechanics. We see also that there would appear to be two 
incompatible foundational bases yielding the same theoretical content.
From these circumstances, bu t restricting the ambit o f the  
ciaim soieiy to the con te it in which Hertz wrote, couid Hacking 
now  assert vindication o f h is own views?  For the present I restrict 
Hacking thus, because subsequent history has invalidated Hertz's ideas 
about the ether and thereby denied Hacking any opportunity to seek 
vindication in contemporary physics. The answer to the question I have 
raised is 'no', as we shall now see.
The situation in the setting we have now attributed to Hertz would 
call for the importation, from electromagnetism into his formulation of 
mechanics, of a fundamental term equivalent to what would be a non- 
central force in Newtonian mechanics. This term, according to our 
interpretation of Hertz, would have no empirical consequence among the 
phenomena that we regard as mechanical. Amendment of the Newtonian 
foundations to include provision for this empirically ineffectual term 
would be required, nevertheless, so that theory might correspond 
correctly with the world, or as Hertz would put it, so that our image 
would be correct. And in such amendment we would see a familiar theme 
repeated, in that equivalence between alternative foundations would be
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re-established. In this case, however, the significance of the change would 
be that it reflects an appreciation of the fact that the world is different 
from the way that Newtonian mechanics at first took it to be: different in 
the nature of the force that exists between coupled bodies, and in the fact 
that forces in action at a distance are, really, forces' transmitted by 
connections. It would be this necessity, to revise Newtonian mechanics to 
accord with the way the world is, that, in the circumstances we have 
assumed to apply, would result in there being still just one system of 
mechanics, albeit a system admitting two modes of formulation.
2.5A Final Assessment of the Thesis
We now know that there is no ether, so Hertz's dream of validating one 
particular axiomatisation of mechanics from discovery of the properties 
of that 'imponderable medium’ is unrealizable.
We know too a lot more about atoms, and about their properties and 
their behaviour. Most of us are completely comfortable with the concept 
of force, and, without it, we would have difficulty in understanding and 
discussing a lot of modern physics. The idea of force as a concept 
corresponding to a structural feature of the world is required in order 
that we make sense of a lot of what we do, as well as of a lot of what we 
say, when we carry out experiments designed to investigate the 
gravitational force, the electromagnetic force, and the strong and the 
weak nuclear forces.
It would not be difficult to formulate claims about the ways in which 
Hertz's speculations pointed towards what we now take to be established 
truths. But it is nevertheless the case that, in relation to our interests 
here, he was in error. For, if,on the one hand, his idea for a crucial test 
had been one located solely within the confines of mechanics, then, 
independently of whether the test were supposed to comprise direct 
experiment or inference via indirect experiment, the idea considered in 
the context of Hertz's background views would have been incoherent.
And if, on the other hand, his idea had been to import, into the 
foundations of mechanics, truths about the ether gleaned from the 
domain of electromagnetism, then nature herself has ruled him wrong.
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2.6 A Final Word on Hacking's Interpretation of Hertz s Exposition
Our fina l conclusion m ust then be that, in Hertz's eiposition, we 
do not fin d  aiternative theories o f mechanics that wouid give  
content to Hacking s thesis. Moreover, we cannot discern, even in the 
context in which Hertz was talking, any possibility that there could be 
mutually incompatible theories of mechanics that could credibly remain 
on the books independently of how the world is.
Of his three images, Hertz himself rejected one. That was the energy 
formulation. We noted that the integrity of such formulation could, 
nevertheless, be ensured - but at a cost. What was required was the 
importation, into the foundations, of a substantial content of Newtonian 
mechanics. And the penalty incurred by that process, we saw, was that 
the energy formulation lost its independence as an alternative and 
became merely an equivalent to the customary formulation. Either way 
we were left with but two images.
In a speculative world that we now know to be false it might have 
been that experience wouid have shown one only of these two to be 
correct. In that event there would have been no multiplicity of theories, 
just one that was acceptable and two that had been discarded. However, 
the very basis of such a possibility was demolished with the rejection of 
the ether, and so the Hertzian image, in the form in which its author 
conceived it, also dropped out as an alternative to the customary 
presentation of mechanics, however formulated. But we saw also that 
rejection of the Hertzian image was not contingent on rejection of the 
ether. The image was incomplete, and it was not clear how that deficiency 
was to be made good, nor was it clear if, indeed, it could be made good. 
Moreover, the concept of invariability as Hertz had it, requiring as it did 
to be given complete and timeless expression within equations specifying 
fixed connections, was shown to be, at the least, highly implausible.
And so it transpired that, of Hertz s three images, only one was left 
intact. But that one image, we saw, admitted of different modes of 
equivalent formulation.
As things stand, none of the standard ways of formulating the single 
edifice of classical mechanics can claim any priority or any greater degree
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of truth than any other. They are all equally valid. But they are 
approximations in the sense in which we have seen Hertz and Feynman 
point to the inevitability of approximation in the physical world. 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which mechanics, so derived, can 
be taken as true. That is to say, there is no need in these cases to hedge 
the results we derive from theory with any form of qualification other 
than to demand that they accord with the way the world is. To accept 
classical mechanics in such cases is to follow the usual scientific 
procedure of opting for simplicity to the greatest extent practicable. We 
can then go on from there and introduce warranted complications when 
they matter, but only when they matter. And it is the phenomena to be 
encompassed by theory that provide the criterion of what matters.
There are those, like Cartwright, who argue that fundamental laws 
could not be true, given the sort of complexity that we know to be typical 
of the world, and given that the laws are simplifications and idealisations. 
I disagree. If, for example, a Newtonian law yields a statement about the 
motions of bodies that accords with the observed motions, then I assert 
that, as a restricted generalisation, the law is true for phenomena of that 
sort. The law loses its validity as soon as, but not before, we are able to 
resolve some aspect of the motion for which it does not account. We then 
know to look to relativity theory or to quantum theory or to both to 
explain the motion. It would be taking pedantry to the point of absurdity 
if it were claimed, for example, that a Newtonian description of the 
motion of a steam-roller is false because such description fails to yield 
the relevant de Broglie wave. And the reason is that it matters not a jot, 
because there is no potential phenomenon of any kind that requires, or is 
likely to require, us to take account of the wave-like property of a steam­
roller.
In the end it is always the phenomena that determine whether a law 
is true or false. Certainly there are circumstances in which we should 
properly leave room for possible  phenomena, but the import of that 
requirement is primarily to blur the sharpness of the demarcation line 
between applicability and non-applicability of a law. That grey area can 
only be reduced as experience accumulates. Meanwhile, we are in no 
doubt about the great mass of cases in which it is proper to use classical 
mechanics on the one hand, or quantum mechanics and/or relativity
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theory on the other. In other words we know, by and large, the domains 
in which different laws are true.
Our final conclusion then Is that Hacking has misunderstood 
Hertz's project and has wrongly accorded It the historical status 
of being the source of a presumption that different theories, 
perhaps including incompatible ones, can credibly be assigned 
to a given physical domain. Hertz s treatise admits of no 
interpretation that would yield the grounds for such a 
presumption.
The originator of the above-mentioned presumption is commonly said 
to be Pierre Duhem. Does he have better reasons for subscribing to it than 
does Hacking? We shall explore this question in Part 3.
[Part 3, SI ] 189
Part 3
DUHEM AND POINCARE : THE MISCONCEIVED GROUNDS
FOR ANTI-REALISM
SI. OVERVIEW
The classic writings of Henri Poincare 1 and Pierre Duhem2, especially the 
latter, are often taken by present-day philosophers as launching-pads for 
scientific anti-realism. But, as I  wiii argue below ; to type-cast 
Poincare and Duhem as paradigm anti-reaiists is  to err, since 
each o f them, in a manner common to both, was in part a strict 
scientific reaiist -and overtiy  such Further, my speculation is that, 
if they were alive today, then, given the shared part of their basic 
metaphysical positions, they would each agree that the state o f  
physics in the tw en ty  year period  centred on the turn o f the  
century had m isied them into  advocating a partiaiiy anti-reaJist 
position. And it is on the anti-realism in their respective writings that 
some modern philosophers have seized, without properly examining 
either the broader context in which the view was advanced or the 
background scientific circumstances underlying it. In what follows it is 
my purpose to remedy this deficiency.
It should now be apparent why the title of this part of my thesis is 
ambiguous. For the title could be intended to suggest that misconception 
can be perceived within the writings of Duhem and Poincare, or what 
could be meant is that their writings have been misconceived by their 
disciples. Both meanings are intended, for it will be contended that 
Duhem and Poincare were mistaken in the grounds that led them to anti-
iPoincarä J. H; (1) S cien ce  a n d  H ypo th esis  -, 1902 French edition translated by 
G.B. Halsted, first published in English in 1905 and re-issued by Dover in 1952. (2) 
Science an d  M eth od ; 1909 edition translated by F. Maitland and published by 
Dover in 1952. (3) The Value o f  S c ie n c e ; 1905 edition translated by G. B. Halsted, 
first published in 1907 and re-issued by Dover in 1952. All three are contained in 
Foundations o f  Science, translated by G.B. Halsted and issued by The Science 
Press in 1913.
2Duhem P.M; The Aim a n d  S tru c tu re  o f  P h ys ica l T h e o ry ; second edition of 
1914 translated by P.P. Wiener; Princeton University Press, 1954
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realism about entities, and that their disciples are mistaken in attributing 
to them anti-realism about theories.
I have an additional aim. I t  is  to subm it to close scrutiny a 
thesis in which are conjoined a particular doctrine and a view  
about that doctrine. The doctrine asserts that a given set of 
phenomena can be accommodated by a m uitip licity o f theories, and 
that some of these theories may be incompatible with others. It is 
usually attributed by anti-realists to Duhem, and, together with the 
conjoined view, is enthusiastically proclaimed by them as a thesis 
endorsing their metaphysical position at the expense of that of scientific 
realists. The conjoined view is that we had  better take the 
possib ility  e ipressed  b y  the doctrine seriously  We have seen how 
Cartwright did just that in what I dubbed The Argument from Principle'; 
and, in my opinion, no scientific realist can afford to let the thesis go 
unchallenged, because it does threaten his whole position in the way that 
Cartwright claims^. Surprisingly, realists seem for the most part to ignore 
the doctrine, rather than to confront it, and, in consequence, it keeps 
bobbing up in all sorts of places as though it were an eternal truth or an 
extract straight out of holy writ. Does it merit that status? Our challenge 
to the thesis will lead us to answer "no".
There are obviously trivial ways in which the thesis must be correct. 
For example, take any axiomatised physical theory and add to the axioms 
some proposition, p, that is irrelevant to the deductions that follow. Now 
take the original theory and add the axiom, not-p. The second of the new 
theories is clearly incompatible with the first, and, by definition, both 
theories, along with the original one, apply to the same phenomena. I am 
not concerned about tricks of this kind, nor am I concerned about 
discredited theories. We should take the possib ility  seriously  
when we are presen ted  with two current theories, both  
com pletely credible in the con teit o f m odern-day physics, both 
applicable to the same phenomena, and one incompatible with 
the other.
I know of no such cases. Moreover, I cannot agree that Cartwright has 
produced any illustrations, and Hacking's attempt to find something of
^See my Parti. §2.1 to §2.4. pp7-18
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the sort in Hertz's mechanics I believe I discredited. Well, does Duhem or 
Poincare deliver the goods? The short answer, we will find, is no’.
Our investigations will locate the source of the doctrine in a 
course of physics Jectures given by Poincare in Paris in 
1888/1889. We shall find that it was Maxwell's treatise on electricity 
and magnetism that provided the stimulus for Poincare to announce the 
doctrine. We shall find Duhem in 1905 chiding Poincare for doing so, in 
the belief that Poincare was motivated by the wrong reasons.
Nevertheless, we shall see Duhem reluctantly acknowledging that, 
on iogicai grounds, the doctrine cannot be rejected, and we 
shall see how uneasily it sits alongside his firm and contrary 
metaphysical convictions. We shall see that, as it was for Poincare, so 
it was for Duhem: Maxwell s theory was decisive in persuading him.
Poincare, we shall see, was influenced to promulgate the doctrine by 
factors far more worthy and more substantive than the grounds that 
Duhem attributed to him. Nevertheless, our analysis will also show that:
* compelling as these factors were in 1888, they would 
carry no weight today;
* the positive grounds that could be invoked in Poincare s 
day to justify the actual likeiihood of the intrusion of 
incompatibility within any given multiplicity of theories, 
turned out subsequently to have been largely illusory, 
and, for the most part, only the logical possibility 
remained;
* the potential domain within which this logical possibility 
might be actualised has shrunk dramatically.
Finally, there being no credible case to which we might point as 
conforming to the prescription, we shall conclude that the doctrine is 
leaitimate in form but empty of substance.
Let me now proceed to argue for the various claims made above.
Since, in a number of respects, my interpretations of the philosophies of 
Duhem and Poincare run counter to the usual ones, I shall be lavish in 
quoting them directly.
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§2. CONJUNCTION OF A MISCONCEIVED ANTI-REALISM ABOUT ENTITIES 
WITH QUASI-REALISM ABOUT THEORIES
§2.1 Duhem
Duhem's ideas about the nature of physical theory are, he tells us,
....rooted in the practice of scientific research and the exigencies of
teach ing.1
About his method he says:
'We have analysed the procedures through which physical theories were 
constructed and sought to conclude from this analysis the exact meaning 
and proper scope or range of the propositions formulated by these 
theories.'* 2 3
We will readily  discern in Duhem two doctrines rem iniscent of Kant. 
Firstly , Duhem thinks that u ltim a te  r e a li ty  i s  n o t to b e  fo u n d  in, or 
d ed u ced  from , phenom ena. Consonant w ith  that view, he is consistent 
throughout his w ritings in his opposition  to a n y  m e ta p h ysica l 
p re su p p o sitio n s  fo r  p h y s ic s , treating alike the doctrines of the 
Aristotelians, the Cartesians, the Newtonians and the atomists^.
The preference for a non-m echanistic physics evinced at the end of 
Part 1 of his book on mechanics,4 and the consequential move in Part 2 
tow ards a rational mechanics comprehending, and characterised by, the 
principles exhibited in therm odynam ics, stem from his dissatisfaction 
w ith  attem pts to extend mechanism throughout physics via the notions of 
ether, atoms, hidden masses and hidden motions. All of this, according to 
him, is m etaphysical, and so has no place in physics. In any case, these 
approaches, he believes, in adm itting only m atter and motion into 
physics, reflect an unjustifiable prejudice against p rim ary ’ qualities.5
JDuhem P; The Aim en d  Structure.....; p.278
2op. cit; p280
3op. cit; Ch.l
4Duhem P; The Evolution o f  M echanics; translated from the 1903 French 
edition by M. Cole; Sijthoff and Noordhoff; 1980 
5Duhem P; The Aim and Structure.....; p.279
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We have no cause to dispute the fact that Duhem is  a n ti-rea lis t 
about th eore tica l e n t i t ie s . We should, however take special note of 
h is  reasoning: m etaph ysics has no p i  ace in physics, and  
atom ism  is  m e ta p h ys ica i.
The second principle, reminiscent of Kant, that we find in Duhem is 
that m etaph ysica l speculation  and re iig iou s conviction are 
d eem ed  to b e  in  o r d e r :
‘W hatever I have said of the method by w hich physics proceeds, or of the 
nature and scope that we must attribute to the theories it constructs, does not 
in any way prejudice e ither the metaphysical doctrines or the religious
beliefs of anyone who accepts my words.' 6 
Now, although physical theory and metaphysics are to be strictly 
distinguished and kept apart, we shall see later that Duhem has such 
strong metaphysical views about theories that they cause him to disobey 
his own dictum and override the outcome of his strictly logical 
conclusions about the nature of theories. And we will find in this 
circumstance that, contrary to general opinion, he shows himself to be a 
realist about theories. Before we come to that, we need to be clear on his 
general views about them.
What does he take a p h ys ica l th eo ry  to b e  ? This is what he 
says:
'A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical 
propositions, deduced from a small num ber of principles, which aim to 
rep resen t as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of
experim ental laws1.7 8
Later he adds:
....we understood that physical theory is n e ither a metaphysical
explanation nor a set of general laws whose tru th  is established by 
experim ent and induction; that it is an artificial construction manufactured 
with the aid of mathematical magnitudes; tha t the relation of these 
magnitudes to the abstract notions em ergent from experim ent is simply tha t 
relation which signs have to the th ings signified; that this theory 
constitutes a kind of synoptic painting or schematic sketch suited to
summarize and classify the laws of observation ....'s
When is  a th eo ry  tru e  ? He answers:
^op. cit; p.274
7op. cit; p.19
8op. cit; p.277
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A greem ent with experim ent is  the sole criterion  o f  tru th  fo r  & 
p h y s ic a l th e o ry  9 (emphasis in original).
What is the concept of explanation that he denies to a 
physicai theory ? He says:
' To explain ..... is to strip reality of the appearances covering it like a veil.
in order to see the bare reality itself .1°
So, he has it that a physical theory does not explain phenomena in terms 
of what is ultimately real. If it were to do so, it would trespass into the 
domain of metaphysics, and such excursion is forbidden.
But it  soon emerges that Du hem regards a physicai theory as 
more than a mere instrument for ciassifying and summarising 
Jaws. For, a theme which recurs throughout his writings is that, as 
physical theory becomes more and more refined, so it approaches more 
and more to what he calls ' a natural ciassification The analogy he 
uses to indicate what he means by this term is that of the classifications 
of comparative anatomy, in which subject the reiations among its 
abstractions are beiieved to correspond to reai reiations am on2 
the entities that constitute its subject matter. Here are some of 
the things he says:11
Without claiming to explain the reality hiding under the phenomena whose 
lavs v e  grasp, we fe e l  that the grou pings established b y  our 
th eo ry  correspond to rea l a ffin itie s  among the th in gs  
them selves.
...vhen  v e  see in the plan dravn by these hypotheses a vast domain of 
optics, hitherto encumbered by so many details in so confused a vay, become 
ordered and organised, i t  is  im possible fo r  us to be lieve  th a t th is  
order and th is  organisation are no t the re flec te d  image o f  a rea l 
order and organisation ........
....the more complete (physical theory) becomes, the more we apprehend  
tha t the log ica l order in which th eo ry  orders experim en tal laws 
is  the re flec tion  o f  an ontological order, th e  more we suspect 
tha t the re la tion s i t  establishes among the data o f  observation  
correspond to re a l re la tion s among things, and the more we fe e l  
th a t th e o ry  tends to be a natu ra l classification  (my emphases).
cit; p.21 
10op. cit; p.7 
1 *op. cit; p.26
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Notice how, in these quotations, we move from intuition to conviction. 
And then there follows an argument:12
Nov. on the occasions when we confront the predictions o f  the  
theory with reality, suppose we have to bet for or against the  
th eo ry ; on vhich side shall ve lay our vager?
i f  the theory is a pu re ly  artificia l system ......if the theory fails to
hint at any reflection of the real relations among the invisible realities, ve 
shall think that such a theory vill fail to confirm a nev lav, That, in the 
space left free among the dravers adjusted for other lavs, the hitherto 
unknovn lav should find a draver already made into vhich it may be fitted 
exactly vould be a marvelous feat of chance. It would be fo lly  fo r  us to 
risk  a bet on th is sort o f  expectation.
If, on the contrary, we recognise in the theory a natural 
classification, i f  we fe e l that its principles express profound and 
real relations among th in g s . ve shall not be surprised to see its 
consequences anticipating experience and stimulating the discovery of nev 
lavs; we shall bet fearlessly in its fa vor.
The highest test, therefore, of our holding a classification as a natural one is 
to ask it to indicate in advance things vhich the future alone vill reveal.
And vhen the experiment is made and confirms the predictions obtained 
from our theory, we fee l strengthened in our con viction that the  
relations established by our reason among abstract notions tru ly  
correspond to relations among th in g s .' (my emphases)
Conviction, grown beyond intuition, is thus strengthened. Recall that it 
was earlier pointed out (my p.59) that this passage marks a significant 
parting of the ways for Duhem and Cartwright, since the latter takes the 
view that success at predicting is never an argument for truth.
Having first outlined how incompatible theories have come into 
vogue13 and then reluctantly sanctioned their use1*, Duhem continues to 
insist on the legitimacy of the search for unity and consistency in physical 
theory. He claims justification on two grounds: (i) physicists using 
incompatible theories, he says, do so only with regret and in the 
expectation that later discoveries will resolve incompatibilities; (ii) the 
aim of unity and consistency
’....results from an innate feeling of ours vhich ve cannot justify by purely 
logical considerations but vhich ve cannot stifle completely either’15, and
’.... this feeling surges v ith in  us v ith  indomitable strength; whoever
would see in th is  no th ing  more than a snare and a delusion 
cannot be reduced to silence by the principle o f  contradiction;
12op. cit; p.2S
,3¥e  shall discuss the circumstances shortly - see my p.206 et seq 
l4*Duhem; The Aim and Structure...; Part 1, Ch. iv, esp. pp99-104 
150p. cit; p.102
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but b e  would be excom municated b y  common sense  ‘1 8 (my 
emphasis)
Later, when he discusses how hypotheses are to be chosen, he has 
this to say:
‘....the different hypotheses which are to support physics shall not 
contradict one another. P h ysica l theory, indeed, is  n o t to be 
reso lved  in to  a mass o f  disparate and incom patible m odels; i t  
aim s to p re se rv e  with jea lous care a log ica l u n i ty , for an intuition 
we are powerless to justify, but which it is impossible for us to be blind to, 
shows us that only on this condition will theory tend to an ideal form,
namely, that of a natural classification' 17 (my emphasis)
The aim of physical theory is now quite explicit. It is nothing less than to 
capture the ordered relations that exist in nature. When i t  com es to  
form ula ting  th eories Du hem  is  a sc ien tific  r e a l i s t .
Can we be optimistic about the pursuit of such an aim? Duhem 
certainly thinks that we can:
'Diversity fusing into a constantly more comprehensive and more perfect 
unity, that is the great fact summarising the whole history of physical
doctrines.'18
But, he goes on to say, a study of physical theories and their histories
aimed at revealing and elucidating the procedures by which physical
science progresses does not show the rationale for the evolution of
science towards unity and logical coherence. Nevertheless,
'....i f .... (the physicist) yields to the nature of the human mind, which is
repugnant to the extreme demands of positivism......he will break through
the wall at which the procedures of physics stop, helpless, and he w ill 
make an affirm ation  which these procedures do not ju s tify ;  he
w ill be m e ta p h y s ica l ........He w ill affirm  that underneath th e
observable data..........are hidden rea litie s  whose essence cannot
be grasped  b y  these same methods, and that these re a litie s  are  
arranged  in a certain order which p h y s ic a l science cannot 
d ire c tly  contemplate. But he w ill note th a t p h y s ic a l th e o ry  
through i ts  su ccessive advances tends to arrange experim en ta l 
law s in an order more and more analogous to the tran scenden t 
order according to which the rea litie s  are classified, th a t as a 
resu lt oh vsica l th e o ry  advances gradually  to wards i ts  lim itin g  
form, nam ely  th a t o f  a n a tu ra l classification, and f in a lly  th a t 
log ica l u n ity  i s  a characteristic  w ithout which p h y s ic a l th e o ry
l8op. cit; p.104 
17op. cit; p220 
18op. cit; p2%
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cannot claim  th is  r a n t  o f  a n a tu ra l c la ssifica tion .'19 (my 
emphasis)
That Duhem could not give an incontrovertible proof to support his 
conviction about the scientific realism that he took to characterise 
physical theories puts him in a situation no worse than that of anyone 
else who professes that kind of realism. His confession that he is  a 
scientific realist about theories needs no apology for being based on 
metaphysical grounds, nor does it carry less conviction on that score.
What of his anti-realism about entities? Modern physics has shown 
that Duhem, in lumping atomism with Cartesianism and Aristotelianism, 
in labelling them all metaphysical, and in then banning the lot from 
science on that account, made the mistake of
diminishing too much the depth of reality which the progress of physics 
can procure for us‘ 20
It is possible that Duhem was right on a fundamental issue, namely that 
ultimate reality is not to be gleaned out of phenomena, and that he erred 
only on the lesser score of setting the demarcation line wrongly by taking 
it that atoms are not physically real. The fact remains, however, that his  
anti-realism about at least some theoretical en tities was based  
on what we can in  retrospect see as a m is ta ke . He was right in 
rejecting the ether, but wrong in rejecting atoms. He was also right in 
resisting the proposition that all of physics can be given a mechanical 
explanation in terms of atoms and their motions, but he was also wrong 
in thinking that none can.
We m ay conclude that Duhem offers no grounds on which to 
base a philosophy o f anti-realism  .
The tension that we have noted in Duhem's thoughts is the dominant 
theme in his criticism of a book written by Abel Rey21. That tension is, as 
we have seen, between on the one hand what he has it that a study of the
19ibid
20de Broglie L; Foreword to Duhem's The Aim an d  S tructure... ; p. ix
21Duhem P; The Aim a n d  S tru c tu re  Appendix, The Value of Physical Theory',
PP312-335.
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practices in science and teaching reveals to us about physical theory 
(namely, that it is a method for organising and classifying laws), and on 
the other, what intuition, reflection and common sense force us to think 
about it (namely, that there is an ontological order in nature that physical 
theory must aim to capture, and indeed does capture). According to 
Duhem, even hard-line positivists like Rankine and Mach, as well as the 
so-called conventionalist, Poincare, are similarly affected. We shall now 
move on to consider the position of the last-named.
§2.2 Poincare
In examining Poincare’s philosophy our aim will be to treat the same 
issues that arose in our consideration of Duhem's, and for ease of 
comparison to try to do so in the same order. There are both striking 
similarities and important differences.
According to Poincare, whose method, like Duhem's, consists in very
detailed consideration of, and reflection on, scientific practice, ultim ate
rea lity  taken as things them selves Is beyond our reach and so,
a fortiori, is  not to be fo u n d  in phenom ena :
'Now we daily see what science is doing for us. This could not be unless it 
taught us something about reality; the aim of science is not things 
themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations
between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowabie.' 22
‘....not only science cannot teach us the nature of things; but nothing is 
capable of teaching it to us. and if any god knew it. he could not find words
to express i t  ’* 2^
Notice, in passing, that science lim its i ts  aim to that o f determ ining  
the relations betw een things; and to that eiten t, and that 
extent only, i t  does teach us something about r e a lity . Notice too 
that, unlike Duhem and Kant, Poincare professes to leave no place for 
metaphysics to teach us anything about reality.
But it could hardly be claimed that Poincar6 banishes metaphysics 
altogether, because he articulates a version of his own. There can be no 
reality, he says, which exists completely independently of the mind:
22Poincar6 H; S cien ce  a n d  H yp ...... ; p.xxiv
23Poincar6 H; The Value o f  Sc...; See p.330in The Foundations o f  Sc....
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'No, beyond doubt a reality completely independent of the mind which 
conceives it, or feels it, is an impossibility. A world as exterior as that, even 
if it existed, would for us be forever inaccessible' 2<*
All that is not thought is pure nothingness; since we can think only 
thoughts and all the words we use to speak of things can express only 
thoughts, to say there is something other than thought, is, therefore an 
affirmation which can have no meaning'25
Our purposes not requiring us to argue about Poincare's metaphysical 
position, but rather only to note it, we will not dally over the confusions 
here between epistemological and ontological questions, nor with the 
unsatisfactory response he interpolates in his statement of recognition of 
the obvious objection:
And yet -strange contradiction for those who believe in time- geologic 
history shows us that life is only a short episode between two eternities of 
death’2^
The idealistic conception so far revealed could threaten collapse into 
solipsism. Poincare avoids this by arguing from the fact that there are 
communications of ready-made reasonings from persons to persons, to 
the concept of the objectivity of the world. In short, objectivity is 
guaranteed by, but contingent on, the fact that we share the world with 
other thinking beings and communicate among ourselves about it:
*.....what is objective must be common to many minds and consequently
transmissible from one to the o th er .......no discourse, no objectivity. 27
Individual sensations, presumably causally connected with things
themselves, are not transmissible, but relations between sensations are,
and it is these that have objective value. In particular:
'External objects.....are really o b jec ts  and not fleeting and fugitive
appearances, because they are not only groups of sensations, but groups 
cemented by a common bond. It is this bond, and this bond alone, which is
the object in itself, and this bond is a relation'28 
Note that the object, as perceived, does not exist outside the mind. What 
lies out there is the thing itself, and to this we have no access. This aspect 
of Poincare's metaphysics is pure Kantian, and licenses us to look therein 
for signs of empirical realism', with or without Kantian transcendental 
idealism'. We shall find them.
24op. cit; p.209 
25op. cit; p.335 
26ibid
27op. cit; p.347/8 
28op. cit; p.350
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Now Poincare, lik e  Dukern, ieg is ia tes  against m etaph ysica i 
p resu p p o sitio n s fo r  physics. He assigns to th eories the ro ie  o f  
co - or din a ting  ph  y s ic a i Ja v s :
The object of mathematical theories is not to reveal to us the real nature of
th in g s....... Their only object is to co-ordinate the physical lavs vith vhich
physical experiment makes us acquainted, the enunciation of vhich, 
vithout the aid of mathematics, ve should be unable to effect. W hether  
th e  e th e r  ex ists  or n o t m a tters l i t t le  - le t  us leave th a t to th e  
m e ta p h ys ic ia n s ; vhat is essential for us is. that everything happens as if
it existed.... ’ 29 (my emphasis)
’When, therefore, a scientific theory pretends to teach us vhat heat is, or 
vhat is electricity, or life, it is condemned beforehand; ail it can give us is
only a crude image. It is. therefore, provisional and crumbling'30
Let us now examine Poincare’s views about theories in the general 
context of his views about science. Firstly, v h a t does h e take  science  
to  b e ? :
...... it is before all a classification, a manner of bringing together facts
vhich appearances separate, though  th e y  were bound to g e th er b y  
some n a tu ra l a n d  hidden k in sh ip . Science, in other vords, is a system
of relations'3* (my emphasis)
As to the goa l o f  science, Poincare states an unequivocal view when 
expressing disagreement with Edouard Le Roy's contention that science is 
only a rule of action:
To my eyes, on the contrary, I t  is  th e  know ledge which is  the  e n d , 
and the action vhich is the means'32(my emphasis)
The o b jec tive  value o f  science  consists in the fact that it teaches us 
the true relations of things, objectivity residing in the circumstance that 
the relations expressed are the same for all people.33
For Poincare, E xperim en t is  th e  sole source o f  tru th  '34, and science 
can serve its functions of classifying and making prediction possible only 
if we generalise facts as em pirica l h y p o th e se s^ . Such hypotheses,
29Poincar6 H; Science a n d  Hyp......; p.211
30Poincar6 H; The Value o f  Sc..:. See p.350 in The Foundations o f  Sc.... 
31 op. cit; p.349 
32op. cit; p.323 
33op. cit; pp 350-332
3^ Poincar6 H; Science and  Hyp..... ; pl40 (my emphasis)
35op. cit; ppl40-144
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when verified, are truths about the w orlds the laws that theory co­
ordinates. Hypotheses of this kind would appear to be much the same as 
Cartwright s phenomenological laws37. They are to be sharply 
distinguished from three other types of hypotheses that Poincare claims 
to find in science 38: Q) the indifferent type, which features in theory in 
the manner in which Hertz claimed that the concept of force does39, 
namely as a sleeping partner (e.g. that gases are composed of molecules 
in continuous random motion); (ii) the natural and necessary type, 
constituting the common basis for all the theories of mathematical 
physics (e.g. that small motions are linear); and (iii) the disguised 
definitions and conventions, about which I should now make a few 
remarks.
Poincare has it that some laws, initially expressed as empirical 
hypotheses based on experiment, have come to acquire very special 
status; specifically, Newton’s laws and the principle of the conservation of 
energy are supposed to be no longer susceptible to invalidation by 
experiment; they are said to be disguised definitions or conventions. It 
seems to me that not everyone who has commented on Poincare 
has been dear on the latter 's meaning here. for some writers 
have dubbed him a conventionalist without addins the 
necessary qualifications. Incredible as it may seem, Duhem must be 
included among these.40
Thorough conventionalist about space, step me try, time and, 
in part also mathematics. Poin car 6 certainly was. But, it has to 
be noted that his conventions were not at aJJ arbitrary: They 
had to be carefuily chosen to fit to eiperience. On the other 
hand, thorough conventionalist about einerimentai and 
theoretical ohvsics Poincard was not. We can see this when we
36op. cit; p.ixii
37Cartwright N; Ho v  th e  L avs o f  P hysics L ie ; esp. Essay 6, p.100 et seq.
See also my Part 1. esp. ppl, 2, and 3. and §2.5 (p.18 et seq.)
3*Poincar6; Science and Hyp.... ; pp 132-3
39Hertz H; P rin cip les o f  M ech an ics; p.ll. See also my Part 2, §2.2.2. esp. 
ppl39/H0
4°Duhem P; The Aim and Structure  ...; See p.328 for Duhem's misconstrual of 
Poincar6 on hypotheses
[Part 3, S2] 202
understand the sense in which he takes Newton’s law of gravitation to be
a convention. He equates the empirical hypothesis, The stars obey
Newton s law’, to the conjunction of a convention or definition,
Gravitation obeys Newton's law', and another empirical hypothesis,
Gravitation is the only force acting on the stars'. Gravitation serves as an
abstract intermediary between two verifiable (or falsifiable) hypotheses.
Newton's law of gravitation is then no longer falsifiable because any
deviant case would be accommodated by dubbing the second empirical
hypothesis false. Poincare sees the principle of conservation of energy as
similarly isolated from experimental test. But, as he points out:
'Every lav may be broken up into a principle and a lav, but thereby it is 
very clear that, hovever far this partition be pushed, th ere  w ill Always
rem ain laws. Nominalism has th erefore  l im its ........... 41 (my
emphasis)
In  other words, Poincare h im se lf warns us that there is  a strict 
lim it to conventionalism in science.
I have mentioned the preceding points to show that Poincare's 
philosophy contains many more nuances than we can discuss here.
Indeed, before we return to matters of more immediate concern, there is 
one other element in his philosophy of science that we should note. How 
is  i t  that generalisation from  fact to hypothesis, and often, to 
Jaw, is  possible ? Poincare's response is unabashedly metaphysical:
..........every generalisation supposes in a certain measure a belief in the
unity and simplicity of nature' 2^
But we find later that this response is hedged in two respects. Firstly, a 
brief glance over cases drawn from the history of science leads Poincare 
to make the qualification :
If, then v e  believe Nature to be profoundly simple, ve  must conclude that it 
is an approximate and not a rigorous simpiicity'43 
Secondly, he sees no way in which he could convincingly justify the 
practice of generalisation:
'I do not at all v ish  to investigate here the foundations of the principle of 
induction; I knov very v e il that I should not succeed; it is as difficult to
justify this principle as it is to get on vithout it........ ' ^
41Poincar6H; The Value o f  Sc...; See p.335 in The Foundations o f  Sc....
42poincar6 H; Science and Hyp...... ; pl45
43op. cit; p.150
^Poincar6 H; The Value o f  Sc...\ See p.343 in The Foundations o f  Sc....
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It is by means of theory that we co-ordinate and classify the 
generalisations that we formulate from our experiments and 
observations. Mathematical physics (the formal part of theory) is to 
experimental physics, according to Poincare, as cataloguing is to the 
holdings in a library. A good catalogue not only classifies and 
systematises information about what is on the stacks, but also shows 
where gaps exist in the collection and so indicates where new stock 
should be sought. In like manner, mathematical physics systematises 
laws and directs our experimental elTorts. The value o f a physical 
theory, then, lies in its  utiiity, inciuding its  roie as an 
instrum ent fo r prediction  45
To complement and reinforce this view Poincare, like Duhem, insists 
that theories do not eip ia in  phenom ena . Both authors use the word 
explain' in much the same sense. A paradigm explanation for Poincare 
would be the billiard-ball model of atoms (or molecules) that is invoked 
in standard presentations of the kinetic theory. Such attempt to say how 
things ultimately are, he says, is nothing more than metaphor:
Are we to understand that God experiences the same sensation in the 
contemplation of His work that we do in watching a game of billiards?'46
But, again with the wisdom of hindsight, we can say of Poincare, as we 
did of Duhem, that he takes an altogether too pessimistic view about the 
depth of nature that physics can plumb, and that, in consequence, he is 
too ready to commit to the metaphysical that which is properly physical.
But physicai theory fo r  Poincare is  no t ju s t a recipe, for, 
when i t  endures, i t  does so because i t  has succeeded in  
capturing reai reiations that e iis t  in n a tu re47. Many 
commentators have failed to pick up this sentiment in Poincare. Even 
Duhem, writing nine years after it was first expressed, had still not 
managed to grasp the fact that this qualification had to be added to the 
pronouncement that physical theory is an instrument.48 Strictly speaking,
45Poincar6 H; Science en d  Hyp...... ; pl60; this is the moral drawn from the
example of Fresnel's theory 
46op. cit; p.164 
47op. cit; p.161
48Duhem P; The Aim and Structure .....; second edition, p.319
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against the background of Poincare's basic metaphysics we should 
translate  the clause tha t exist in na tu re ' by the clause that are the same 
for all men'. If we also take it th a t the existence of real relations among 
things amounts to the existence of universal harmony, and if we recall 
tha t it is only the relations betw een sensations, and not the sensations 
them selves, that can be communicated, we can understand Poincare s 
r e m a rk :
But what we call objective reality is, in the last analysis, what is common to 
many thinking beings, and could be common to ail; this common part, we 
shall see, can only be the harmony expressed by mathematical laws. It is this 
harmony then which is the sole objective reality, the only truth we can
attain'
The aim o f  m a th em a tica l p h y s ic s  b e c o m e s , th e n ,:
’.......not only to facilitate for the physicist the numerical calculation of
certain constants or the integration of certain differential equations.........
it is above all, to re v e a l to him the hidden harm ony o f
things....... '5° (my emphasis).
We can n o w  sum  up Poincare s  p h ilo so p h y  o f  science. In its 
fundam entals it has a d ea l In com m on with Kant 's, though there  are 
significant differences. In the  latter respect, for example, space and tim e 
are not pure intuitions for Poincare, bu t ra ther they are conventions, 
chosen to suit our convenience, bu t not arb itrarily  so. They must be 
accommodated to experience, and to m athem atics and physics, especially 
m athem atical physics. M athem atics itself is partly  conventional; but it has 
an inductive elem ent, and y e t it is deductively rigorous.
In its epistemological leanings also, Poincare's philosophy bears some 
resem blance to Kant's. It is Id ea lis t  because the objects of our 
experience are not ex ternal things; while the latter cause our sensations, 
they are supposedly unknowable. Unlike Kant, however, Poincare takes 
an object of experience to be a com bination of sensations related by  a 
common bond. Because of the differences mentioned, and others, we 
would not label Poincare’s philosophy 'transcendentally  ideal' - perhaps a 
term  like ep istem o lo g ica lly  Id e a l' would be the proper caption.
49poincar6 H; The Value o f  Sc..., See p.209 in The Foundations o f  Sc.... 
5°op. cit; p.284
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Now, on the other hand, his philosophy is thoroughly empirical in 
that the only truths we can attain come from experiment. About 
theoretical entities it is anti-reaiist, because there are supposedly 
none such. But with theories it is very different, for these, on the 
assumption of the unity and simplicity of nature, aim to comprehend the 
harmonies that can be elicited from objective human experience, the 
relations that constitute the only reality knowable.
in short, as theories go, Poincare s phi Jo sophy is 
espistemoiogicaJJy ideal but empirically real; it is quite 
incorrect to dub it anti-reaiist.
[Part 3, S3] 206
S3. GENESIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF MULTIPLICITY AND 
INCOMPATIBILITY OF THEORIES
We n o w  re tu rn  to Duhem a n d  ask  w h y  h e  th in k s  th a t 
incom pa tib le  th eo ries  m u s t b e  a d m itte d  in to  p h y s ic s . The 
answ er is to be found in a long chapter in The Aim ...J  But before we 
tu rn  to that, let us note two points.
First, contrary to folk-lore, i t  was n o t Duhem who o rig in a ted  th e  
id e a . That distinction belongs to Poincare who, as it happens, was 
prom pted by reasons similar to those affecting Duhem. Perhaps it was 
partly  because Poincare made his announcem ent in strictly scientific 
w orks,1 2 and partly  because Duhem articulated the thesis in g reater detail 
and w ith  more force, th a t the la tte r is often m istakenly named as 
originator of the doctrine.
Second, we should recall th a t Duhem himseJT is  a se eke r  a fte r  
u n ity  a n d  iog ica l coherence in  p h y s ic a l th e o r y , and tha t he 
a ttribu tes the same aspirations to physicists generally. We shall see his 
lack of enthusiasm  for the doctrine, so evident in the passages in w hich it 
emerges, standing in sharp contrast to the credit he is now so often given 
for its promulgation.
There are advantages for exegesis in starting w ith exam ination of the 
reasons w hy Duhem adopted the doctrine, ra ther than w ith those th a t 
motivated its originator, and we shall follow this course. Unfairly and 
incorrectly, it seems to me from  my reading of its initial prom ulgation by 
Poincare, Duhem, in acknowledging the latter as author, a ttributes to him 
superficial and seem ingly unw orthy motives.^ In thus seeking to 
besm irch the m anner of the introduction of the doctrine into France,
1 Duhem P; The Aim and S tructure  ...; Part 1. Ch.4, pp33-104
2Poincar6 H; E lectricity  e t Optique, Vol.l; Les Theories de Maxveil et La Theorie 
Electromagnätique de la Lumidre; Cours de la Faculty des Sciences de Paris, Lemons 
professes pendant le second Semestre 1888-89; Paris. 1890. This vork predates, by 
over ten years, the reference, given by Poincar6 himself on p.211 of Science and  
Hypothesis, to a book v ith  the same title. Ch.xii of Seien ce and Hyp.... is a 
translation of the Preface of the 1890 publication except for the omission of some of 
the detail of the thesis concerning vh en  mechanical explanation is possible. 
^Duhem P; The Aim and Structure. ; second edition, p.91
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Duhem gives added emphasis to his distaste for it. But these are matters 
that will come out below.
§3.1 Duhem
Two considerations, taken together, caused Duhem to countenance
incompatible theories in physics. In the first place, there is obviously no
logical barrier prohibiting them entry, given his conclusion, from the
analysis of scientific practice and from teaching, that on logical grounds
the most he is entitled to assert is that physical theory merely classifies
and organises material. That circumstance on its own does not entail that
incompatible theories will be found. Indeed, if Duhem were right in his
characterisation of the great continental theoreticians, with their
supposedly strong but narrow minds, and if physics were to consist solely
in what they produced, then there would be no incompatible theories :
The theories created by the great continental mathematicians, whether 
French or German. Dutch or Swiss, may be classified in two large categories : 
explanatory and purely representative theories. But these two kinds of 
theories offer a common feature : they are understood to be systems 
constructed according to the rules of strict logic. Products of a reason 
unafraid of profound abstractions or long deductions, but mainly eager for 
order and clarity, their theories demand that an impeccable method 
characterize the series of their propositions from beginning to end, from 
the basic hypotheses to the consequences that can be compared with the
facts4 *
The case is different, however, according to Duhem, when one 
considers the prodigious output of the supposedly ample but weak minds 
of the English  ^ school of physicists, and in particular the work of Kelvin 
and Maxwell. We have already had occasion, when examining Hertz s 
Principles o f Mechanics, to take note of Kelvin's use of mechanical 
models, especially in application to electromagnetism and the ether.6 
Duhem points to the multiplicity and frequent incompatibility among 
models purportedly having the same reference. For example, four very 
different models are used to represent the material molecule,7 and 
models, in bewildering variety, were proposed at one time or another by
4op, cit; p.80
5He should have added Scottish'
^See esp. my p p l37 ,158,160
7Duhem; op. cit; p.82
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Kelvin to represent the complex of space/ether/matter.8 * Commenting on
a book by Oliver Lodge, purportedly presenting theories of electricity,
Duhem, in exasperation, remarks:
In it there are nothing but strings which move around pulleys, which roll 
around drums, which go through pearl beads, which carry weights; and 
tubes which pump water while others swell and contract; toothed wheels 
which are geared to one another and engage hooks. We thought we were 
entering the tranquil and neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find
ourselves in a factory'^
Now Duhem, though he does not welcome the use of these models,
nevertheless acknowledges their legitimacy, given that they are not
claimed to be explanatory and that they merely serve as heuristic
devices. But, he says, the English physicists go on to in troduce
aigebraic form ula lion s in to  th eir  theories, an d  trea t th ese
form u ia tion s as th e y  do models. That is to say, logical inconsistencies
now become part of physical theory. Maxwell s own development of
electromagnetic theory, according to Duhem, is the paradigm case :
Maxwell's Treatise on E le c tr ic ity  and  M agnetism  was in vain attired 
in a mathematical form. It is no more of a logical system than Thomson s 
L ectures on M olecular Dynamics. Like these L ectures  it consists of a 
succession of models, each representing a group of laws without concern for 
the other models representing other laws and, at times representing these 
very same laws or some of them; except that these models, instead of being 
constructed out of gyrostats, spiral springs, and glycerine, are an apparatus 
of algebraic signs. These different partial theories, each developed in 
isolation, indifferent to the previous one but at times covering part of the 
field covered by this predecessor, are less properly addressed to our reason 
than to our imagination. They are paintings, and the artist, in composing 
each of them, has selected with complete freedom the objects he would 
represent and the order in which he would group them. It matters little 
whether one of his clients has already posed in a different attitude for 
another portrait. The logician would be out of place in being shocked by
this; a gallery of paintings is not a chain of syllogisms'10
The situation now facing Duhem is this. Physical theories aim to 
classify and organise physical laws. In principle, incompatible theories 
are possible, and they are permissible because the function served by
8op, cit; p.83. Duhem is drawing from Thomson V; Notes o f  L ectures on 
M olecular D ynam ics a n d  th e  Wave Theory o f  L ig h t ; Baltimore; 1884. These 
were subsequently republished as Baltim ore L ectures on M olecular 
D ynam ics and  th e  Wave T heory  o f  L ig h t, Cambridge; 1904
^Duhem; op, cit; p.70
10op, cit; p.86
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theories does not entail otherwise. The strictly logical development which, 
according to Duhem, characterises continental practice, would rule out 
incompatible theories; but English practice does not do so, and Maxwell's 
development of his own equations is a practical case in point. Much as 
Duhem would like to see Helmholtz's electrodynamic theory take 
precedence over Maxwell's11, we know from our recent study of Hertz's 
Principles o f Mechanics that this is not a viable option. Nor does 
Duhem take it to be such, though his reason is different from ours. We 
know that the physical basis or Helmholtz s theory disappears at the 
crucial limiting case leading to Maxwell's equations12. Duhem merely 
thinks that Maxwell's equations have now had such wide acceptance on 
the Continent that it would be pointless to try to turn the clock back. For 
this situation he blames Poincare whose reasons he says w ere:
....... the taste for the exotic, the desire to imitate the foreign, the need to
dress the mind as veil as the body in the fashion of London....113
That Poincare might have been convinced that Maxwell's theory captures 
true relations in nature - to use Poincare’s way of speaking - does not 
seem to have occurred to Duhem.
The essential difference between Duhem and us, among whom 1 
include Poincare, is that we welcome Maxwell's equations, while Duhem 
does not:
The reasoning and calculation by vhich Marvell tried on several occasions 
to justify them abound in contradictions, obscurities and plain mistakes 14
Nevertheless, we and he arrive at the same conclusion: the equations are 
an accepted part of physical theory.
That being so, Duhem acknowledges th a t:
I f  we confine ourselves s tr ic t ly  to considerations o f  pu re  logic ; 
ve cannot prevent a physicist from representing by several incompatible 
theories diverse groups of lavs or even a single group of lavs; ve cannot
condemn incoherence in physical theory'15 (emphasis in original)
In these words, Duhem re-iterates, and expands on, what Poincare had 
said before him, and, difficult as it now is to believe, the thesis o f
Hop, cit; p.90
12See my Part2, §2.2.4, esp. ppl49/130 
^Duhem; op, cit; p.91 
14op, cit; p.90 
Uop. cit; p.100
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incompatible theories apolvins to the same phenomena has its  
origin in M ai weil's Treatise on electromagnetism  .
§3.2 PoincarS
For Poincare, as for Duhem later, the spectre of incompatible theories 
stemmed from consideration of Marvell's treatise:
The English scientist does not try to erect a unique, definitive, and ve il-  
arranged building: he seems to raise rather a large number of provisional 
and independent constructions, betveen vh ich  communication is difficult 
and sometimes im possible16
For example, Poincare continues, the chapter on electrostatics is self- 
sufficient and need not appear in this book at all; as it happens, its 
inclusion leads to problems of reconciling its content with the 
fundamental ideas of the rest of the theory.
He goes on to say:
Tvo contradictory theories, p ro v id ed  th e y  ere  k ep t from  
overlapp in g . and that we do n o t look to f in d  in them th e  
explanation o f  th in g s . may. in fact, be very useful instruments of
research'17 (my emphasis)
Poincare, then, does not object to contradictory theories per se. They are 
in order provided they do not purport to explain, in the sense we have 
noted, and provided they do not overlap.
This comment about contradictory theories reiterates one which was 
first made in the same context by Poincare as early as 1888/9 1S, and 
which, as far as I have been able to discover, constitutes the first 
promulgation of the doctrine in the modern philosophy of science.
It will be our purpose here:
1. To ascertain precisely how consideration of Maxwell’s theory 
stimulated Poincare to make this pronouncement;
2. To enquire how he might seek to justify it;
l6Poincar6 H; Science and Hyp...... ; p215
17ibid; p.216
18Poincare H; E lectricity  e t O ptique; p.ix
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3. To determine the significance of the two provisos with which he 
hedged it; and
4. To make some judgement about its modern-day relevance.
3.2.1 The Critique of Maxwell's Theory, a Dilemma, and the 
Incompatibility Thesis
The thesis of incompatibility of theories follows a criticism of Maxwell's 
treatise that Poincare gives, against the background of the expectations of 
a French reader, to serve as a warning to the latter of
what he will find and what he will not find in Maxwell' 19 
Those expectations, says Poincare, conform to the way the great French 
masters proceeded:
'Starting with clearly enunciated hypotheses, they deduced from them all 
their consequences with mathematical rigour, and then compared them
with experiment' 20
The number of hypotheses must be minimal, the different parts of the 
theory must be logically connected, and not the least appearance of 
contradiction is to be tolerated. A further demand, says Poincare, is less 
reasonable - the demand for a mechanical explanation via the notion of 
atoms obeying the laws of dynamics.
Maxwell, continues Poincare, does not give a mechanical explanation, 
though he shows that such is possible (namely along lines that we shall 
later see Poincare articulate21). There follows a listing of particulars in 
which the French reader might discern deficiencies, together with the 
remarks we quoted above - namely that Maxwell does not erect an 
integrated structure, but a large number of provisional and independent 
constructions between which communication is difficult and sometimes 
impossible, electrostatics being one such supposedly independent 
component.
Poincare now goes on:
^Poincarä H; S cien ce a n d  H yp ......; p.213
20op. cit; p.213 
21See my p.213
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'We must not flatter ourselves that we have avoided every contradiction, but 
we ou gh t to mähe up our m inds. Two contradictory theories, provided
22 (my italics)
Note that, in Duhem's book, the second clause is translated:
'but  we m ust take sides' 22> (my italics)
What are we to make o f thisP
Before I suggest an answer I need to say a little more about the 
context. The French reader, Poincare tells us, expects a theory (i) to be 
deductive and coherent, and (ii) to include a mechanical explanation along 
atomic lines. Poincare evaluates (ii) as less reasonable' than (i), and 
thereby invites us to infer that he is inclined to reject that component, 
while acquiescing in the other.24 He advises his countrymen not to look 
for a mechanical explanation in Maxwell's treatise, because such is not to 
be found there. Moreover, he warns that the expectation of coherence will 
not be satisfied. He does not say here, but he makes it clear elsewhere, 
that he approves of Maxwell's theory.
So my answer to the above question is that we are confronted with a 
dilemma, the resolution of which requires us to make up our minds', to 
take sides' - are we to persist in demanding the sort o f theory  
that has attracted us in the past, or are we going to adjust our 
standardsP  Poincare indicates how he will respond when he scoffs at 
the possibility that we could avoid all contradiction, and urges that two 
contradictory theories could be usefu i instrum ents o f research, 
provided they....
And thus, out of Maxwell's theory, in the second semester of 1888/9 
at the Faculty of Science in Paris, the thesis in skeleton form was 
conceived by Poincare. Does he deserve the harsh criticism of Duhem that 
he was motivated by:
’...... the taste for the exotic, the desire to imitate the foreign, the need to
dress the mind as well as the body in the fashion of London'* 25 ?
Let us see.
22op. cit; p.216
23Duhem P; The Aim und S tru ctu re .....; second edition, p.91
24Poincare; S cien ce und Hyp..., p.214
25üuhem P; The Aim a n d  S tru ctu re .....; second edition, p.91
[Part 3, S3] 213
3.2.2 The Factors that influenced Poincare
We heard earlier of Poincare's dismissal of the billiard-ball model of the 
kinetic theory, when this is conceived as an explanation26. Now there is 
nothing wrong with using such models, he thinks, provided we 
understand that they are nothing more than
‘ the images we substituted for the real objects which Nature will hide
forever from our eyes',27
and provided we are successful in capturing the same relations between 
our images as exist between the things themselves. These relations 
transcend our images and characterise the equations of theory. Different 
images can then give rise to the same equations, and Poincare thinks that, 
if the latter are known to be valid, it is of no consequence which image, if 
any, we invoke to represent the things themselves.
Much in science, and in the history of science, he thinks, can be 
understood in this way:
* For instance, attribution of a given periodic phenomenon, such as 
an electric oscillation, to the vibration of an atom visualised as 
being displaced back and forth in the manner of a pendulum is 
neither certain nor essential. Between the electric oscillation, the 
motion of a pendulum and all periodic phenomena there is, 
however, a similarity
'which corresponds to a profound reality .28 
This similarity is a consequence of more general principles
(conservation of energy, least action:....)
‘.....this is the truth which will remain the same in whatever garb we
may see fit to clothe it 2?
*Why does Fresnel's theory of optics still predict phenomena 
successfully even though it has been supplanted by Maxwell's 
theory? Because, according to Poincare, the different equations of 
the theory remain valid; what is different is that our images have 
changed.30
26See my p.203
27Poincar6 H; S cien ce  a n d  Hyp...... ; p.161
28ibid
2< V  cit; p.162 
3°op. cit; pp!60/161
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‘Again, different theories of dispersion have different starting 
points, yet they end with the same equations. Poincare speculates 
that they are ail true in that, despite the different images they 
invoke, they all have one truth in common, namely the 
affirmation of some true relation between certain things.
Such examples tell us why Poincare feels that multiplicity of 
theoretical treatment is in order. For, according to Poincare, a theory  
comprises both the equations in which it  cuiminates and the 
im ages we form  in their conception . Since explanation, in 
Poincare s terminology, is ruled out, our images are only heuristic devices 
and beyond that they have no virtue. It is only the equations to which 
they lead that could have lasting value. A n y  image wiii do, provided  
i t  culm inates in the right equations ; if anyone should doubt this, let 
him examine the work of the current English school of physicists and 
their models. Did not Kelvin have several mechanical models, some even 
incompatible, representing the one entity, the molecule?
Couid anyone, at the time, i t  m ight be asked, argue 
fo rcefu lly  to the contrary, given the background against which 
Poincare is  writing P 1 doubt it.
If, then, multiplicity of theoretical treatment is in order, could there 
not be incompatibility within some complex of multiple treatments of 
some particular phenomenon? Now Poincare had it that two seemingly 
contradictory theories might well each express true relations, since the 
contradiction might reside only in the images we have chosen 
fo r  rea lity  - such would be illustrated, for example, by Kelvin's 
mechanical models for the molecule.
So, according to Poincare’s version of the doctrine of multiplicity of 
theories, anything goes as far as our images are concerned, and it is only 
the resulting equations that matter. There is, in principle, no bar to our 
starting with inconsistent im ages , and so having inconsistent 
images applying to the same phenomena. Moreover, we are potential 
victims o f circumstances that create almost unlim ited
opportunity fo r  us to do just th a t . How does this come about?
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First note that it is common practice to conjure up images based on 
mechanical models. For example, recall the variety and complexity of 
such models as the English school invokes, some being demonstrably 
incompatible with others when ostensibly representing the same 
phenomena or entity. Second, note too that, when Poincare was examining 
Maxwell's theory, he asked the question: when is it possible to conceive a 
mechanical explanation of some phenomenon which is characterised by 
observable time-varying parameters: q1.q2.Q3.....Qs*~ say?31 Third.
remember that a mechanical explanation is one that invokes the motions 
of atoms or molecules or fluids, in accord with the principles of dynamics.
Poincare finds that a mechanical explanation is possible when, and 
only when, the phenomenon can be represented by equations expressed 
in Lagrangian form. This requirement reduces to the necessary and 
sufficient condition that explicit functions, U(qs) and T(qs, qs), be
specifiable such that U and T : (i) represent potential and kinetic energy 
respectively; and (ii) together satisfy the principle of least action and the 
principle of conservation of energy. Poincare also shows that, if one 
mechanical explanation is possible, then there is no limit to the number of 
such explanations that can be found.
Here, then, is  a form al demonstration o f the inescapable 
threat o f m ultip licity  o f theoretical treatm ent for the 
circumstance in which a theory consists o f equations allied to 
an imase comorehendins a mechanical m odei. Any number of 
mechanical models can be conceived as explanations underlying any 
particular phenomenon. And if there is a veritable infinity of mechanical 
models matched to images each affording mechanical explanation of a 
phenomenon, then we can be assured that p len ty  o f these will be  
incom patible , one with another. As we have already heard Poincare 
put the matter, two seemingly contradictory theories could well each 
express true relations because the contradiction could reside in 
the images chosen fo r  r e a li ty .
Our conclusion is that Poincare had much better grounds for the 
doctrine of multiplicity and incompatibility of theories than those for 
which Duhem gives him credit.
31 op. cit; pp217-224. Also E lec tric ity  e t Optique, Vol.l; pp ix-xvi
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3.2.3 The Qualifications in the Doctrine
We can deal quite quickly with the first qualification, namely that, 
provided  th ey  are k e p t from  overlapping , contradictory theories 
could be useful instruments of research. At first glance there seems to be 
an ambiguity here. For we could say that two theories overlap when, on 
the one hand, they apply to the same phenomena, or when, on the other, 
we take all or part of one, add this to all or part of the other, and apply 
the conjoined theory. The second interpretation seems to imply such an 
unlikely action by any sensible person, that one is tempted to assume 
that Poincare means us to take the first interpretation. But then Poincare 
would be saying that incompatible theories could be useful, provided 
they do not apply to the same phenomena; and, in that event, what would 
be ruled out, namely application to the same phenomena, is just what is 
exemplified in the cases drawn from his writings to illustrate how 
contradictory theories occur. We shall therefore take it that the 
qualification Poincare has in mind is the trivially obvious one 
comprehended by the second of the alternative interpretations.
What of the second proviso, namely that, provided  we do no t Jook 
to f in d  in them the eiplanation o f th in g s , two contradictory 
theories could be useful instruments of research? Now recall that 
Poincare understands explanation' to mean a supposed accounting for 
observable phenomena by way of images involving hidden atoms moving 
in accord with the principles of dynamics, and that he banishes such 
purported explanations to the realm of metaphysics. Why, then, does he 
bother to include the proviso in the doctrine? The answer is that the 
doctrine of incompatibility of theories, with the two attendant 
qualifications, appeared in print a long time before the metaphysical 
views to which we have just referred. In the context of the original 
promulgation of the doctrine, the second proviso serves to convert into a 
prohibition Poincare s expressed judgement that it is not altogether 
reasonable for French people to demand that theories be underpinned by 
mechanical explanations.
Perhaps Poincare felt it necessary to do this because of the express 
novelty of the doctrine at the time. Moreover, he might have thought that 
the French reader, accustomed to complete logical coherence in theory, 
and subscribing to some such doctrine as he himself held about the unity
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of nature, needed to be shocked out of the views that mechanical images 
are real explanations, and that, for that reason, incompatible theories are 
ruled out. So Poincare turned this argument around, ruled in the 
incompatible theories by ruling out the unique mechanical explanations, 
pointed to Maxwell's theory as evidence of validity, and promulgated the 
doctrine. The other grounds in justification of the doctrine, which we have 
already noted, were not to appear till much later. When they did, they 
took the form of a conclusion, derived from a set of case studies, to the 
effect that incompatibility of theories was not only possible, but quite 
widely actualised.
Poincare s implicit justification for the second proviso would now 
have taken the form of an argument along the following lines:
* examination of the theories that we have on the books 
establishes that incompatibility among theories is not only 
possible but also widely actualised;
* if our images were real explanations, then incompatible 
theories would be ruled out;
‘ therefore our images are not real explanations.
The weakness of arguments like this stems from the universal 
quantification implicit in the first premise and explicit in the conclusion. 
We shall return to this argument shortly (see my pp218-219)
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§4. AN EVALUATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
§4.1 The Doctrine in Retrospect
We have seen how Duhem followed Poincare in accepting that a specific 
set of phenomena could fit under the umbrellas of contradictory theories. 
Duhem's acquiesence was grudging and by no means unqualified. On 
logical grounds he felt compelled to accept the doctrine, but on 
metaphysical grounds he was far from convinced; intuition, common 
sense, and rationality in the pursuit of physics all demanded unity and 
coherence. Poincare, on the other hand, had no reservations.
In both cases it was Maxwell's theory that was decisive in committing 
them to the doctrine. Here, they thought, was a theory that had proven so 
successful that, on physical grounds, it could not be rejected; and yet, 
they claimed, it was full of contradictions. Were they right in this latter 
assessment? I shall argue below that they were both mistaken on that 
score, and that, in the con te it o f  today's physics one cannot fin d  
in M aiw eii's theory any ground fo r  adherence to the doctrine 
we are considering.1
Before we come to that, let me offer the opinion that, in the 
framework of the physics of their day, and judged by the full reasoning 
which they gave and which we have only briefly traversed, both 
provided substantive arguments for adoption of the doctrine. But 
vindication in that conteit has almost no relevance to assessment against 
the background of physics in the last two decades of the 20^ century. 
What is now required is that, in particular, the two instances of universal 
quantification in the argument at the end of §3.2.3 accommodate among 
their respective instantiations not only the theories extant at the time 
when Poincare and Duhem wrote, but also those theories that have lapsed 
and those that have emerged in the meantime. In seeing whether this 
condition is met, let us be generous to Poincare and Duhem, and assume 
that the doctrine of incompatibility of theories and the argument at the 
end of §3.2.3 admitted of no counter-examples in their day. What, then, 
are we to conclude from changes that have occurred since?
*See my p.221 etseq
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Modern physics assures us that there is no ether, and in this respect 
Poincare and Duhem are vindicated. But the victory is not without cost to 
them, for the weird mechanical models of the 1850-1900 epoch, parasitic 
on the concept of the ether, are now anachronistic - historically of 
interest, yes; but physically relevant, not at all. If we need to know about 
them, then that is only in order that we might dismiss them, should the 
subject inadvertently arise. With the relegation of these models to 
history, there disappeared from the purview of physics a large part of the 
set of considerations that weighed heavily in persuading Poincare to 
formulate the doctrine, and Duhem to become a reluctant subscriber to it. 
There also disappeared the practical instances to which one could point to 
give substance to the claim of the wild abandon with which, according to 
Poincare, theories could be concocted. Likewise confined to the archives 
are other theories that influenced Poincare - Fresnel's theory of light (as 
founded on the conception of a moving ether)2 3, Helmholtz s theory of 
dispersion, Hertz s mechanics, for instance.
If Poincare's and Duhem's views were impeccable in their opposition 
to the reality of the ether, then they were gravely astray about the 
reality of atoms and molecules, for modern physics assures us that there 
are such entities. For this reason we m ust accept as explanatory 
much o f what th ey  ruJed out. The argument at the end3 of §3.2.3 
needs to be recast, therefore, because it does not admit of the universal 
quantification which it has there. Continuing to regard a theory as image 
plus equations derivable therefrom, and now taking the image to 
represent real 'goings-on', we need to formulate for a whole class of 
theories a new first premise which, with the same second premise, gives 
us a new conclusion:
* some of our images are real explanations;
* if an image is a real explanation, then only the one theory 
is valid, and theories incompatible with that are ruled out;
* therefore, there is a class of theories such that each member 
admits of no incompatible competitor.
For these theories the conclusion has swung back full-circle, so that our 
expectations accord with those of the French readers before Poincare
2Poincar6 H: Science And Hyp....; p.160
3See my p.217
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converted them to the new doctrine. But our acquiescence in mechanical 
explanation is now grounded, not on metaphysics, but on the new depths 
of reality which physics has been able to plumb.
We cannot rule multiplicity of theoretical treatment right out of 
current physics, for that would be a patently false manoeuvre. But there 
are good reasons why we can no longer accept the doctrine explicit 
in  Poincare, that, so fa r  as theories are concerned, anything  
goes as Jong as we get the right equations . This is so partly 
because there is no longer anything in physics that even remotely gives 
expression to such a doctrine, and partly because theories are constrained 
in all sorts of ways. Quite apart from the requirement that theories be 
formulated in accord with the various principles that Poincare sees as 
non-arbitrary conventions, there are conditions imposed on them that 
Poincare, in his day, could not be expected to have appreciated. To give 
one example, we insist that any theory within the domain of optics, or 
that of electromagnetics, or that of heat, be constrained by Maxwell's 
equations and/or the principles of relativity and/or the principles of 
quantum mechanics. At the time he wrote, Poincare would have known 
nothing of the second and third of these.
Duhem, but not Poincare, lived to witness the birth of Bohr’s old 
quantum theory, but that event did not shape anything that Duhem 
wrote. Nevertheless, the subsequent rise o f the new  quantum  
theory provides anti-reaiists with an opportunity to resurrect 
the Poincare/Duhem doctrine, because quantum theory aliies 
i ts e l f  to a m etaphysics not uniike that conceived b y  Poincare 
and Duhem as attendant on the theories o f their day Thus, in the 
case of many of the phenomena treated by quantum theory we either do 
not know, or we are unsure about, what the underlying goings-on' are. In 
some instances, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics 
would have it, either there are no goings-on' at all, or it makes no sense 
to speculate on what they might be. These prescriptions are just such as 
might prompt the views (i) that theories are merely instruments whose 
value lies in how well they serve us, and (ii) if two different theories 
might do much the same job, why should we think it any more likely that 
they must be compatible than was the case when different mechanical 
images of the ether and of ether-matter interactions were conceived?
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Now, in this thesis, I do not intend to canvass the issues just raised. 
But, nevertheless, I want to insist on two things:
Firstly , the argument that I  have constructed on behaJf o f  
the anti-reaiist applies to quantum theory only; and does 
not admit o f automatic eitension  to other fields',
Secondly , if the anti-realist via such argument were to expect us to 
take the revival of the Poincare/Duhem doctrine as portending 
more than unactualised possibilities, then it would be encumbent 
on him to present us with a credible instance of incompatible 
theories applying to the same phenomena. It seems to me that, if 
he could do that, and make the instance stick, then he would have 
proved his point fo r  that domain and, for it, the Cartwright 
argument from principle would go through. But where are the 
instances?*1
Let me sum up by saying that, in my opinion, the doctrine of 
multiplicity and incompatibility of theories, as formulated by Poincare 
and adopted by Duhem, no longer has substance, for the simple but 
decisive reason that, when it comes to the crunch, the doctrine is not 
instantiated.
4.2 The Mistaken Perception of Incoherence in Maxwell's Theory
We have seen how Maxwell’s treatise played a decisive role in converting 
Poincare and Duhem to the doctrine of multiplicity and incompatibility of 
theories. The question we need to explore is whether Maxwell's theory 
could plausibly serve a similar function today. We shall answer in the 
negative.
^It is, of course, trivially obvious that wave-particle duality does not fit the bill, 
since a wave description and a particle description do not apply to the same 
phenomena. (Refer to my p. 16 for an example of possible misunderstanding about 
the application of the italicised expression). It might perhaps be urged that E. T. 
Jaynes’ neo- classical theory for phenomena covered by quantum electrodynamics 
(QED) - see Bibliography for references to Jaynes' papers - is a case in point. But 
Jaynes does not see these two incompatible conceptions as standing credibly side by 
side. He is concerned about conceptual deficiencies in QED, and he thinks that a 
partially classical formulation could sharpen appreciation of where to look, or what 
to do, to improve matters.
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I have not studied the detailed bases5 for Poincare’s and Duhem’s 
conclusions that Marvell’s theory is replete with contradictions, for that 
task would be a lengthy exercise and, I believe, a pointless one in the 
context of our immediate concern. There are available now, and there 
have been for a long time, many fine expositions of the theory of 
electromagnetism, and a close study of any one of these would establish 
that there are no contradictions or incoherencies in Maxwell's theory6. 
This point is driven home when we note that M.S. Longair presents 
Maxwell's equations within an axiomatised system that, under 
interpretation, yields the laws of electromagnetism7.
Let me outline briefly the reason why we should conclude that there 
is no incoherence in Maxwell’s theory. We consider his equations, four in 
number, for media at rest. Three of them express laws firmly grounded 
in experiment. The remaining one also expresses, in part, such a law, but 
it includes an initially speculative component which Maxwell called the 
displacement current. He had good reason at the time to suppose that 
such a component represents a real phenomenon.
In their most general form, and expressed in the usual vector 
notation, Maxwell's equations are*:
div 0 - p (1)
div B = 0 (2)
curl E = -dB/dt (3)
curt H = i tdO/dt (4 )
5Poincar6 H; E lectricity  e t Optique, and Duhem P; Les Theories 61ectriques 
de J  Clerk M axw ell: Etude h istoriqu e e t c r i t iq u e ; Paris; 1902
6Follow its development, for example, in any of these texts:
Teans T.H: The M athem atical Theory o f  E lec tr ic ity  and Magnetism  ; fifth  
edition; Cambridge University Press; 1946 (exposition in non-vector notation). 
Abraham M; The Classical Theory o f  E lec tr ic ity  and Magnetism  ; revised by 
R. Becker; eighth German edition of 1930 translated by J. Dougall; Blackie; 1937 
(exposition in vector notation; likewise for the references following). Smvthe W. 
R; Static and Dynamic E le c tr ic ity ; McGraw-Hill; 1939. Harnwell G.P: 
P rin cip les o f  E lec tr ic ity  and Electrom agnetism  ; McGraw-Hill; 1938.
Longair M. S: Theoretical Concepts in  P h y s ic s ; Cambridge University Press; 
1984; Chs.3,4
7Longair M.S; op. cit; Ch.4
*1 assume that the terminology, which accords with that commonly used in 
textbooks, is understood
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Equation (1), which is equivalent to Gauss's law for electric flux, 
expresses the observational fact that electric charge is the source of the 
electric field, and it quantifies the latter in terms of the former in 
accordance with the results of experiments.
Equation (2), sometimes known as Gauss’s law for magnetic flux, 
expresses the observational fact that there are no free magnetic poles - 
they always occur in pairs.
Equation (3) is a refined version of Faraday's law (e= -d#/dt) which 
expresses the observational fact that a changing magnetic field induces a 
voltage in a circuit cut by the lines of force; the equation quantifies the 
relationship in accord with experiment, as well as specifying the relative 
directions of the electric and magnetic fields. (The equivalence between 
(3) and Faraday s law is established mathematically via Stokes' Theorem)
Equation (4), without the term a O / d t , is known both as Ampere's law 
and as the Biot-Savart law. It expresses the experimental fact that an 
electric current is always accompanied by a magnetic field, and that, in a 
straight wire for example, the magnetic field encircles the wire in a plane 
at right angles to it. The additional term dD/dt expresses Maxwell's 
insight in recognising the need for hypothesising the displacement 
current.
Use of the vectors D and B, rather than E and H, expresses the fact 
that applications of the equations may require us to take account of the 
dielectric constant and/or the permeability of specific media. In free 
space D would reduce to E, and both p and i would be zero. In material 
bodies we would need to know K in the expression, D=KE; ji  in the 
expression, B=^ lH; and <j  in the expression, i= or E.
With the wisdom of hindsight we should look upon Maxwell's 
conjecture about the displacement current as a formal hypothesis that 
would be judged by the court of future experience. As it happens, the 
first test was not long in coming because the theory predicts propagation 
of electromagnetic energy at the speed of light, along with the 
phenomena of reflection, refraction etc. We know now of the remarkable 
series of experiments that Hertz conducted to verify the theory9, and we
^HertzH; E lectric Waves, Macmillan; 1893
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know too that it is the displacement current term that underlies the 
capacity of free space to sustain electromagnetic propagation. There, the 
displacement current reduces simply to the time rate of change of the 
electric field intensity.
Maxwell s equations, then, comprehending the hypothesis of the 
displacement current, are confirmed by their success in accounting for 
the nature of light and for the innumerable practical applications of the 
technology of radio and its derivatives.
The equations, made symmetrical in their magnetic and electric 
aspects by inclusion of the displacement current, are also found to be 
invariant under a Lorentz transformation, and so conform to the 
requirements of Special Relativity.
Where, it might be asked, is inconsistency or incoherence to be found 
in Maxwell s equations? The answer is that there is none. The supposed 
grounds for Duhem s and Poincare s acquiescence in the doctrine we have 
been considering turn out to be chimerical. They were simply mistaken, 
though perhaps understandably so. Before we resile from scientific 
realism on the basis of incompatible theories covering the same 
phenomena, we should demand better evidence than we now discern 
here. We should insist on being presented with a case in which credible 
incompatible theories are shown as accepted in today s physics.
4.3 How Duhem might have become a Realist
What fin a l conclusion should we draw about Duhem s supposed  
anti-realism  ? He is not at all the paradigm anti-realist' that Bas van 
Fraassen dubs him.10 Certainly, he is anti-realist about the theoretical 
entities: electrons, atoms, molecules. In that respect he takes exactly the 
opposite stand to Cartwright and to Hacking.
About theories his stance might be evaluated as ambivalent; on 
logical grounds he professes to be anti-realist, but on metaphysical 
grounds he professes to be a realist. It seems to me that, in the former 
respect, the logical analysis of theories on which he bases his anti-realism 
is pretty much irrelevant, and it also seems to me that, in the latter
l°van Fraassen B; The S c ie n tif ic  Im&ge, Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1980; p.86
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respect, he is just like any other realist. For, whilst one might claim to 
have excellent grounds for being a realist, it would be clutching at straws 
to hope that those grounds could justify the stance with the sort of 
certainty that characterises a conclusion reached from true premises via 
the principles of logic.
However, there is cause, I think, to put some qualification against 
Duhem's metaphysically-based realism about theories. This is so because 
it seems to me that anti-realism about entities, when not conjoined to 
some principle such as that which Russell recommended to the effect that 
entities should be replaced by logical constructions, would make full 
realism about theories impossible. For what status would a theory's 
entities have? My way of resolving the situation as far as Duhem is 
concerned is to label him quasi-realist about theories. This is how 1 
synthesise his anti-realism about entities with his unshakeable 
metaphysically-based conviction that theories reflect an ontological order 
and constitute an analogy of real relations existing in nature. But that 
evaluation is set in the context of the physics of his day.
Suppose he had lived to witness the
tremendous revival which the atomic theory in its present form was to 
bring to physics 1
or to have some
presentiment of the prodigious developments it was to have in the half- 
cen tury12 „ 
or to appreciate that
The passages in which he exposes almost to derision the notion of the 
electron and its introduction into science have since received cruel
refutation inflicted by the extraordinary advances of micro physics’, 13
or to digest the implications of Perrin s work on the Brownian motion,
would he have remained anti-realist about electrons, atoms and
molecules ?
We can only speculate, but we must surely guess that he would not. 
And if we are right about that, then some of the relations in nature that
1 l de Broglie L; Foreword to Duhem P; The Aim end  Structure.....; second edition,
ppx/xi
*2ibid
I3ibid
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characterise his quasi-realism would surely have been proclaimed by him 
as relations among those sorts of entities. In expressing that doctrine, and 
in rejecting the belief, for the reasons we have given earlier, that 
incompatible theories in physics are a genuine practical possibility, would 
he not then hold a view very much like that of any latter-day realist? We 
must answer in the affirmative.
In Part 1, §3.2 (p54 et seq.), I argued for an holistic thesis that causal 
stories owe their credibility to the theories from which they spring, and 
that the theories owe their credibility to other true causal stories which 
they comprehend and to other phenomena which they explain.
In Part 3, §4.1 (p.220) I urged that formal constraints now on 
theories inhibit their formulation with the abandon that characterised 
many of them in the twenty-year period centred on the start of the 20th 
century, and so restrict the possibility that incompatible theories could 
apply to the same phenomena.
□aims like these are intimately related to the argument from 
coincidence and/or to the principle of inference to (best) explanation14, 
which, if they can be sustained, constitute strong grounds for scientific 
realism.
Accordingly, we move in Part 4 to discuss Bas van Fraassen's 
supposed rebuttal of J.J.C. Smart s 'cosmic coincidence' argument.
,4See my pp7/8
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PART 4
ON VAN FRAASSEN’S RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS
FOR REALISM
SI. INTRODUCTION
In The Scientific Image Bas C. van Fraassen argues for a version 
of empiricism which he calls Constructive Empiricism' and which he 
articulates as an alternative to scientific realism. In Chapter 2 he presents 
a case for rejecting the sorts of grounds commonly offered in justification 
of the realist's position. We shall restrict our interest here to one only of 
his two main targets, namely the notion of inference to the best 
eip iana tion* 2. This he sees as the common rule relied upon by Wilfrid 
Sellars, J.J.C.Smart and Gilbert Harman in the several ways in which, 
individually, they claim that the canons of rational inference require 
scientific realism'3
Central to the idea of inference to the best explanation, according to 
van Fraassen, is Reichenbach's principle of the common cause,4 a formal 
articulation of which I provide in S2.2 (see my p.232 et seq.). Meanwhile 
a rough statement will suffice : if two events occur simultaneously with 
implausibly high probability, then it is very likely that they are 
independent effects of a common cause.
van Fraassen sees the principle of the common cause as the base on 
which arguments for realism rest. Illustrating the point is an argument 
which he attributes to Wesley Salmon^ which purports to show that
Wan Fraassen Bas C ; The S c ien tific  Im age ; Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1980
2 Grover Maxwell's arguments against the possibility of drawing any plausible 
distinction in science between the observable and the unobservable is the other
target. See The Ontological Status o f  T heoretical Entities  in M innesota  
Studies in  P hilosophy o f  Science , vol.III, Uni of Minnesota Press, 1962, p.3 
Wan Fraassen Bas C ; op. cit; p.19
4Reichenbach H; The Direction o f  Tim e; Berkeley, Uni of California; 1956; 
Section 19, ppl57T63; see also Sections 22 and 23
^Salmon W.C; Theoretical Explanation' in Explanation  ; S. Körner (editor); Yale 
Uni. Press; 1975
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....if this principle is imposed as a demand on our account of what there is in 
the world, then we are led to postulate the existence of unobservable events 
and processes' &
The argument, van Fraassen says* 7 8, runs like this :
(1) The explanation of two correlated events requires the 
finding of a cause common to both;
(2) Often it is not possible to find an observable event as 
common cause;
Therefore
(3) Scientific explanation often requires that there be 
certain unobservable events;
Therefore
(4) Scientific explanation will be impossible unless there 
are unobservable entities;
hut
(3) The aim of science is to provide scientific explanation;
Therefore
(6) The aim of science can only be served if it is true that 
there are unobservable entities.
The principle o f the common cause, van Fraassen believes, 
also underlies a classic argument for realism advanced by  
Professor JJC  Sm arts In the sequel, we shall focus our 
attention on Smart s argument and on van Fraassen s claimed 
rebuttal which turns on an alleged discrediting of 
Reichenbach 's principle. We shall argue that van Fraassen falls 
In this latter task and that Smart s argument stands.
Since the principle of the common cause is crucial to our interests 
here, we begin our considerations with an account of that principle before 
moving on to Smart s classic argument.
*van Fraassen; op. cit; 1980; p.23
7ibid
8Smart J.J.C; Between Science en d  P hilosophy, Random House, N.Y.; 1968; ch.3, 
esp p p l38 ,141-155
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S2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON CAUSE
According to this principle, the simultaneous occurrence of two events 
with implausibly high probability, given their respective individual 
probabilities, is to be explained by a common, temporally prior, cause of 
which they are each independent effects.1 Often the postulated common 
cause will be a hidden one, or at least a non-obvious one, and it is the 
task of the scientist to flush it out on particular occasions.
To formulate the principle, which we do in §2.2, we first need to have 
at our command some concepts and theorems from the calculus of 
probabilities. These we summarise in §2.1
S2.1 Formal Preliminaries
We symbolise the case as follows:
*Let A and B be two events that are observed to occur in 
circumstances S;
*Then P(A|S), P(B|S) and P(A.BIS) are symbols designating 
respectively the probabilities that, given S in each case,
A occurs, B occurs, and the joint event, A and B, occurs;
"Thus we allow that A might occur without B, B without A, 
both might occur, or neither might occur.
S picks out the conjunction of factors that stand as background to the 
events in question. For example, A and B could be respectively the 
turning up of an ace and a king in play with a pack of cards. S would 
comprise a statement of the rules of play, plus other information bearing 
on the outcome - details of the composition of the pack, instruction that 
the pack be shuffled appropriately, that there be no bias favouring 
particular cards (or, if there is, wherein it consists), and so on.
P is a positive number between 0 and 1, and for our purposes we will 
take it to represent the reia tive  frequency  of the occurrence of the
^ince the correlation spoken of here is statistical, it vouid be more rigorous to talk 
about event-types rather than events. We shall take the point as understood.
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events in question; that is, in an unlimited sequence of observations the 
event will be found to occur in a fraction P of all the results in which it is 
possible for it to be manifested; necessarily, then, it will not occur in a 
fraction (1-P) of such results
Often the circumstances S are talcen as understood, and the 
probability is then written simply as P(A). For example, if A is the event 
of a fall of more than 4mm of rain in Garema Place on any particular day, 
then P(A) is the fraction obtained by dividing the number of days when 
the event occurred by the number of days of continuous observation, 
given that this period is a lengthy one. If the observations were to be 
limited to winter months, then P(A|S) would indicate that the probability 
is so constrained, S containing the appropriate qualification.
We will employ the symbol P(AIB.C) to indicate the probability of the 
occurrence of event A, given that either the events B and C have 
occurred, or the event B has occurred in circumstances C. A particular 
case of interest to us is symbolised in the form P(A.B|C), where B is an 
event statistically correlated with A, and C an event standing to both A 
and B as cause to effect. An example would be this: A signifies a heavy 
frost overnight, and B the fall of the thermometer reading to or below 
zero. A and B are highly correlated, but each is caused by C, the event of 
there being a very cold atmosphere out of doors.
Theorems that we n eed  to have at our dJsposaJ are th e se :
Theorem 1
If P(A) is the probability of occurrence of A, and P(A) the probability of 
its non-occurrence, then P(AIS) + P(A|S) = 1
Theorem 2
If A and B are independent e v e n ts , then P(A.BIS) = P(AIS) * P(BIS)
We may generalise: P(A. B. C... ) = P(A) * P(B) * P(C) x ..... for
independent events
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Definition 1 (presupposed by Theorem 2)
A and B are independent if and only if the occurrence of either does not 
affect the probability of occurrence of the other2.
Definition 2
A is dependent on B (or B is statistically relevant tok)  (or A and B are 
correlated) if and only if the occurrence of B, or of B, alters the 
probability of A - that i s , when 
P(A| B) * P(A) or P(A| B) * P(A)
Definition 3
There is positive correlation between A and B if and only if the 
occurrence of either increases the probability of occurrence of the other. 
The correlation is negative if and only if the occurrence of either 
decreases the probability of occurrence of the other.
Thus A and B are positively correlated if and only if 
P(A|B) > P(A) and P(B|A) > P(B)
Theorem 5
A and B are positively correlated if and only if 
P(A.B) > P(A) x P(B)
Theorem 4
For two events, A and B, occurring in circumstances C, 
P(A.B|C) = P(A|C) x P(B|A.C)
^ o r  a rigorous introductory account of the theory of probability, see : von Mises R; 
Probability. Statistics and Truth; translation of third German edition of 1951; Alien 
and Unvin; 1957; re-issued by Dover. N.Y., 1981
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§2.2 Reichenbach s Conjunctive Causal Forks'
At the beginning of §2,1 introduced Reichenbach’s principle of the 
common cause, and in §2.1 I gave an example in which the cold 
atmospheric conditions were invoked as the cause of both the frost and 
the below zero’ reading of the thermometer. Although the frost and the 
thermometer reading are highly correlated, neither explains, nor causes, 
the other, but both are explained as effects of a common cause.
For such cases Reichenbach introduced his principle which, he said,
....can be stated in the form : I f  an improbable coincidence has occurred,
there must exist a common cause ^
We shall label this quotation STATEMENT 1*. and note it for future 
reference.
After giving a few illustrations, he remarks:
Chance coincidences, of course, are not impossible .... The existence o f  a 
common cause is  therefore in  such cases no t absolutely certain, but o n ly  
probable. This probability is greatly increased if coincidences occur
A
repeatedly..... ’ (my emphasis)
Later he adds:
'It will be advisable to treat the principle of the common cause as a statistical
problem.......We...generalise the problem by extending it to statistical
relationships between cause and effect, that is, to situations in which the 
cause produces the effect only with a certain probability. The special case 
that this probability is practically equal to 1.... is then included in the
general treatment'^
^Reichen bach H, op. cit; p.137 
4ibid; PP157/158 
5ibid; p 138
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Reichenbach now sets down four relations which correspond to our 
Theorem 3, Theorem 4, Definition 3 and Definition 3 respectively 6 :
WA.B) > P(A)xP(B) (Rl)
PU.B) - P(A)x P(B|A) - P(B)x P(A|B) (R2)
P(B|A) > P(B) (R3)
P(AIB) > P(A) (R4)
Relation (Rl) expresses the fact that the simultaneous occurrence of A 
and B is more frequent than would be the case for chance coincidences. 
R3 and R4 are derivable from Rl and R2, and Rl is derivable from R3 or 
R4. So each of the latter states the same fact as does Rl.
What we should notice is  that we need  to have the requisite em pticai 
evidence for R l orRJ orR 4 before we start talking about common causes.
Reichenbach now goes o n :
Tn order to explain the coincidence of A and B, which has a probability 
exceeding that of a chance coincidence, we assume that there is  a common 
cause C If there is more than one possible kind of common cause. C may
represent the disjunction of these causes'. (my emphasis)
Referring to the ' conjunctive fork' that characterises the common cause,
namely, C
he adds*
We will now introduce the assumption that the fork ACB satisfies 
the following relations* :
P(A.BIC) - P(AIC) x P(BiC) (R5)
P(A.B|C) - P(A|C) x P(B|C) (R6)
P(A|C) > P(A|C) (R7)
P(BIC) > P(BJC) (R8)
-B. 1 have elected to use the same symbolism as van Fraassen for whom P(A|B) 
designates the probability of A. given that B has occurred. For Reichenbach, this 
symbol designates the probability of B, given that A has occurred. No confusion will 
ensue provided this difference is kept in mind.
7
Reichenbach H; op. cit; p.139 
‘ ibidq
Note that (R5) and (R6) are special cases of Theorem 2 above, and that (R7) and 
(R8) specify that C have a causal effect on A and B
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Subsequently Reichenbach shows that (RJJ is derivable
from  this set o f  reiations. He remarks :
When we say that the common cause C explains  the frequent coincidence, 
we refer not only to this derivabiiity of relation (Rl), but also to the fact 
that, relative to the cause C the events A and B are mutually independent [see 
(R3)l : a sta tis tica l dependence  is here derived from an independence. 
The common cause is the connecting link which transforms an
independence into a dependence'10 ( parenthesis and underlining added) 
This comment comprehends the interpretation we placed above on the 
frost/ thermometer/ cold atmosphere example.
It will be useful to quote the amplified definition of the principle 
which Reichenbach now gives :
' I f  coincidences o f  two e ve n ts  A and B occur more fre q u e n tly  
than would correspond to th e ir  independen t occurrence, that is, 
i f  the even ts  sa tis fy  rela tion  (Rl), then th ere  exists a common 
cause C fo r  these even ts  such tha t the fo rk  ACB is  conjunctive,
tha t is, sa tisfies  re la tion s (R5)~ (R8). ‘ 11
We shall label this quotation as 'STATEMENT 2' and retain it, along with
STATEMENT 1, for future reference.
We now see that the principle o f the common cause can be 
no more than a plausible ru le o f thumb pointing to the 
probability o f a common cause. For what Reichenbach establishes 
deductively is only this : if there is a common cause of two events such 
that (R5)-R(8) are satisfied, then, considered in isolation from the cause, 
the two events will present themselves as having the character, (Rl), of a 
seemingly unlikely coincidence. He does not establish logically what 
STATEMENTS 1 and 2 claim, namely, that, if there is an unlikely 
coincidence^ l)f then it is always to be explained via a common cause in 
the manner of (R5MR8).
For this reason it would be better, in my opinion, to express the 
principle as follows:
Let there be a coincidence between two events exhibiting a higher 
probability than would be expected from the supposition that their 
simultaneous occurrence is due to chance. I f  we assume that 
th ey  are each separate e ffects o f a common cause and\ on
i°ibid
1 *op. cit; p.163
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that basis are statisticaJJy independent of one another, we 
have a p os sib Je eipianation for them.
There is another reason for this proposal. As I shall show in §4.7 and 
Appendix 1, there are cases which can be drawn from the macrocosm 
which accord with (R1) but which certainly do not call for any common 
cause. Those cases are not counter-eiamples to the principle, but at the 
very least they call for caution in claiming universality for it. The 
proposed revised formulation accords strictly with what Reichenbach 
actually did, namely establish an implication from the conjunction 
(R5).(R6).(R7).(R8), to(Rl).
As I have shown, we have no deductively-based licence to assume a 
common cause when, in any practical situation, we find that a relation 
like (Rl) holds. It is precisely at this point that inference to (best) 
explanation is invoked, instantiated in this case by the search for a 
common cause. Salmon gives a fetching example.12 Twin quasars, of only 
small angular separation, and exhibiting remarkably similar properties, 
were recently discovered. The probability that two different quasars 
would be so much alike was considered so small that astronomers looked 
for some connection to explain the similarities in the observations. Two 
hypotheses were formulated, one proposing descent from a common 
ancestor, the other envisaging the diffraction of diverging radiations from 
a common quasar source by the gravitational lens effect* (similar to the 
effect observed by Eddington in 1919 in checking the prediction of 
general relativity that light rays would be bent in a strong gravitational 
field). Subsequent observations revealed the existence of a galaxy in the 
right place for the production of the lens effect. We should note in passing 
that we have here a very good illustration of how, in classical physics, 
(inductive) inference to best explanation is invoked.
12Salmon W.C; S cien tific  Explanation and th e  Causal Structure o f  th e  
World; Princeton Uni. Press; 1984; p.159
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§3. VAN FRAASSEN'S CRITICISM OF THE STANDARD ARGUMENTS FOR 
REALISM
S3-1 Sm art's Paradigm  Argum ent
To develop his case, van  Fraassen1 selects passages from Sm art2 as 
paradigm atic of how realists argue for their position. Smart is pleading 
the cause of realism  as opposed to instrum entalism  and opera tionsm  
which he characterises thus:
'.....on the instrumentalist view scientific theories do not consist in
meaningful statements about the world but are computational devices which 
enable us to predict what we shall see when we look at laboratory 
instruments and other medium sized objects. Operationism differs from 
instrumentalism in that it holds that scientific theories consist of 
meaningful statements, but it shares the tendency of instrumentalism to 
deny ....that (theoretical statements) are about independently existing 
theoretical entities (e.g. electrons, mesons, photons). According to 
operationism all the concepts of theoretical physics have to be defined in 
terms of operations with medium sized objects, such as laboratory 
instruments’3
Sm art focusses attention on the claim, shared by instrum entalists and 
operationists, that scientific theories are really concerned w ith 
macroscopic observables, in which respect he classifies them  as varieties 
of m acrophenom enalism ’ *
He a sks w h e th er m acrophenom enalism  can be  d e fen d ed  b y  a 
p r o o f  th a t th eo re tica l te rm s  can a lw ays b e  e lim in a ted  from  
science. He has earlier cast doubt on the idea tha t a scientific vocabulary 
can be divided into two parts, one involving strictly observational term s 
and the other strictly theoretical ter ms,5 but, for the sake of argum ent, he 
allows that a w orkable difference can be found. So, the vocabulary V of a 
scientific theory comes to comprise V0 (the observational, logical and 
m athem atical term s) and VT (the rest, including term s like electron ).
Jvan Fraassen Bas C; The S c ien tific  Im age; pp 19, 23-25.28, 32
2Smart J.J.C; Between Science and P h ilo so p h y ; Random House, N.Y.; 1968; ch.5.
esp p p l38 .141-155
3op. cit; p.138
“*op. cit; p.144
5op. cit; pp75-82,136
[Part 4, S3] 237
Smart now considers the two devices that might be tried as ways of 
dispensing with VT, namely the Ramsey sentence and Craig s
theorem .
The first, he concludes, achieves the end, but to no purpose 
- the Ramsey sentence merely imports the same ontological commitments 
as are taken to be imposed by the original theory; neither the realist nor 
the macrophenomenalist is required to shift ground. Note that nothing so 
far is disputed by van Fraassen. Disagreement starts with what is  to 
be made o f Craig s theorem.
To understand what is  at issue we m ust have some 
acquaintance with the theorem .* 6 A rough statement of it is this. If a 
theory T comprehends two distinguishable classes of terms, then, under 
stated conditions, T may be replaced by another theory T* which 
dispenses with one of the classes of terms and yet can express everything 
statable in T that utilises only terms from the class not eliminated.
Given some domain of discourse (e.g. a scientific theory) which 
supposedly employs both a class of expressions7 8regarded as essential 
(e.g. those containing observational terms only), and another whose 
members are taken to be in some sense auxiliary (e.g. those containing at 
least one theoretical term), how do we apply Craig s theorem to eliminate 
the theoretical terms? Put another way, how do we get from our theory 
to one that retains only the empirical content?
We are first required by Craig to construct a form ai system for 
expressions occurring in the original domain of discourse. T must 
therefore be axiomatised, its primitive terms must be listed, the rules for 
constructing sentences from the vocabulary must be stated, and the rules 
of inference for deriving sentences must be specified. In addition there 
must be an effective  procedure  8 for determining, for every 
expression, whether it belongs to the essential or the auxiliary class. With
^Craig V; Replacem ent o f  A u xiliary  Expressions in Phil. Rev. 65; 1956;
PP38-55
7Tlie vord 'expression' is here taken to denote a term (e.g. 'electron') or a phrase 
(e.g. 'the speed of an electron’) or a sentence (e.g. 'abeam of electrons is moving at 
a speed of half the velocity of light1)
8The adjective effective' signifies that a definite determination is to be made in a 
finite number of steps
[Part 4, S3] 238
a scientific theory, the move would be to attempt to apply the same 
distinction, Y0 versus VT, as was done with Ramsey sentences.
Expressions with empirical content employ terms from V0 only and these
are the ones taken to be essential. Any expression with theoretical 
content employs at least one term from VT and is auxiliary. The aim is to
eliminate the latter.
Within T, an axiom, like a derived sentence, may or may not be 
regarded as auxiliary, and it may be strictly a logical axiom, or it may be 
an extralogical one (which means that it would contain at least one term 
from either V0 or VT)9. Craig requires that there be an effective
procedure for determining whether any particular expression is a logical 
axiom or an extralogical axiom.
If T§ is to replace T, Craig notes, then auxiliary expressions must be 
eliminated from T* both in single statements and in all occurrences in 
sequences of such statements constituting proofs. Also, T and T* must 
agree in their essential contents (in our case, their empirical contents): 
they must contain the same essential theorems, and the same essential 
sentences must be able to be formulated in each. They must have the 
same rules of inference, with the condition that a rule valid in T be 
restricted in T \ in its application and yield, to sentences not containing 
auxiliary expressions.
It is now specified that T have the following rule: ' I f  A, then
A.A. A ....  Is valid in  7!10 T  also has the converse ruler the rule
o f simplification: 'If A. A. A ...... , then A "is valid in T.
Next it is required that every sequence of symbols in T be assigned a 
Gödel number n. T Mcan now  be specified as a replacement fo r  Tr 
with the elimination o f au iiiiary eipressions b y  proceeding as 
foiiow s  11 Let A be any theorem of T containing no expressions 
regarded as auxiliary, and let n be the Gödel number of the sequence of 
symbols in T that constitutes a proof of A in T. In T form the conjunction 
An (the subscript is intended to mean that the conjunction comprises n
^Here I am interpreting Craig; the logical terms are separated out from Yq and V-j 
but cf. Smart s exposition six paragraphs back (the logical terms are in Vq )
1 °There is no upper limit on the number of terms in any conjunction 
1 JThere is much more to Craig’s account than I can give here.
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terms, each of which is A) which is authorised by the fact that A is a 
theorem of T and by the rule:' I f  A, then A. A. A  'is  valid.
Now choose as the logical a iiom s  of T‘ those conjunctions, Aa , for
which n is the Gödel number of a proof within the underlying logic of T.12 
As eitralogical aiiom s  of T* choose all other conjunctions, An . As
sentences of T‘ choose those sentences of T which contain no auxiliary 
expressions. The rules o f inference  of T* are then the rules of T 
(including the rule of simplification) restricted in application and yield to 
sentences not containing auxiliary expressions (that is, to sentences 
containing no theoretical expressions).* 1 2345
The device o f using as a iiom s fo r  T ' the conjunctions A n 
guarantees an e ffective procedure fo r  deciding whether a 
sentence o f T* is  or is  no t an aiiom. A little reflection shows that 
this would not be so if the A s were each used individually as the axioms. 
Applications o f the ruie o f simplification then provide in T* the 
same essential theorem s as are in T. By use of the rules other 
sentences involving only essential expressions can be formulated in T* as 
counterparts of sentences in T.
It might be thought that T and T* are equally good in that their 
empirical contents are identical. Nevertheless, it seems at first glance that 
the replacement of T by T" is of only curiosity value since T is 
immeasurably superior in pragmatic value. But reflection suggests that 
perhaps there is more than curiosity value to be elicited from the fact 
that it is in principle possible to frame a theory without its familiar 
theoretical infrastructure. Could i t  be that the whole theoretical 
fabric is  no more than an elaborate Inference device, and that, 
in consequence, the instrum entalist is  vindicated?  This is the 
question asked by Smart at our point of entry to the foregoing exegesis of 
Craig s theorem.
12That is, n in these cases picks out the proof of a logical truth in T
^Note in passing thatT* satisfies the following conditions:
(1) both its logical axioms and its extralogicai axioms are effectively defined
(2) so too is the class of sentences it contains
(3) any theorem of T‘ is a sentence of T*
(4) any theorem of T* is also a theorem of T
(5) any theorem of T containing no auxiliary expressions is a theorem of T  
For the demonstrations of (1) to (5) see Craig W; op. cit; Appendix, pp34/55
[Part 4, S3] 240
Now there is a quick reaction that would seek to deny th is: the sine 
qua non for T* is covert dependence on the theoretical expressions of T, 
and so on indirect appeal to the entities named in those expressions.
Craig responded to the related charge that the use of auxiliary 
expressions is not avoided because the construction of the axioms of Ta 
requires first the construction of proofs in T. The response was that the 
construction of T* does not require us to use the auxiliary expressions of 
T, but only to name them. 14
This response alerts us to the use of what Smart calls a 
m etalinguistic apparatus associated with T\ This apparatus provides 
the facility for talk about the expressions of T that is a necessary pre­
requisite for its replacement by T‘ - whether, for example, a sentence B 
is an axiom of T \ To answer this question one first examines B to see if it 
is of form An. If it is, one then counts the terms A in the conjunction to
determine n. If n is a Gödel number, one next examines the sequences of 
symbols in T to see if that labelled n is a proof of A. If it is, then B is an 
axiom of T \ The process does not call for inspection of the proof of A in 
T. In many cases this proof will involve the theoretical entities, reference 
to which is expunged from T \
Is  i t  the case, then, that Craig s response constitutes an 
adequate answer to the charge that the viabiiity o f T* iies in  its  
covert dependence on the theoreticai entities re ferred  to b y  T?
My opinion is that it does not. Although T* and its metalanguage 
avoid the use of the theoretical expressions of T and merely name them, 
nevertheless the purpose of naming a proof in T is to justify the 
specification of an axiom of T \ That axiom, it might be said, is only as 
good as the proof that purportedly justifies the theorem from which, by 
repeated conjunction, it is formed; if that proof depends on the 
supposition that there are theoretical entities, and on their properties 
and behaviour, then so does the integrity of the axiom in T \
A likely response to this attempt of mine to deflate T1 to the 
advantage of T is that the axiom of T \ that is claimed to be at risk in 
accordance with the integrity of the proof in Tf is a V0 sentence that
stands or fails on how things are in the world. And I grant that this is so.
I4Craig V; op. cit; p.50
[Part 4, S3] 241
But many V0 statements are not directly testable15 - we accept them 
because we accept the theory in which they are derived. Such statements, 
arising in T \  get whatever integrity they have, not from T \  but from T. 
Examples abound in cosmology, astronomy and relativity: the red shift 
and the speed of recession of distant galaxies; black holes; spectroscopic 
observations and the composition of stars; the twin 'paradox’; ....
Craig 's response addresses not the reaJ issue but a man of 
straw. That one can name a proof is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for the integrity of T\ the proof must be abie to 
provide the substance that naming of it requires.
Obviously, Smart thinks likewise:
....Craig s method can be applied only after we have first constructed the
theory T, and..... the success of T1 is explained by the fact that the original
theory T is true of the things that it is ostensibly about: in other words by 
the fact that there really are electrons or whatever is postulated by the
theory T '^
What other explanation could we have?, asks Smart:
‘If there were no such things, and if T were not true in a realist way, would 
not the success of T1 be quite inexplicable? One would have to suppose that 
there were innumerable lucky accidents about the behaviour of things 
mentioned in the observational vocabulary, so that they behaved 
miraculously as //th e y  were brought about by the non-existent things
ostensibly talked about in the theoretical vocabulary’17
Smart moves on to summarise his views. The instrumentalist, he says,
is instrumentalist about all theories, whereas the realist, while being
committed to the belief that some theories are true, might well be
instrumentalist about others. But the realist has a fundamental
disagreement with the instrumentalist:
'The chief realist objection to instrumentalism is, as I have suggested, that 
on the instrumentalist view it is a surprising and inexplicable fact that the 
world is such that Vq facts can be related to Vq facts by means of Vj
sentences, whereas on the realist view there is nothing mysterious at all; if 
Vj sentences really are about the hidden mechanisms of the universe after
15The technology may not be available, the cost may be prohibitive, a test may be
impracticable......
l6Smart J.J.C; op. cit; p.130 
I7Smart J.J.C; ibid.
[Part 4, S3] 242
all, then of course they are expected to help us to relate Vq sentences to 
other Vq sentences.
Consider the Ptolemaic system of planetary motions and the Copernican 
system. The latter constitutes a true description of how things are. The 
instrumental usefulness of the former, says Smart, is explained by the 
fact that it can be proved that predictions based on it are very nearly the 
same as ones based on the latter.
§3.2 An introduction to van Fraassen’s critique, with some comments
van Fraassen offers us a rebuttal of the realists’ arguments, of which that 
by Smart that we have just run through is a paradigm. The rebuttal goes:
(1) Such arguments point to explanatory power as a criterion for 
theory choice;
(2) These arguments succeed only if the demand for explanation 
is supreme-
if the task of science is unfinished, ipso fa c to , as long as any 
pervasive regularity is left unexplained* l9;
(3) The unlimited demand for explanation implied by (2) leads to 
a demand for hidden variables;
(4) Hidden variables are ruled out by
at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century 
physics'20;
therefore
(5) these arguments for realism fail.
We need to keep this argument in mind. However we shall not 
be Jn a position to evaluate it till we come to §6 (my p:279).
Smart’s arguments are recast by van Fraassen to a pattern suiting the 
intended rebuttal. Starting with Smart’s explanation of the 
instrumentalist usefulness of the Ptolemaic system by appeal to the truth 
of the Copernican system, van Fraassen suggests the alternative that the
^Smart J.J.C; op. cit; p.131 
19van Fraassen; op. cit; p.23 
20ibid
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former system works because its predictions are very much like those of 
the Copernican system whose predictions are em piricaiiy adequate. 
Now this would not suit Smart, says van Fraassen, because Smart would 
want an explanation for the success of the Copernican system. But, the 
story continues, the anti-realist would reply:
‘....that the observable phenomena exhibit these regularities, because of
which they fit the theory, is merely a brute fact, and may or may not have 
an explanation in terms of unobservable facts "behind the 
phenomena".....‘21
Continuing, van Fraassen examines Smart's explanation for the 
success of a theory T* which has been freed from the theoretical terms of 
a predecessor theory T via Craig s theorem. Recall that Smart attributed 
the success of T* to the fact that T is true of the things that it is about; 
that is, if T is about electrons, then there are electrons with the 
properties and behaviour ascribed in T. Recall too Smart's claim that, if 
we were inclined to reject this account, then we would be confronted with 
the need to suppose that there are innumerable lucky accidents resulting 
in observable behaviour that miraculously has all the hallmarks of what 
would have been expected if only the now rejected entities described in 
the theoretical vocabulary had existed.
van Fraassen now trains h is firepow er on two main targets:
1. the demand for eipianation that he sees as im piied  
b y  Smart s account:
I submit that if the demand for explanation implicit in these 
passages were precisely formulated, it would at once lead to
absurdity’ 22;
2. the supposition that the aiternative to such demand  
would commit us to an unsustainabie b e iie f in
lucky accidents and coincidences on a cosmic scale' * 23 
since
’....it seems to me that it is illegitimate to equate being a lucky 
accident, or coincidence, with having no explanation’2<*.
2 lop. cit; p.24 
22op. cit; p.23 
23op. cit; p.25
2<ibid
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Before we continue with van Fraassen's argument, we should take a 
moment to set out how we intend to present and discuss it.
3.2.1 Strategy of presentation 
In the sequel we proceed as follows:
(1) In §3.2.2 we clarify the terms in which the issues are now stated. 
We see how van Fraassen links Smart's demand for explanation 
and Reichenbach s principle of the common cause, and how, on 
that basis, the refutation of the latter would discredit the former.
I  also argue that van Fraassen responds to onJy a part o f  
Smart 's challenge;
(2) I claim in §3-2.3 that van Fraassen fa ils  to e itrica te  the  
anti-realists from Smart 's charge o f their being  
com m itted  to cosmic coincidences ',
(3) In §3.2.4 we start to examine van Fraassen's attempt to reduce 
Smart's demand for explanation to absurdity. Specifically we 
move to rebu t van Fraassen s argument that, on the  
criterion o f postulating regularities without eipianation, 
a theory T  is  in principle no better  than a theory T* 
which replaces it  via Craig s theorem. Our examples point to 
the sorts of cosmic coincidences to be addressed by the anti-realist 
if he is to essay to respond to the full challenge issued by Smart. 
By stating where the bottom line is to be set, we also deny
van Fraassen‘s assertion that the realist is  com m itted  
to an uniim ited demand fo r eipianation  ;
(4) In §4 we offer a rebu tta l o f van Fraassen s a ttem pt to 
re fu te  Reichenbach 's principle -
(i) the abstract schema on which van Fraassen relies is 
inadequate to the task (§4.4);
(ii) the schema, as it is presented, applies in a domain from 
which Reichenbach specifically excluded the principle of 
the common cause (§4.5 and §4.6);
(iii) three cases which I devise to instantiate the schema
in the macrocosm, where Reichenbach's principle does
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apply, turn out to be irrelevant to the principle (§4.7 and 
Appendix 1)
(5) In §5 we enquire whether van Fraassen's schema is instantiated 
by the non-classical correlations, associated with the work of 
Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, and those subsequently inspired by them. 
In so doing we allow van Fraassen a common cause principle which, 
of course, cannot be Reichenbach 's. Ironically, the appeal here to 
a common cause has all the hallmarks of inference to explanation, 
which concept van Fraassen also rejects. The schema is instantiated, 
but to no purpose.
3.2.2 Demand for explanation, cosmic coincidences, and the principle of 
the common cause - connections and clarifications
In van Fraassen's account, the links between the above-mentioned 
concepts do not seem to me to be articulated as clearly as is desirable. Let 
us try to clarify them via the four-step process now outlined.
First, recall how  Reichenbach s principle is  to be invoked  to 
eip ia in  an improbable coincidence. Actually the improbable 
coincidence is restricted by Reichenbach to e v e n ts , indeed to 
macroscopic events that can stand in the relation of cause and effect, 
but we shall not be overly particular about that qualification in the first 
instance. The principle involves the following probability relations with
which we are now familiar :
P(A.B) > P(A) x P(B)............................... .(Rl)
P(A.B|C) - P(A|C) x P(B|C).......................... (R5)
Second , keep  in m ind  three k e y  rem arks b y  van Fraassen:
(i) The regularities in the observable phenomena must be explained in 
terms of deeper structure, for otherwise we are left with a belief in 
lucky accidents and coincidences on a cosmic scale',25
(ii) 'I shall now look at a precise formulation of the demand for explanation: 
Reichenbach s principle....'26
25op. cit; p.23 
26ibid
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(iii) This princip le.....may be regarded as a formulation of the conviction
that lies behind such arguments as that of Smart, requiring the
elimination of "cosmic coincidences" by science'27
The first of these quotations is, of course, what van Fraassen takes to be 
the realist's position.
Third , against the background outiined, make the following 
assumptions'.
(1) The term regularity' is to mean something akin to repeated 
conjunctions of events A and B‘ ;
(2) The term 'lucky accident' is to describe such conjunctions when 
something like (R1) is the case, and there is no explanation;
(3) When (R1) gives way to something like (R5), conjunctions of 
events are not lucky accidents (that is, they are explained);
(4) For explanations in science, the condition C of (R5) is to stand 
for the structure and causes within nature that constitute the 
realisation of scientific theory25.
Fourth , note that the realist 's demand for explanation, 
expressed in the first of the above three key quotations, is then 
seen by van Fraassen as a demand to find a relation (R5), and, 
in particular, some appropriate component of C within it, 
whenever a relation (RJ) is encountered. So this demand and
the conviction.... requiring the elimination of "cosmic coincidence" by 
science*
are seen to be, in effect, the same thing. That is, the demand and the 
conviction are just the motivation to move from (Rl) to (R5) under 
assumption (4).
Note also that, if I have correctly described what van Fraassen is 
about, then we can see how the demand for explanation could 
perhaps be discredited i f  his subsequent move to discredit the 
principie of the common cause were successful
27op. cit; p.2S
25In §4.9 I make some remarks on the legitimacy of having a state of affairs at the 
apex of a conjunctive fork; see my pp270/l
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A crucial question is this : does the above account o f  what 
van Fraassen is doing, i f  I  am right about it, capture Smart 's 
dem and fo r  eipianation  ? To attempt to answer this we need to look 
at what Smart himself says. Two quotations will be helpful:
(i) '....Craig's method can be applied only after v e  have first constructed the
theory T. and...... the success of T1 is explained by the fact that the original
theory T is true of the things that it is ostensibly about..... if T were not
true in a realist way, would not the success of T1 be quite inexplicable?
One would have to suppose that there were innumerable lucky accidents 
about the behaviour of things mentioned in the observational vocabulary, 
so that they behaved miraculously as / / t h e y  were brought about by the
non-existent things ostensibly talked about in the theoretical vocabulary 2^
(ii) ’....on the instrumentalist view  it is a surprising and inexplicable fact that
the world is such that Vq facts can be related to Vq facts by means of Vj
sentences, whereas on the realist view  there is nothing mysterious at a l l : 
if  the Vj sentences really are about the hidden mechanisms of the 
universe after all, then of course they can be expected to help us to 
relate Vq sentences to other Vq sentences'30
Clearly the demand for explanation conveyed in the second quotation 
accords very closely with the understanding of that demand that I have 
attributed to van Fraassen in the four-step process outlined. For example, 
in Smart s language, if one V0 sentence is about the observed positions of
sun, moon, and earth at some particular time, and another is about the 
observed depths of the waters in Botany Bay at the same time, then any 
relation between these sentences would call for an explanation. Such a 
relation, we know, would emerge from insightful examination of pairwise 
comparisons of these sentences when sequences of both types are 
available. The relation would express some regularity between the events 
that the sentences are about. As it happens, an explanation of such 
regularity is provided by sentences of a theoretical kind that refer to 
Newtonian gravitation. About the realist's attitude to this example, van 
Fraassen, tacitly appealing to assumptions (1) to (4) above, would say 
that the regularities (unlikely coincidences) prompt a demand for 
explanation via the structural mechanism of gravitation within the solar 
system.
In the example that I have given we might have reason to baulk at 
van Fraassen's appeal to a structural feature of the world as a suitable
2^Smart; op. cit; p.150 
30op. cit; p.151
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referent for the term C in (R5), given that Reichenbach s entities, namely 
A, B and C, are all events. Part of any response to an objection of this sort 
would be, I suppose, that the entity proposed here, namely gravitation, in 
being essentially causal, satisfies the spirit of Reichenbach's principle. But, 
until we come to §4.9,1 leave it as an open question whether this reply, 
or some elaboration of it, would be adequate. Davidson has things to say 
that a van Fraassen disciple could possibly draw on.31
The dem and fo r  explanation in the fir s t quotation does not 
seem to me to su it van Fraassen nearly as well as that in the 
second. In particular, the first quotation, as distinct from the second, 
does not necessarily involve relations between V0 sentences (or
conjunctions of different events, to use the terminology van Fraassen 
needs for the principle of the common cause). It is enough there for 
Smart that there be individual V0 sentences to be explained. And there is
no difficulty in providing examples. Becquerel's observations in 1896 of 
the unexpected blackening of a photographic plate led ultimately to the 
discovery of radioactivity. But it was the single event, the biackening  of 
the plate, no more and no less, that gave rise to Becquerel's demand for 
explanation.
'My goodness!' may well be the reaction of the first person to see 
blocks of ice forming in a saucepan filled with water, initially at room 
temperature, and now put on the stove to boil. But the demand for 
explanation of a single event implicit in that expression of astonishment 
is real enough, and a physicist would immediately move to respond both 
by talking about the statistical nature of the second law of 
thermodynamics and by simultaneously calling his colleagues to get over 
quickly and witness an incredibly rare circumstance in which that 
characteristic of the law is actually being demonstrated.
It seems to me, then, that, even if we were to allow that van Fraassen 
has captured Smart's demand for explanation in one of its manifestations, 
he has not done so in the other. But perhaps it might be replied that this 
is of no consequence, for it might be urged that it is enough for van 
Fraassen to show that the demand that does accord with Reichenbach's
31])avidson D; 'Causal Relations' in Essays on Actions and E ven ts ; Oxford; 1982; 
pp149-162
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principle^ leads to absurdity. In response we shall move below to argue 
that van Fraassen fails in this latter task.
L et us now  Look at the concepts 'lucky accident‘ and 'cosmic 
coincidence '. The latter presumably is meant to convey the idea of a 
countless number of lucky accidents or perhaps a lucky accident of 
incredibly small probability. So far, without examining the matter too 
closely, we have taken a lucky accident to be the/conjunction of two
events. But is this the correct way to evaluate Smart s usage of 
the term? The prim  a facie  answer is, I think, no!'
Earlier, when we looked at the second quotation^3, we just assumed 
that the conjunction of one V0 fact with another was unlikely, and we did
so uncritically, because explanation seemed to be called for. I think that 
we, and van Fraassen, were entitled to do that. But, in doing so, we were 
infiltrating into the account our own perception of what the actual 
coincidence is that gets named a lucky accident1, and that perception, as 
it happens, is not the same as the coincidence that Smart calls 'a lucky 
accident'.
Look again at the two quotations. Smart is throwing out two 
challenges to the instrumentalist. First: since the instrumentalist denies 
the truth of T, what account has he for the success of T"? He has none. 
Second : in that event, what account does the instrumentalist have for the 
fact that the observables behave as if they are caused by the theoretical 
entities that he denies exist, in the way that the theory T which he claims 
to be meaningless or false prescribes? Smart s further point is that, if 
there is no explanation for the fact just mentioned, then we would have 
to take it that it is just a lucky, but highly improbable, coincidence that a 
whole host of theoretically-derived statements about observables 
correspond, one to one, with an equally vast array of statements about 
actual observations. This Is a second type o f lu cky  accident, to do 
with the concurrence o f theory and observation, and quite  
differen t In character from  the fir s t  k in d  which was to do with 
Improbable coincidences betw een events
32ßut recall that I have questioned whether this is so, on the grounds that the cause 
appealed to is not an event but a structural feature of the world 
33Second paragraph on p.247
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Consider a couple of relatively uncomplicated cases. We have a theory 
about the effects of the motions of the earth, sun and moon on the 
movements of the bulk water masses which flow over the surface of the 
earth subject to various constraints: viscous drag at the boundaries 
(atmosphere, ocean floor, etc.); obstructions to free movement imposed by 
ocean bottom topography, by intruding land masses, and by channelling
of flow through straits, harbour entrances,...Are we to take it that it is
just a lucky accident that, element by element, a whole array of sentences 
derived from the theory correspond, one to one, with another array of 
sentences describing the observed depths of water in Botany Bay, in
Puget Sound, in the English Channel,..... at various times of day
throughout the lunar month, comprehending the daily high and low water 
levels, modulated by the monthly variations that are strikingly evident in 
the spring and neap tides?
Or take the appearances of Halley s comet. The instrumentalist is 
faced with the lucky accidents that, just as theory says, the comet comes 
and goes as it does, loses mass as it leaves debris in its wake, has its tail* 
behind it when approaching the sun but ahead when receding from the
sun.....as would be the case if there were (but, according to the
instrumentalist, there are not) such entities as gravitational fields,
electromagnetic radiation (light and heat), radiation pressure...... and as if
there were operative (but are not) Newton s laws of motion, the law of 
gravitation, the laws of thermodynamics....
Ignoring this second conception of cosmic coincidence altogether, van 
Fraassen merely says:
‘....that the observable phenomena exhibit the regularities, because of 
which they fit the theory, is merely a brute fact, and may or may not have
an explanation in terms of unobservable facts behind the phenomena'
What we have seen is that the passages from Smart that van Fraassen 
chooses for attention incorporate two demands for explanation, each 
allied to a different but specific perception of a cosmic coincidence that 
attends the instrumentalist s rejection of a realist attitude to theory. The 
quotation that I have just given is no response at all to the demand that
34Van Fraassen; op. cit; p.24
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constitutes Smart s challenge to the instrumentalist. And if that is the 
best that the anti-realist can do, then his position is not one whit stronger 
now than it was over twenty years ago when Smart s words were first 
written. In m y  opinion it  is  not a rational action to admit to an 
extrem ely improbable set o f circumstances, and, 
simultaneously, to reject a compelling explanation and to have  
no alternative to offer.
van Fraassen of course does pick up the other demand for explanation 
which he finds (correctly, I agree) in Smart's exposition, with the 
intention of discrediting it. I claim to show in §4 et seq that, in this, he is 
not successful.
3.2.3 The argument that the alternative to Smart s demand for
explanation is not a commitment to coincidences on a cosmic scale
Since van Fraassen wants to be absolved from commitment to lucky 
accidents and, at the same time, to dispense with theoretical explanations, 
he needs an argument to sever any possible implication between the 
propositions ' x is a lucky accident' and ' x has no explanation'. And it 
seems to me that, in respect of the concept lucky accident’ as van 
Fraassen takes it in invoking the Principle of the Common Cause in the 
way we discussed in §3.2.2 , there are prima facie grounds for equating 
these two propositions. That is why van Fraassen’s response to Smart's 
paradigm argument for realism, has a defensive as well as an offensive 
dimension. On the one hand he denies that the alternative to acceptance 
of Smart's demand for explanation is a commitment to an unsustainable 
belief in cosmic coincidences, and on the other he attempts to show that 
Smart s demand leads to absurdity.
We shall defer examination of the offensive movement for the 
moment and look briefly at the defensive manoeuvre which comes via 
appeal to Aristotle's explanation of the chance meeting of two friends in 
the market place:
‘....1 can explain why I was there, and he can explain why he came, so 
together we can explain why this meeting happened. We call it a
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coincidence, not because the occurrence was inexplicable, but because we 
did not go severally to the market in order to meet'35
But the analogy fails, or so it seems to me, because the sort of 
coincidence that characterises van Fraassen's conception of 'lucky 
accident' here is not the same as that which underlies his conception 
when he addresses Smart's argument. For then, as we saw in §3.2.2, his 
lucky accidents are to do with such regularities as the constant 
conjunctions of the positions of the moon and the earth on the one hand, 
and the earth's tides on the other. And surely he would not want to claim 
that regularities of that sort are nothing more than coincidences that 
could be explained by finding independent reasons for the positions of 
sun, moon and earth on the one hand, and for the heights of the tides on 
the other, in the same way as independent reasons for the comings and 
goings of the two friends explain their meeting in the market place. Yet, 
incredibly, van Fraassen talks here as though that is what he has in mind, 
even though we can be certain, I think, that he would not really mean us 
to interpret him that way.
The question perhaps arises then whether van Fraassen, in drawing 
on the meeting in the market place, has inadvertently switched to Smart’s 
conception of ’lucky accident’, namely the unlikely concurrence of theory 
and observation in the circumstances instanced. At least in this case there 
would be a credible meeting, indeed lots of them, between theoretical 
statements about observables on the one hand, and actual observations 
on the other. We could also give a good account of how the theoretical 
statements come to be as they are. But the account of why the 
observations are as they are is another matter. It hardly seems likely 
that van Fraassen had this conception of lucky accident' in mind either 
when he invoked the meeting in the market place.
So it seems to me that van Fraassen, in appealing to the meeting in 
the market place, does not succeed in severing any relation that there 
might be between the terms luckv accident' and no explanation’ in the 
present context. But it also seems to me that the attempt to do so has 
something of the flavour of a red herring, for, in order to dismiss the
35op. cit; p.25
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charge of commitment to cosmic coincidences, van Fraassen is faced with 
a problem that is not the same as that posed by denying that being a 
luckv accident' equates to no explanation. Let me explain why.
Smart's argument, addressed as it was against macrophenomenaiism, 
was to do with the success of T\ given that it has replaced T. In that 
context the question of the equivalence or otherwise of being a lucky 
accident’ and having no explanation’ need not arise at all for van 
Fraassen. Recall that Smart s argument was that the statements of T\ 
confirmed as true by actual observations, are explained via the entities 
and hidden mechanisms of T. The subsequent comment about ’lucky 
accidents’ points to the extremely unlikely coincidence with which one is 
confronted if that explanation is rejected. Now, unquestionably, Smart 
thought that his account was the only viable one, but the relevance, and 
indeed the force, of his comment about ’lucky accidents’ does not depend 
on his being right on this point. For example, van Fraassen rejects Smart’s 
account and substitutes his own, namely that the empirical adequacy of T 
accounts for the empirical adequacy of T\ If that happened to be the full 
truth of the matter, then it would not be the case that there is no 
explanation for the success of T*. but it would be the case that Sm art s  
comment about lucky accidents' remains pertinent, van Fraassen does 
not address this consequence of his account of the success of TV
3.2.4 The claim that T is in principle no better than T*
Recall van Fraassen’s claim that precise formulation of Smart’s 
demand for explanation would lead to absurdity. The argument to back 
up this claim seems to proceed in two stages, one short and the other 
long. The short argument seems to go like this: if it is the mere fact of 
postulating regularities without explanation that makes T* a poor theory, 
then is not T just as badly off, because regularities within the hidden 
structure are postulated there  without explanation? Presumably in 
response to some objection that he does not articulate, he goes on:
’If, on the other hand, there is some precise limitation on vhat sorts of
regularities can be postulated as basic, the context of the argument provides
no reason to think thatT1 must automatically fare vorse than T
3^op. cit; p25
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Now there are many situations in which, if I have understood his first 
point correctly, van Fraassen is in error. For example, for him such 
theoretical entities as electrons, protons and neutrons are allocated to 
that domain of discourse about the reality of whose individuals we are 
counselled to be agnostic. But such entities and their assigned properties, 
relations and behaviour feature in a whole host of theories that are just 
like the theory T that Smart was talking about when he examined the 
implications of replacing it with T' via Craigs theorem. And it is not the 
case that all the regularities in T are postulated without explanation or 
without commitment outside of T, for whatever is said in T about any of 
the theoretical entities mentioned is not only constrained by all the other 
theories in which they feature, but is at the same time partly explained 
bv those other theories.
For example, if I use quantum mechanics to account for coarse 
fea tures  in the atomic spectrum of hydrogen, then I explain the 
occurrence of any particular line as a transition between energy states of 
an electron bound to a single proton. Imm ediately, I  am com m itted  
to, and constrained by, other theories that concern the electron, the 
proton and the concepts energy' and state'. Thus, to calculate the energy 
change, I need to use, inter alia, the masses of proton and electron, and 
their respective charges - and these com m itm ents tie me into a 
complex o f other theories and their rela ted  observational 
counterparts. To convert energy change to the frequency of a spectral 
line, I rely on the relation, E=hv, and here again I  am com m itted in  a 
great variety o f other ways
If now I want to account for fin e  structure  in the spectrum, I 
appeal to relativistic effects and electron spin - 1 im port more theory  
and become s till more deeply com m itted to m atters external to 
the case in hand.
The im ported  theory m ust complement, and in no way 
conflict with, the theory that 1 have used already to explain 
coarse structure; also i t  m ust do the job asked o f i t  in every  
case in which it  is  called upon, failing in none i f  i t  is  to survive.
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To explain hvoerfine s tru c tu re , I need to introduce nuclear 
effects, and the labyrinth o f m utual eip lanatory and m utually  
compatible theories invo lved  eipands s till fu r th er
And complexity grows yet more when I im port quantum  
electrodynamics to explain the Lamb s h i f t .
T \  on van Fraassen's view of theoretical entities, can give expression 
to none of the complex of explanation that I have shown to be located at 
the theoretical level in T in the case just considered. Wherever the 
regularities are postulated in T, and I do not deny that such lie there 
somewhere, it remains that T  would win hands down over T '  as an 
account o f the atomic spectrum o f hydrogen .
T wins hands down too as an account whose truth is re-affirmed by 
the fact that it meshes in with a whole web of other theories and 
explanations to do with things both like, and also very much unlike, the 
case in hand. In saying this I am, of course, relying covertly on the cosmic 
coincidence argument. But there is no begging of the question here, 
because the coincidence invoked is not the one that van Fraassen's 
argument addresses.
Whatever the theorems and sentences of T1 might turn out to be if 
they were spelt out, it is obvious that they would be a pretty austere lot. 
And surely it would indeed seem quite remarkable that the observation 
statements deducible from the axioms of T \  for which we have no 
explanation if van Fraassen is right (they are just brute facts), should 
accord with experience. But even more remarkable would be the 
circumstance that, if the anti-realist were right, then, without any 
explanation, these observation statements would also accord qualitatively 
and quantitatively with detailed accounts to be found in a theory of the 
complexity of T, whose components intersect in all manner of ways with 
other theories whose observational consequences are tested in quite 
unrelated applications. From these considerations 1 draw two 
conclusions.
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Firstly , the cosmic coincidences that van Fraassen should  
have a ttem pted  to dismiss are ones e iem piified  in the case I  
have ju s t described , and in the innumerable instances of like 
character that could be invoked to supplement and complement it. That 
he fa ils. as I  shall claim, in the much more lim ited  objective  
that he sets, is  evidence o f the daunting task confronting any  
anti-realist who would essay to rebut the argument of which Smart's is 
a paradigm.
Secondly , van Fraassen is mistaken in claiming that the need to 
postulate regularities somewhere without explanation means that, as an 
explanatory theory, T can do no better than T\ For, as we have seen in 
considering an actual case, namely the spectrum of hydrogen, T does 
immeasurably better than T* in that particular one of many instances 
that could be chosen to demonstrate the same point.
In the above discussion I agreed that there would be places deeper in 
the structure than the level at which I talked of T being explanatory, 
where regularities would have to be postulated. This is so because 
physics includes among its aims that of reaching down to, and discovering 
for us, the boundary between itself and metaphysics, and the depths to 
which physics has plumbed nature at any time determine what 
regularities are to be postulated as basic at that time. For example, 
Newtonian-style gravitation looked at one stage as though it might be 
something pretty near rock-bottom; but now it seems that physics, in 
probing more deeply, might be on the verge of confirming the speculation 
arising in relativistic gravitational theories that gravity is an influence 
propagated as a wave with finite velocity. In that event it could be that 
the deeper explanation of gravity involves gravitons and their 
interactions with the gravitational field. Even if that were so, it would 
remain an open question whether that explanation is rock-bottom.
Against the background that I have just sketched, now recall van 
Fraassen's words^7 :
37See foot of my p253
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'If, on the other hand, there is some precise limitation on vhat sorts of 
regularities can be postulated as basic, the context of the argument provides 
no reason to think that T  must automatically fare vorse than T.
But we have seen that what is to be postuiated as basic is 
determined by the state of progress of physics at any 
particuiar time. That being so, the context of the argument, as we have 
discussed it in appiication to specific cases, gives us ample reason to 
think, pace van Fraassen, that T  does automatically fare immeasurably 
worse than T.
ft  is important to note that what I  have said above amounts 
to an emphatic deniai of van Fraassen s assertion that the 
reaiist is committed to an uniimited demand for eioianation. 
The realist takes it that there is a dividing line between physics and 
metaphysics, and that there will be regularities which physics cannot 
explain and which are metaphysical. In that respect nothing has changed 
since the point was articulated by Duhem and Poincare.
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§4. THE SUPPOSED REDUCTION OF THE REALISTS' DEMAND FOR 
EXPLANATION TO ABSURDITY
§4.1 Aims
Our interest lies in van Fraassen s two aims:
1. To reduce Smart ’s demand for explanation to absurdity:
‘Arguing against Smart, I said that if the demand for explanation implicit 
in his arguments were precisely formulated, it would lead to absurdity. I 
shall now look at a precise formulation of the demand for explanation :
Reichenbach s principle of the common cause’1 *;
2. To discredit Reichen bach s prindpie
‘(this) principle cannot be a general principle of science at all’ ,
and, by so doing, to pave the way to achieving aim 1 in the 
manner discussed in §3.2.2.
S4.2 A or6cis of the argument and of its rebuttal
van Fraassen appeals to an abstract schema that, he says, incorporates 
’... the sorts of non-classical correlations which distinguish quantum 
mechanics from classical physics ,
namely, correlations that characterise experiments conducted to test Bell’s 
inequalities. The latter are relations, formulated on classical lines, about 
the correlations expected to be found among properties of micro-entities 
that have interacted and then separated. Quantum-mechanical 
calculations yield figures which violate the inequalities and agree with 
the results of actual measurements4.
That causality breaks down in the microcosm has long been the 
orthodox view of modern physics. For those who subscribe to that view, 
and I do, the principle of the common cause has no licence in that domain, 
as Reichenbach stipulated5. For reaiists of this persuasion, even i f  van 
Fraassen 's schema were up to the task of refuting the prindpie,
*van Fraassen; The Scientific Image; p.23
oop. cit; p.26 
5op. cit; p.28
We go into all of this in §3 and Appendix 2
5See §4.3 below (my p.263)
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i t  would be a p o in tle ss  outcom e since the re su lt would n e v e r  
have been in contention.
As a matter of fact, however, the schem a is  n o t up to the task; as 
we will see. But it is useful as a vehicle for elucidating Reichenbach's 
principle.
§4.3 The supposed refutation of Reichenbach’s principle of the common 
cause
We should first note van Fraassen's rendition of the principle:
Reichenbach held it to be a principle of scientific methodology that e v e ry  
sta tistica l correlation  (at least every positive dependence) must be
explained through common causes'6 (my emphasis)
and later:
’....e v e ry  relation of positive statistical relevance must be explained by
statistical past common causes, in the above vay (that is, via the mechanism
of the common cause)’7 (underlining and parenthesis added)
Recall that the principle, as enunciated by its author, was explicitly 
about e v e n ts . Since not every statistical correlation is one linking 
e v e n ts , one might well ask how Van Fraassen comes to augment its 
domain of application.8
Having alerted us to the fact that he has in mind non-classical 
correlations of the sort I have mentioned,9 van Fraassen gives us the 
argument:
’...Imagine that you have studied the behaviour of a system or object vhich , 
after being in a state S, aivays goes into another state vh ich  may be 
characterized by various attributes Fj....J n and Gj.....Gn. Suppose that you
have come to the conclusion that this transition is genuinely 
indeterministic, but you can propose a theory about the transition 
probabilities :
6op. cit; p.26
7op. cit: p.28
8I v ill have something to say on this question in §4.9 (p.270)
9He refers to a paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (vhom v e  shall designate as 
EPR), vh ich  paper provided the original stimulus for the vork from vh ich  he is 
draving. We v ill see later h ov  the EPR vork, the Bell inequalities, etc. fit together
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(8 )  (a) P(F;IS) - 1/n (b) P(GjlS) - 1/n (c) P(F; s G;IS) - 1
where = means if and only i f ........
In other words, it is pure chance whether the state to which S transits is 
characterized by a given one of the F-attributes, and similarly for the G- 
attributes, but certain that it is characterized by Fj, if it is characterized by 
Gj, by F2 if by G2 , and so on.
If we are convinced that this is an irreducible, indeterministic 
phenomenon, so that S is a complete description of the initial state, then we 
have a violation of the principle of the common cause. For from (8) we can 
deduce
(9) P(FjlS) x P(GjlS) - 1 /n2 P(Fj. GjIS) *P(Fj|S) - 1/n
which numbers are equal only if n is zero or one - the deterministic case. In 
all other cases. S does not qualify as the common cause of the new stated
being Fj or Gj, and if S is complete, nothing else can qualify either.'10
§4A A preliminary assessment and an impasse
Let us reflect on this argument. We note that the move from (8) to (9) is 
in order : the first component of (9) follows directly from (8)(a) and 
(8)(b), the second from (8)(a), (8)(c) and our Theorem 5. But how should 
we view the two equations in (9)? As they stand they seeiv ready-made 
for invocation of the principle of the common cause, since 
PCFj.GjlS) > P(F||S) x P(GjlS),
for all n : n> 1,
and it is just such a relation of improbable coincidence that, according to 
Reichenbach, initiates the thought that Fj and Gj couid be effects of a
common cause.
Now van Fraassen's argument is not spelt out in detail, so we must 
attempt to fill in the missing bits. The most likely possibility seems to be 
that he takes i t  as understood  that the above inequality is invoked 
(that is, that (Rl) is satisfied), that this inequality according to 
Reichenbach creates the demand for a common cause C, relative to which 
(Rl) could be converted to (R5), but that, S being complete, no additional 
factor C is to be found. Reichenbach s principle, the story would continue, 
is therefore discredited.
I0van Fraassen; op. cit; p.29
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The difficulty I have with this account as an interpretation is that I 
am not able to see how it gives effect to van Fraassens promise to reduce 
Smart's demand for explanation to absurdity. If the argument were 
sound, and I intend to dispute th a t , it would certainly comprise a 
counter-example to van Fraassen s formulation of Reichenbach's principle, 
but, on the face of it, no absurdity would seem to be involved.
If I have interpreted van Fraassens argument as he intends it to be 
read, then my response to it is simply this. Why need  we conclude 
that Reichen bach s principie is  discredited b y  the caseP There 
are other assumptions in v o iv e d in  van Fraassen s schema, 
which he does not ju stify , and I  beiieve that i t  is  one or other  
o f these that is  brought in to  disrepute  - in particular, the overt 
assumption that S is complete, or the overt assumption of perfect 
correlation expressed in (8)(c), or the covert assumption that the  
schema caiis fo r  a common cause. My claim that this third disjunct 
is an assumption might seem at first sight to sit oddly with how, in the 
discussion above, I have allowed Reichenbach's principie to be read. The 
claim will be vindicated when we show later that an inequality like (R1) 
need not call for a common cause at all.
An alternative possibility for interpreting the argument might be this. 
van Fraassen takes i t  that the observed one-to-one correlation calls 
for a common cause which, since S is complete, must be included therein. 
In that event, Reichenbach would license us to invoke (R5) directly1!, so 
it would then be permissible to equate P(FJS) * P(Gj|S) with PCFj.GjlS),
and, from this move, there would follow the absurd result, 1/n1 2 = 1/n for 
n : n > 1. If this interpretation of the argument were correct, then, among 
other criticisms which I think need not be spelt out, I would also offer the 
same objection as I did to the first interpretation.
Given that van Fraassen s argument against Reichenbach's principle is 
open to the objection that I have raised against his abstract schema, I 
claim that, to make h is  case, the onus is  on van Fraassen, f ir s t iy  
to speii out an instantiation o f the schema in which the
1 !This follovs from Reichenbach's conception of the conjunctive fork. See my §2.2,
p.232 et seq., esp. STATEMENT2 on p.234
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assumptions that Ihave challenged are justified In the actual 
circumstances of the case, and secondly to discredit the 
principle in those circumstances.
As things stand it seems that we have reached a stalemate. Nothing 
that I can find in van Fraassen's text seems to offer promise as the basis 
of an answer to my objection. The rest of PART 4 of this Thesis is 
therefore devoted to an attempt to resoive the impasse:
*In §4.5 and §4.6 I explain that it  is not, in fact, Reichenbach 's 
principle of the common cause that van Fraassen can 
claim as his target ',
*With that clarification made, I move in §4.7 and Appendix 1 to 
offer three instantiations of van Fraassen’s schema that do not call 
for any common cause. I thereby demonstrate that, i f  the 
schema is supposed to be capable of use to discredit the 
principie of the common cause, then it is necessary to 
justify, not just assume, that the correlation involved 
demands explanation via a common cause',
* In §5 i  eiamine the EPR correlation experiments to see if  
instantiation of the schema is to be found there. ! 
conclude that it is, but that such instantiation, rather than 
establishing the fact that the correiations are not 
explained by a common cause, is conditional on that fact.
As mentioned, it will be shown in §4.7 that it is not true that every 
pair of highly correlated events’12 demands explanation via a past 
common cause. It is only van Fraassen’s idiosyncratic rendition of the 
principle that might suggest otherwise:
Reichenbachs P r in c ip le  o f  th e  Common Cause is that e v e r y  relation 
of positive statistical relevance m u st be exp la in ed  by statistical past 
common causes....'*3
It is just this rendition that van Fraassen draws on in the argument which 
I quoted in §4.3, and whose conclusion I disputed above. Reichenbach
12The significance of the term events' will become clear when we come to §4.9. It 
may be timely also to recall a point made earlier: we are dealing in statistics, and it 
would be more correct to talk of 'event-types'
13van Fraassen; The S c ie n tif ic  Im a g e ; p.28
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made no such claim, as will be evident from §4.5. Casel in §4.7 (see my 
p.266) is one that, on van Fraassen's formulation of Reichenbach s 
principle, would demand a common cause, but on Reichenbach s actual 
formulation would not; nor would it on any reasonable notion of a 
common cause.
§4.5 van Fraassen s example lies outside the domain of application of 
Reichenbach's principle
A point that should be stated is that van Fraassen's invocation of the 
principle of the common cause in microphysics runs counter to 
Reichenbach s prescriptions. In fact Reichenbach went to considerable 
trouble to explain why the principle does not apply in that domain.
The chapter in which Reichenbach deals with his principle of the 
common cause is headed The Time Direction of Macrostates .14 He makes 
clear at the start that the concerns of this chapter are with the 
macrocosm :
’We shall nov extend our statistical considerations to processes other than 
mixtures of molecules, namely, to processes the elementary "particles’’ of
vh ich  are macroscopic objects.......We may speak here of the statistics of
m a c ro a .m iig e  m e n t s , and shall also use the terms m acro p r o b a b il i ty  
and m a c ro e n tro p y . We thus arrive at statistical relationships vh ich  refer 
e x c lu s iv e ly  to the macrocosm and vh ich  may be called m acrosta tistics, 
in contrast to the m ic ro s ta tis tic s  of the kinetic theory of matter’’ 
(underlining and italics added)
In introducing the principle of the common cause, Reichenbach re­
emphasises the point:
"We shall nov study some further applications of macrostatistics vh ich  lead 
once more to the distinction of cause and effect and thus to the definition of 
a time direction. The results v il l  be formulated in a sp e c if ic  p r in c ip le
g o v e r n in g  m acroscopic a rra n g em en ts' 1  ^ (emphasis added)
,4Reichenbach H; op. cit; Ch.4; p.144 
!5op. cit; pp 143/146 
l^op. cit; p.157
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§4.6 Reichenbach's reasons for the specific exclusion of the sort of 
example invoked bv van Fraassen
Reichenbach had very good reasons fo r  eiciuding the 
microcosm from  the domain o f appiication o f A il principie. They  
are e ia c tiy  the reasons that make van Fraassen 's schema fu tiie  
as an attem pt to discredit the principie . Let me substantiate this 
claim.
That Reichenbach sees no role for the principle of the common cause, 
or indeed for any causal relation, in the domain of the phenomena which 
prompted van Fraassen's schema, is evident from what Reichenbach says 
when he turns to discuss The Time of Quantum Physics'17
Reichenbach has it that, in contrast with traditional causal laws that 
connect macroscopic phenomena, it is only statistical laws that connect 
the observables of quantum mechanics.18 Moreover, he goes to great 
lengths to defend the claim that the indeterminacies specified by the 
Heisenberg principle19 are fundamental properties of the physical world; 
a fo r tio r i , they are not just artefacts of measurement, nor are they the 
consequence of quantum mechanics being incomplete. Indeed, his claim is 
that the so-called synoptic principie  is true and, in strict consequence, 
so is Heisenberg s principle. The former asserts that the wave function 
provides the most complete description that is possible of the 
observational knowledge that is attainable.
Reichenbach’s argument for the synoptic principle20 turns on the 
inductive evidence provided by the improbability of the consequences 
that would flow if the principle were false. Our purposes do not require 
us to go into ail this. We need only to know what his project here is, and 
that the case proceeds via what he calls the principie o f anomaiy In 
colloquial terminology, this principle asserts that goings-on’ at the 
microphysics level, that occur’ between our ordinary (macroscopic)
17op. cit; Ch.5; esp. pp207-224 
18op. cit; p.210
19See Appendii 2, section 1.1, my p.290 
2°op. cit; pp214-224
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observations, are characterised by the breakdown of our ordinary notions
of causality. Here is what Reichenbach has to say on the subject:
The observables of physics....are always macroscopic things....All
statements about physical quantities of a smaller scale are derived by means 
of inferences based on these macroscopic observables.
These inferences proceed by steps. We first infer that some elementary 
coincidence has taken place, such as a collision between two electrons, or
between a y-ray and an electron....For elementary coincidences of this
kind I have proposed the name of phenomena.... we might call them 
"micro-observables'1....
These other occurrences are happenings that take place between the 
phenomena, for which happenings I have therefore used the name of 
in terphenom ena .. The inferences leading to them can be made only 
within the framework of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, these 
inferences presuppose certain definitions, or extension ru ie s  of 
language, which allow us to extend the language of phenomena to that of 
interphenomena and thus to speak meaningfully about occurrences which 
cannot be observed ...
We can now ask for the physical properties of the interphenomena 
introduced by our definition. Here we are given the strange answer that the
behaviour of the interohenomena violates the principle of causality .21 
(underlining added)
In particular, Reichenbach says, our long-cherished belief in causal 
propagation through space and action-by-contact is overturned when we 
discover in the two-slit experiment, for example, that the subsequent 
path of an electron or a photon that goes through' one slit is affected by 
whether or not the other slit is open or closed. A similar anomaly is 
associated with the collapse' of the wave that we take to be extended in 
space, when its complementary particle' is detected - as occurs, for 
example, by the marking of a photographic plate set up to register the 
diffraction pattern of photons incident on a grating.
In these circumstances, then, Reichenbach formulates the breakdown 
of causality in his P rinciple o f  a n o m a ly :
I f  we assign, b y  a n y  k in d  o f  rules, sim ultaneous values to n o n - 
com m uting quan tities th e  d istribu tions o f  which are g o vern ed  
b y  th e  ip-function, th en  th e  re su ltin g  in terphenom ena  are  
sub/'ect to causal anom alies' 22
21op. cit; pp216/7 
22op. cit; p.218
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But it is precisely to the unique characteristics of interphenomena 
that van Fraassen appeals in claiming to refute Reichenbach's principle of 
the common cause. I f  van Fraassen were refuting anything, it  
would certainly not be Reichenbach's principle.
§4.7 Three cases which fit van Fraassen s schema and are irrelevant to 
Reichenbach’s principle
NOTE (i) Each of these cases can be made more realistic- at the price 
of added complexity and greater length. I have opted to 
sacrifice some degree of realism in the interests of brevity.
(ii) To keep the main argument flowing. I have moved Cases 2 
and 3 to Appendix 1, but they are none the less relevant.
Case 1- a hidden causal Jink betw een e ffe c ts '
A person from a culturally isolated community visits our city for the first 
time. Although unacquainted with our commercial practices and 
technology, her society is knowledgeable in mathematics, and uses a 
number of rules of inference, one of which is similar to the principle of 
the common cause.
She inspects the operations of a small business. Coincidentally, she 
notices a display board equipped with six lights that glow from time to 
time and then go out. After a while she observes that one particular light 
(she dubs it the precursor light'), is nearly always closely followed by 
one or other of the remaining five (’the successors'). She notices too that a 
particular successor glows whenever a particular person (seated near the 
display board) picks up what she has already learned to be the telephone. 
Making an induction on this datum, she verifies a proposition which we 
would formulate thus: one successor is associated with the switchboard, 
and each of the other four with a particular extension. Her observations 
of the order in which the successor lights come on suggest to her that 
their activations are essentially random in character.
Formalising the situation, she jots down :
S - precursor glows
Fj =- i111 extension is answered, i - 1,2_5
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Gj = i& successor glows
She notices that the several phones are not answered with equal 
probability but no points of principle are compromised if we ignore this 
complication. With this simplification, her encapsulation of the 
circumstances is then comprehended in van Fraassens relations (8),23 
with n=5. She also moves to (9), after which she has written down 
PCFj.GjlS) > P(FjlS) x P(GjlS) ?
Asked what her jottings mean, she talks about an initial state S 
(signified by the glowing of the precursor) which transits to one of five 
successor states (namely, i:l,2...5), it being a matter of chance which
particular one results on any occasion. She offers (8) and (9) as her 
theory for the process. So far, we can see, her account parallels van 
Fraassen’s schema. The difference comes now.
She says that the inequality (copied above) expresses her belief that 
the coincidences she has observed are underwritten by a common cause. 
The question mark following the inequality signifies her conviction that S 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the coincidences, and that 
their common cause must reside in some parameter to which she has no 
access. (We might be tempted to call it a hidden variable.)
But she is mistaken. It transpires that the telephone company is doing 
a survey of the traffic loading on the incoming line, and of the 
distribution of incoming calls among the extensions. The lights are merely 
a convenient visual display of what is taking place, and the important 
role in the survey falls to electronic counters and some computer 
processors, none of which are accessible to view. She learns from the 
engineer that Fj, the event of the id* extension s being answered, and Gi?
the event of the corresponding successor light glowing, are not in fact 
simultaneous: the picking up of the receiver initiates a signal that travels 
with the velocity of light in a wire connecting a switch on the receiver to 
a switching mechanism at the monitoring light.
23See my p.260 The relations are
(S)U)  P(FilS) - 1/n (b) P(GjlS) =■ 1/n (c) P(Fj 2  GjlS) - 1
(9) P(FilS) x P(GjlS) - 1/n2 P(Fj. GjIS) - P(FjlS) - 1/n
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The case, then, instantia tes the schema, but there is, 
contrary to appearances, no common cause for Fj and Gj2^ ,  since
the two seemingly coincident and improbable events turn out to stand in 
a hidden cause-effect relation. There is, therefore, no violation of 
Reichenbach s principle here, and there is  an eipianation fo r the 
correlation.
Each of the two cases detailed in Appendix 1 illustrates another set 
o f circumstances in which the schema is  instantiated, no 
common cause is  called for, and there is  an eipianation fo r  the  
correlation. In one the coincidence gives expression to a structural 
feature of the case such that either attribute (e.g. colour and elasticity, in 
a macroscopic variant) entails the other, because of the way things are. In 
the other, the supposedly improbable coincidence is nothing more than 
one event or state of affairs under two descriptions.
§4.8 Reichenbachs principle stands: so does Smart's argument: and the 
anti-realist remains committed to luckv accidents
I argued in §4.4 that van Fraassen’s use of his schema does not constitute 
a prim a facie  refutation of Reichenbach s principle. The reason is that, 
on either of the ways of filling out the account, there are at least three 
other assumptions involved, and one or other of these could be 
responsible for the result he claims. In particular I questioned the 
assumption that the schema calls for a common cause. In §4.7 and 
Appendix 1 I give substance to that reservation by offering three 
instantiations o f the schema, each o f which is  eipiained, not b y  
a common cause, bu t b y  a factor that would be characteristic of 
a family of like examples that could be conceived.
24The conjunctive fork (see my Part 4, §2.2, p.232 et seq.) does not apply. In this 
case, according to Reichenbach. Fj s c r e e n s  o f f  Gj from earlier causal influences.
See Reichenbach; op. cit; section 22
25The example is similar to one of the types of experiments that have been carried 
out to test the Bell inequality. The experiment that I have in mind involves the 
atomic cascade' in which one of the two emitted photons that are the subjects of the 
correlation measurements follows the other after a very short time delay (see my 
p.299)
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The considerations in §4.4 allowed van Fraassen, for the sake of 
argument, to subject Reichenbach s principle to critical eiamination by 
appeal to a schema which, he says, derives from the sorts of correlation 
measurements that have been made to test the Bell inequalities and/or 
the EPR paradox'. In §4.5 and §4.6 I claimed that van Fraassen was not 
entitled to do that, if his aim were to test Reichenbach 's principle. 
Reichenbach stipulated that his principle applies exclusively to the 
macrocosm, and, moreover, he argued explicitly that causal relations are 
not to be found in the domain of interphenomena, which is precisely 
the domain to which van Fraassen supposes his schema to apply.
I would have no objection in principle to van Fraassen's invocation of 
the non-classical correlations if his purpose were to try to illustrate that 
causality breaks down in the domain of interphenomena. But that point 
does not have to be made, because there is no disagreement between us 
on that score. It is precisely for this reason that van Fraassen's argument 
is ineffective, not only against Reichenbach 's principle of the common 
cause, but against any acceptable formulation of such a principle. (Note 
that it is for this reason too that van Fraassen's subsequent refutation of 
epistemic realism' is an irrelevance - see Appendix 2.4, pp301-303)
In summary, van Fraassen 's schema is not up to the job o f  
refu ting  the principie o f the common cause because
1. in the domain of interphenomena, from which he claims 
it derives, we admit no such principle;
2. in the macrocosm the instantiations of the schema that we 
devised were quite irrelevant to it; and
3. for my part I have not been able to devise any that are.
Now recall that van Fraassen, in electing to proceed via Reichenbach's 
principle, limited his engagement with Smart, as we noted in §3.2.2, to 
the seemingly less exacting of the two options open to him, each 
determined, as we saw, by a particular combination of the conceptions of 
the terms ‘demand for explanation' and lucky accident' that may be 
drawn from Smart's argument. Failure to answer the less onerous o f 
the two challenges Issued b y  Smart seem s to me to be 
indicative o f the strength o f that argument.
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Finally, if Smart s argument stands, then so too does the claim that 
the anti-realist is  com m itted to a b e lie f in cosmic coincidences 
That view is supported by our considerations in S3.2.3 which led to the 
conclusion that van Fraassen failed in his attempted rebuttal of the claim.
§4.9 Reflections on Reichenbach's principle
What o f the ambit o f the principle? As Reichenbach formulated it, 
i t  is  restric ted  to macroscopic events. But, as we have seen, van 
Fraassen extends its domain of application beyond the realm of the 
macrocosm, and changes the character of the individuals in the domain. 
States of affairs and even correlations as such become terms to which the 
principle is taken to apply:
Reichen bach's P rin cip le  o f  th e  Common Cause is that e v e ry  relation 
of positive statistical relevance must be explained by statistical past common
causes'26(emphasis in original).
Salmon says something similar:
'Reichenbach s basic  principle of explanation seems to be this: e v e r y  
relation  o f  s ta tis tica l re levan ce  m ust be explained b y  re la tion s
o f  causal re levan ce  27(emphasis in original)
van Fraassen quotes what we called STATEMENT 2 28 to support his 
understanding of the principle, but that formulation does not serve his 
purpose, since every  relation of positive statistical relevance is not one, 
the terms of which designate simultaneous macroscopic events, as our 
instantiations29 of van Fraassen s schema illustrate. Moreover, 
Reichenbach ruled out all such relations between interphenomena.
2hvan Fraassen; The S c ien tific  Im age; p.28
27Salmon V ;' Theoretical Explanation ' in Explanation ; S. Körner (editor);
Yale Uni. Press; 1975; p.124
28Recail from my p.232 and p.234 resp .:
(STATEMENT!)- 'If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a 
common cause'
(STATEMENT2)- 'If coincidences of two events A and B occur more frequently than 
would correspond to their independent occurrence, that is, if the events satisfy 
relation (Rl), then there exists a common cause C for these events such that the 
fork ACB is conjunctive, that is, satisfies relations (R5)-(R8)‘
29Part 4, §4.7 (my p.266), and Appendix 1 (my p.282)
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It seems to me, however, that even Reichenbach blurs the concepts 
even t and state o f  affairs, e.g. in his accounting for the correlation 
between the fall of the barometer and the occurrence of a storm as joint 
effects of a change in atmospheric conditions. Perhaps it could be argued 
that all three are e v e n ts , but, even so, the example seems to open up 
the possibility of a slide from event to state of affairs, subject, of course, 
to the mandatory requirement that the onset of the causal state be 
temporally precedent to that of its effects.
In van Fraassen's writings the slide is even more pronounced. Note 
his example of heavy smoking now, and lung cancer now, being joint 
effects of heavy smoking in the past.30 That slide is the thin edge of the 
wedge for extension of the domain of the principle to comprehend every  
relation o f statistical relevance, which extension van Fraassen 
explicitly endorses in a subsequent paper:
The common cause picture is one that can certainly f it  an 
indeterministic world: correlations, rather than events as such, 
require an explanation, and this is given by tracing (stochastic)  
processes bach to their in tersections '31 (my emphasis)
I have no quarrel with the extension of the principle from events to 
states of affairs. Nor, with two p ro v iso s , do I object to being classed as 
one who seeks explanations for correlations. The first proviso is that I do 
not seek common causes in the domain of interphenomena. The second is 
that I do not expect that the explanations I seek will invariably involve 
common causes.
What o f the sta tus o f the principle? Restricting it to events, 
Reichenbach claimed universality for it but this claim, phrased as it is in 
STATEMENT 2, sits oddly with the qualification which we noted, that
'The existence o f a common cause is therefore in such cases not 
absolutely certain, but only probable'}'1
3°van Fraassen; The Scientific Image; p.27
3 Ivan Fraassen B. C;' The Charybdis o f  Realism : Epistemological 
Implications o f Bell's Inequality '; in Synth Cse 32; 1982; p.27 
32Reichenbach; op. cit; ppl57/138
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In §2.2, we observed that STATEMENT 2 was not deduced at all.33 
The deduction in fact was of an implication running in the reverse 
direction: if there is a common cause for two events such that (R5)-(R8) 
hold, then, considered in isolation from the cause, the two events will 
present themselves as having the character, (Rl), of a seemingly unlikely 
coincidence. We concluded that Reichenbach's principle should be viewed 
as a rule of thumb^ pointing to the probability of a common cause.
The rule of thumb that constitutes the essence of Reichenbach's 
principle is one on which we may place substantial reliance. Perhaps it is 
not infallible, but, given the enormous number of cases in which it has 
been shown to work, it merits at least a status equal to that of a well- 
confirmed inductive generalisation. It would be more correct, I think, to 
call it, not a rule of thumb, but rather a well-established  
methodological principle.
33see esp. my p.234
3^We suggested presentation along the lines:
Let there be a coincidence between two events exhibiting a higher probability 
than would be expected from the supposition that their simultaneous occurrence is 
due to chance. If we assume that they are each separate effects of a common cause 
and, on that basis are statistically independent of one another, we have a possible 
explanation for them.’
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§3. VAN FRAASSEN'S SCHEMA AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
Although van Fraassen says that his schema
‘.... incorporate(s) the sorts of non-classical correlations which distinguish
quantum physics from classical physics',1
he does not elaborate on this statem ent. We should therefore examine 
those correlations to see if the schema adm its of an in terp retation  more 
favourable to van  Fraassen than  heretofore. We also need to do this so 
th a t we might look at the question of h idden variables and evaluate the 
van  Fraassen argum ent of §3.2.2
§5.1 The non-classical correlations
In Appendix 2, the sequence of ideas and events underlying the non- 
classical correlation experim ents is outlined. The story begins w ith  the 
EPR paper of 1935 and continues w ith  Bohm's conversion of the idea of a 
thought-experim ent therein  to th a t of a practical experim ent. Roughly 
th irty  years after EPR, come Bell's theorem  and the Bell inequalities. Then 
follow the proposals of Clauser e t a l  for actual experim ents which came 
to be carried out in a sequence tha t is still continuing and probing more 
and more deeply into the issues rem aining unsettled. In  th e  n e i t  
p a ra graphs I  e i tr a c t  fro m  th e  account g iv en  in  th e  a p p e n d ii  
th e  sk e le to n  o f  w hat we n e e d  h e re  fo r  p re se n t p u rp o ses
EPR3 claimed to show, by analysis of a thought-experim ent, tha t the 
quantum -m echanical description of phenom ena given by the w ave 
function is incom plete. This conclusion derives from  an argum ent whose 
basic assum ptions a r e :
(1) Concerning the com pleteness of a theo ry - a ph  y s i  cal th eo ry  is  
com plete i f  and o n ly  i f  i t  in corpora tes a counterpart to e v e ry  
elem en t o f  ph  y s ic a l r e a lity  ;
*van Fraassen (1980); op. cit; p.28
2See my p.242 etseq.
^Einstein A, Podolsky B, and Rosen N; Can Quantum-Mechanical Description  
o f  P h ysica l R ea lity  be Considered Complete?\ P hysica l R eview  47; 1933; 
pp777-780
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(2) Concerning Physical reality- If. without in an y  way d isturbing a 
system , we can p red ic t with cer ta in ty  (i.e. with p ro b a b ility  
equal to u n ity ) the value o f  a p h y s ic a l quantity, then th ere  
exists an elem ent o f  p h y s ic a l r e a lity  corresponding to th is  
p h y s ic a l qu an tity  4 ;
(3) Concerning action at a distance- if two systems separate after 
interaction, then a measurement on one of them after separation 
cannot disturb the other. This assumption was not articulated 
explicitly by EPR; it was tacitly taken for granted. It subsequently 
became known as the locality  or separability requ irem en t.
The EPR thought-experiment bore in its wake a set of puzzling 
consequences. David Bohm5 considered the following example. Let a 
molecule consist of two atoms, one of spin +h/2, the other of spin -fi/2, so 
that the total spin of the molecule is zero. Let the molecule disintegrate 
and the two atoms fly apart, each retaining its original spin. According to 
classical physics, from a measurement of the spin of either we may then 
deduce the spin of the other, since, as a consequence of the earlier history 
of the atoms and of the fact that, by hypothesis, no disturbing torques 
have acted on either, the spins remain correlated.
But the quantum-mechanical account is more complicated. For a start, 
only one component of the spin of each atom can have a precise value at 
a given time. If, for example, referred to a Cartesian co-ordinate system, 
the x-component is precise and definite, then the y- and z- components 
are indeterminate. Now here comes one of the puzzles. If, on the one 
hand, we measure the x-component of the spin of one atom, then we get a 
precise value for it. In turn we also get a precise value, on measurement, 
of the x-component of the other, which is in fact equal and opposite to 
that of the first. In this event, the y- and z- components of spin for both 
atoms are indeterminate. But, if on the other hand, instead of its x- 
component, we measure the y-component of the spin of the first, then we 
get a precise value for i t . And in that event it is now, according to 
quantum mechanics, the y-component of the spin of the second atom that 
is precise and definite, and the x- and z-components that are
o^p. cit; p.777
5ßohmD; Quantum Theory. Prentice-Hall; 1951; p.614
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indeterminate. It seems that, contrary to the locality requirement tacitly 
assumed by EPR, the second atom is affected by what is measured on the 
first. Out of these and related considerations emerged a proposal for a 
feasible experiment to test whether the predicted quantum-mechanical 
effects are genuine.
A related question which arises out of the EPR argument is whether 
quantum mechanics could be made complete (if it Is incomplete) through 
the discovery of variables which have so far lain hidden. In addressing 
this question, John Bell6 showed that the idea that hidden variables could 
restore causality and locality to quantum mechanics is inconsistent with 
the statistical predictions deducible therefrom. He proved a theorem to 
the effect that, if a theory is to reproduce the quantum-mechanical 
predictions for an experiment like the one proposed by Bohm, then it 
must be a non-local one That is, it must reject the locality requirement. 
Bell showed, in a strict deduction, that local-realistic theories, 
incorporating hidden variables that are supposed to ensure locality and 
causality, imply, for three pairs o f measurements, the inequality :
1 + E(b,c) > lE(a,b) - E(a,c)|.
Here, taking the unit of spin as ft/2 , E(b,c) is the expectation value7 of 
the product of the spin (namely +1 or -1) of one particle measured along 
a direction b set on the first analyser, and that of the other (namely +1 or 
-1) measured simultaneously along a direction c on the second analyser.8
Now, according to quantum mechanics, there are sets of angles for 
which this inequality is violated. An example is given in Appendix 2 
(section2).9 In that particular case, the quantum-mechanical expectation 
corresponding to E(b,c) above is just -Cos 0, where 0 is the angle 
between b and c. Let b define a direction oriented at an angle tt/3 
measured clockwise from a, and let c be rotated clockwise from b 
through a further angle tt/ 3 in the same plane. As shown in the appendix 
(see my sub-paragraph (9), p.298) the inequality, according to quantum 
mechanics, is then violated.
6Bell J. S; On t he  F . . . P . P a r a d o x ; Physics 1; 1964; ppl95-200
7Thatis, the mean value of the product of the values of the two spins obtained from
a large number of simultaneous measurements
8 b is a conventional symbol used to represent a unit vector
9See my p 298
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Notice that, for the example we have just been considering, if c is 
parallel to b, then E(b,c) = -1. For this result to be obtained in practice, it 
would not only be necessary that without fail each pair of simultaneous 
measurements find the spins to be equal and opposite, but also that, in a 
long series of measurements, no genuine coincidences be missed, and no 
spurious coincidences be registered. Such a practical outcome verges on 
the impossible, and correlation less than unity is to be expected. Detailed 
quantum-mechanical calculations for specific experiments accord with 
what is realisable in practice. We need to make a mental note of what has 
just been said, because the point is relevant to our reconsideration of van 
Fraassen s schema in §5.2.
The purpose of the non-classical correlation measurements', then, is 
to determine whether the above inequality, or another of like kind but 
specific to some particular experiment, is violated in practice and, if it is, 
whether the calculations from quantum theory are confirmed. It is now 
generally agreed that the experimental results (involving correlations 
between the spins of particles or the directions of polarisation of photons) 
are unquestionably in favour of quantum mechanics10.
§5.2 The schema and the EPR non-classical correlations
Does the schema fit a case in which the non-classical correlations are 
exhibited and, in so doing, refute the principle of the common cause? 
The issue is whether the schema refutes the principle, since one m ay  
hoid  that the correlations are not to be e ip la ined  b y  common 
causes, and reject that the schema establishes the point. For the 
sake of argument we suspend the principle of anomaly (see foot of my 
p.265)
Let us try to see what parallels, if any, there are between the schema
and the cases exhibiting non-classical correlations, van Fraassen says:
'Imagine that you have studied the behaviour of a system or object which, 
after being in state S, always goes into another state which may be
characterised by various attributes Fj,... J n and Gi^.-.G^'11
10See Appendix 2, section 3. p.299 etseq.) 
1 *van Fraassen (1980); op. cit; p.29
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It seem s p re tty  clear that any parallel would require  that F be the spin 
(or polarisation) of one en tity  and G that of the other. S, then, would be 
the in teraction state; and the state into which S always goes would be the 
one th a t characterises the two entities as they  separate. In that even t n 
would have two values, one corresponding to spin up, the other to spin 
down (or one to passage through the poiariser, the other to rejection by 
it). So far, so good!.
van  Fraassen continues12:
'Suppose that you have come to the conclusion that this transition is 
genuinely indeterministic, but you can propose a theory about the 
transition probabilities:
(S )U ) P(Fj|SM/n (b) P(Gj|SM/n (c) P(Fj s Gf|S) - 1 ‘
We can agree, then, tha t the transition is indeterm inistic and we can 
agree w ith  8(a) and (8b). But 8(c) presents a difficulty. For, w ith the non- 
classical correlations, as we saw exemplified in the case near the end of 
§5.1 (m y pp275/6), both the calculations and the experim ental results 
show that, only w hen the two measuring instrum ents (or analysers) are 
set at the same angle, might there be any possibility that this relation 
could hold - and, we might add, as far as the calculations go, tha t applies 
for both quantum  mechanics and the local-realistic (classical) theories. 
But a 1:1 correlation is only a theoretical possibility. If the results of the 
experim ents cited in Appendix 2 are examined, it will be found tha t the 
m easured correlations fall short of this theoretically possible value. In 
fact, both the local-realistic theories and the quantum -m echanical 
calculations specifically allow for the shortfall.
W hen we examine m easurem ents in which the angular settings of the 
two analysers differ, we find the correlation betw een F and G falling 
away, and th a t is predicted by both quantum  mechanics and the local- 
realistic theories. W hat then  distinguishes the two types of theory is 
captured  in the Beil inequality  which becomes crucial. Since th e  
e ip e r lm e n ta l  r e s u lts  v io la te  th e  In e q u a lity  a n d  accord w ith  
q u a n tu m  theory, our u su a l m e th o d  o f  In feren ce  to e in la n a tlo n  , 
In c lu d in g  via In fo rm a l Invoca tion  o f  com m on causes, Is  ca lled  
In to  question. But this arises, not from the case of parallel analyser
I2ibid
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settings potentially instantiating the schema, but rather from the 
observed correlations for other-than-parallel' analyser settings.
We now have the situation that the schema is not instantiated in 
practice  by the non-classical correlation measurements. It might be 
claimed, nevertheless, that, with the analysers set parallel, the theoretical 
possibility of a 1:1 correlation as a potential upper limit of what to expect 
from measurement is sufficient for van Fraassen's purposes. But then 
there might seem to be a new difficulty because, for this case, both the 
local-realistic theories (relying on inference to explanation) and quantum 
physics yield a similar prediction. So, it might be said, in the circumstance 
where the schema might have done the job, eipianation  for the 
correlations is not ruled out. van Fraassen's response would undoubtedly 
be that the local-realistic theories are ruled out by other correlation 
measurements where the analysers are not set parallel. He could also add 
against me that, if I were not to rule them out in toto, then I would be 
condoning the application of two incompatible theories to the one set of 
phenomena (the parallel analyser case). I accept the rejoinder.
The upshot of the foregoing is this. Instantiation of the schema in the 
case of the non-classical correlations is a theoretical possibility. But it is 
not the instantiated schema that rules out explanation. Rather, the 
schema derives whatever integrity it has in that respect from the 
circumstance that explanation is ruled out by cases of correlation for 
other-than-parallel' analyser settings.
The answer to our opening question (p.276) is  then that the 
correc tions are not to be e ip ia ined  b y  common causes, but i t  is  
not the schema that estabiishes this conciusion.
For th is reason, aiong with those adduced in §4. d-Sd.8, I  am 
Jeft with the conviction that the schema fa iis  to serve van 
Fraassen s purpose o f refu ting  Reichenbach 's principie, or, fo r  
that matter, any credibie form uiation o f the common cause 
principle .
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§6. CONCLUSION : CONCERNING THE SUPPOSED DEMAND FOR HIDDEN 
VARIABLES
In the belief (which I have claimed to be false) th a t his schema has 
discredited Reichenbach's principle, van Fraassen moves to take his 
supposed rebu tta l of argum ents for realism  to its conclusion:
'Could one change a theory which violates Reichenbach s principle into one 
that obeys it. without upsetting its empirical adequacy? Possibly: one would 
have to deny that the attribution of state S gives complete information about 
the system at the time in question, and postulate hidden param eters  that 
underlie those states. Attempts to do so for quantum mechanics are referred 
to as hidden variable th e o r ie s . but it can be shown that if such a theory 
is equivalent to orthodox quantum mechanics, then it still exhibits non-local 
correlations of a non-classical sort, which would still violate Reichenbach s 
orinciole. But again, the question is academic, since modern physics does 
not recognise the need for such hidden variables'1 (underlining added)
The spirit of w hat I have underlined above we may grant, since w hat 
is involved is a reference to Bell s theorem  w ith  which, recalling my 
p.275, we are now fam iliar. I interpolate a clarificatory reservation, 
how ever, nam ely the observation th a t a common cause principle would 
indeed be violated, but, for the reasons given before, tha t principle would 
not be Reichenbach 's.
As for Bell's theorem , recall tha t the inequality  associated w ith  it is 
derived on the assum ption of there being hidden param eters whose 
function is to preserve the locality requ irem en t via a mechanism having 
its origin in an earlier common cause. However, in the various derivations 
of a Beil inequality  tha t I have come across2, none includes invocation of 
any form al principle like Reichenbach s. Rather, the appeal to h idden 
param eters, and the sim ultaneous ascription to them  of the functions 
they  are expected to serve, seem to me to exhibit nothing more than  
spontaneous instantiation of the practice of inference to explanation. 
Much o f the subsequent fuss , consequent on the actual 
correlation measurements, is  to do with the question o f how  
that sty le  o f  inference went wrong. And in tha t question, one of the
!op. cit; p.30
Except for a derivation by van Fraassen which I summarise in Appendix 2, 
section 4 (my p.301 etseq.)
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possibilities tentatively highlighted for scrutiny by Bernard d'Espagnat is 
the very principle of inductive inference itself, in its tacit role in the 
derivation of the inequality, namely as an assumed rule of inference. But, 
like the great majority of us, when it comes to the crunch, d'Espagnat is 
not going to surrender that principle.3
There is an important moral to be drawn, I believe, from the 
circumstances attendant on the EPR correlation experiments. The results, 
confirming quantum theory and disagreeing with the local realistic 
theories, resulted in general perplexity about where the latter had gone 
astray, and led to a concerted attempt to discover what had gone wrong.
It is not appropriate in this Thesis to examine that question. But it is 
appropriate to observe that the consternation, caused by recognition that 
our usual process of inference to explanation might be fallible, bears 
testimony to the importance we place upon it, and undermines van 
Fraassen's attempt to discredit its status as a rule on which we commonly 
rely.
The gist of the quotation from van Fraassen that I have recorded on 
the previous page is that respectability could only be restored to 
Reichenbach's principle if we allow hidden variables, but that modem  
physics has no place for such. So, according to van Fraassen,
Reichenbach s principle and the classic argument for realism, as instanced 
by Smart, lose their credibility. I submit, however, that my arguments up 
to the end of §5 constitute a rebuttal of van Fraassen's claim to have 
reduced Smart's argument for realism to absurdity via the discrediting of 
Reichenbach's principle. There now remains a loose end to be tied up, and 
that, as will become apparent, requires the expression of an attitude to 
hidden variable theories.
In saying that modern physics has no place for hidden variables, van 
Fraassen of course is echoing the orthodox view to which 1 referred in the 
bottom paragraph on my p. 258.
3
d'Espagnat B; (1) * The Quantum Theory andReality '; in Scientific American', Nov. 
1979; ppl28-140. There, p.128, the second premise underlying the local-realistic 
theories is said to be ' that inductive inference is a valid mode of reasoning';
(2) In Search o f  R ea lity ; p.64, p.155; Springer-Verlag; 1983
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Now a proper evaluation of hidden variable theories, in the context of 
either physics or philosophy, is outside the scope of the present work, 
but, as mentioned, it is desirable that I at least state my own conviction 
in order to bring the present project to a conclusion. I believe that the 
orthodox stance is the right one, and 1 am encouraged in this assessment, 
not only by its endorsement by the great majority of physicists, but also 
by the recent considered views of Mario Bunge on the subject:
‘Hidden variables theorizing remained outside the mainstream of physics 
until Bell and others succeeded in deriving formulas capable of being 
subjected to rather direct crucial experimental tests. Then it came briefly to 
the fore, and it may soon become little more than a historical curiosity.'4
To emphasise the point, then, let me say that 1 opt to reject hidden 
variable theories.
That being the case, we sJhouJd now look back to $3.2 where we 
started* 12345 The actual course of van Fraassens exposition, however, has 
involved much more than is encapsulated in the relatively simple precis 
summarised there.
My response, tout court, to that presentation of the argument is now 
immediate and obvious: an emphatic denial of premises (2) and (3). For, 
as we have seen in 83.2.4 (see esp. my pp256/7), the realist is entitled to 
reject the charge of being committed to an unlimited demand for 
explanation, and, to complement that attitude, he has good reason to 
reject the quest for hidden variables.
Now one can point to a small group of dedicated people whose aim 
has been, or is, to establish the credibility of hidden variable theories. The 
most prominent names to be mentioned are Louis de Broglie, David
^Bunge.M; Treatise on Basic Philosophy; Vol.7, Parti; Reidel; 1983;p.216
^Recall van Fraassen s argument (my p242):
(1) Such arguments point to explanatory pover as a criterion for theory choice
(2) These arguments succeed only if the demand for explanation is supreme-
'if the task of science is unfinished, ipso facto, as long as any pervasive 
regularity is left unexplained'
(3) The unlimited demand for explanation implied by (2) leads to a demand for
hidden variables
(4) Hidden variables are ruled out by
'at least one major school of thought in tventieth-century physics'
therefore
(3) these arguments for realism fail
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Bohm, and John Bell, and there are others. They may wish to respond to 
the argument of van Fraassen's that we are presently considering, by 
moving to depreciate premise 4. But that would throw the onus on them 
to stand up and deliver a hidden variable theory that merits general 
endorsement. So far, in this endeavour, no-one has been successful.
The rejection of hidden variable6 theories incurs a penalty - namely, 
the acceptance of causal anomaly at the level of interphenomena - and 
this, in turn, determines that the principle of the common cause be 
formulated with the proviso built into it by Reichenbach so many years 
ago.7
6Note especially that the term 'hidden variables' as used here has no connection at 
all with the 'hidden mechanisms' to which Smart was referring, namely atoms and 
their parts, and the corresponding properties and behaviour.
7The realist who rejects hidden variable theories rejects, moreover, any charge of 
commitment to "epistemic realism", as made in van Fraassen B.C; The Charybdis o f  
Realism:Epistemological Implications o f  Bell's Inequality', in Synthdse 32; 1982; 
pp25-38.1 make a few comments on this article in section 4 of Appendix 2 (my p.301 
etseq.)
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Appendix 1
INSTANTIATIONS OF VAN FRAASSEN'S SCHEMA1
1. Case 2- a structural connection betw een 'effects'
Here is a ' though t e x p e r im e n t ' on classical lines that accords w ith van 
Fraassen's schema and tha t does not requ ire  us to look for a Reichenbach- 
like common cause. I say Reichenbach-like' to em phasise a point. Such a 
cause is taken to be an e v e n t  an tecedent in time to the two 
sim ultaneous events whose seem ingly im probable high correlation it 
explains.
Suppose we have a container in which there is one atom of copper 
and one atom of silver. Add one molecule of hydrochloric acid in such a 
w ay that a reaction occurs w ith  one of the metal atoms, the probability 
being 0.5 tha t copper is involved, and 0.5 tha t silver is involved. One 
molecule of a chloride salt results, bu t we do not know w hether it is 
copper chloride or silver chloride.
Let us now chemically separate the chloride molecule from the 
metallic atom that rem ains w ith it in the container, and subm it the 
form er to a fu rther reaction so as to recover the metallic atom. Next 
perform  two tests on this atom, one to determ ine its mass num ber, the 
other to determ ine its atomic num ber. Each of these param eters is a 
unique constant. Repeat the experim ent a large num ber of times, and 
record the results. We now have an instantiation of van  Fraassen's 
schema for the case n=2. That is to say, his initial conditions are satisfied, 
and the theory expressed in his equations (8) and (9) applies2:
Fj = the event tha t the m easurem ent of the mass num ber of the 
elem ent recovered yields the value 63
Gj = the event th a t the m easurem ent of the atomic num ber of the 
elem ent recovered yields the value 29
or
1Case 1 was presented in Part4, §4.7, p.266 et seq.
2See my pp259/260
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F2 = the event that the measurement of the mass number of the 
element recovered yields the value 107
G2 = the event that the measurement of the atomic number of the 
element recovered yields the value 47
Flf Gj are the results for copper; F2> G2 are those for silver.3
But we would not be motivated to look for a common cause here in 
the sense of an event (or, for that matter, state of affairs) of which 
(Fj. Gj) and (F2. G2) are each an unlikely  pair of joint subsequent
effects. At the time we make the measurements of F and G, it is by 
hypothesis either a copper or a silver atom that is involved, and each of 
these has, by some sort of physical necessity, the unique atomic number 
and mass number that we measure. The partners in these pairs are 
therefore far from being unlikely couples, and comprise, in each case, 
just two of the characteristics with which nature endows copper and 
silver respectively. It is this structural fea ture  of the atom that 
accounts for the 1:1 correlation. Reichenbach s principle has nothing at all 
to do with the case.
This thought experiment m ay be converted into an actual 
experim ent in the macrocosm in the following way. Take two balls, 
one black and elastic like a squash ball, and the other white and inelastic 
like a billiard ball. Let them be constructed so that they are of the same 
dimensions and weight. Put them in an urn and then make repeated 
draws of one ball randomly chosen therefrom.
It is not hard to see how van Fraassen's schema is instantiated in this 
case. The initial state S from which the transition takes place is that in 
which the two balls, as they  are constructed , are in the urn. The new 
state is that in which one ball has been chosen from the urn, and F, refers 
to its colour and Gj to its elasticity. It is a structural fea ture  of the case 
that a ball is black if and only if it is elastic, and white if and only if it is 
inelastic. So, there is no call for a common cause to explain the observed 
coincidences (except perhaps in the sense of a call to be informed about
3See, for example, Heslop R.B and Robinson P.L; In o rg a n ic  C h em istry , second 
edition; Elsevier; 1963; pp574/6.1 have taken the atom in each case to be the one 
that designates the most common isotope
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how the balls each came to be constructed as they are, but that would be 
irre levan t to our interests here since th a t refers to a state prior to S).
2. Case 3- different descriptions of the same event
Other cases conforming to van Fraassen's schema and not requiring 
common causes as explanations can be conceived. Here is one such which 
I shall narra te  in exactly the w ay that, fictionally, I became involved in it.
Recently a casual acquaintance, Smith, told me that he listens in to 
one of four A.M radio stations at 7.30 each morning. The choices available 
to him, he said, may be sum m arised as fo llow s:
Fr  he tunes to 666 kHz (station 2CN)
Gr  he gets The Breakfast Show', 
plus th ree  like pairs of events.
He added that detailed records over a lengthy period yield interesting 
results. On the condition (designated bv the symbol S) tha t his radio was 
working correctly and that the stations w ere all transm itting, analysis of 
the records, he told me, leads to the following re la tio n s :
(f) P(Fi.Gi|S) = P(F£) x P(Gi|Fi.S)= 0.23 (by Th.5, plus (a) and (d))«
Smith said that he was puzzled about (g) because he thought it should 
point to a common cause, of which F* and Gj should be joint effects, but he
could conceive of nothing tha t would be plausible in tha t role. Since (a) to 
(g) com prehend van Fraassen's relations (8) and (9), I was given to 
w onder w hether Smith had produced a case in the macrocosm that 
refu tes the principle of the common cause.
The first question to be resolved was w hether, given S, the choices 
w ere really random. This was a point to be settled by fu rther discussion 
w ith  Smith.
(a) P(FilS)
(b) P(GJS)
(c) P(Fj s GjIS)
(d) P(Fi|Gi.S) =P(Gi|Fi.S)
(e) P(FilS) x P(GjlS)
= 0.25 ( M .. . .4 )  
= 0.25 
=  1 
=  1
= 0.06
(g) P(Fi.Gi|S) > P(FjlS) x P(GjlS) (from (e) and (f))
^For Theorem 5 see my p.231
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I next asked myself what possible antecedent event or state of affairs 
could be hypothesised to serve as a potential cause for the set of 
supposedly improbabie5 coincidences, F* and GL After some considerable
reflection it became clear to me that a fertile imagination applied to this 
question can lead one to set out on a variety of courses over very tricky 
terrain,* 6 when, as it transpires, there is available a direct and relatively 
easy route to the terminus.
It will be instructive, however, to follow the general run of a couple 
of the false leads, but to avoid the full complexity of the subsidiary 
excursions to which the main diversion provides access. Let us 
concentrate on and Gp My first conjecture is that Smith has certain
likes and dislikes, 2CN is aware of these, and The Breakfast Show1 is 
tailored accordingly. The common cause, the conjecture continues, stems 
from Smith s own dispositions which, on the one hand, influence 2CN to 
provide a program that Smith likes, and, on the other, cause him to tune 
in to it.
But there are several things wrong with this conjecture. We shall 
restrict ourselves to one such. The fact that Smith likes the show could 
well be the reason why he tunes to 2CN when he does, and on one 
account might be seen as the cause of his so doing,7 but, if this fact does 
constitute the cause of his behaviour, it seems at first glance to be 
irrelevant to 2CN's since Smith, on being asked, said that neither his view 
about the program nor information on his likes and dislikes had ever 
been sought by the station. If it were retorted that 2CN has conducted 
sample surveys of listener attitudes and that Smith s likes are implicit as 
a causal factor in the decision about what programs to transmit, then 
perhaps I should modify my statement to allow that Smith's likes in some 
loose sense may be relevant to what 2CN does, but they are certainly not 
the  cause of the transmission of The Breakfast Show' in the way in
5See relation (g)
6For example, make the case more realistic by changing Gj to the ev en t: He hears  
"The Breakfast Show" ‘
7Davidson D; 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' in his Actions and Events-, 
Oxford; 1982; p.3
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which they could perhaps be the  cause of Smith s tuning to 2CN. It is 
therefore not the common cause that I am seeking.8
There is a point about the conjecture just considered that I want to 
bring to notice. Recall that we were looking for a common cause to explain 
on the one hand Smith's tuning to 666 kHz, and on the other his  getting 
The Breakfast Show'. The conjecture, however, was about a common 
cause of Smith s tuning to 666 kHz and of 2CN's transmitting The 
Breakfast Show'. But the state of affairs designated as Smith's getting 
that program' and that designated as '2CN's transmitting it“, although 
causally connected as I shall outline below, are not identical. The moral is 
to be alert to distinctions that might easily be overlooked.
When we next met, Smith cleared up the point outstanding about 
randomness of station choice. It transpires that he is an inspector 
employed by the broadcasting control authorities, and part of his job is to 
listen to the listed stations at the time in question to check conformity 
with regulations. He uses a valid random sampling technique to 
determine his station monitoring schedule. The case now accords fully 
with van Fraassen's schema: given S, there is a transition to one of four 
possible alternatives, and the transition is indeterministic.
The circumstances, as now revealed by Smith, suggest that we try the 
following conjecture: it is because the station is transmitting that Smith is 
required to tune to it, and it is because of what it is transmitting when he 
happens to be listening that he gets The Breakfast Show'. The common 
cause, then, is just that the station is transmitting. But this conjecture will 
not do because the inequalities (g) are conditional on S which includes the 
requirement that the stations be transmitting. For a common cause we 
need an event x, additional to S, such that we convert these inequalities 
conditional on S into equalities conditional on the conjunction S.x.
Should S include the condition that the station be transmitting? Yes, 
because it transpires that there had been interruptions to transmissions 
during the period of the monitoring program, and these instances had
8It should perhaps be mentioned that this abridged account admits of ready 
expansion into aversion involving discussion of intentionality and the causes of 
human action, technological causal factors inherent in the broadcasting process, 
the interplay between these, and the screening o ff of various events in the 
elaborated causal chain
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been eliminated by Smith from the figures on which (a) to (g) are based. 
But more importantly, Smith told me, relation (c) would fail without that 
condition, and, for my part, I noted that, in that event, the example would 
not conform to van Fraassen's schema.
Now recall something we noted earlier, namely that Gj is not 
equivalent to the ith station s transmitting. Rather, Gj is the end point of a 
sequence of cause-effect relations: the station must be transmitting, its 
program must be the usual one (and not a special departure, dictated for 
example by some sensational turn of events), and its transmissions must 
not be interrupted in passage from the transmitting array to the 
receiving circuit (a misadventure which might well be instantiated in a 
number of ways). S failed to spell out the second and third elements of 
this sequence. These additional elements stem from consideration of what 
is involved in the case over and above the relations (a) to (g) which, it 
will be recalled, follow solely from statistical data independently of 
physical mechanism and human intention and action. S must be expanded 
to include them.
If now we remove from S the condition that the station s program be 
the usual one, but retain the rest, we must modify Gj to read Smith gets
2CN', etc, meaning that he gets the program currently being transmitted 
by 2CN, etc. We are now in a position to drop the most troublesome 
aspects of intentionality from our considerations. For, subject to S as now 
modified, someone who at any time tunes to 666 kHz gets 2CN, 
regardless of whether he likes the program, loathes it, wants it or not, or 
even bothers to listen to it.
In these circumstances, the statement Smith gets 2CN' signifies at 
least a state of affairs identical with that which characterises the end 
point of a process designated by the statement Smith tunes to 666 kHz'. 
This latter statement means that Smith performs a ritual with a definite 
end point. The ritual might typically comprise fiddling with a knob, 
watching a pointer, and listening for a certain quality of sound. The end 
point is nothing more and nothing less than the state of affairs in which 
the set is tuned to 666 kHz.
I used above the qualification at least1, because the statement Smith 
gets 2CN’ could possibly be ambiguous. As I chose to interpret it, it boiled 
down to the fact that the set Is tuned to 2CN; hence the talk about the
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end point of the tuning process. However, the statement might mean that 
his set comes to be tuned  to 666 kHz, in which case the ritual just 
referred to would be part of a process, and the statement would therefore 
mean more than just the state of affairs expressed by the fact that the set 
is  tuned to 666 kHz. In both cases, nevertheless, the two descriptions 
would pick out the same state of affairs. In one, the two statements 
would be equivalent; in the other case, one statement would be 
equivalent to only part of the other statement.
We conclude, then, that we have here an example from the 
macrocosm that instantiates van Fraassen s schema and that, at first 
glance, seems to call for invocation of Reichenbach s principle of the 
common cause. On examination, however, we discover that the seemingly 
improbable correlation derives from the circumstance that the two 
descriptions which were taken at first to represent two effects of a 
common cause are, in fact, different descriptions that pick out the one 
state of affairs.
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Appendix 2
THE NON-CLASSICAL CORRELATIONS 
1. The Einstein-Podolskv-Rosen (EPR) Argument 
1.1 Some basic concepts in quantum mechanics
The most basic concept is that of the state  of an atomic system, which is 
characterised by a wave 4; that is a function of the variables chosen to 
describe the behaviour of the system.
To each observable quantity  A, there corresponds an operator 
(call it A too), and to each operator there correspond eigenfunctions 
and eigenvalues. These notions are expressed in an equation 
Aip = aip (1)
where a is a pure number (the eigenvalue of A), the existence of which 
gives effect to the meaning of the statement that 4/ is an eigenfunction of 
the operator A.
Equation (1) expresses the fact that a measurement would reveal that 
the observable corresponding to A has, in this case, the precise value a.
A state evolves in time in accordance with the equation 
Hip - ifi aip/at (2)
where H is the operator that corresponds to the Hamiltonian, an 
expression well known in classical mechanics.
There are circumstances in which the state of a system is expressed 
as a superposition of orthogonal states:
V - 2 cn ipn (3)
A measurement results in collapse of this composite wave function into 
one of its components. |ck|2 is the probability that, after a measurement, 
the system will be found in the state tpk , where k is one of the values of 
n : 1,2,....
[A ppendix 2 ] 290
In the quantum mechanical description of the behaviour of atomic 
systems, there are certain pairs of physical quantities (’conjugate 
variables') whose simultaneous values do not admit of an unlimited 
degree of precision. Within the theory, the two members of each such 
pair are represented by a pair of non-commuting operators'. The 
momentum and the position of a particle constitute a pair of conjugate 
variables, and the precision with which each of these may be specified is 
restricted by Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle1
Ap Aq 1 fi (4)
In this particular expression of the inequality, Ap would typically be the 
indeterminacy in the specification of the momentum p of the particle, and 
Aq that in the simultaneous specification of its position q; h=h/2ir where 
h is Planck's constant, the quantum of action (=6.6 x 1(H4 Joule-seconds). 
There is no formal restriction on the precision with which either of the 
two variables may be specified theoretically or determined 
experimentally, provided the precision of the other is then such that (4) 
is satisfied.
1.2 The Argument
The EPR argument2 was one aimed at establishing the conclusion that 
quantum mechanics is incomplete. From this conclusion would emerge the 
hope that a more complete theory (in particular, a hidden variable' 
theory) would eliminate the sort of indeterminacy to which we have just 
referred. I shall summarise the essential steps in the argument:
(1) The necessary condition for a theory to be complete is that
e v e r y  elem ent o f  the p h y s ic a l r e a lity  m ust have a counterpart 
in the p h y s ic a l th eo ry  '3.
(2) Elements of the physical reality are determined by experiment 
and measurement.
i n s u l t  any textbook on quantum mechanics; e g. Schiff L.I; Quantum 
Mechanicsflic&rzw-YlÄM, third edition; 1968; pp7/8, 60/61
E instein  A. Podolsky B, and Rosen N; Can Quantum- M echanical Description  
o f  P h ysica l R eality  be Considered Complete ?; in P hysica l R eview  47; 
1935; pp777-7S0 
3op. cit; p.777
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(3) The sufficient criterion of physical reality is this:
'If. without in an y  way d isturbing a system, we can p red ic t  
with certa in ty  (i.e. with p ro b a b ility  equal to u n ity ) the value 
o f  a p h y s ic a l quantity, then th ere  exists an elem ent o f  p h y s ic a l  
r e a lity  corresponding to th is  p h ysica l q u a n tity '«.
(4) Consider a particle having one degree of freedom. If its 
momentum is specified (theoretically, through the wave function) 
with certainty, then its position, according to theory, is completely 
indeterminate. If now a measurement is made to determine its 
position, then, according to theory, its state is altered and it no 
longer has the momentum previously specified. Quite generally, 
precise knowledge of one of a pair of conjugate variables 
precludes such knowledge of the other.
(5) It follows that
either (1) the quantum -m echanical description o f  r e a lity  g iven  
b y  the wave function  is  no t complete or (2) when the operators  
corresponding to two p h y s ic a l quantities do not commute the  
two quan tities cannot have sim ultaneous re a lity  '5.
(6) It is usually assumed that the quantum mechanical formulation 
provides a complete description of the physical reality of the 
system. From this assumption, together with (3) above, 
we go on below to produce a contradiction.
(7) Consider two systems, I and II; let them interact for a specified 
period, after which, interaction ceases. Now, according to theory, if 
we decide to do a measurement on I, then the state in which 
system II is left, after the measurement on I is made, varies with 
the physical quantity of I that we measure.
More specifically, the situation is as follows:
After interaction, the state function may be expressed in the form
(X,,I2) = 2 +n^ 2) U„(X|)
where un is an eigenfunction of an operator A corresponding to a 
physical variable which characterises system I and which we 
intend to measure.(This is just an elaboration of equation (3) of
«ibid
5op. cit; p.77S
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section 1.1 above). Suppose a m easurem ent of A yields an 
eigenvalue corresponding to uk(xl ). System II, on collapse of y
w ith m easurem ent, will be left in the state given by the wave 
function 4>k(x2). But had we chosen to m easure a quantity  B,
different from A, then, by exactly the same reasoning, we would 
be left w ith system  II in some other state, cpr(x2), different from 
4>k(x2). Thus, choice of w hat we m easure on I determ ines the state 
in which 11 is left.
(8) But w hen the m easurem ent on I is made, the two system s no 
longer interact.
(9) Thus
i t  is  possib le  to assign two d ifferen t fun ctions ...to the same 
r e a l i t y ' 6 .
(10) Now it can be shown that these two states could yield precise 
values for two conjugate variables.
EPR show this for the case w here, after two particles have 
in teracted and separated, a m easurem ent of momentum is first 
contem plated for the first particle. In this case, after that 
m easurem ent, the second particle would be left in a state which is 
an eigenfunction for its momentum operator, and so we could 
then  predict the outcome of a precise m easurem ent of the 
m omentum  of th a t particle. Likewise, contem plation of a 
m easurem ent of position of the first particle leads us to suppose, 
via similar reasoning, that we could predict the outcome of a 
precise m easurem ent of the position of the second particle.
(11) Since, as shown in (10), we can predict the momentum of the 
second particle w ith  certainty, then, in accordance w ith (3), that 
momentum  is an elem ent of reality. Likewise, the position of the 
second particle is an elem ent of reality. For two non-commuting 
operators, therefore, we have dem onstrated in this instance tha t 
the two corresponding observables have sim ultaneous reality.
(12) The second disjunct in (5) is thus ruled out, leaving us w ith the 
conclusion tha t th e  quantum  m echanica l descrip tion  g iv en  
b y  th e  w ave fu n c tio n  is  n o t com ple te  - c f.(6J
6ibid; p.779
[Appendix 2] 293
(13) EPR reject any objection to the effect that their criterion of 
reality should restrict simultaneous elements of reality to what 
can be simultaneously measured or predicted. Their grounds are 
that the objection, if allowed, would make the reality of system II 
dependent on the process of measurement carried out on the first 
system, even though that measurement does not disturb the 
second system in any way.
It is not my aim here to analyse the above argument or to provide an 
exegesis of the responses which it provoked.* 12347 Note, however, that (8) and 
(13) imply the locality requirement which we shall see to be made 
explicit by Beil (See my section 2, p.296). More important to our 
immediate purposes is the variation on the EPR ideas conceived by David 
Bohm. These I shall now briefly summarise.
Bohm8 considers a diatomic molecule with a total angular momentum 
(spin) of zero, representing the resultant of equal and opposite spins of 
fi/2 of each of the constituent atoms.9 The molecule is caused to 
disintegrate in such a wav that the total spin is not affected. On a classical 
description, the atoms fly apart with equal and opposite spins. From a 
measurement of the spin of atoml, then, we could immediately deduce 
the value of the spin of atom 2, and vice versa. For this no interaction 
need be postulated between either the separated atoms or the measuring 
apparatus and the atom not subject to measurement. The spins are 
strictly correlated as a result of the original interaction of the atoms to 
form a zero-spin molecule, and because no disturbing torques have 
affected them in the meantime. Here\ then, we have eiplanation in 
the manner o f a common cause, bu t no conjunctive fo rk  o f the 
fo rm a iReichenbach type is  involved.
7See especially
(1) Bohr N: 'Can Quantum- Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be 
Considered Complete?'; P h ysica l R eview  48; 1933; pp696-702
(2) Furry V .H: Note on the Quantum-Mechanical Theory of Measurement; 
P h ysica l R eview  49; 1936; pp393-9, and 476
(3) Schrödinger E; Proceedings o f  the Cambridge P hilosophical 
Society  31; 1933; p.555- Also Naturwiss 23; 1935;
pp807-812. 823-828.844-849
(4) Bohm D: Quantum Theory, Prentice-Hall; 1951; pp611-623
8Bohm D (1951); op. cit; p.614
9 According to quantum theory, spin is quantised in amounts of nfi/2,
where n«± 1 , ± 2 , .... Spin may be specified in units of ft o r  in u n i t s  o f  ft/2
[Appendix 2] 2 9 4
Bohm goes on to show that quantum mechanics also predicts 
correlations between the spin of one atom and that of the other. We shall 
pass over his subsequent inferences purporting to rebut the EPR 
conclusion, as we shall his investigations of hidden variable theories, 10 
but what we should note is that, according to quantum mechanics, only 
one component of the spin of each particle can have a precise value at a 
given time.11 This condition stems from Heisenberg's indeterminacy 
principle, since the operator corresponding to one component of a 
particle s spin does not commute with that corresponding to either of the 
others. Yet, irrespective of which component of spin we attempt to 
measure on one atom, the same component of the spin of the other will 
have a definite and opposite value when the measurement on its fellow 
has been completed.
At the same time, correlations between the remaining components of 
the spins of the two atoms are destroyed, despite the fact, it seems, that, 
had we chosen one of these components in the first place, then, perfect 
correlation with its counterpart would have been found. Any particular 
choice of which component of spin of the first atom is measured (which 
corresponds to the choice of a particular setting of the angle of an 
analyser that interacts with that atom) has the effect of making definite 
and precise the corresponding component of the distant atom and, at the 
same time, making indefinite the other components. And yet, a second 
but different choice for the first atom would result in one of the latter 
indefinite components becoming precise and definite, and in the 
component of the second atom that, on the previous choice, would have 
been definite, now becoming indefinite. And these puzzling effects occur 
in circumstances where there is seemingly no interaction between, on the 
one hand, the second atom, and, on the other, either the first atom or the 
measurement apparatus.
In a subsequent paper, Bohm and Aharanov dismiss the possibility of 
hidden interactions between the atoms, and raise the question whether 
the supposed effects are genuine.12 They consider an experiment
10BohmD; 'A Suggested In terpreta tion  o f  the Quantum Theory in Terms 
o f  "Hidden " Variables' ; in P h ysica l R eview  85; 1952; pp 166-193 
1 JSpin is here taken to be a vector v ith  components referred to Cartesian axes 
12Bohm D and Aharanov Y; 'Discussion o f  Experim ental P roof fo r  th e  
Paradox o f  £.. P... and R....‘ ; in P hysica l R eview  108; 1957; p.1070
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involving photons produced in the annihilation radiation of a positron- 
electron pair. In such a case, two photons are produced, each being 
emitted with polarisation orthogonal to that of the other. The detailed 
quantum-mechanical calculations lead to similar correlations to those 
discussed for the spins of atoms that have separated after dissociation 
from a parent molecule that has zero spin. Bohm and Aharanov conclude 
their paper by comparing the reported results of an actual experiment on 
the scattering of annihilation photons13 with, on the one hand, 
calculations based on the usual quantum principles that entail distant 
correlations, and with, on the other, calculations based on what they 
consider to be a reasonable hypothesis about how quantum theory might 
break down in a manner adequate to avoid the EPR paradox. They 
conclude that the reported experimental result supports the usual form of 
quantum theory.
The contribution of Bohm and his disciple, Aharanov, to the further 
study of the EPR paradox is considerable. Firstly, they widened the 
thought-experiment conceived by EPR and exemplified originally as one 
involving essentially the determination of continuous variables, into 
one now involving the (very much less difficult) determination of 
discrete quantities (spin, polarisation).1'1 In so doing, they took the 
thought-experiment a great deal nearer to realisation. Secondly, in 
pointing to the relevance to the problem at hand of an actual experiment 
that had already been conducted (but for a different purpose), they 
threw out the chalienge to physicists to conceive an e iperim en t 
specificaiiy aim ed at testing the hypothesis, now  supported b y  
a comparison o f their own caicuiations with the re su its o f  the 
eiperim en t to which th ey  drew attention , that the puzziing EPR 
correiations are indeed  genuine.
13Wu C.S; P hysica l R eview  77; 1950; p.136
^Relative to any particular reference axis chosen by the experimenter, a detected 
particle can have only spin up', i.e. spin - +nh/2, or spin dovn, i.e. spin - -nh /2 . 
Relative to the axis of polarisation of a polariser, any polarised photon vill either 
be rejected by the polariser, or it vill pass through it, subsequently vith its 
polarisation direction parallel to that of the axis of the polariser
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2. Bell's Theorem and the Bell Inequalities
Different versions of 'the Beil inequality* 1 234, which gets its name from J.S.
Beil who was the first to propound it,15 are to be found in the literature.16 
At the time, Beil's interest was focussed on hidden variable theories, and 
what he showed was that the idea that hidden variables could restore 
causality and locality to quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the 
statistical predictions deducible therefrom. Locality  (or, as it is 
sometimes called, separability) is the name given to the demand that
'the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a 
distant system with which it has interacted in the past' 17
This requirement had been central to the generation of the perplexity 
inherent in the earlier considerations by EPR and by Bohm. Bell's result 
dashed the hope, stemming from the supposed demonstration by EPR that 
quantum mechanics is incomplete, that a hidden variable theory would 
reinstate the classical ideas underlying their local-realistic1 argument, a 
description flowing in an obvious way from the basis of the argument.
Bell claimed that it is the locality requirement that creates the real 
difficulty, and he proved a theorem  (now known by his name) that, if_a 
theory is to reproduce the quantum-mechanical predictions for an 
experiment like the one of Bohms that we have iust discussed, then it 
must be a non-local one (that is, it must reject the locality requirement). 
In passing we should perhaps note that Bohm s hidden variable theory 
(which we have mentioned but not discussed) is non-local.
^Bell J.S;' On the E..P..R... Paradox'; in Physics 1; 1964; pp 195-200
l6Here are references to a few of them:
(1) d'EsoagnatB: * The Quantum Theory and R e a l i t y in Scientific 
American; Nov 1979; p.135
(2) d'EsoagnatB: In Search o f Reality \ Springer-Verlag N.Y.; 1983; 
pp27, 34/35
(3) Mevstre P:' Is Reality Really Real?- An Introduction to Bell's 
Inequalities'; in Quantum Electrodynamics and Quantum Optics, 
Barut A. 0 (editor); Plenum Press; 1984; p443 et seq. See also reference 11 
at the end of Meystre s paper
(4) Clauser IF. Horne M.A. Shimonv A. and Holt R. A;' Proposed Experiment 
to test Local Hidden-Variable Theories'; in Physical R eviev  
Letters 23; 1969; pp881/2
17Bell J.S; op. cit; p.195
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We shall now set out the steps in Bell s argument. Note that the  
fir s t s i i  o f them constitute a reformuiation o f the BPR account 
in the context o f the experim ent proposed b y  Bohm :
(1) Following Bohm and Aharanov, consider two particles moving 
freely in opposite directions after earlier interaction. One particle 
has spin +ft/2, the other -ft/2.
(2) Let the spin of each particle be measurable in a suitable apparatus 
(in this case, a Stern-Gerlach analyser)18.
(3) Assume the locality requirement - in this case that the angle at 
which one analyser is set, and that the measurement made with 
it, do not influence the result obtained with the other.
(4) By measuring the spin of the first particle in any chosen direction, 
we can predict what the spin of the second one will be in that 
same direction.
(3) Let us follow EPR in concluding from (4) that the result of the 
second measurement is predetermined.
(6) The initial quantum-mechanical wave function does not determine 
the result of an individual measurement, so the predetermination 
at (5) implies the possibility of a more complete specification of 
the state of the system.
(7) On the assumptions
(a) that hidden parameters can be found to give effect to the 
more complete specification sought, and
(b) that these hidden parameters, along with each analyser angle 
setting, suffice to determine the result of the measurement 
with that analyser (and, in particular, that the setting of 
either analyser has no effect on the measurement result 
obtained with the other),
it is shown, in a strict deduction incorporating the hidden 
parameters, that, for the following three pairs o f 
measurements; this inequality holds:
1 + E(b,c) > |E(a,b) - E(a,c)|.
Here, taking the unit of spin as ft/2, E(b,c) is the expectation
18For details of this apparatus, see, for example, Feynman R, Leighton R. B, Sands M; 
The Feynman L ec tu res  on P h ys ic s  vol III ; Addison-Wesley; 1965; p.5-1 etseq
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valued of the product of the spin (namely +1 or -1) of one 
particle measured along a direction b set on the first analyser, 
and that of the other (also +1 or -1) measured simultaneously 
along a direction c on the second analyser.20
(8) The quantum-mechanical expectation corresponding to E(b,c) is 
just the value -b.c , i.e. -Cos 0, where 0 is the angle between b
and c.21
(9) It is easy to show22 that there are values of a, b, and c such that 
the expectation value at (8) is incompatible with the inequality in 
(7).
For example, let a, b, and c be restricted to parallel planes and 
oriented as follows:
Then, from (8), according to quantum mechanics,
[a.b = b.c = 1/2] and [a.c = -1/2] ;
so
IE(a.b) - E(a,c)l = l and l + E(b.c) = 1/2 , 
which expressions are not consistent with the inequality in (7)
(10) It follows from (8) and (9) that the statistical predictions of 
quantum mechanics are not compatible with the hidden 
parameter theories of (7), and so Bell's theorem is  
established.
(11) The inequality at (7) seems to offer a specific quantitative basis 
for conducting an experiment of the type which we saw in the
J^Thatis, the mean value of the product of the values of the tvo spins obtained from 
a large number of simultaneous measurements
20 b is a conventional symbol used to represent a unit vector
21 Here I use the symbol •  to mean that I am forming the scalar product of the tvo 
unit vectors
22Clauser JF and Shimony A; 'B ell's theorem : ex p erim en ta l te s ts  an d  
im p lica tio n s'  ; in R ep o rts  on P ro g ress  in  P h ysics  41; 1978; p.1889
a
c
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challenge that emerged from the considerations of Bohm and 
Aharanov.
3. Experiments to test the Theorem
The conditions for a definitive practical experiment were set out by John 
F. Clauser et aJ P  who, building on the ideas of EPR, Bohm,and Bell, had 
in mind the correlations among the polarisations of optical photons 
produced in an atomic cascade. In this process an atom is excited to a 
state from which it decays to the ground level via the emission of two 
optical photons of different wavelengths in quick succession:
For such an experiment, Qauser et aJ generalise Beil s theorem on the 
basis of an assumed statistical correlation between the measurements 
obtained with two analyser set at arbitrary angles.
They suppose that the correlation is of causal origin, having its 
genesis in the initial production of the photons and being realised through 
a set of hidden variables which include information localised within each 
photon. The measurements at each analyser are then controlled by 
deterministic functions which are mutually independent, and each of 
which is also independent of the setting of the analyser whose output is 
controlled by the other. The inequality they derive is this24:
[P(a,b) - P(a,c)l < 2 - P(b',b) - P(b\c) (1).
b‘ is introduced in a manner providing a way to
'avoid Bell's experimentally unrealistic restriction that for some pair of 
parameters b' and b there is perfect correlation‘* 25
2^Clauser J. F. Horne M.A, Shimony A and HoltR.A; op. cit; pp880-884
24What follows is an incomplete account of what is, in fact, a much more elaborate 
story. We will not be led astray here by neglecting the detail. In inequality (1) 
P(a,b) may be taken to be the same as E(a,b) - see foot of my p.297 and top of p.298, 
and footnote 19
25ciauser et al; op. cit; p.8Sl
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Note the relevance o f the quotation at the foot o f the 
previous oase to m v rem arks about van Fraassen 's schema and  
its  instantiation (see m y p.277).
It is now shown how inequality (1) may be expressed in terms of 
experimental quantities in the form:
IR(a,b)-R(a,c)l + R(b‘,b) + R(b\c) - Rl - R2 < 0 (2a)
where, in the first four terms, R stands for a coincidence rate, that is for a 
rate of simultaneous counts on the two analysers when set respectively to 
directions a and b, to directions a and c , .... and Rj and R2 are respectively
the (constant) rates at which photons are counted at analysers 1 and 2 
when the poiarisers are removed.
Clauser et ai go on to derive quantum-mechanical predictions for the 
counting rates, showing that, for su ffic ien tiy  efficient poiarisers ,26 
there are relative analyser orientations for which the quantum- 
mechanical predictions of counting rate violate (2a).
A subsequent experiment27 along the lines proposed here showed 
both that the inequality28 is violated and that the observed correlations 
conform closely to the quantum-mechanical predictions.
Since that time a series of like experiments, probing successively 
more deeply into the issues involved, have been performed. With the 
exception of that by Holt and Pipkin, the others listed in the footnote
26In practice, poiarisers are not perfectly efficient. A sufficiently efficient 
poiariser turns out to be one for which a certain inequality holds between, on the 
one hand, its efficiency for detecting photons polarised parallel to the poiariser 
axis, and, on the other, a specified function which is to do with the capability of the 
analyser to gather photons emitted from the source.
27Freedman S.J. and Clauser J f ; Experim ental Test o f  Local Hidden-Variable 
T heories; in P hysica l R eview  L etters  28 ; 1972; pp938-941 
28A simplified inequality is now derived from (2a):
3 R ( c p ) - R ( 3 c p ) - R , - R 2 ^ 0
Use of this inequality requires that, for each angular displacement cp of the 
analysers for which a coincidence rate is measured, a second determination be 
made at displacement 3cp. The inequality takes the simplified form:
3R(cp ) / ( R i +R2) - R(3<p) / (R i +R 2 ) i 1
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have been characterised by violation of the Bell inequalities and 
conformity with quantum-mechanical pre dictions.
Experiments have also been carried out on the spin correlations of 
protons following proton-proton scattering, and on the correlations of the 
polarisations of high-energy gamma rays consequent on electron-positron 
pair annihilation. We shall not go into these, but we should note that, with 
one exception which seems to have been subsequently disconfirmed, the 
Bell inequality is violated and quantum-mechanical predictions are again 
confirmed. The experiments are essentially similar to those of optical 
photon correlations that we discussed.30
4 van Fraassen on eoistemic realism
In a paper31 which appeared after The Scientific Image, van Fraassen 
provides, on the basis of five assumptions, a derivation of the Beil 
inequality for the type of experiment that we have been discussing, 
namely one in which (in theory) perfect correlation is expected between 
measurements on analysers with parallel settings. The assumptions are32:
(1) Perfect correlation : given parallel settings, the measured spins 
(or polarisations) are invariably of opposite character;
29«HoltR.A. and Pipkin F.M; Harvard University: 1973; the results are well known 
but, I think, unpublished
•Clauser J. F; Experimental In vestigation of a Polarization Anomaly', 
in Physical Review Letters 36; 1976; ppl223-1226
•Fry E.S. and Thompson R.C; Experimental Test of Local Hidden - Variable 
Theories'-, in Physical Review Letters 37; 1976; pp465-468
•Aspect A, Grangier P. and Roger G; Experimental Tests of Realistic Local 
Theories via Bell s Theorem in Physical Re vie w Letters 47; 1981; 
pp460-463
•Aspect A., Grangier P. and Roger G;'Experimental Realization of 
E-P-R -Bohm Gedankenexperiment: A New Violation of Bell's 
Inequalities'; in Physical Review Letters 49; 1982; pp91-94
•Aspect A., Daiibard J. and Roger G; 'Experimental Test of Bell's 
Inequalities Using Time-Varying Analyzers'-, in Physical 
Review Letters 49;1982; ppl804-1807
30Resum6s may be found in Clauser J J. and Shimony A; Reports on Progress in 
Physics 41; 1978; ppl914-1918
31 van Fraassen B.C; The Charybdis of Realism: Epistemological
Implications of Bell's Inequality, in Synth bse 52; 1982; pp25~38
32For our purposes it is not necessary to follow van Fraassen's rigorous articulation
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(2) Surface locality, given an arbitrary combination of settings, the 
measurement on either analyser is independent of the actual 
setting on the other;
(3) Causality', the perfect correlation results from the operation of 
hidden variables that act as a common cause and originate in the 
source from which the two 'particles' derive;
(4) Hidden locality, a clause is added to (2) which allows for the 
measurement on each analyser to be conditioned by the hidden 
variables;
(5) Hidden autonom y’, the hidden variables are independent of the 
analyser settings.
Van Fraassen establishes from (1) and (3) that every possible 
experimental outcome, conditional on the analyser settings and the 
hidden variables, has probability zero or one. Since hidden variables have 
usually been contemplated as a vehicle for the incorporation of 
determinism in theories that otherwise would be essentially stochastic, 
we thus have some reassurance that van Fraassen is on the right track. 
’When he says
'I doubt very much that Reichenbach can have perceived this consequence 
of his principle, because he had explicitly designed it so as not to require 
determinism for causal explanation', 33
ve may readily acquiesce, not only for the reason van Fraassen gives, but 
also for the reason that Reichenbach, as we have noted on several 
occasions, specifically excludes interphenomena from the domain of 
application of the principle.
Van Fraassen also shows that assumptions (1), (3) and (4) lead to the 
conclusion that, given the values of the hidden variables and the setting 
of an analyser, the outcome of any of the possible measurements on that 
analyser is zero or one.
Now follows the deduction of the Bell inequality in the form:
p(l;3) i p(l;2) + p(2;3)
33op. cit; p.33
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Here p(1;3), for example, is the probability that the simultaneous 
measurements on the two analysers will both be one, given that the first 
(the one on the left, say) is at setting 1 of three possible settings, and that 
the second (the one on the right) is at setting 3.
Van Fraassen now points to the fact (that we have already noted) that 
experiment has, on the one hand, shown the inequality to be violated, 
and, on the other, confirmed the quantitative predictions of quantum 
mechanics for the case in hand. He concludes, correctly, that:
*.... there are veil-attested phenomena which cannot be embedded in any 
common-cause model*.
Since he has already defined epistem ic realism  as the doctrine that
Reasonable ex p ec ta tio n s o f  fu tu re  e v e n ts  is  p o ssib le  o n ly  on th e  
basis o f  some u n derstan d in g  o f  (or reasonable c e r ta in ty  abou t)
causal m ech an ism s th a t p rodu ce  those e v e n ts ',35
he now claims that epistemic realism has been refuted. The other side of
the coin is the positive thesis:
' assuming (as v e  surely all agree) that it is reasonable to base one's 
expectations on well-supported scientific theories, we are reasonable to 
expect the persistence, whenever the relevant conditions obtain, of the 
correlations predicted by such theories. And this point is quite independent 
of whether we are provided with a causal explanation - or even with the 
possibility thereof 36
If there are people who subscribe to the doctrine of epistem ic  
realism  as van Fraassen defines it, then we will immediately agree that 
the non-classical correlation experiments have refuted their position. But 
one can be a scientific realist without espousing that doctrine and, in that 
event, its refutation as an argument against realism is an irrelevancy. A 
realist may also subscribe to the sentiment expressed in the last * 
quotation without compromising his or her position.
3^op. cit; p.35 
35op. cit; p.26 
36op. cit; p.36
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